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Abstract 
In this century the Irish have claimed, at critical moments, that 
they were neutral and that they have established a policy of traditional 
neutrality. In the last generation they have also claimed, on occasion, 
to be nonaligned. These claims are tested by identifying the true 
nature of neutrality and variables by which a state's claim to be 
neutral can be assessed, and by identifying the essence of nonalignment. 
That essense is inapplicable to developed European states. Given that 
neutrality per se can only apply in time of war, the variables are 
adjusted to reflect a peacetime policy 'for neutrality' in the event of 
war. For this purpose the model presented by three European neutral 
countries is examined and used to generate variables against which to 
test the Irish claims. 
The identified variables are: (i) due diligence with respect to 
neutral rights and duties; (ii) the extent to which Irish claims have 
been recognised by others; (iii) the disavowal of help by them and; 
(iv) the extent of their freedom of decision and action. In addition, 
and partly reflecting the claim to non-alignment, two other variables 
are used: (v) lack of isolationism, willingness to ameliorate world 
problems, and impartiality and; (vi) the attitude to identity, nation-
building, unity, stability and self-determination. 
Ireland has consistently failed to meet the criteria associated 
with either 'of' or 'for' neutrality, whilst its record on variable (v) 
is mixed. Its concern with variable (vi) has been pervasive, but 
ineffectual. 
Nonetheless, Ireland has not been committed to co-belligerency, 
although neither non-aligned, neutral nor an alliance member. It is 
in a sui generis position, particularly, but not only, within the 
European Community. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
Some states have a great deal written about them, others little 
or nothing, except insofar as their own nationals delve into their 
history. These states remain largely forgotten by the world at large, 
or merely footnoted. Whilst Ireland does not fall quite into this 
category, crucial ~spects of Irish history and policy have been 
glossed over or simply ignored by Irish, British and other authorities. l 
Indeed, Ireland is, in some respects, a forgotten state, if not a 
forgotten nation. 
Geography and history go far in explaining this circumstance. 
Ireland, geographically, is on the periphery of a continent, a 
position compounded by being sheltered and obscured as "une 11e derri~re 
'" 2 une ile". Its large neighbour not only influences the Irish, "it also 
insulates them" or at least, has done so in the past. 3 Moreover, 
given the relative position and weight of the two islands, "Political 
independence did not automatically bring economic independence or 
4 
cultural autonomy". Indeed an Irish ability to pursue any 
independent policy had been thwarted for centuries by the political 
sUbsumption of the small island by the larger. Nevertheless, the 
Irish have played a rather more significant role as a people arid 
nation in international relations than is sometimes credited. The 
isolationist-insulated dimension can be exaggerated. 5 
The extant political literature on Ireland deals predominantly 
with Irish history, the 700 years of British domination and the Irish 
freedom struggle. Traditionally the works on its external relations 
have been similarly orientated, focusing on (i) the independence 
question, (ii) Anglo-Irish relations and, (iii) empire's evolution into 
Commonwealth, and the Irish role in that process. Once these 
matters appeared to have been resolved, firstly by political 
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independence for 26 counties in 1922; secondly, by the loosening of 
Commonwealth ties in the 1920s and 1930s; thirdly, by the affirmation 
of independence by the apparent neutrality of 1939-1945; and finally, 
the declaration of the Republic in 1949, interest declined in Ireland, 
until "the troubles" in Ulster demanded attention, albeit even then, 
attention has not really focused on Dublin. 
Thus there has been no major work which has focused primarily 
upon the self-proclaimed basis of Irish foreign, security and defence 
policies for nearly fifty years, namely an Irish attempt to pursue a 
variant of neutrality, in addition to a periodic aspiration and 
commitment to a policy of nonalignment. 6 Thus a major raison d'~tre 
for this work is the attempt to fill this vacuum. This is 
particularly important because it will be argued that the lack of 
serious analysis of the basis of Irish foreign policy has led to a 
situation of great confusion in Ireland itself, and amongst other 
states in the international system, about the nature and foundations 
of Irish policy, especially the relevancy of certain concepts and 
policies, as well as their possible implications. In other words, a 
central and recurring theme of this work is that the imprecise use of 
concepts and language has obscured significant aspects of Irish 
foreign policy. That that policy has been different from that often 
portrayed in official statements, doctrine and rhetoric. What 
follows, therefore, endeavours to analyse the degree of Irish 
conformity in practice to the conceptual essence of the terms 
'neutrality' and 'nonalignment'. 
No previous major study has explicitly attempted to apply these 
concepts to Irish foreign and security policy except in particular 
cases, nor to seriously analyse the Irish interpretation and under-
standing of these concepts, nor indeed to question whether Irish 
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policy in this regard is sui generis or not, despite the attempts 
to delineate 'neutrality' and/or 'nonalignment' with respect to a 
few other select countries. 7 This is despite the fact that for 
nearly half a century the Irish themselves have seen their policy as 
predicated upon neutrality, and that in the postwar period they 
have at times seen themselves as exponents of nonalignment. 
Moreoever, Ireland is worthy of special attention with respect 
to these concepts for a variety of reasons. For example, the Irish 
have been aware of the potential relevance of their position as an 
example to others, so that "The student may, therefore, be tempted 
with some justice to treat Ireland as an ex-colonial, recently 
independent state".8 Ireland also claims to be neutral and/or 
nonaligned whilst at the same time being a full member of the 
European Community, participating in all its activities without any 
'neutrali ty clause '. or 'reservation'. Ireland believes, and proudly 
proclaims, that there is no inherent incompatability between 
neutrality and membership. This, of course, puts it into a very 
different position from the other self-confessed neutral and 
nonaligned in Europe, who as will be seen, explicitly rejected that 
the two conditions were and are compatible. 9 The Irish, on the 
contrary, have advanced the view that their own position and 
experience can serve as a model for these doubters, showing that 
there is a distinction between NATO and the Community, and that 
membership of the Community need not involve a military commitment. 
Thus the Irish see their experience as an encouragement to Sweden, 
Switzerland and Austria to join. 10 It is thus of interest to 
examine whether Irish experience does offer encouragement to other 
European neutrals and whether it is an appropriate model for them. 
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Ireland is particularly interesting because Irish policy since 
the 1930s has not been constrained by international treaty or by a 
constitutional commitment to neutrality, but rather has been the 
result of a 'free', albeit constrained choice. There is always the 
question of how 'free' any decision by a small, weak country really 
is in an interdependent world, and particularly for a country like 
Ireland with a very heavy trading dependency upon the United Kingdom. 
But it was 'free' in the sense that unlike Switzerland, which is 
constrained by the 1815 Treaty of Paris, whereby Swiss 'perpetual' 
neutrality was both recognised and guaranteed; or Austria which is 
constrained by the Constitution of 1955 which by Austria's own 
volition decreed its perpetual neutrality;ll or Finland, which has 
been self-constrained by the ambivalent and ambiguous nature of the 
1948 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with 
the Soviet Union, Ireland has faced no legal constraint vis-e-vis 
its neutrality for many years. In this sense, the Irish position 
has been much more analogous to that of Sweden, similarly 
unconstrained by constitution or treaty. Of critical interest is 
that looking at the same European treaties, commitments and 
obligations in the 1960s and 1970s, the Swedish and Irish governments 
came to diametrically opposed conclusions concerning Community 
membership and neutrality. 
It may be that their relative economic strength and inter-
dependence vis-a-vis other nations critically affected their 
evaluations. Ire1and's constrained choice with regard to the 
Community is typical of the dilemmas faced by it since 1921-22. 
Whilst Ireland has retained an element of choice, one must question 
the extent to which economic factors, especially dependency, have 
impinged upon Irish policy, and particularly the extent to which they 
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have or have not in the Irish case impinged upon neutrality. In 
particular, "is it possible to meet both the imperatives of political 
nationalism (for an independent economy) and the demands of the 
populace for the modern high-consumption life? Eamon de Valera in 
the 1930's said 'no' - and that it was better to be independent than 
-
well-off. Since then, southern Irish politicians have been tacitly 
admitting that the two goals were indeed incompatible, but that it 
is better to be comfortable than independent." In fact, this 
latter view has a longer pedigree than Akenson suggests. 12 
Whilst Ireland is not unique in this regard, these considerations 
do lead to a central hypothesis of this work,namely that socio-
economic and political environment of Ireland, both domestically and 
internationally, has perforce led in the practice of Irish foreign 
policy to the aspirational pursuit of neutrality being over-
shadowed by more pressing and immediate concerns of an economic and 
social welfare nature. That Ireland could not claim like Sweden 
that her "neutrality is determined by fundamental evaluations relating 
to security policy, not by economic interests".13 
This possibility also raises other possible doubts as to the 
permanency of Irish neutrality which need to be analysed. Is Irish 
neutrality absolute or is it conditional? Conditional, moreover not 
only upon the economic variable, but also conditional upon the Partition 
and Ulster situation, particularly given the regularly recurring 
suggestion of some sort of deal of 'united Ireland for defence 
commitment' to the United Kingdom and/or the West in general, or 
even as an enticement to Ulster Unionists. Furthermore, the Irish 
have clearly demonstrated the difficulties of trying to separate the 
interplaying strands of economic policy, foreign policy, politics, 
security and defence; and these difficulties have become 
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particularly apparent both with respect to the European Community and 
the national question. 
Fundamentally, Ireland is of interest because as a self-professed 
neutral, and at various times, nonaligned state, it provides an 
opportunity to examine the essential components of those concepts 
against the actual policies of a state claiming to apply them, that is 
Ireland provides a possible test for the applicability of key criteria 
in those concepts. Ireland may be used as a test case for the 
various types of 'neutrality' and 'nonalignment' which are thought to 
exist, variations of which proliferate in the literature. Ireland 
might also be regarded as a legitimate test of whether classical 
neutrality, which reached its zenith in the Second Hague Conference 
of 1907, still retains any vitality, or whether Roderick Ogley was 
correct, when writing in 1970, to predict that "The neutrality that 
we are likely to see will, then, be a somewhat messy neutrality".14 
Is the same true of nonalignment? Does Ireland substantiate or 
undermine Ogley's contention? In essence, what follows is 
concerned with the question of whether Ireland can legitimately be 
termed neutral or nonaligned. This is now a 1ive issue in Irish 
politics, even though much of the debate is highly uninformed. 
In examining these questions, this work will, after a review of 
the literature on Irish foreign, defence and security policies in 
Chapter 2, examine in Chapter 3 the concepts of neutrality and non-
alignment, attempting to move beyond their 'messiness' to isolate 
the key criteria at their essence. There are significant 
problems in this given that the concepts can be equated with their 
professed application in foreign policies, and that, as noted 
previously, the concepts have not remained static in meaning. But 
given the proliferation of terms, it is crucially necessary to define 
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and delineate usage and meaning. The proliferation is illustrated 
by the continuum in Table 1. Although there are problems in 
categorization, Table 1 is heuristic, and does illustrate that no 
agreed name for 'neutrality' in peacetime exists in international 
relations. Moreover, further complications arise with the famous 
Swedish formulation of "non-participation in alliances in peacetime, 
aiming at neutrality in the event of war,,15, and the possibility of 
'for neutrality' rather than 'of neutrality'. In addition, to these 
variations one must also consider whether 'nonalignment' umbrella 
can be legitimately extended to incorporate both the Afro-Asian 
experience and the European experience? Whilst both will be looked 
at, particular emphasis will be placed in Chapter 4 upon the 
European models and variants of nonalignment and neutrality. Further-
more, Ireland will be particularly compared to Sweden, partly for the 
reasons already given, but also because on occasion, Irish officials 
and politicians have wanted to model Irish policy upon the Swedish 
example, even to test the Irish position against the Swedish touch-
16 
stone. 
Always, it is necessary to be aware that these terms are often 
deliberately misused for political purposes, both as a means of 
accusation and of defence. In addition, one must distinguish between 
what the terms have historically meant, and what they are now under-
stood to mean. Are they pass~, anachronistic or outdated? If so, 
what are the implications for the Irish position? 
Part One of this work thus delineates the essence of these 
concepts, models and variants, and identifies key variables which 
may be used to determine whether a state may legitimately be termed 
neutral or nonaligned in either a general sense or in the senses 
understood by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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Part Two commences with an analysis of Irish policy prior to the 
outbreak of the Second World War. Whilst the variables identified in 
Part One cannot legitimately be applied earlier than 1939 because of 
the complications engendered by the Irish constitutional position 
vis-a-vis Britain and 'the ports' issue, and their partially proleptic 
nature, the prewar period remains important. It provides an under-
standing of a basic feature of Irish discussion and practice 
regarding security policy, namely the existence of at least two 
alternative traditions, the one stressing, albeit not exclusively, 
the pursuit of an aspiration for neutrality, and the other stressing 
an acceptance of practical and current realities. The prewar back-
ground also helps to explain why the notions of neutrality and non-
alignment have appealed so strongly to the Irish and what the Irish 
have actually tried to do. 
The Second World War obviously provides a good test of Irish 
'neutrality', and the relevant variables identified in Part One will 
be applied to Irish policy in that period. Subsequently the 
variables will be applied to determine the extent to which Irish 
security policy in the postwar period has conformed to the general 
understandings of neutrality and nonalignment or even to the models 
provided by apparently similar European states. Has Irish policy 
been based upon consistent, identifiable principles or expediency? 
1982 was a particularly significant year marking, as it did, the 
sixtieth anniversary of independence, the tenth anniversary of 
European eommunity membership, and providing the test to Irish policy 
of the Falklands campaign. It thus provides a suitable point of 
conclusion, although many of the issues continued to have relevance 
beyond that time. 
I 
C1> 
I 
Table 1 Typology of different terms for 'nonalignment' and 'neutrality' 
Nonalignment 
nonaligned 
unaligned 
not aligned 
positive nonalignment 
negative nonalignment 
noninvolvement 
independent foreign policy 
non-bloc 
non-identity 
neutralism (ist) 
militant neutralism 
uncommitted 
have nots (etc.) 
non-associated 
third force 
Bandung 
Panchsheel 
middle power 
non-belligerent 
neo-neutrality 
non-alliance 
Neutrality 
permanent 
perpetual 
perfect 
absolute 
total 
traditional 
general 
voluntary 
treaty based 
guaranteed 
positive 
integral 
expedient 
economic 
ideological 
armed 
spiritual 
neutralized 
free rider 
conditional 
benevolent 
qualified 
partial 
imperfect 
unneutral service 
semi-alliance 
protective umbrella 
Alliance 
bilateral 
collective 
universal 
satellite 
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Chapter One Footnotes 
1. See below, Chapter Two, for an analysis of the extant literature 
on Irish security, defence, foreign policy, neutrality and non-
alignment, by Irish, British and other authorities. 
2. Jean Blanchard, Le droit ecclesiastique contemporain d'Irlande, 
(Paris 1958) p.ll. Quoted in Basil Chubb, The Government and 
Politics of Ireland, (London, Oxford University Press, 1974) 
p.46. 
3. idem. 
4. idem. 
5. See Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations: Issues of Irish 
Foreign Policy, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1978) 
for a detailed analysis of Irish involvement in "international 
relations as a people", p.17. 
6. See Chapter Two pp.11~25 below. 
7. See Chapter Four pp.95-138 below. 
8. David Thornley, 'Historical Introduction' in Chubb op.cit. p.2, 
but note that Thornley also highlights reasons why the analogy 
is flawed, since "Unlike so many of the emergent African states, 
Ireland is not a legal entity superimposed arbitrarily upon 
ethnic and economic diversity by a conqueror", although, of 
course, Partition was so imposed! Thornley also argues Ireland 
has not been so examined. 
9. See Chapter Four pp.110-136 below. 
10. See, for example, the speeches of Mr. Richie Ryan as reported, 
for example, in The Irish Times of 24 October 1978 and 24 October 
1981. Mr. Ryan's approach is particularly interesting because 
it illustrates that these argument" are not confined to "the 
left" in Ireland, and Mr. Ryan has been a Member of the European 
Parliament, Fine Gael spokesman on foreign affairs, and also 
Minister of Finance 1973-77. 
11. Albeit that, in practice,this was implicit in the negotiations 
over the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, although not explicitly 
stated in the treaty. 
12. Donald Harman Akenson, The United States and Ireland, (Cambriage, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973, p.129, and pp.149 ff 
below. 
13. Broadcast by Swedish Foreign Minister 1 November 1971 reproduced 
in Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1971 (Stockholm : Royal 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, New Series 1 : C21, 1971) p.81. 
14. Roderick Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the 
Twentieth Century, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970) p.205. 
15. Fact Sheets on Sweden : The Swedish Defence System (Stockholm: 
Swedish Institute July 1982). 
16. One prominent example, one-time official and politician, is Conor 
Cruise O'Brien. See, for example, To Katanga and Back, (London, 
Four Square Books, 1965) p.25. Other Labour politicians, for 
example, ex-leader Michael O'Leary, have had similar hopes. 
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Chapter Two A Negligent Literature 
Outwith the three areas previously identified - independence, 
Anglo-Irish relations, and Commonwealth relationship 1 - for years 
very little of substance was published on Irish foreign, security 
and defence policies. At first sight this view is apparently 
contradicted by the authoritative bibliographical guide, 
A Bibliography of Published Works on Irish Foreign Relations 1921-1978, 
which lists 1314 "books, articles, pamphlets and official 
pUblications as well as a number of unpublished dissertations", on 
2 the broad area. 
This appears impressive, but in reality is much less so if one 
searches for major works dealing with the issues of Irish putative 
neutrality and nonalignment. Under the heading "General foreign 
policy,,3 there are only two major works on Irish foreign policy, 
both by the same Irish author, whilst the rest are minor articles, 
with the exception of three articles by Keatinge, Lemass and Conor 
Cruise 0'Brien. 4 
Of the two major works, the first, published a decade ago, The 
Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, focuses upon "the way in which 
foreign policy issues are treated in the Irish political system, as 
well as the principal attitudes of Irish political figures towards 
their country's external relations" (p xi), but the book deals 
predominantly with 'The Policy-Making Machinery' (pp 39-160) and 'The 
Domestic Environment' (pp 161-294). On several occasions, 
neutrality and security are mentioned, but these references are 
scattered and are only raised as illustrations of some other point, 
for example, in the context of parliamentary questions, cabinet 
solidarity, or in prewar and World War II context. 5 The work 
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contains only a very brief discussion of neutrality policy per ~, 
whilst the final section "Ireland's New Diplomacy" looks at the 
policy-making implications of recent changes in the Irish external 
environment, particularly European Community membership, rather than 
at policy itself. 6 Nonetheless, Keatinge's work is seminal, as the 
first, and until his second book, the only major, authoritative work 
on the general nature of Irish foreign policy and how it is made. 
That second work, published in 1978, is more promising and 
substantial, examining as it does 'Issues of Irish foreign policy,.7 
It focuses upon six issue-areas - "independence, security, unity, 
prosperity, global order and global justice".8 However, 'security' 
is dealt with in only 19 pages, of which only 7 are postwar, and 
that section, of course, includes much on Northern Ireland. 'Neutrality', 
'defence and 'security' are also touched on under other issues, such 
as their relationship with the Irish quest for identity and 
independence, as well as Anglo-Irish relations, relations with the 
United States and in the context of Partition. But, Irish neutrality/ 
defence/security are only briefly discussed, there being no thorough-
9 
going analysis of the issues. It is not a central theme or concern. 
Also in the period covered by the bibliography Professor 
Keatinge addressed some of these issues more specifically in 'Odd 
Man Out? Irish Neutrality and European Security' published in 1972. 10 
This article has a brief explanation of the basis of Irish 
neutrality, before moving on to consider the Community membership 
debate and neutrality, and possible developments in the Community 
potentially affecting the Irish position. It does include a brief 
discussion of "factors which tend to involve Ireland in a European 
alliance system" (p 445) and "Does the western alliance need Ireland?" 
(pp 447-9). 
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With respect to general discussions of Irish foreign policy, 
Patrick Keatinge has written on the policy of the new 1973 coalition,ll 
whilst more substantially there is the brilliant, if tendentious, 
article 'Ireland in International Affairs' by Conor Cruise O'Brien. 12 
A typically incisive analysis, this is again predominantly concerned 
with prewar Irish policy and World War II. Whilst it does contain a 
brief, perceptive, discussion of the 1949 debate over the attitude 
to NATO, it contains no real discussion of the Community dimension, 
except to note the alleged absurdity of the argument that "'independent 
foreign policy', it is hinted, was a very nice thing in its way, but 
Ireland's economic interests require that it is dropped so as to get 
into the Market".13 Nonetheless, this remains the best short account 
of Irish foreign policy, and it also raises interesting questions as 
to the basis of Irish policy at the United Nations. 
Sean Lemass also principally concerned with Ireland at the U.N., 
sought to counter the 'liberal' (and O'Brien) argument that the Irish 
position changed, by asserting "it was not wewho changed our position; 
rather it was the United Nations that changed. This change was 
brought about by another major shift in the balance in the Assembly 
when in the early sixties a large number of Afro-Asian countries 
gained independence and seats in the Assembly".14 With respect to 
Europe, however, he simply declar€s Irish enthusiasm for regional 
organisations and full commitment to the ideals of the Treaty of Rome 
and the aims of the Community, without discussing the implications, 
except insofar as to assert that small states have a clear stake in 
international organisations. 
With respect to specific areas of policy - Anglo-Irish relations, 
the Commonwealth etc, there are several references to Irish 
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foreign policy, defence and security, but, it must be said, only very 
much as a by-product of another predominant focus. This is the case, 
for example, in the excellent studies by Mansergh and Harkness, both 
historically orientated, which deal with the Commonwealth question in 
depth. 15 Something of a similar pattern emerges with reference to 
the literature on Ireland and the European Community, where, of course, 
there have been a number of articles and pamphlets on the "implications 
of membership".16 These, however, also contain either only passing 
reference to the neutrality issue, or alternatively comprise only a 
handful of pages. 
There are, of course, several general texts dealing with 20th 
Century and postwar Ireland, which contain a chapter relating to Irish 
foreign policy, security or defence. These are, however, for the main 
part by leading historians and only succinct overviews. They are 
based largely on secondary sources and do not discuss the concepts at 
stake. 17 An exception is the O'Brien article cited above. A 
similar problem is inherent in most of the texts dealing with World 
War II, with only a few exceptions, including Carroll's Ireland in the 
18 War Years. 
The Maguire bibliography lists only six items under "General 
Defence Policy", plus two official publicatons, only one of which is 
, 'f' t 19 slgnl lcan • There is, however, here a rather surprising omiE1.sion, 
namely, the 1968 Irish Army Hand-book, which contains a very useful 
descriptive summary of the history, role, organisation and structure 
of the Permanent Defence Force (P.D.F.), and of its U.N. service. 20 
Of the six, three were published in the Commonwealth orientated Round 
Table, one dating from 1939, and the others dealing with the original 
N.A.T. decision. 21 Two further articles are from the 1960-62 period 
when Ireland was first seriously considering EEC membership, one 
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't t' , 't' 22 ~n eres ~ngly ~s a Sov~e v~ew. More substantial than any of these 
is the Shebab history of Irish defence, but it has a limited time-span 
d 1 " 23 an a ~m~ted focus. There are, of course, other works cited 
elsewhere,24 but, in sum, there is nothing of substance dealing with 
the post-1950 period, and little even on the earlier postwar period. 
The specific topic of "Neutrality" is somewhat better treated, 
but of 39 cited works, 30 are wholly or predominantly concerned with 
pre-1939 developments or the position relating to "The Emergency". 
Even the interesting work by T. Ryle Dwyer on the relationship with 
the U.S. during this period on the issue of neutrality is focused 
upon the short 1939-47 period. 25 Of the other eight, one contains a 
succinct account of "America's Neutral AllY",26 whilst there was a 
general brief discussion in Contemporary Review in 1959. 27 An 
Italian published a more substantial work in 1950 dealing with thB 
link between independence and neutrality.28 Five focused upon the 
link with the Community, including the Keatinge work cited above. 29 
The other four contain either very succinct descriptions or are 
concerned with the general issues of the political and legal 
relationship of European neutrals with the European community.30 
The only official publication listed is the legislation enacted in 
1941 relating to war damage. 31 It is wor~h noting that there is, 
and has been, no systematic nor coherent set of neutrality laws, as 
is frequently found elsewhere. 32 The only conclusion that can be 
drawn from the foregoing is that in the period 1921-1978 very little 
of substance was published on the issues which provide the central 
focus of this study. Although more has been published since 1978 
on aspects of Irish foreign policy, that lacuna still exists. 
1984 saw a contribution to the filling of the lacuna with the 
pUblication of a third significant work by Patrick Keatinge, 
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A Singular Stance Irish Neutrality in the 1980s. 33 However, as the 
title suggests this is primarily an analysis of the contemporary Irish 
position. It embraces a comparative review of Austrian, Swedish, 
Swiss and Finnish positions, as well as an analysis of the diplomatic 
and military challenges to the Irish position and the domestic Irish 
debate. The concept of neutrality per se and 'The Historical Record' 
are, however, only dealt with briefly. There is no rigorous 
definition of neutrality, which is rather inadequately described as 
"not being involved in wars between other states".34 A further 
contribution is the unpublished D.Phil. thesis by Norman MacQueen, 
Irish Neutrality: the United Nations and the Peacekeeping Experience 
1945-1969. 35 This thesis examines Irish U.N. policy with reference 
to the apparent policy of neutrality, to the concept of 'middle power' , 
and addresses the question of whether the Irish position changed 
during the period under examination. Peace-keeping is used as a test 
case. The discussion involves an historical examination of Irish 
neutrality, looking at its prewar evolution, the Second World War 
experience and the legacy. It focuses upon entry into the U.N., the 
famous Cosgrave 'principles' and most particularly upon the role of 
Frank Aiken, the Irish Minister of External Affairs between 1957-1969 
(as well as 1951-54). It examines whether Irish policy at the U.N. 
was affected by the original EEC application of 1961 and in Chapter 6 
has a very useful analysis of U.N. voting, which purports to show 
that Irish policy did not 'change' in 1961, that although there was a 
somewhat greater propensity to vote with the West, this can be dated 
from 1959 (the 14th session).36 It goes on to examine the concept 
of 'middle power', and the Irish contribution to U.N. peace-keeping. 
In many ways, it is an excellent work, its statistical analysis being 
particularly interesting, but, and this unfortunately is important, 
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there is no attempt at a rigorous definition of 'neutrality' and very 
few references to the literature on neutrality.37 
The other major works published in recent years have tended to 
focus upon particular historical periods or issues. Two deal with 
the wartime situation, namely In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the 
price of neutrality 1939-1945 by Robert Fisk38 and Neutral Ireland 
and the Third Reich by John P. Duggan. 39 Works by Bowman, Canning, 
Downey, Dwyer and McMahon touch upon aspects relevant to this study, 
but have their primary focus elsewhere, either upon the national 
question or upon Anglo-Irish relations. 40 A major contribution to 
understanding, albeit a different type of work to those cited, was 
the publication in 1980 of Speeches and Statements by Eamon De Valera 
1917_73. 41 
Contributions to the 1980s debate have also been made by William 
Fitzgerald, Patrick Comerford, Bill McSweeney and Anthony Conghlan. 
Fitzgerald argued for Irish membership of NATO as a quid pro quo for 
British agreement to reunification of Ireland. 42 Comerford, writing 
from a CND standpoint, argued for positive steps to ensure a 
permanent guarantee of Irish neutrality.43 In a somewhat similar 
vein is the edited work by Bill McSweeney. McSweeney's own 
contributions cover the arguments for and against Irish neutrality, 
changing perceptions of Irish neutrality and the case for active Irish 
neutrality. Two contributions focus upon the impact of Community 
membership and involvement in European Political cooperation. 44 The 
Community provides the focus for The EEC Ireland and the making of a 
Super Power by Anthony Coughlan, a polemic against the Community.45 
Reflections on the impact of Community membership are also to be 
found in edited works by David Coombes,46 and P.J. Drury and Dermot 
47 McAleese. Both works have chapters on the impact of membership 
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upon Irish foreign policy, as well as other pertinent comments. 48 
Putting membership into historical perspective, but with very little 
upon the focus of this current study is The Road to Europe : Irish 
Attitudes 1948_61. 49 In addition, there are several articles and 
contributions on the impact of Community membership by Cooney, 
Keatinge, Kennedy, MacKernan and Salmon. 50 
On the specific questions of defence and neutrality there have 
also been a number of articles, some on the organisation and structure 
of the Irish Permanent Defence Force;51 some on neutrality, specifically 
raising questions about Irish neutrality and the pressures upon it52 
and; some looking at specific issues, such as the decision to abstain 
from membership of the Atlantic Alliance. 53 
Whilst this explosion of work is to be welcomed, it has not 
filled the lacuna since the major works, as has been seen, either 
focus on a particular aspect or period of the issues treated in this 
current study, whilst the articles, notes and chapters are either 
brief, or treat these issues as a by-product of some other predominant 
concern. 
A striking factor emerges when the broader literature on 
neutrality and nonalignment is examined, namely, that whilst Ireland 
proudly proclaims its neutrality and/or nonalignment, Ireland is 
hardly ever mentioned in the literature on these subjects, except 
perhaps in passing or as a footnote. Thus, although much of the 
general literature might be thought either applicable or relevant to 
Ireland, authors have tended to ignore Ireland both as an example and 
as a possible case-study. Of considerable significance to this 
current study is that Ireland is rarely, if ever, mentioned even in 
discussions of the 'European neutrals'. Perhaps the most striking 
example is the publication Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe. 54 
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This work focuses exclusively on Austria, Finland, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Yugoslavia as these are "often mentioned in the same 
breath as the major European countries that do not belong to either 
of the two military alliances", in addition to their involvement in 
the 'neutral and nonaligned' group at the C.S.C.E. 55 No mention is 
made of Ireland at all, nor is it even thought necessary to explain 
why Ireland is excluded. All this in a collection organised by two 
leading European academics, one of whom is an expert on neutrality 
(Neuhold) • Similarly, in the companion work on arms control, 
Neuhold writing on The European Neutrals and Arms Control again makes 
o thO d 56 no reference to Ireland, nor to Frank Aiken's efforts ~n ~s regar . 
Instead, the reader is informed that "The main members of the 
heterogeneous group of European neutrals are Austria and Switzerland 
•.. Sweden ••• Finland ••• and nonaligned Yugoslavia." Again, 
interestingly, it is not even thought necessary to explain the 
exclusion of Ireland, despite saying that neutrality is seen as not 
belonging to military alliances, and relying primarily upon "their 
own efforts in providing for their defences".57 
With one notable exception, other writers and collections have 
taken a similar line. Even Harto Hakovirta, the exception, has not, 
however, always been consistent. In 1980 he identified Ireland as 
a European neutral,58 as he did in 1981, although in 1981 he 
acknowledged "Ireland is seldom grouped together with Switzerland, 
Austria, Sweden and Finland" albeit that "since she does not belong 
to the Western alliance and adheres to typical neutrality 
declarations, it is meaningful to include her in the present sample 
as a case possibly revealing some extremes or limits of neutrality".59 
In 1983 he both included and excluded Ireland. In the first case it 
was with the caveat that on at least one issue Ireland could be 
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disregarded "as a special case",50 whilst in the second, the 
exclusion of Ireland (and Malta and Cyprus) was supported on the 
grounds that their inclusion "would make the discussion too 
51 
unfocused". 
More typical of the literature are 'The European Neutrals and the 
Atlantic Community' ,52 which contains no reference to Ireland, and 
'The European Community and the neutrals' which rules out Ireland 
from consideration without mentioning it by the simple assertion 
that "neutrality, whatever it is based on, precludes membership",53 
again focusing solely upon Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, with 
some reference to Finland. In another symposium, this time on 
Small states in International Relations three contributions in the 
published work list the European neutrals in one way or another 
without including Ireland, despite the presence of Lemass, who does 
not seem to have commented upon this omission. 54 Again, in 1973 
the University Association for Contemporary European Studies 
managed to hold a conference on the European neutrals and the 
Community without a paper on Ireland. 55 Miriam Camps too has had 
problems in this regard, when writing of the period of Britain's 
first negotiation, since she refers to "the three neutrals" (Austria, 
Sweden and Switzerland) noting that "2c;~,ociation with the neutrals 
raised problems of a different order".55 Even the Commission fell 
into this trap at that time, reporting to the European Parliament in 
1953 that whilst with "Norway and Ireland contacts had been made 
and the importance of certain special problems had been assessed. 
As regards the three neutral countries, the negotiations had not 
advanced beyond an initial statement".57 
Works on neutrality in general tend to illustrate these same 
features either ignoring Ireland or mentioning it only in passing. 
-21-
One notable exception is Peter Lyon who describes Ireland as an 
"erstwhile isolationist" between 1935-6 and entry into the U.N. in 
1955, and then cites Ireland as a "dramatic example of how membership 
of the U.N. can lead to a radical alteration in the policies of an 
erstwhile isolationist", whilst the E.E.C. application of August 1961 
is seen as having "implied a willingness to abandon her nonalignment".68 
Other works, however, do live up to the tendency previously cited. 
Leo Mates, in his otherwise excellent study of nonalignment from a 
European, and particularly Yugoslav, perspective only refers to 
Ireland in the course of remarks about Churchill and India, but 
otherwise fails to mention it despite several references to Sweden 
and Switzerland as examples of one or another aspect of Western non-
aligned attitudes. 69 Adam Roberts refers only to "continental 
European neutrals", despite the fact that Ireland has a longer 
history of a variant of "territorial defence" than those countries he 
does examine, i.e. particularly Sweden and Yugoslavia, and that 
Ireland is hardly less "European" than either. 70 Roderick agley's 
study of The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth 
Century includes only passing reference to Ireland with no postwar 
reference at all. 71 This contrasts markedly with chapters devoted 
to Belgium, the United States, Norway, Switzerland,-S\feden and 
Austria, in addition to the Belgrade Conference documents etc. Only 
Finland is similarly treated to Ireland. The classical studies by 
Burton, Martin and London all suffer from similar problems. 72 In 
addition the classic treatise on international law, admittedly some-
what dated on this topic, contains only two very slight references 
73 to Ireland. 
In another, but relevant context, namely the literature on the 
'external relations' and 'foreign policy' of the European Community, 
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it is again both remarkable and significant, how many of the classical 
works do not make any acknowledgement of the position of Ireland and 
the problems that does or may pose for the Community in the evolution 
of its policies and identity towards the rest of the world. For 
example, European Political Co-operation makes no reference to Irish 
neutrality and/or nonalignment in the main text, although in noting 
one reason for the allegedly pro-Arab stance of Ireland, reference is 
made to the historical liberation parallel. 74 In a postscript David 
Allen notes that "EPC has quietly considered security matters without 
any noticeable embarrassment of the Irish", yet no reason is given as 
to why it might cause them embarrassment. 75 In this major work on 
political co-operation, the special position of Ireland is not 
adequately taken cognizance of. The same is true of 'Political 
Co-operation: Procedure as Substitute for Policy' in the first edition 
of Policy-Making in the European Communities published in 1977. 76 In 
the second edition published in 1983, the parallel chapter 'Political 
Co-operation Integration Through Intergovernmentalism', demonstrates 
slightly more awareness particularly in the discussion of the Genscher-
Colombo suggestion that the Ten should discuss the military aspects of 
security. Nonetheless, no real analysis of the Irish position is 
made. 77 The Keatinge contributions to the volumes edited by Hill, 
and Allen and Pijpers have somewhat remedied the situation, but 
generally acknowledgement and analysis of the Irish position has 
. d 78 rema1.ne sparse. 
This has lorig been the case. For example, writing in 1967 
Werner Feld focused upon economic issues in discussing Ireland but not 
upon defence and security, even when discussing Community relations 
. . t t· 79 W1.th Commun1.s coun r1.es. Similarly in his 1976 work no specific 
mention is made of any special Irish problem arising from neutrality, 
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even when 'strategic problems' are considered. 80 Contributions by 
Holston security and Garnett on defence in EEC Policy towards Eastern 
Europe also contain no acknowledgement of the Irish position,81 and 
neither does The Defence of Western Europe by Garnett. 82 Well 
might Bailey note over a decade ago, that "very little has been heard 
of how the addition of Britain, Ireland and Denmark ••. affected 
the Community". Bailey, himself, however, does not discuss the most 
important potential effect of Irish entry.83 Neither does the 
Geusau volume. 84 Morgan does acknowledge Irish nonalignment and non-
participation in NATO, but focuses upon the problems generated by the 
French position, and the distinctive legacies of the major powers, 
rather than upon the country with perhaps the most distinctive legacy 
of all. 85 In other words, there is token factual recognition of 
Irish non-membership of NATO but this is not allowed to intrude upon 
other arguments, for example, in the discussion of whether the 
Community might be a 'superpower' or a 'civilian power'. 
Galtung, in addressing that question, makes a factual reference 
to the Irish position but at the same time asserts that the Community 
could not "be said to be politically neutral". Indeed, inter-
member association might so develop "that any political virginity 
becomes purely technical".86 Given that "in and by herself" Eire is 
not "sufficient to upset the relationship", Ireland's position is not 
allowed to interfere with his central theme. 87 Galtung's protagonist 
in the debate over the future of the Community, Francois Duchene noted 
Scandinavian objections to colonialism, but not the Irish. 88 Even 
more strikingly, in discussing proposals for a 'Neutral Community' 
there is no reference to Ireland even when discussing to whom the 
idea might appeal! Moreover, "with the sole exception of France 
under de Gaulle" apparently all of the nations of Western Europe have 
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been pursuing "collective action".89 Furthermore, it is very striking 
that despite his idea of 'civilian power', an idea many in Ireland 
believe Irish neutrality helps to bring nearer reality, Duchene makes 
no reference to Ireland as a possible model, guide or initiator of such 
a policy. 
The same story is repeated in the Twitchett volume (1976) in the 
contributions of Twitchett, Morgan and Pinder. Despite a token 
reference to Irish non-participation in NATO, focus is again placed 
predominantly on difficulties caused by France, and the Irish case is 
not allowed to interfere with the general argument. Morgan, for 
example, focuses upon London, Paris and Bonn when looking at defence 
f 't' 90 rl.C l.ons. Pinder in examining why the Community has avoided the 
defence issue, refers to the EDC debacle and French opposition, and 
later on, to Danish opposition to "any Community intervention in 
political affairs", but not to the neutral and/or nonaligned member 
which joined with Denmark. 91 Similarly, Edwards and Wallace fail to 
comment upon Ireland as a model for the future of the Community, 
even in the Swedish connection. 92 
Only a few are properly aware of the Irish dimension. Burrows 
and Irwin, for example, probably have the emphasis exactly right in 
suggesting that it is "probably permissible to think of Ireland taking 
part in the rather generalised consultations on defence policy which 
we have envisaged as the initial extension of the Davignon type of 
structure into this field. It is much more difficult to envisag~ 
Irish participation on concrete and practical measures of defence 
co-operation between countries who, except for Ireland, are members 
of the Atlantic Alliance".93 Similarly, Burrows in The Defence of 
Western Europe demonstrates an awareness of the potential 
difficulties and of the Irish dimension, although he envisages 
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developments which would not be entirely congenial to that 94 country. 
The same is true of European Defence Co-operation by Trevor Taylor. 
Taylor acknowledges the Irish position, noting that "a real obstacle to 
the EPC's moving into defence questions is the attitude of Ireland, 
which presents itself, not entirely convincingly, as a neutral state" 
but he is also aware that the major powers might press ahead, rather 
than let 3.5 million people determine their future. 95 Paul Taylor also 
demonstrates some awareness of the situation, quoting a member of the 
Irish Permanent Representation in Brussels who drew the usual Irish 
distinction between defence and security. Taylor goes on to say "The 
distinction may appear to be one of semantics, but it is, for the 
Irish, an important one", and notes that in the Community there are 
"different national perceptions as to the question of collective 
security (for example, Ireland advocates neutrality)".96 
Conclusion 
Ireland has been poorly served in the general literature on 
neutrality, nonalignment and the European 'neutrals'. It has been 
equally poorly served by Irish authors on the question of defence, 
security and neutrality. These deficiencies go some way to 
explaining the paucity of public debate in Ireland on these issues, 
and the rather loose usage of these terms by the Irish themselves. 
The next chapter, therefore, will attempt to clarify the meaning of 
these concepts, identifying their essence. 
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Chapter Three Neutrality a~d_Nonalignment 
Although most writers are agreed that "1648 marks the beginning of 
neutrality as a formally recognized princiPle",l there had always been 
states which sought to take no part in the quarrels of others, with 
relations between belligerents and non-belligerents being "governed by 
variable customs_ and rudimentary rules". 2 It was, however, after 1648 
with the embryonic emergence and recognition of both sovereign states 
and international law, "that neutrality as a legal concept was born".3 
At that time the concept appeared to mean merely not participating 
fully in wars. As sovereignty became more firmly entrenched, and with 
it the apparent absolute and unconditional right of war, the no less 
logical consequence of "the equally absolute and unconditional right 
of neutrality" also became established. As Politis points out 
"sovereignty, wars and neutrality have been closely allied ideas".4 
The emphasis upon sovereignty coupled with the development of inter-
national economic relations, however, had to contend with on the one 
hand the belligerents' desire to cut off all trade with their opponent, 
anj on the other the neutrals desire to maintain their own trade with 
belligerents. As a consequence it was "natural for governments to 
seek precision in written undertakings, and it was in this way that 
the la'.'i of neutrali ty was formed and became explicit". 5 
Despite this evolution, there remained no general international 
agreement codifying neutral rights and duties, and as war became more 
absolute with the Napoleonic struggles, with war including 
increasingly economic warfare and blockade, so neutrality came under 
strain. Yet ironically, it was at this same time that the real 
foundations were laid for "that strange and important political creation 
of the nineteenth century, impartial and passive neutrality or 
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neutrality built on law".6 
All writers stress the seminal importance of the United States 
attitude during the period 1793-1818. 7 Of particular significance 
was the 'Proclamation of Neutrality' in April 1793 which stressed for 
the first time impartiality as one of the principal duties of a neutral 
power.8 Another key principle was that belligerents were not to be 
allowed to engage in hostilities within neutral territory and 0rvik 
correctly asserts that "Respect for neutral territory has ever since 
been the corner-stone of all neutral policy, since it involves the 
related question of sovereignty".9 The Americans also emphasised 
abstention. 
Before long many European countries, especially the weak WhO 
desired to stay out of war, followed the United States model, and an 
increasingly strict view was taken of the requirements of neutrality. 
"Wanting to be left alone, they adopted the principles of impartiality 
and non-participation, .•. From that time one, Europe spoke of 
"10 traditional neutrals. This process was aided by the return to 
limited wars and a readiness on the part of the major powers to see war 
regulated, codified and thereby to some extent limited. Peter Lyon 
has described the nineteenth century as "like a golden age for the 
theory and practice of ~eutrality" and has argued that this reflected 
"the coincidence of a multiple balance of power, a general respect 
for international law and the absence of any widespread and prolonged 
international conflict. This period found its apogee in the Hague 
11 Conference of 1899 and 1907." 
As 0rvik argues "For the first time, the whole system of neutral 
rights and duties, on sea and on land, was defined and officially 
incorporated in international law to its fullest extent. What had 
for centuries been the always shifting usages and interpretations of 
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the 'law of nations' were now put into an international code which had 
the official approval of all nations.,,12 The codification, however, 
was not complete, and it largely involved codifying existing customary 
law. 13 Moreover, given insufficient international ratification, the 
Convention did not become an international obligation in a strictly 
legal sense. Nonetheless, the system was approved, if not ratified, 
by all. Refinements were added subsequently by the Declaration of 
London in 1909, which again although not ratified, served as a model for 
neutral conduct. 14 But it was the Fifth and Thirteenth Conventions of 
1907 which were of most significance, although some of the other 
Conventions were indirectly of great importance. 15 The Fifth 
Convention concerned "Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land" and the Thirteenth "the 
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War".16 Of general 
significance in the Conventions were the following: 
(a) that the signatories wished to lay "down more clearly the rights 
and duties of neutral Powers in case of war on land" and were 
"desirous of defining the meaning of the term 'neutral'''j17 
(b) "The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable"j18 
(c) "The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts 
to violate its neutrality can not be regarded as a hostile act,,;19 
and 
(d) "Seeing that it is, for neutral Powers, an admitted duty to apply 
these rules impartially to the several belligerents.,,20 
What has emerged as the essence of neutrality was abstention, the 
inviolability of neutral territory, and impartiality. Each of these 
aspects had associated with it a number of rights and duties. 21 Since 
1907 there has been virtual unanimity among writers on international 
law as to the essence of neutrality in this classical sense. 
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Neutrality its core, characteristics, reguirements and definition 
Several definitions of neutrality equate it simply with non-
participation in or abstention from war{s). For example, agley 
suggests "The idea of neutrality is simple enough. It means, 
obviously, not taking part in others' quarrels: that is, for states, 
keeping out of other states' wars".22 Peter Lyon comes to a similar 
conclusion, in that after arguing that today "the law on the rights 
and duties of neutrals is neither undisputed nor unchanging" he goes 
on to suggest that "given a hot war, every state which stays out of it 
is 'eo ipso' neutral".23 other authorities have sought to impart 
more content to the concept of neutrality by making inherent within it, 
not just non-participation, but also the concept of rights and duties, 
especially the obligation of impartiality, and that neutrality is a 
legal status. Jessup in his authoratative definition, for example 
sees neutrality as "a legal status arising from the abstention of a 
state from all participation in a war between other states, and the 
recognition by the latter of its abstention and impartiality".24 
0rvik argues that a "status of neutrality is dependent upon strict 
impartiality and absolute non-participation and passivity".25 Perhaps 
the most authoritative definition, found in Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, 
takes a similar view, seeing neutrality "as the attitude of impartiality 
adopted by third states towards belligerents and r~cognized by 
belligerents, such attitude creating rights and duties between the 
impartial States and the belligerents ••••• Since neutrality is an 
attitude during a state of war only, it calls into existence special 
rights and duties which do not generally obtain ••.• they expire ipso 
facto with the termination of the war, or with the outbreak of war 
between neutrals and a belligerent".26 
Rather than these elements being integral to neutrality, Tucker-
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Kelsen prefers to draw a distinction between neutrality "as the status 
of non-participation in war" and "the specific consequences that are 
attached to the status of non-participation according to the traditional 
law". It is accepted that the legal significance of non-participation 
is the bringing "into operation rules for the regulation of neutral-
belligerent relations", that these rules impose duties and confer rights 
upon both belligerents and neutrals and indeed that "the law of 
neutrality comprises the totality of the duties imposed and the rights 
conferred upon participants and non-participants." Nonetheless, 
Tucker-Kelsen is emphatic that whilst "Not infrequently .... these rules -
the consequence of non-participation - have been identified with 
neutrality and particularly with the neutral's duty of impartiality. 
This identification of neutrality with the duties imposed by international 
law upon non-participants is nevertheless incorrect. Instead, 
neutrality should be considered simply as the status of states which 
refrain from participation in hostilities; the only essential 
condition for neutral states being that of non-participation in 
hostilities".27 
The distinction between non-participation and the consequential 
rights and duties, especially impartiality, does pose fundamental 
problems, not least because of the emergence of the notion of "non-
belligerency". It can be argued that the term neutrali ty "should be 
abandoned, •••• where the object is not impartiality, but keeping the 
country out of war". According to Wright the mere object or indeed 
fact, of staying out of war at any price is not sufficient to enable 
a state to use the term neutrality.28 Supporting this argument Nils 
¢rvik draws particular attention to the neutrality of the late 1930s 
which he argues "boiled down to one single object, namely, to stay out 
of the war that was to come. Not conditionally, by insistence on 
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rights and duties, but almost at any cost and by all means •••• Unbound 
by rules and obligations, they prepared to steer their course, through 
discrimination and compromise, in order to stay out of war. It was no 
longer neutrality, it was non-belligerency".29 Tucker-Kelsen itself 
notes that "the pursuit of discriminatory policies" coupled with "the 
abandonment of the impartiality required by the traditional law" led to 
the emergence of so-called 'non-belligerency'. Non-belligerency being 
regarded as indicating "the position of states that refrained from 
active participation in hostilities while at the same time abandoning 
the duties imposed upon non-participants •••• it involved the 
abandonment by non-participants of the impartiality required by 
30 
customary law". In fact, all these non-belligerent states were 
seeking to assert and establish that "there could be an intermediate 
posi tion between impartial neutrality and belligerency.-,,31 In 
practice the relationship between belligerents and non-belligerents was 
governed by political and military factors so that the degree of 
partiality shown varied considerably, and was not governed by legal 
formulas. 
Given these problems a more satisfactory approach is that of 
Lauterpacht-Oppenheim with its equation of neutrality with "an 
attitude of imr8rtiality". Indeed so strong is that identification 
that it is argued that "the rights and duties arising from neutrality 
come into existence, and remain in existence, through the mere fact 
of a state taking up an attitude of impartiality, and not being drawn 
into the war by the belligerents".32 Neutrality has to be seen as 
involving both non-participation in military conflict and the rules 
1 t ' th' t' , t' 33 regu a ~ng ~s non-par ~c~pa ~on. The two must be taken together. 
Building upon Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, "neutrality - supposes a state of 
war in the formal or factual sense of the word. It describes the 
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situation of a state which remains outside armed conflicts involving 
other states. When a state decides to adopt this attitude, its 
decision takes the form of a conditional act which involves the 
application, for a time, of rules pre-determined and pre-arranged in 
international law. These rules involve a balance of rights and 
obligations and make up what is called the law of neutrality".34 
This attitude must also be recognized and accepted by the belligerents. 
A futher difficulty with the simple non-participation criterion 
is what might be termed the 'far-off-country' phenomenon. Can a 
state thousands of miles away aptly be termed neutral in a local or 
regional conflict simply upon the basis of its non-participation? 
Involving rights and duties in neutrality does at least imply a 
consciousness on the part of the state concerned, rather than neutrality 
by nothingness. 35 This way of looking at neutrality leads to an 
appreciation that a state is neutral towards specific wars involving 
specific belligerents and that, therefore, a distinction is to be made 
since that state could be neutral towards one war and one set of 
belligerents, but not necessarily so regarding another war with a 
different set of belligerents. 
Given common misconceptions, certain aspects of neutrality need 
brief attention. For example~ neutrality is not a unilateral action. 
, 
It requires to be recognized by the belligerents. As Lauterpacht-
Oppenheim suggests "A belligerent who, at the outbreak of war, refuses 
to recognize a third state as a neutral, does not indeed violate 
neutrality, because neutrality does not come into existence in fact 
and in law until both belligerents have, expressly or by implication, 
acquiesed in the attitude of impartiality taken up by third States".36 
Secondly, the "Rights and duties derived from neutrality do not 
exist before the outbreak of war, however imminent it may be".37 Thus 
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legally there cannot be any such thing as 'peacetime neutrality'. It 
is a contradiction in terms. 
Thirdly, given impartiality, there is no duty to break off all 
intercourse or economic exchange with the belligerents. 38 Indeed it 
can be argued that the very raison d'~tre of the "rules of neutrality 
is to ensure the maintenance of the normal economic relations of 
39 
neutral States". Impartia~ity necessitates that trade cannot be 
totally free, but rather that exchange takes place as before. 
Fourthly, "International law does not recognize ideological, 
political or economic neutrality".40 In international law there is 
no question of 'military neutrality' which in some way might be regarded 
as distinct from other forms of neutrality. Whilst in the past 
'qualified neutrality' was occasionally allowable, the majority of 
modern writers have maintained "that a State was either neutral or not, 
and that it violated its neutrality if it rendered any assistance what-
ever to a belligerent from any motive whatever".41 
Fifthly, legally speaking "A special assertion of intention to 
remain neutral is not ••• legally necessary on the part of neutral 
states, although they often expressly and formally proclaim their 
neutrality".42 It is clearly in the self-interest of the states 
concerned that a special declaration of neutrality be issued, given , 
the need for that neutrality to be recognized by others. 43 
Sixthly, as has been argued above, certain correlative rights 
and duties are inherent in the concept of neutrality, and non-
participation is not enough. Neutrality can only be carried out if 
both neutrals and belligerents follow a certain agreed code of conduct 
in their relations with one another. 44 
In essence both the rights and duties of neutrals can be simply 
expressed in two sets of ideas. As to rights, these are the 
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inviolability of their territory and freedom in the commercial 
relations between them and with each of the belligerents,45 whereas the 
"duties incumbent upon neutral states in time of war can be expressed 
with the two words: abstention and impartiality".46 Certainly, the 
duty of impartiality is universally regarded as essential. In 
addition to that duty, Tucker-Kelsen identify others: "the duty to 
abstain from furnishing belligerents any material assistance, whether 
goods or services, for the prosecution of warj the duty to prevent 
the commission of hostile acts within neutral jurisdiction as well as 
to prevent the use of neutral jurisdiction as a base for belligerent 
operationsj and •.• the duty to acquiesce in certain repressive 
measures taken by belligerents against private neutral commerce on the 
high seas". Under these four general duties, which also establish 
correlative rights for belligerents, "may be-grouped almost all the 
specific obligations regulating the conduct of neutral states".47 
Finally, and also incidentally another reason why neutrality 
cannot be simply equated with non-participation, neutrality requires 
"active measures from neutral states". Neutrals must prevent, even 
by means of physical resistance and fighting, belligerents from making 
use of their territory or their resources for military purposes during 
the war. Similarly, they must seek to prevent any interference by 
one belligerent with their legitimate intercourse with the other 
belligerent in commerce etc. 48 Whilst not obliged to prevent such 
acts under all circumstances and conditions, to escape neglect of duty 
if they are nevertheless performed, "due diligence" must have been 
exercised "for the purpose of preventing such acts".49 What is clear 
is that a simple pious declaration of neutrality is not enough. The 
neutral state must exhibit a willingness to uphold that condition. 
For example, neutral states have not only the right to prevent misuse 
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of their waters "but also a duty to take adequate measures of 
prevention". A neutral may, therefore, need to convince belligerents 
that it will seek to stop encroachments, and has some reasonable 
prospect of so doing. Even if militarily weak, some effort is 
necessary, as the neutral is "obliged to use the means at its disposal.,,50 
This then is the classical, legal understanding of neutrality. 
But neutrality, of course, has a "general diplomatic or political 
connotation" as well, which has caused tremendous confusion as to the 
real meaning of the term. 51 It must be emphasised, however, that 
the real essence of neutrality remains that as outlined above. 
Neutrality 20th Century Challenges 
(a) Legal Problems 
The legalistic view of war and thus of neutrality has always 
faced challenges. Historically one significant query has been the 
'just war' doctrine, with the concomitant implication that abstention 
in such a war was either illegal or immoral, or both. A modern-day 
variant of it has arisen from changes in the legal position of war. 
Of particular significance have been the provisions of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War (the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact) and the Charter of the United Nations, which have 
led to a~questioning as to "whether it is correct to assume the 
continued validity of the law that has traditionally served to regulate 
52 the conduct of war". 
The Covenant did not at first sight give a clear-cut answer, 
there being particular debate about articles 10, 15 and 16. In 
practice neutrality had not been abolished, and the League Covenant 
did not abolish war under all circumstances. 53 The collective security 
system established was almost completely decentralised since "The 
decisive question whether a member had resorted to war in disregard of 
-44-
the Covenant was to be answered by each of the members for itself".54 
Moreover, the League was not universal. In addition Switzerland was 
accepted for membership whilst at the same time insisting upon 
maintaining its position of permanent neutrality,55 and finally, there 
was the constant stream of statements from governments qualifying 
their commitment, their understanding of their obligations and the 
Covenant itself.?6 
Whilst clearly not abolishing neutrality, the Covenant and the 
League did modify some of its classic tenets, particularly 
impartiali ty • Measures such as economic sanctions "would normally 
constitute an abandonment of absolute impartiality", and thereby 
represent a violation of neutrality. Yet, ingeniously, the concept 
was arguably saved since "the Covenant-breaking belligerent was 
deemed, by signing the Covenant, to have consented in advance to 
measures of discrimination being applied against him by those Members 
of the League who did not elect to declare war upon him.,,57 
Under the Kellogg-Briand Pact it remained lawful to be neutral 
since a degree of discrimination against an aggressor appears to have 
been acceptable, without violation of the duties imposed upon neutrals 
by the traditional law of neutrality. Certainly, the Pact was not as 
radical an attack upon neutrality as is sometimes suggested. 58 
Apparently much more genuinely radical were the innovations introduced 
by the UN Charter. 
At the San Francisco Conference which drew up the Charter it was 
clearly thought that a status of permanent neutrality was incompatible 
with membership in the new organization. The issue was raised directly 
by the French who wished this to be stated explicitly in the Charter. 59 
This was not done and the terminology "peace-loving" was retained, but 
it was agreed that any applicant for membership would have to be ready 
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and able to accept and fulfill the obligations of the Charter. For 
the Swiss these provisions were enough to deter it from applying, 
especially since there was to be no special treatment for them as had 
happened vis-a-vis the League. other 'neutrals' also had doubts with 
prominent Swedes, for example, believing that membership involved 
writing off the traditional policy of neutrality. Although prepared 
to do this in support of "international solidarity", they also 
anticipated that the likely absence of great power unanimity meant 
that certain obligations were not likely to be imposed upon them. 
Sweden joined the United Nations in 1946. 60 
Austria was admitted to membership in 1955. This was despite 
its announced intention to pursue permanent neutrality and its request 
to all states to recognise its position and status. Most did, 
including it should be noted the permanent members of the Security 
Council. Austria was apparently to be allowed to refrain from 
involvement in war, and to uphold the traditional law requirements. 61 
This did not lead to a change in the Swiss position. 
Perhaps the main innovation of the Charter was the greatly 
enhanced centralization with respect to the legitimate use of force 
and the bringing into operation of the new international security 
system. Under the Charter the Security Council has the authority to 
determine, with an affect binding upon all the member-states, whether 
there has been aggression, who is responsible, and what action shall be 
taken to remedy the situation. 
collective use of force. 62 
It can make obligatory even the 
Articles 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47 which relate to the obligation 
"to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in 
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, 
assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for 
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the purpose of maintaining international peace and security" and the 
establishment of a Military Staff Committee also theoretically pose 
53 problems for neutrals. Some have argued that there is no obligation 
to conclude any such agreement and that the absence of an agreement 
negates any Security Council competence to obligate member states to 
undertake military action. 54 This interpretation, however, so under-
mines the letter and spirit of Chapter VII as to appear perverse. 
The notion of neutrality can, however, to some extent be saved 
within the Charter. For example, the Charter "contains no direct 
obligation to outlaw 'aggressors' or to take sanctions against them",55 
nor does it lay down "that the determination of a State as an aggressor 
shall automatically be followed by a general war against it".55 
Moreover, one must not lose sight of the fact that action requires 
unanimity on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council, 
and that has been lacking. It should perhaps also be noted that if 
in the event of Security Council inaction, the General Assembly 
decides to seek to take action, it can only make a recommendation, not 
d t d ·· 57 a man a ory eC1Sl0n. 
In summary, the position is confused. Under certain circumstances 
neutrality has been abolished by the Security Council's powers to call 
upon members to declare war or take warlike actions. But there are 
other cases where the situation is not so clear-cut and the survival 
of neutrality may depend upon whether a member-state's general 
obligation under article 2 (5) undermines impartiality.58 Certainly, 
neutrality as classically understood, has been circumscribed by the 
Charter, although the actual practice and experience of the UN has 
meant those constraints have not been as wounding as was perhaps 
imagined in 1945. 
In addition to these specific legal problems for neutrality, 
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there is a more general and profound challenge to the continuing 
vitality of the concept. So far the discussion has presumed the 
existence of an international community "where all the members could 
agree to abide by certain rules of conduct recognized by them as 
binding in peace and in war", whereas what has occurred has been the 
break-up of the international law community and a growing reluctance 
to accept predominantly Western legal concepts and philosophy.69 A 
significant example is that Communists have a view of neutrality, 
which is not in accordance with traditional Western thinking. 70 
is of great relevance to states contemplating neutrality in any 
This 
future war involving Western and Communist states. What one demands 
of a 'neutral' may well not be regarded as neutrality by the other 
side. The Struye Report puts this issue very pertinently in relation 
to the issue of whether neutrality is compatible with participation in 
the EEC - "the communist theory must reply 'No', as such participation 
does not serve the Communist cause,,!7l Yet these states need to 
acquiesce in the neutrality of small Western or Northern European 
states in a European war or a global war involving European states, 
since neutrality does not come into existence until recognized by 
both belligerents. 
(b) Political Difficulties 
A number of conditions underlay the classical period of 
neutrality, including the nature of war and the international system. 
Wars were limited in scope, method and objective, and whilst war 
remained an instrument of policy, it was becoming regulated and 
codified. Furthermore, there was a growing acceptance of 
international law, and the need to regulate trade, even during periods 
of conflict. Despite the challenges produced by trade and 
technological innovation, faith in sovereignty remained. 
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A number of developments since 1907 undermined several of these 
conditions. In particular, the industrial revolution with the 
concomitant mass-production of weapons of ever greater destructive 
power, coupled with growing economic interdependence, the evolution 
of democracy and the growing assertiveness of nationalism, led to 
changes in the attitude to and the nature of war, making total victory 
, d t' t d" t 72 more appea11ng an res ra1n more 1ff1cul • These developments, 
moreover, placed strain upon a vital ingredient which allowed states 
to be neutral, namely that a state should be "absolutely sovereign 
and absolutely independent of other states in all matters",73 since 
the status of neutrality is "inseparably connected with and dependent 
upon the amount of sovereignty which a country enjoys" 74 To be 
neutral a state requires a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency, 
and at least sufficient military strength to deter violations of its 
territory and rights. 0rvik has argued, however, that "In the 
realistic, interrelated world of today, a true, impartial and legal 
neutrality is impossible", since neutral rights, duties and sovereignty 
75 
are threatened. 
Politis felt 1914-18 "dealt the death-blow to neutrality" because 
of the way great powers transgressed established rules relating to 
neutral rights, and their determination to involve "the entire forces 
of the belligerents", so that "the economic situation of each of them 
plays a decisive part in so far as the outcome of the conflict is 
76 
concerned". In other words, the "process of economic and political 
interdependence had gone too far",77 so that the conditions prevailing 
in the two World Wars could hardly be reconciled "with the conditions 
that are plainly assumed by the traditional law".78 In addition, 
since those wars the further geographical expansion of the 
international system, as has been seen, has contributed to the general 
undermining of the sense of comity of nations. 
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These trends clearly have had a profound effect upon the 
possibility of genuine neutrality, and in particular the interdependence 
literature of recent years has tended to give the impression that no 
country has total independence, and even that "dependence in one area 
tends to correlate highly with dependence in other areas ••• If a 
country is highly dependent economically upon another country, the 
likelihood is that it will also have a high perceptual, communication, 
military and political dependence as well".79 Nonetheless, this trend 
towards determinism may be misleading, since states can break the links 
of interdependence, albeit at cost to themselves. States do not 
always choose to do that which is of economic advantage to their 
citizenry, and there may be other values which, on occasion, are 
placed higher in value than the economic. 80 
The trend towards absolutism in war can also be overstated since 
it is self-evident that not all wars since 1945 have exhibited that 
character. Scores of conflicts have remained limited. Moreover, 
the economic weapons of sanctions, blockades and boycotts have not 
enjoyed total success. 81 
Whilst they have been challenged by a number of developments 
this century, it cannot be stated definitively that the necessary 
conditions for the existence of neutrality have been destroyed, 
although there should be no illusion as to the difficulties involved. 
Neutrality has, however, always been problematical in that it 
depended more upon power than upon law, and upon "the good pleasure 
of the belligerent(s)", who were always liable to disregard it 
whenever they perceived it to be in their interest to do 82 so. 
Neutrality relates as much, if not more, to factors such as 
location, strength and the balance of power as to aspiration and law. 
With Bj¢l the crucial importance of "security geography" must be 
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recognized,83 that for example, the "situation of each country on 
the operational map makes its neutrality improbable or probable in 
advance".84 Neutrals may be attacked not because of their own 
intrinsic value, but rather because of their strategic position. 
The relative strength of a neutral is also crucial. This is 
somewhat paradoxical in that many neutrals, particularly in Europe, 
have tended to possess only a limited capacity for military action. 
Nonetheless, as will be seen, some of the leading 'neutrals' in 
contemporary Europe do take their own defence seriously, in addition 
to relying upon the dictum "Marginal Resource Attack, Marginal Cost 
Deterrence".85 In the battle between David and Goliath, Goliath 
may only have one arm free and will probably be looking elsewhere 
also. Neutrals do, however, need the ability to deter by making 
the cost of attack too high, relatively for the belligerent. 
A further complication is what has been termed 'defence against 
help' or 'the protective umbrella' .86 A neutral may need defence 
against potential allies as much as against potential adversaries. 
Neutrals need to be able to resist the idea of 'friendly' intervention, 
that one belligerent will protect them against another by direct 
action,and being placed by a major power under its protection whether 
the neutral requests it or not. A major power may let it be known 
that "it would consider penetration by another power as a hostile act 
and would respond militarily" to it. 87 
In meeting these difficulties a neutral may be helped by the 
existence of a balance of power system. Indeed, Hagglof and Hopper 
both argue that a basic condition of neutrality is the existence of 
a balance of power.88 Today, it has been argued that this condition 
is met since the independence of small European states "is protected 
not by their policy of neutrality but by the existence, thanks to 
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the defensive measures adopted by the Western committed nations, of 
a balance of power which compels the Soviet Union to respect the 
neutrals".89 Clearly, however, this position may degenerate precisely 
into a protective umbrella. 
These issues are relevant to the critical issue of credibility 
since "A neutral must ••• convince each belligerent that, if left 
alone, it will not go over to the enemy, nor help the enemy in any 
unneutral way ... that it can and will stop encroachments and attack 
90 from the other". Also relevant in this context are the 
predisposition and behaviour of the neutral state prior to the 
commencement of hostilities, and whether it has given any putative 
belligerent cause to believe that it will not remain neutral. Such 
cause may emanate from its ideological stance, its socio-economic 
and political system, or from the pattern of its trade which may 
appear to make abstention or impartiality difficult. The difficulties 
are compounded in that neutrality lies in the eye of the beholder. 91 
A neutral needs "to make clear the unequivocal and determined 
character of its foreign policy; and in Europe those states which 
have turned the legal status of neutrality into a great national dogma 
have in fact generally been the more successful neutrals - simply 
because their neutrality is widely understood and accepted".92 In 
some cases the "tendency to transform neutrality into an ideology" 
may be so pronounced as to raise it beyond the everyday level of 
poli tical debate, and to lead to it being accepted internally as 
" t" 93 aXloma lC. Similarly, it may be transformed into an unquestioned 
tradition, whereby rather than there being any contemporary compelling 
rationale for the position, it is rather the case that "'We are neutral 
94 because we have always been neutral'''. Neutrality may "surreptiously", 
or deliberately, be allowed to creep "to a much higher station in the 
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hierarchy of policy aims "than its logical status entitles it to. 
It is a means not an end. 95 
A neutral may also seek to establish its position by a formal 
declaration of intent, and whilst not legally required, such a 
declaration is normal practice. Another method is by way of 
international treaty or guarantee, or by joint affirmation of 
neutrality by a group of countries, such as the agreement among 
Scandinavian countries in 1938. 96 States may also seek to have 
their status recognised by means of having it written into 
communiques after bilateral meetings with putative belligerents. 97 
The problem remains, however, of credibility since "Formal 
arrangements did not solve the core problem of credibility. A 
declaration of traditional, legal neutrality would hardly be credible 
when a state's economic and perhaps also military capabilities 
depended upon continued massive exchange and cooperation with the 
states that would be involved in a major conflict •.. the ties of 
organised interaction could not be undone overnight".98 
This, and other of the difficulties mentioned, have not been 
ameliorated by the high degree of flexibility shown by so-called 
neutral states in the twentieth century. Writing in the winter of 
1944-45, JO€f)ten asked "Which of the few surviving neutral countries 
can claim to have maintained the same status throughout the war? 
All of them have passed through various stages of affiliation with 
one or the other of the belligerents, ranging from unavowed 
collaboration to non-belligerent alliance, or even 'moral 
belligerency,,,.99 
A related issue is whether abstention and impartiality are to 
be regarded as "equivalent to complete disinterestedness", whatever 
100 the cause or character of the war? Given a concern with self-
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preservation, can any state be disinterested in the course and out-
come of a war between third parties? The classical view has been 
that the ambience, and indeed definition, of neutrality "cannot be 
given without invoking the concept of the negative",101 and that 
"political passivity was the main characteristic" of neutrality.102 
Indeed, Frei has argued that "it is legitimate in the Swiss case to 
interpret neutrality in terms of isolationism",103 whilst Andren has 
noted the "traditional idea of Sweden's attitude to international 
events - long prevailing not least in Sweden itself - as one of not 
having any foreign policy at all".104 
Most neutrals, however, no longer wish to identify with passivity 
and disinterestedness, such an attitude being "definitely and 
105 
absolutely obsolete". Petitpierre has challenged the isolationist 
view of Swiss neutrality,106 whilst Vukadinovic, amongst others, has 
done the same for Finland and Sweden arguing that on European soil 
"the conception of neutrality has essentially changed", since only an 
"active international policy can satisfy the interests of small 
t . ,,107 coun rles • One consequence has been their activity in mediation 
and UN peace-keeping. UN membership in itself, with the concomitant 
need to take a view and vote, has been a factor in this transformation, 
although it is salutory to recall the Soviet argument that "there 
108 
are no neutral men". 
Given the foregoing difficulties, Roberts argues that neutrality 
"should not .•• be regarded as a totally fixed quantity" but rather 
as "a rudimentary framework" of foreign policy, within which changes 
109 
of style and substance may occur. Somewhat similarly, Ogley 
whilst suggesting neutrality is "far from being an anachronism" since 
it is "a condition that states are likely to find themselves in 
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with increasing frequency", goes on to argue that this "will not ••• 
be a status governed very meticulously by the international law of 
neutrality", since the rules will be "improvised" and may be 
disregarded by the powerful. Nonetheless, he argues, there will 
persist "a reluctance of third parties to involve themselves in 
others' conflicts ,,110 This, however, is no longer neutrality, 
although it may be non-belligerency, there being "a clear 
distinction" between the two. 111 For neutrality per se, as 
demonstrated earlier, certain conditions must be met and utilising 
them content can be given to the concept. The fact that the 
concept is often wrongly applied, or that the conditions may be 
difficult to attain in the contemporary world, is no grounds for 
abandoning it, especially since the term is still widely used, not 
least by states themselves, and does provide a useful yardstick 
against which to analyse the policies of such states. The essence 
of neutality is a deliberate, conscious policy of impartial absention 
during a war or armed conflict with concomitant rights and duties, 
together with an intention to resist violations of those rights and 
duties by armed resistance if necessary. Given this a number of 
'types of neutrality' are, in reality, nothing of the kind whether 
they be 'integral', 'qualified' ,'benevolent' ,'spiritual', 'idological', 
'neo', 'peacetime' or indeed 'non-belligerency' .112 
Within 'genuine neutrality', however, it is worth noting an 
important distinction, namely that in some cases neutrality may be 
imposed by international treaty, whilst in others it is voluntarily 
adopted by the state concerned. This distinction being important 
because it vitally affects the freedom of action of the states 
concerned. In the first case, the state is governed by the specific 
requirements of the treaty by which it is bound, whilst in the 
latter, it has no obligation save to itself and the policy is a matter 
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of choice, to be continued or abandoned as it sees fit. Occasionally 
a certain confusion arises because some authorities wish to term the 
former 'perpetual' or 'permanent' and the latter 'occasional' or 
'temporary' neutrality.113 It can be argued, however, that perpetual 
neutrality need not be neutralisation, whilst in practice 'occasional' 
or 'temporary' neutrality may well be exceedingly long-lasting, 
elevated indeed into a 'traditional' neutrality! 
Voluntary neutrality may indeed be sub-divided between (a) 
traditional, by which is usually meant 'general' and (b) 'ad hoc', 
by which is usually meant particular. With respect to the former the 
state concerned has the objective of keeping out of all and any war, 
whilst with respect to the latter, the state merely wishes to be 
neutral in a particular conflict at a particular time. A succession 
of such 'ad hoc' decisions may transform the state into a traditional 
neutral, as has occurred in the Swedish case. The credibility of a 
general and traditional neutral is likely to be higher than that of 
an 'ad hoc' neutral, since in the latter case no state can be sure 
in advance what the putative neutral will actually do. 
The issue of types of, or variants of, neutrality is of 
particular relevance to the European context given the conventional 
wisdom (often supported by internal rhetoric from the st~~es 
concerned) regarding Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
focus of this study, Ireland. If not pursuing a policy of neutrality, 
are they pursuing what Roberts terms a policy "for neutrality,,?114 
They, themselves, have wished to see their policies in this light, 
and may therefore be used as a model to identify the key requirements 
of such a positioninasfar as it differs from neutrality per se. 
Before turning to examine their position in the following 
chapter, however, the key characteristics of nonalignment will be 
identified. 
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Nonalignment 
There is some dispute about dating the origins of nonalignment, 
depending upon whether nonalignment is regarded principally as a 
movement, with its origins at Belgrade in 1961, or as a rather more 
amorphous development of ideas and tendencies. In the former school 
belongs Willets who maintains that "nonalignment was not born until 
1961 as a coherent group of ideas propounded by a group of relatively 
like-minded states".115 He is also adamant that to go back earlier 
is "One of the more frequent ways in which nonalignment is given false 
roots".116 Leo Mates, on the other hand, sees the Bandung Conference 
as at least a precursor of nonaligned meetings, whilst accepting that 
in 1955 "nonalignment was still not a finished political concept".117 
The conference laid "down the foundations of a movement which 
subsequently expanded the original program considerably, ••• leaders 
of the nonaligned countries ..• have always stressed their attachment 
to Bandung, and the movement of the nonaligned was regarded as the 
political continuation of the 1955 anti-colonial conference. This 
connection is significant because it stresses the importance of anti-
colonialism in the years of the early movements to define non-
alignment". Moreover, "the movement of nonaligned is not a formal 
organization with a definite membership, holding regular meetings".118 
Those attached to this view also cite earlier Indian thinking, 
meetings in New Delhi in 1947 and 1949, Colombo and Bogor in 1954, 
and put particular emphasis upon the Panch Sheel declaration of 1954. 119 
Whilst these earlier meetings and pronouncements cannot be equated with 
nonalignment, they were important influences upon it. 
The Bandung conference of 1955 was officially "The Asian-African 
Conference", with 29 states attending, with a clear preponderance of 
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Asians. Given its regional composition, that about half of its 
attenders were aligned, and the very active role of China, Bandung 
cannot be equated with nonalignment, but many of its concerns have 
lived on to be equally the concern of the nonaligned. 
The communique touched upon many themes concerned with the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the condemnation 
of colonialism, as well as emphasising equality, sovereignty, 
independence and freedom. It contained no blanket condemnation of 
alliances, but did condemn those which served "the particular 
interests of any of the big powers". It also emphasised the "urgency 
of promoting economic development", although this was not a central 
issue. 120 The conference was an assertion of independence and of 
distinctive concerns, and it was this together with "increasing 
contacts and seeing the advantages of an international platform", 
which was perhaps of most significance, rather than the actual 
formulations of words agreed upon. 121 
In Europe, President Tito of Yugoslavia became increasingly 
interested in such matters visiting Asia and Africa, and meeting 
122 Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah and Sukarno. Partly to forestall a second 
Bandung, Tito and Nasser sent an initial joint letter inviting 
twenty-one nonaligned countries to a preparatory conference at Cairo 
in 1961. This invitation list set both the initial tone and 
membership of the movement, since Tito and Nasser "strongly influenced 
the issue by sending preliminary invitations to 21 countries of their 
choice", and there was a high correlation between these states and 
those who finally attended. 123 When asked the basis of the 
invitation "the principles they had applied were never revealed to 
t ' " 124 ques loners • The Cairo meeting of Foreign Ministers, drew up a 
five-point definition of nonalignment which "framed the first ••. 
official definition of nonalignment".125 The principles were:-
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(i) to follow an independent policy based on peaceful coexistence, 
or to show trends towards such a policy; 
(ii) always to support popular liberation movements; 
(iii) not to become a party to any collective military pact or 
bilateral treaties that would involve implication in 
East-West wrangles; 
(iv) not to have on its territory any foreign military bases 
set up with their own consent. 
This is hardly a definitive classification, with Anabtawi arguing 
it was a "meaningless yardstick for assessing whether or not a state 
is neutralist".126 Flexibility was needed because of the multiplicity 
of policies being practised and the diverse nature of the interests of 
those involved. Whilst it might be said that all those invited were, 
broadly, neutralist, not all neutralists were invited,127 and in 
deciding additional invitees a number of local, and idiosyncratic 
factors were taken into account, not all of which touched upon non-
alignment. India and Ceylon, amongst others, fought for a wider 
range of countries being represented, perhaps as many as 19 more 
(including Sweden, Finland and Ireland), but at the end of the day 
only four countries were added. "This involved no mere dispute 
over diplomatic protocol, for the invitation list would in turn 
largely determine the agenda, tone and results of the conference.,,128 
There is some confusion as to who actually was invited, and this 
revolves around the fact that some countries were sounded-out but 
let it be known the answer would be no. Thus "the choice of 
Belgrade as the venue •.. discouraged the European nonaligned 
countries ••. Sweden, Finland and Ireland would have had invitations 
but they ... cried off in advance because attendance at a political 
conference in Marshall Tito's domain might compromise their neutrality".129 
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It is also true that it would rather have changed the nature of the 
conference. 
In September 1961 the Heads of Government or State of 25 
'nonaligned countries', as it was put in Final Declaration, met in 
Belgrade. Three countries sent observers. It was the first large 
meeting of self-proclaimed nonaligned countries. Whilst previously 
nonaligned policies had tended to be referred to in terms of 
independence, autonomy or peaceful coexistence, increasingly the term 
'nonalignment' was now used,130 despite the fact that several 
governments represented were aligned on one issue or another. 131 
It was initially uncertain whether the conference would concentrate 
on problems of world peace, or would develop along strict anti-
colonialist lines. More generally, Belgrade was concerned with peace 
and security, self-determination, imperialism, colonialism and neo-
colonialism, racial discrimination, especially apartheid, disarmament, 
a test ban, the problem of foreign bases, peaceful coexistence, and 
the structure of the UN. The great divide between rich and poor 
countries was also a theme running throughout the conference, with 
attention being focused on economic development. Several times 
during the conference reference was made to the nonaligned as being 
the 'conscience of mankind', '!!hilst most speakers stressed non-
alignment "was not a passive doctrine despite the negative prefix to 
132 the word". 
The final document reflected the aspirations, concerns and 
fears of those represented. It was agreed that for conflict to be 
eradicated it was necessary "to eradicate colonialism in all its 
manifestations and to accept and practise a policy of peaceful co-
existence in the world". It attempted to give some content to 
'peaceful coexistence' by stressing that it involved "the right of 
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peoples to self-determination", and "to an active effort towards the 
elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national 
oppression, guaranteeing at the same time, to every people their 
independent development". 
The declaration also affirmed, amongst other things, that the 
nonaligned "do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc". 
Foreign military bases were denounced as violations of sovereignty; 
their abolition being a contribution to world peace. Disarmament 
was regarded as imperative, as was the ending of all nuclear tests. 
The declaration called for the "abolition of colonialism", since all 
nations had the right to "unity, self-determination, and independence". 
All nations should be able to "freely dispose of their natural wealth". 
The "economic imbalance" was to be removed, and "just terms of trade" 
secured. Moreover, "excessive fluctuations in primary commodity 
trade and the restricti ve measures and practices "which adversely 
affected developing countries were to be eliminated. Of most 
significance in the economic area was the call for all such countries 
to convene a conference "to discuss their common problems" and how 
they might "ensure the realization of their economic and social 
133 development". 
Whilst in subsequent years the nonaligned have tended to vary in 
their enthusiasm for specific aspects of this declaration, it does 
represent many of the concerns of the nonaligned, at least, as 
represented by international declarations. Thus whilst it can be 
claimed that Belgrade w~s "singularly unproductive of concrete 
results", it did have a longer-term significance. 134 It revealed 
that whilst the nonaligned movement was not monolithic, containing 
a number of fissiparious tendencies, it could reach a measure of 
agreement on fundamentals. At the same time, its fissiparious 
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nature meant there was no question of seeking to bind the conference 
attenders to specific policies agreed by the group as a whole. 
After 1961 the economic factor became even more of an issue and 
this was reflected in "A conference on the Problems of Economic 
Development" in Cairo in 1962, at which a majority of attenders had 
been at Belgrade. The Cairo meeting was a boost to the development 
of interest in this area, and proved to be almost a preparatory 
conference for Geneva and UNCTAD. It fuelled demands for a 
conference on trade and development, and this led to demands for a 
permanent organization, and the development of "The Group of 77".135 
These developments represented "the most significant achievement of 
the nonaligned countries in their efforts to improve the economic 
't t' ,,136 Sl ua lon • These developments are also significant in that they 
reflected a crucial distinction between the Bandung/Belgrade group 
and the European 'neutrals' (with the exception of Yugoslavia), 
namely the growing divergence between white 'haves' and coloured 
'have-nots'. 
These developments demonstrate why the concept of nonalignment 
is difficult to pin down since the movement had begun to introduce 
concerns which were different from the original motivation. Yet, 
the economic dimension cannot be discounted as irrelevant to non-
alignment given its importance to the countries concerned, whilst it, 
plus anti-colonialism, do help explain why some countries were 
involved in the movement and others not. The increased weight 
attached to anti-colonialism was revealed at the second nonaligned 
summit in Cairo in 1964. 
By 1964, the number of attenders had grown to 47 and there were 
10 observers (including Finland). In issuing invitations there was 
no attempt "to define the precise principles or limits of nonalignment, 
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still less to apply them to individual invitees".137 At the Cairo 
conference, questions of world peace seemed much less urgent than in 
1961, and in the final document the initial focus was upon the 
elimination of colonialism, the right to self-determination and, the 
need to end racial discrimination, especially apartheid. Only then, 
did it turn to nine "fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence". 
The document also referred to sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
pacific settlement of disputes, disarmament, non-proliferation, 
nuclear free zones and the abolition of nuclear weapons and foreign 
bases, amongst other issues. A separate section (Section X) dealt 
with "Economic Development and cooperation".138 
The next major conference at Lusaka in 1970 confirmed the tendencies 
apparent at Cairo. So much so, particularly on the economic front, 
that Rothstein amongst others, has argued that "Nonalignment as 
either a tactic of manoeuvre between the cold war blocs or as a means 
of establishing a zone of peace, began to decline in the mid-1960s" 
largely because of the declining salience of the old core issues such 
as cold w~r tensions and colonialism, and the ever-increasing 
salience of internal problems relating to internal development. 139 
"The Third World was no longer merely new and Afro-Asian states, 
for the common denominator was now poverty and a shared resentment 
of unfair treatment", with the consequence that "a foreign policy of 
nonalignment simply seemed increasingly irrelevant". Rothstein 
goes on to argue that the nonaligned movement has been "transferred 
into something quite different a joint alignment against all the 
industrial countries", thus his aphorism "from nonalignment to class 
war". Despite this, he also points out "that foreign policy in 
its more traditional meanings has (not) completely disappeared 
Nevertheless, the axis of real concern has shifted".140 
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The tension between the old and the new, as it were, can be 
seen in any examination of the speeches and declarations of Lusaka 
(1970), Algiers (1973), Colombo (1976), Havana (1979) and Delhi 
(1983).141 Despite the language of Castro in his opening remarks 
in Havana in the Havana Conference Political Declaration most of 
the concerns remained those of previous conference communiques. The 
language used, however, was more strident, for example, in the 
references to the need for a new international economic order (NIEO). The 
establishment of such an order was in 1979 regarded as "an integral 
part of the people's struggle for political, economic, cultural and 
social liberation", and it was argued that the world economic crisis 
was aggravated by the "structural and management deficiences of 
developed market economies" 142 
Havana embodied a number of conflicting ideas, not all of which 
were capable of resolution. There was also 'the Cuban problem' , 
given Havana's role in drafting documents. Cuba's initial draft 
conference documents, for example, implied that the nonaligned were 
the reserve and natural allies of the Soviet bloc. 143 Indeed in 
September 1979 the Burmese Foreign Minister announced Burma's with-
drawal from the movement on the grounds that the principles espoused 
were no longer recognizable as nonalignment. Such problems were 
exacerbated by further increases in attendance, with 92 full 
participants at Havana (plus a further 3 which were considered to be 
so), and nearly 40 official observers and guests. In fact, the 
final texts were not as pro-Soviet as the drafts, and the diversity 
of view represented led to an emphasis upon the nonaligned remaining 
I , d 144 nona 19ne • 
After Havana, the Indians hosted the seventh summit in Delhi 
in 1983. Here there was a clear attempt to steer the movement away 
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from divisive political issues and towards a concentration on the 
creation of NIEO and the North-South dialogue. Nonetheless, the 
Delhi meeting still condemned much of Western policy, although it 
also deplored foreign intervention in Afghanistan, albeit without 
naming the Soviet Union. Delhi had a simple unifying message as 
lithe voice of the poor, pleading, or demanding, more from the rich. 
Money ... became the main theme". Indeed, by 1983 the countries 
concerned felt that the gap between rich and poor countries was lithe 
most serious problem threatening world peace" 145 
Problems of Definition 
In the literature on nonalignment, there is almost unanimous 
agreement that the term has been used "so often by so many people in 
such different circumstances and with such different intentions, that 
its meaning seems to change, chameleon like, depending on the context 
" h" h "t II 146 In w lC l appears This has been increasingly so, moreover, 
given the exponential rise in the number of adherents, each influenced 
by their own interests,values and backgrounds. The amorphous 
character of nonalignment also reflects the fact that it did not 
come into being as a fully-fledged idea but evolved in a series of 
ad hoc reactions to contemporary stimuli. Only later were there 
attempts to construct a legitimising conceptual f;amework. 147 
and Jansen both emphasize that nonalignment was "pragmatic", was 
Lyon 
"a policy, not a creed; a tactic, even a weapon, but not a gospel; 
for whatever else gospels may do, they do not establish or preserve 
the national self-interest of newly and fiercely independent states". 148 
For these reasons nonalignment is eclectic, lacking both "canonical 
works" and a "corpus of knowledge, ••• (an) integrated body of theory II , 
and is "rather a constellation of concepts ••• shrouded in a confusing 
medley of supporting arguments". 149 To add to the problem, the 
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'constellation of concepts' is not static, so that "nonaligned states, 
except in the most general terms, do not agree among themselves" about 
the nature of nonalignment. As a result generalizations are 
150 !ldangerous and largely erroneous". 
As a consequence both Crabb and Lyon argue that the term means 
"little in abstract",151 needing to be applied to policies and view-
points of particular countries in particular cases, with the first 
question being "whose neutralism is referred to and what forms does 
it take, how general or particular are these forms?".152 Indeed 
Lyon believes it is "a mistake and a distraction of political 
enquiry from its proper concerns to seek for a quintessential 
neutralism".153 It is, nonetheless, worthwhile to pursue the search 
for the essence of nonalignment, since if a concept is to be used, it 
should have a clearly understood content. 
In establishing that content there are difficulties, although 
Willets suggests "there is an easy way out" since the summit 
communiques should "be relied upon as the most authoritative 
statements of the principles of nonalignment".154 Whilst Willets 
is clearly right to emphasize such communiques, and the Cairo 1961 
principles, as vital sources in the endeavour to understand non-
alignment, there are certain traps in relying too heavily upon such 
declarations. Why should communiques be taken at face-value as 
definitions, especially given Willets' earlier observation that it is 
"too facile to accept the judgement of the Non-Aligned politicians,,?155 
Moreover, it leads to an equating of nonalignment with membership of 
the Non-Aligned Movement. Was Burma necessarily less non-aligned 
because it left the movement? These difficulties are compounded by 
the way in which the initial invitations were issued, and the "all 
t " 156 and sundry" aspects of later mee lngs. In addition, some of 
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those subscribing to the communiques have not conformed themselves 
to a strict application of the injunctions contained therein. 
Communiques are the result of horse-trading and bargaining rather 
than any conception of an ideal type, being at best compendiums and 
at worst collections of internally inconsistent assertions. A 
further difficulty is the tendency of the nonaligned lito act as if 
verbal pronouncements, without any subsequent substantive policy ... 
are sufficient to Idecide l complex issues". 157 This is important 
given the significance Frankel, Holsti, Wolfers and others attach 
to distinctions between aspirational and operational foreign policy 
goals. l58 
There are other traps in attempting to define nonalignment, for 
example, forgetting that policies involve means to ends and that 
nonalignment is both a means to ends and "only one aspect of the 
foreign policies pursued by its adherents", since each nonaligned 
state has "other distinct foreign policy objectives". 159 Thus 
many of them have maintained relationships with their former 
metropole, which it would be costly to break, and have distinguished 
these "from the wider systemic relationships II towards which they 
, l' d 160 rema1n nona 19ne • Indeed, many such states may "be more 
fettered than some aligned states 11.161 Marshall Singer demonstrates 
this vividly, showing that formal treaties or alliances are not 
necessary to create "Ties that Bind". 162 Thus the behaviour of 
a nonaligned state may not accord wi th the pronouncements of the 
movement. This is evident in the way such states tend to ignore 
such pronouncements on peaceful co-existence, military pacts and 
the use of force in international relations when it comes to 
localized, regional disputes. 163 
The answer to the issues raised in the foregoing discussion is 
that nonalignment is not a foreign policy. Rather it is "an 
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approach to policy-making ••• (defined) not in terms of what ••• 
government's policy will be on the problems ••• but in the spirit 
in which the government would approach the decision ••• That non-
alignment is an approach is a point seldom grasped".164 Thus non-
aligned countries are to be "identified more according to their 
position in the international community than according to their 
t d 'f' f' 1"" 165 concre e an . speCl lC orelgn po lCles . Indeed, nonalignment 
is to be seen as "a 'frame of mind' that sharpened and emphasised 
the distinction between 'we' and 'they,,,.166 After all "The new 
countries became nonaligned first in the consciousness of their 
political leaders and statesmen".167 
The "Key" to Nonalignment 
Whilst one cannot discount the idiosyncratic and national 
variations shaping the consciousness and position of each society and 
leader, "most of the leading neutralist 'ideologues' share a wide 
range of strikingly similar national and personal problems" which 
tends to give them "something of a common character".168 
At the very least there is something of "a racial and cultural 
aspect of nonalignment". Nonaligned countries are those "which 
have been made to feel that they live in a world apart from Europe 
which have been exploited economicatiy and dominated politically by 
others". It is not just a question of colour, the "fact that non-
aligned nations are predominantly non-white is, however, incidental. 
There are other peoples who have equally been exploited and 
dominated". The key is the "natural reactions against being made 
use of by major Powers •.• The common 'cultural' tie in nonalignment 
is probably far more related to traditional relations with major 
Powers than it is to race".169 
More fundamentally, a number of factors have contributed to the 
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perception of a 'common identity' whereby individuals perceive "some 
aspect of the external world more or less similarly, communicate 
their similarity of perception among themselves, thus forming an 
identity group". Singer argues that for this to happen there needs 
to be both channels of communication and most importantly "the 
170 
members of the group must understand the common language or 'code"'. 
Even though- individuals or states may use the same phraseology, 
pursue similar policies, this is not the same as belonging. 
Moreover, "the very ties binding individuals from one state to 
individuals and groups in another are often the barriers separating 
them from other states", so that membership "in one group implies 
membership or non-membership in certain others". In a useful 
analogy, Singer argues that whilst a man may act and think "as do 
women", this does "not make him a member of the perceptual/identity 
group called 'women'" 171 This argument is of seminal importance 
in understanding why Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland and 
Ireland are not nonaligned. The inner consciousness, the id, of 
these societies is different and cannot be transmogrified into 
something which it is not. Nonalignment is not a rigid formula, 
but rather a feeling of belonging "to a world which is different 
from the developed part of the world whether East or w,est", so that 
the North-South divide is not merely economic but "embraces all 
aspects of life as well as the form, substance and structure of 
society".172 In creating this common identity three pillars are 
crucial. 
(a) The Political Pillar 
The overwhelming majority of the nonaligned have experienced 
colonial rule. That experience, together with the struggle against 
such rule, was enough to engender a sympathy towards nonalignment. 173 
As products of this struggle, most of the countries concerned 
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accorded it priority in their newly independent foreign policies. 
Nonalignment served a dual function in this regard. On the one 
hand it was "both a visible symbol of a nation's dedication to anti-
colonialism and a method of inhibiting new colonialist tendencies,,174 
whilst on the other, it seemed to epitomize all that the struggles 
had been about, nonalignment being an "assertion of state 
. t" 175 soverel.gn y . It implied an "ideological and philosophical 
emancipation", promoting the "quest for ideological and spiritual 
'identity,,,.176 
Willets argues indeed that whilst the East-West issue did not 
provide a "common identity" for the nonaligned, "anti-colonialism 
did provide a bond between them", and he sees this as an important 
distinguishing characteristic between the European 'neutrals' and 
the nonaligned. His statistical analysis of voting behaviour 
purports to support this view, enabling him to claim that "The pro-
colonial record of the European neutrals makes it completely 
explicable that these states remained so distant from nonalignment".177 
If, says Willets, "anti-colonialism is a stronger identifying 
characteristic of the Non-Aligned than is abstention from East-West 
alignment, then it is not surprising that the European neutrals have 
not joined the Non_Aligned".178 
The Europeans concerned, in fact, are not pro-colonial. They 
have, however, flinched at some of the vigorous means encompassed 
in U.N. resolutions concerned with eliminating colonialism. Their 
experience of foreign rule was not generally by different ethnic 
groups, nor by geographically remote and alien socio-political 
179 
systems and cultures. There was not the same degree of alien-
ness, and perhaps as a consequence these states have been more 
refrained in their attitude to the means to be employed in ending 
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colonialism than nonaligned states, although they do share the same 
objective. Experiencing foreign rule in itself is not a sufficient 
condition to form that common identity underlying nonalignment. 
The colonialism experience left a number of other legacies 
relevant to an understanding of nonalignment. One was the need 
for nation-building, a concern for national unity, given that the 
new states often were not coterminous with pre-existing nations or 
tribal grouping, but rather were superimposed upon ethnic and 
economic diversity by the colonial power. As a result, the search 
for a cohesive force, for national unity was usually an "overriding 
and unavoidable concern" for the new leaders of these states. 180 
Nonalignment proved to be a mechanism helpful in achieving political 
stability and unity, since it served as a "broad national front 
behind which extremely divergent sections of the population are 
able to come together",18l it helped to secure support, moreover, 
"by reinforcing the goal of independence in foreign policy".182 
Inextricably related was the pursuit of independence in foreign 
policy. According to Mates "nonalignment can be defined as a 
policy strictly based on independence".183 Nonalignment was 
regarded as an ideal vehicle for demonstrating the new states' 
independence since it implied "diplomatic freedom of action and 
h . ,,184 c 01ce . It conformed to the need "to discover, to articulate, 
and to safeguard and strengthen one's own national interest in the 
world",185 whilst also serving to emphasize that the new states 
were concerned with their own interpretation of their ,national 
interest rather than either somebody else's interpretations, or 
somebody else's interests. 
This insistence upon independence in foreign policy relates to 
attitudes to alliances. Equally significant, however, is the 
relationship to the nonaligned "'penchant' for deciding each issue 
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. t . t " 186 on 1 S mer1 s • Whether this penchant is operationalized is the 
subject of some controversy, but at least theoretically, the non-
aligned "proclaimed the right to think for ourselves and to speak 
for ourselves. O .. h " 187 ur V01ce 1S not an ec 0 • This attitude forms 
the heart of Jansen's definition of nonalignment, although perhaps 
it should be regarded as a necessary but not sufficient criterion. 
Jansen suggests that nonalignment is simply "the desire and ability 
of an independent country, .•. to follow an independent policy in 
foreign affairs; it is the desire and ability to make up its own 
mind, to take its own decisions or not to take them, after judging 
each issue separately and honestly on its merits".188 The 
combination of national interest and judgement helps to explain why 
divergences exist among the nonaligned, and why whilst exercising 
independent judgement, the nonaligned are not impartial. It is 
independent yet partial judgement. A further complication is that 
informed judgement requires both information and expertise, which 
many of these states may lack the resources to attain. 
The foregoing helps to explain the nonaligned's attitude to 
alliances and foreign military bases. The nonaligned believe that 
"membership in an alliance would involve at least some compromise 
in the interests of coalition diplomacy, and may even involve 
subordination to the stronger power".189 They fear the possible 
inferior position within such an arragement, and the likelihood 
that bloc leaders would seek to control "the foreign policy of 
alliances members" and even "the internal development of weaker 
nations".190 There is a certain air of disapproval of alliances, 
but this tends to be the alliance of others rather than oneself. 
There is also a residual belief of a relationship between alliances 
and colonialism, and a vague concern that perhaps alliances 
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(particularly involving great powers) are a cause of tension and 
war, and certainly not in conformity with the principles of 
peaceful coexistence. 
Despite this scepticism, the nonaligned are clearly not anti 
all alliances, most of them being heavily involved in alliances of 
191 
one sort or another themselves. The key distinction to be 
drawn was identified in the Havana principles as opposition to 
participation in military pacts and alliances arising from great-
Power or bloc rivalries and influences. 192 It is the link with 
out-of-area great powers which leads to opposition, not the mere 
fact of existence of alliances. 193 Non-alignment was never simply 
a question of opposition to alliances and alignment. This partly 
explains why nonalignment has outlived many of the alliances current 
at the time of its gestation. It has had much more to do with the 
pursuit of an independent foreign policy. 
The attitude to alliances has not been related to pacifism, 
but rather to a feeling of outrage at being dragged into the quarrels 
of others. 194 Gupta, indeed, argues that the desire for "non-
involvement in irrelevant political contexts paved the way for 
subsequent emergence of the doctrine of nonalignment".195 The Cold 
War was regarded as a conflict between countries in a different part 
of the world, a part of the world whose philosophy, culture, 
interests and levels of economic development were very different. 
Distaste, however, was not to be equated with isolationism 
since distance and water were not enough to ensure safety. Whilst, 
therefore, seeking to avoid involvement in the Cold War, the non-
aligned were determined to do their "utmost to prevent the next war 
which we believe will only result in the extinction of human 
, '1' t' ,,196 C1Vl lza lon . Indeed, one of the key aspects of nonalignment, 
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its lack of passivity, partly stems from "an underlying conviction ..• 
that nonaligned countries are in a peculiarly advantageous position 
to ameliorate cold war conflicts and to make 'peaceful coexistence' 
a reali ty" .197 
(b) The Economic Pillar 
In contemplating common experiences which have touched the non-
aligned it is necessary to heed the warning of Geldart and Lyon with 
respect to a closely related issue-area. They point to the fact 
that by the early 1980s it had increasingly been.llrecognised that 
it is grossly misleading to equate North and South with rich and 
poor, industrialised and non-industrialised, developed and under-
developed countries, because each grouping brings together states 
of considerable diversities by any economic measures". 198 Similarly 
one must be wary of any simple developed/aligned - underdeveloped/ 
nonaligned division. 
Notwithstanding this important truth, however, it is also true 
that many of the nonaligned have experienced certain similarities 
f .. t 199 o econom1C C1rcums ance. A number of related economic 
experiences in the economic sphere, which have directly or indirectly 
influenced the nonaligned, can be identified, including: poverty; 
dependency; underdevelopment and lack of industrialisation; 
unfavourable terms of trade on the world market; a desire to attain 
economic independence in order to make a reality of political 
freedom and; a low economic status. 
Of the poverty and relative lack of development, even now, of 
most of the nonaligned there can be little doubt. If a number of 
indices of development and industrialisation are examined, an 
interesting pattern emerges. In the following table (Table 3.1) a 
clear relationship between lower income per capita as a basic (if 
simple) measure of a lower stage of economic development and 
involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement emerges. 
Table 3.1: Countries classified principally according to GNP per capita 
Low-income Middle-income Industrial Capital-Surplus Nonmarket 
Market Oil Exporters Industrial 
Economies Economies 
Number of 
Countries 36 60 18 4 6 
Full members 34 (94!~~) 34 (56!~~) 0 4 (1 OO?~)d 0 
Relationship to 
Observerse Non-Aligned 0 9 (l5~~) 0 0 0 
Movement and 
3 ( 5~~)b Percentage of Guestse 0 4 (22%)C 0 0 
states in 
category Not-involved 2 (5!~oa 14 (23!~6) 14 (78~6) 0 6 (1 00?6) 
a. China and Haiti 
b. Romania 
J c. Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland but not Ireland. N.B. Willets following the official 
~ documentation of Lusaka conference suggests Finland and Austria participated in 1970 as observers, 
whereas in fact, they were guests· 
d. Saudi Arabia boycotted the Havana meeting. 
e. Observers have a higher status than guests, and is now almost a kind of waiting for full membership. 
Sources Derived from: 
Peter Willets, The Non-Aligned in Havana, (London, Frances Pinter, 1981) p.77 
World Bank, World Development Report, 1981, (Oxford, Oxford University Press for World Bank, 1981) categories and 
figures for 'World Development Indicators' pp.133 ff. Not all attenders at Havana have figures in 
the World Bank tables; these are generally 'micro states'. 
N.B. Willetts pp.248-254 uses different categorizations based upon UNCTAD groups, but the broad pattern is similar. 
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In the low-income group 94~% were 'nonaligned' having 'full 
membership' ; in the middle-income group this figure falls to 56~%, 
but rises to 76~% if guests and observers are included. Of 18 
'industrial market economies' it is striking that none attended as 
full members, nor in the next most significant category of 
'observers'. Similarly, none of the 'nonmarket industrial economies' 
were involved. In summary, of 96 low/middle-income countries, 71% 
were full members and 12~% attended in some other capacity. This 
compares with a 16~% minimal involvement by industrial economies. 
Although figures for many countries are not available, an 
examination of "gross manufacturing output per capita,,200 as a 
measure of industrialization tends to confirm the pattern of per 
capita income, as do measures of 'adult literacy rate,201 and energy 
consumption per capita (although in this latter case Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Romania break the pattern).202 Although a number of 
caveats should be entered before accepting this evidence as 
definitive, there is an element of commonality in the circumstances 
of the countries under review. 
One of the most striking things to emerge is that Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland are in a completely 
different economic league from virtually all ~f the 'nonaligned', 
for example, in GNP per capita they rank 14th, 16th, 3rd, 2nd and 
24th respectively, and even the Irish figure is at least double that 
203 
of any of the poorest 85 states. There is an economic aspect 
to the 'identity' dimension of the nonaligned, even if diverse 
interests do lead them to pursue widely differing economic policies. 
Whilst not definitive, figures on trade dependency are 
similarly suggestive. Singer examined 116 states and found that 
over 40 had more than one-third of their trade with just one state. 
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Singer draws two conclusions from his material. Firstly, that the 
"weaker could legitimately be considered economically dependent 
upon the stronger" and secondly, that it is "a generalizaton that 
seems to hold with remarkable consistency that the more economically 
developed the country, the less likely it is to be dependent upon 
one major trading partner".204 The less developed tend to be most 
dependent. 
Dependence and lack of development have led these states to 
seek greater economic independence and to escape their predicaments 
by seeking aid, preferably without strings and from multilateral 
sources, and by developing and diversifying trade. 205 However, it 
does not appear that the old cliche about nonalignment as a tactic 
to maximize aid (by either obtaining help from both sides, or by 
attempting to play each side off against the other) is true. 
All of these problems were compounded for these states by their 
being confronted with "an unfavour.able situation in the world 
market" which has been "dominated by countries that had gone far 
ahead in labor productivity and generally in technical progress".206 
It is thus not surprising that increasingly they have turned their 
attention to the structural weaknesses of the international economic 
system, and demanded a New International Economic Order, in order 
to ameliorate and overcome the inequalities which exist. The 
"compartmentalization of foreign policy and domestic development 
could not survive", and "the economies of development and the 
diplomacy of development have become increasingly difficult to 
separate".207 It is also true the "economic factor constituted 
one of the main motive forces and later became the strongest motive 
which impelled the nonaligned countries to cooperation and joint-
action", although it may be going too far to suggest that "actions 
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in the economic domain brought most of the countries together under 
the banner of nonalignment".208 
Certainly the nonaligned themselves now appear to be fully 
aware that political and economic questions are inextricably linked. 
Thus whilst the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement "maintained 
their separate identities until the mid-1970s despite some degree 
of overlapping membership,,209 increasingly they have been 
complementary to each other, with a certain division of labour, but 
with "each taking up, developing and using the proposals and 
decisions of the other".2l0 
Given this strong concern with the economic pillar, there is 
truth in the argument that nonalignment was "not simply a by-product 
of the conflict between the two protagonists in the cold war" but 
that it was rather "inspired by and desires stemming from their low 
level of development, their internal problems and from the awareness 
of the gap separating them from the developed countries and from the 
fear which is generated by all these disadvantages". There is 
perhaps even some truth in the view that they would have found 
themselves essentially "in a similar position even if there had been 
no cold war", and would in any case have constituted themselves as a 
"separate part of the international community".2ll 
(c) The Social Pillar 
As Burton points out "types of domestic institutions are not 
considered by the nonaligned nations to be a test for nonalignment". 212 
Nonetheless, there is a degree of congruity among the nonaligned in 
their domestic circumstances in the social sphere. The social 
pillar, like the other pillars, reflects the colonial experience 
and legacy, particularly the consequent need for social integration 
and national political unity. Integration has been a major post-
colonial problem, as the political institutions left by colonial 
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regimes have proved to be largely unable to cope with the lack of 
socio-political homogeneity. The new states often lacked the bonds 
usually associated with nationalism. These societies, then, were 
often fragmented, lacking socio-economic development, and not yet 
transformed nor integrated by the impact of industrialization. 
Whilst they have experienced a social transformation during the last 
generation, this has often exacerbated rather than ameliorated the 
problems. 
One important consequence of these factors is the differentiation 
they reflect between the European and non-European societies, such 
that whereas "the internal problems of the industrially advanced 
world were due to different social and political systems based on 
modern economies and social structures, the underdeveloped countries 
faced completely different problems which resulted from their 
backwardness", and clearly their social structures and problems were 
different also. 213 The social, origins, experience and 
orientations of their societies resulted in many of the nonaligned 
lacking "any identifiction with, or attachment to, the traditions 
of the Western state system ••• They tend, that is, to think 
differently than their Western counterparts most significantly, 
perhaps, they do not have the same sense of what being a Small Power 
implies in terms of a range of acceptable behaviour".214 
The urgency accorded to development appears to have influenced 
the type of regime these countries have adopted, or submitted to. 
It also clearly distinguishes the European from non-European states. 
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Thus Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland all come within the 
'competitive 1000+ GNP per capita grouping' in which are found no 
full members of the non-aligned movement, but rather the countries 
of the so-called 'western' world. Ireland falls into the 
'competitive 600-999 GNP per capita' range. Interestingly only 
~ attender at non-aligned summits also falls into the same 
category, namely Trinidad and Tobago, which as already demonstrated, 
is sui generis according to a number of other indices. Whilst 
undue precision should not be claimed for the figures or categories, 
the table remains suggestive. 
Conclusion 
(a) The Europeans Are Not Nonaligned 
In general, the European countries under discussion are 
different in the following ways from the nonaligned: 
(i) most importantly, vis-a-vis 'identity', 'consciousness' and 
empathy of perception; 
(ii) they have different experiences of alien rule and consequently 
subsequent differing legacies; 
(iii) the European states are in a different league with respect to 
socio-economic levels of income, development and 
modernization; 
(iv) the European states are part of a system of society, economies, 
philosophy and politics which is alien to most of the non-
aligned; 
(v) a factor compounded by geographic/strategic location and; 
(vi) the Europeans have a concern with issues which differ from 
the inescapable concerns of the nonaligned. 
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(b) Neutrality and Nonalignment 
Neutrality and nonalignment are often used as generic terms for 
each other, as if they were synonymous or one was a derivation from 
the other. 215 However, from the foregoing discussion it is evident 
that there is no inherent relationship between nonalignment and 
neu trali ty . It can on the contrary be argued that the specific 
demand-s of neutrality run counter to the grain of the ethos of 
nonalignment. Moreover nonalignment is "not a policy of seeking 
for a neutral position in the case of war".216 Indeed, "In the 
event of open warfare between the main power those, nonaligned 
countries could be obliged, as all countries are, to declare 
themselves either as neutral or at war" ,217 since nonalignment does 
not involve any declaration or decision in advance "of a fixed 
position to be taken in case of war".218 Moreover, the nonaligned 
"admit no binding obligations to remain indifferent and impartial".219 
Indeed, the very motivation of nonalignment is not to be an idle 
by-stander, but to be an active participant in the enfolding of 
events. As early as 1961 this positivism was integral to non-
alignment, given the profound belief that it was "essential that the 
non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding 
international issues concerning peace and security in the world as 
none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these 
issues".220 
Nevertheless a degree of confusion persists and the concepts 
are often loosely applied simultaneously to the same countries. 
Partly this is simply a problem of the distinction being slurred in 
popular usage, and that slur being "deeply entrenched".221 
Politicians, too, often deliberately or unconsciously, slur the 
distinction. The problem is compounded in that superficially the 
-82-
two have certain characteristics in common, especially when they 
are operationalized in the foreign policies of states, for example, 
the stress on independence in foreign policy, sovereignty and 
freedom of decision, freedom from entanglements, and non-membership 
in superpower confrontational alliance systems. Confusion is 
further caused by 'neutrality' not being an appropriate description 
for a peacetime policy, and yet widely used as if it were. 
Problems in this regard are extenuated when seeking to clarify 
states whose official policy is 'non-participation in alliances 
in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war'. 
The confusion over these terms is most rife with respect to 
Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland, who often 
claim to be neutral or nonaligned or both. Before examining in 
depth the Irish case, at±ention will now be turned to 'the 
European neutrals'. 
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Chapter Four A European Dimension 
The relationship of members of the Neutral and Nonaligned (NNA) 
caucus(with a population over one million) at recent Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review conferences to the 
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) has been: 1 
Table 4.1 Types of Participation in Nonaligned summits by members of 
Neutral and Nonaligned Caucus 
State 
Summit Austria Finland Sweden Switzerland Yugoslavia 
Belgrade 1961 
Cairo 1962 
Cairo 1964 
Lusaka 1970 
Full Member 
Algiers 1973 
Colombo 1976 
Havana 1979 
Delhi 1983 
I 
I 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
I 
o 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
I Invited but did not attend 
o Observer 
G Guest 
I 
I 
G 
G 
G 
G 
I 
G 
G 
G 
" " 
" " 
" " 
" " 
" " 
" " 
" " 
Sources: Harto Hakovirta, 'Effects of Non-Alignment on Neutrality in 
Europe An Analysis and Appraisal', Conflict and 
Cooperation, XVIII (1983) p.62 Table 1 'Participation by 
European Neutral States in the non-aligned summit meetings' 
Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana, (London, Frances 
Pinter, 1981) p.67. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 
Vol. XXXIX (1983) (London, Longman, 1983) pp.32349-55. 
Yugoslavia has attended all the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summits 
as a full member, whilst the other significant members of the NNA 
caucus have attended as Guests,with the single exception of Finland's 
Observer status in 1964. 2 Ireland has been involved neither in the 
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NNA caucus, nor in the NAM summits, not even apparently receiving an 
invitation to the latter. Despite its position in NAM, Yugoslavia 
will not be used for comparative purposes with Ireland, given its 
radically different political and socio-economic systems and its lack 
of involvement in mainstream West European developments. Finland 
will also be excluded given its similar lack of full participation in 
these developments, and more particularly because of the ambivalent 
nature of its position stemming from the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Particularly 
problematical are those provisions relating to an agreement for 
"assistance, in case of need" from the Soviet Union. 3 Moreover, 
whatever the arguments concerning that treaty, the Soviet Union has 
always regarded the essence of Finnish policy as being "benevolent 
relations" with the USSR. 4 
Austria, Switzerland and Sweden will be used as the basis of 
comparison, particularly Sweden since it is unfettered by constitution 
or international treaty obligations with respect to its position. 
Using these countries an attempt will be made to extrapolate a 
composite view of the essence of their position, although it needs to 
be remembered that each of these states "arrived at their neutrality 
under rather differel1t conditions", this being "reflected in the 
diversity of their ideas and policies".5 
'As regards the three neutral countries,6 
Despite the diversity, similarities in their position have been 
perceived both by third parties and by the countries themselves. 
They engaged, for example, in a "joint exercise" in negotiating with 
the European Community7 and joint activity has also been evident in 
their membership of NNA caucus at the CSCE conferences. They have 
all had the status of Guests at NAM summits, and have shared a common 
-97-
perception of how they differ from NAM members,recognizing the latter 
as lithe political expression" of the poor, whilst they, themselves, are 
rich. Indeed they do not wish "to be politically identified with such 
8 
states". As the Swedes have acknowledged, "many of the decisions 
made by this group diverge from Swedish views",9 as do the "origin" 
and "form" of nonaligned policies, even if the "foreign policy 
b ' t' , 'I ,,10 o Jec 1ves are Slm1 ar • The Europeans do wish, however, to be 
"fully acquainted with the views of the nonaligned group" 11 
The 'three neutral countries' also took a common position on the 
International Energy Programme and the International Energy Agency. 
They joined, given the insertion in their agreements of a special 
clause guaranteeing their neutral status, despite the provisions for 
weighted majority voting and the possibility of automatic activation 
f 'I h ' 12 o 01 -s ar1ng. Ireland, incidentally, did not insist on a 
similar clause. 
More generally, the three states have adopted broadly similar 
positions regarding West European institutions. Before turning 
specifically to those positions, however, the attitudes of Austria, 
Sweden and Switzerland towards alliances, trade, Western values and 
independence will be examined, as will theirreJection;of passive 
isolationalism as a basis for foreig~, policy. 
The three states are not signatories of any military treaties 
with other powers,13 nor indeed are they members of any military 
alliances. Austria and Switzerland have both consistently upheld 
that"A neutral country cannot join a military alliance in time of 
peace because in so doing it would destroy its ability to remain 
neutral in time of war".14 The Swedes have also predominantly taken 
this attitude, arguing that they "do not wish, by advance commitments, 
to deprive ourselves of the right and opportunity to remain outside a 
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new war,,15 and that "neutrality is not only a legal concept but indeed 
also a matter of policy. It implies a conduct, even in peacetime, 
which maintains confidence in the determination as well as the ability 
t . t 1 . . . " 16 o remaln neu ra ln war or crlS1S • Treaties, alliances and 
organizations which prejudice that ability are to be avoided. 
The Swedes have wavered when the issue of a Nordic or 
Scandinavian defence pact has arisen. Andren has characterized 
Swedish initiative on this issue as "remarkable" given that their 
"traditional policy of neutrality had meant not only freedom from 
engagements with the great powers but on the whole a stubborn refusal 
to undertake any military commitments in relation to any other state". 
The Swedish initiative, in fact, represented "an attempt to increase 
the possibilities to attain the first goal by giving up the second".17 
In 1948 the Swedes spoke out clearly against joining "any block 
of the Great Powers" on their own part. 18 But a year later, it was 
emphasised that this did not exclude the possibility of "blocs of 
equal, smaller countries", and clearly a "Scandinavian defence alliance 
is not a great power bloc".19 Clearly the Swedes were not against 
participation in alliance per se, but they would not participate in 
any alliance "if the aim would be that this alliance should form part 
of a major security system with the character of a great power alliance." 
Hence a Scandinavian defence alliance was only acceptable if "free of 
outside alliances". 
Moreover it was to be "directed towards neutrality in case of a 
conflict", and if not directly involved in the war the signatories 
were to consult on both the rules of their neutrality and maintaining 
their neutrality. In fact, whilst directed to "strengthening of 
the power of resistance of the participating countries in the event of 
an attack against anyone of them" this was linked to strengthening 
their neutrality, and to helping them "keep .•• outside a general 
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conflict, and in time of peace to stay outside other groups of powers". 
Whilst acknowledging that the plans represented "a departure and an 
important one from our policy of neutrality" the Swedes felt that 
given the conditions they had laid down, "this Scandinavian alliance 
would, looked at as a whole, mean an extension to all those countries 
of a zone not bound by any alliances to any third power. And so the 
main idea of Sweden's foreign policy would still be maintained." 
If agreed the Scandinavian arrangement would have been a thorough-
going alliance, since the Scandinavian countries "would consider 
themselves, from the point of view of defence, as one unit". There 
were to be plans for a joint defence council and joint defence, in 
addition to close collaboration in foreign policy. Crucially and 
fundamentally, an attack on anyone of the three signatories (Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway) was to be considered an attack on all, and the 
others "would be obliged immediately to render military aid". Also 
considered for a time was "a partial defensive cooperation in peace-
time without an alliance", although this seems to have been discarded 
since "the cooperation could not be pursued as far as possible within 
a defensive alliance, neither could it in war be set in motion as 
quickly and become effective". 
Moreo'rer, as Roberts has noted, "Sweden does not base her 
arguments for neutrality on any sweeping condemnations of alliances 
as such; indeed, there is a tendency to go to the opposite extreme 
and argue that neutrality is a function of the balance of power and 
can only exist in circumstancesof such a balance".20 Although by 
the late 1960s and 1970s many felt this basic condition of Swedish 
neutrality was "in a process of dissolution", an alliance balance has 
been crucial to Swedish policy.21 It has been given a particular 
twist and importance by the concept of the 'Nordic balance' and the 
position of Finland. 22 
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All three states have also given a number of general reasons for 
hostility to alliances. A basic factor has been "a stubborn, almost 
instinctive distrust of being entangled in great Power alliances and 
military blocs",23 a feeling "that the rest of the world is something 
dismal and threatening: hence, the best policy is to keep away from 
foreign entanglements".24 More specifically, there is a fear of being 
drawn into a war by an allied great power, and that membership "increases 
the risk that local conflicts of various kinds will be magnified into 
b . . l' t' l' " 25 ecomlng major po 1 lca lssues The real objection to alliances 
is the link between neutrality and independence of mind and action. 
There is a profound belief that neutrality is "the condition precedent 
for a free and independent attitude. Our deeply rooted resolve to 
define our own policy makes it impossible for us to consider joining 
alliances where decisions must nevertheless make allowances for the 
interests of all members".26 The governments have regarded it as 
inherently inimical to their basic policy that on various international 
questions, their attitudes should be determined beforehand by any 
group, so that a fundamental line of their foreign policy "of neutrality 
is that we shall be free to take our own stand and to rely on our own 
independent judgement".27 To pursue "a credible policy of neutrality, 
the neutral country has as a matter of principle to maintain its 
freedom of decision and action in all spheres of national policy".28 
The policy they have pursued is, of course, regarded as being "firmly 
anchored in our own interests",29 and is of their "own choosing".30 
The problem of choosing, however, is exacerbated by the trade patterns 
and linkages of the economies concerned. The foreign trade 
distribution of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland over a twenty year 
period (Table 4.2) reveals the following pattern: 
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Table 4.2 Foreign trade by area * 
1961 1971 1981 
% imports % exports % imports % exports % imports % exports 
Sweden 
OECD 79.6 78.3 84.2 85.2 79.5 78 
OECD Europe 68.2 73.8 73 87.8 66.6 68.4 
Comecon 4.4 4.2 4.8 4.3 4.5 3.9 
Austria 
OECD 78.7 69.7 81.7 74.8 74.7 70.4 
OECD Europe 72.8 65.8 75.5 66.8 66.5 64.9 
Comecon 3.1 14.6 9.1 12.2 11.9 11.4 
Switzerland 
OECD 85.5 68.5 90.2 77.4 86 72.9 
OECD Europe 75.2 59.2 78.2 59.9 72.68 57.6 
Comecon 2.3 3.2 2.2 4.0 4.0 3.28 
* It should be noted that over the years the figures for various countries 
and groups are not always strictly identical,but the margin of error is 
small. 
Sources 
OECD Economic Surveys (Paris, Organisation for European Cooperation 
and Development): 
Sweden (July 1982) p.64, (March 1967) pp.36-7 
Austria (February 1983) p.72, (July 1976) p.54, 
(March 1967) p.33 
Switzerland (May 1983) p.54, (March 1976) p.56, 
(February 1972) p.76 
and OECD Statistic Bulletin Series A (monthly) (Paris, Organisation for 
European Cooperation and Development) 
The foreign trade of 'the three neutrals' has been decisively with 
the West, particularly with West European markets. Austria, Sweden 
and Switzerland have, themselves, been extremely conscious of this 
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economic dependence and have not hidden their concern about it. 31 The 
figures also help to explain why the neutrality-economic priority 
debate has been significant in these countries,given the question: 
"should the country be allowed to stagnate by not participating in an 
essential political-economic alliance? - or, equally difficult, should 
the reasoned principle of neutrality be abandoned in order to continue 
the economic well-being of the nation?,,32 Even if it was possible to 
avoid this dilemma, Austria, Sweden and Swi tzerland have had "to come to 
terms with a politically loaded economic situation which threatens the 
very premise of neutrality, i.e. independence of action" 33 Nonetheless, 
there has not been any significant trade diversificaton, at least, 
between economic blocs. On the other hand, they have preferred a free 
trade policy as a way of enhancing independence. Clearly, however, 
whilst officially the Swedes have maintained that "neutrality is 
determined by fundamental evaluations relating to security policy, not 
by economic interests", it has not always been quite so clear cut. 34 
These problems are exacerbated by their close identification with 
West European developments and civilization. Even the careful Swiss 
have acknowledged that "We are not placed •.• between the Communist 
world and the Western world; we are part of the latter. Its 
civilization is ours", 35 the bonds, indeed, creating "a moral solidarity". 36 
The Austrian representative spoke in a similar vein,37 whilst the Swedes 
have regarded themselves as linked to Western Europe "by many links 
deriving from a common civilization and a common history no less than 
from geographical affinity".38 In fact, the three states are faced 
with a problem since whilst on the one hand "a strong emphasis on the 
fact that ••• foreign policy is conducted without ideological ties 
would undermine the feeling of solidarity with the democracies",39 on 
the other hand, too great an emphasis upon that solidarity, leading 
perhaps to "neutrality with a Western flavour",40 is subversive of the 
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necessary credibility of independence which is essential for neutrality. 
One way in which these states have attempted to overcome this 
problem has been in the pursuit of active and independent foreign 
policies, with the concomitant affirmation of the belief that the 
"policy of neutrality is not an isolationist policy".41 This has been 
most marked in the Swedish case and the current Swedish position is 
centred around a belief that they have a posi ti ve contribution to make 
and that neutrality does not require silence. Indeed this is regarded 
as strengthening their own position, as "long as these standpoints are 
independent standpoints on matters of principle, there is no reason 
to suppose that they detract from the credibility of our policy of 
neutrality. On the contrary, ••• our independent opinions ..• can if 
anything help to make our neturality more convincing" 42 Somewhat 
hesitantly, even the Swiss have now acknowledged that isolationalism 
"is not only a crime but a political blunder".43 The Austrians under 
Chancellor Kreisky have also moved to a more active role. 
The essence of 'the three neturals' policies, however, has been 
the need to be seen to be independent, since neutrality is to some extent 
in the eye of the beholder, and the concomitant need to retain as much 
sovereignty and freedom of action as is possible. 
(a) the need to be seen to be independent 
For the Swedes "an essential condition determining whether a policy 
of neutrality can be maintained when put to the test is of course that 
the rest of the world must have confidence in the will of the neutral 
state to uphold without faltering its chosen line of foreign policy ... 
We must make it clear by words and deeds that it is our intention in the 
event of war to use the freedom of action we have possessed in peace-
time to assert our neutrality. We must not give the Great Powers any 
grounds for suspecting that Swedish territory may be placed at the 
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disposal of another Power and form a base from which an attack could 
be launched. Our foreign policy must not be drawn up so as to give 
rise to suspicions in the country of one Great Power or expectations 
in the country of another" 44 
Indeed, the Swedes have tried to emphasize that even "If a war 
between the Great Powers breaks out, we cannot choose, even in a critical 
situation and under heavy external pressure, to enter the war on the side 
of one of the belligerents".45 The problem is, of course, that all 
states retain the ultimate right to choose. 46 To try and demonstrate 
otherwise, to attain a high degree of credibility, the policy must be 
pursued with consistency and steadfastness, "it must not be made 
dependent on transitory factors but must be an expression of a lasting 
programme. 47 The world must be able to rely on our assurances". 
Periodically the government has argued that a high degree of domestic 
unity on the issue is the strongest guarantee for the policy's success 
and credibility.48 The neutral must be particularly aware that in 
"an acute and tense situation it is particularly important ••• not to 
give the rest of the world the impression that ••• actions are 
dependent upon consultations with a certain group of states".49 Even 
more fundamentally, it must recognize that to renounce its right to 
defend itself, would also be renouncing its chances of upholding 
neutrality in a future war. A neutral must recognize that "defence 
effort is an instrument of .•• foreign policy. It makes •.. foreign 
policy more credible". Yet if not taken seriously "it immediately 
affects the question of confidence in .•• tenacity to uphold ... chosen 
line of policy", giving rise perhaps to expectations and distrust. At 
worst it might be contended "that we were trying to ensure that we 
should be able to coordinate our policy with that of a Great Power in 
the event of armed conflict".50 In fact, the credibility and 
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viability of neutrality presupposes a strong, independent defence. 51 
It too is an essential precondition of the policy for neutrality. 
(b) the need to retain as much sovereignty and freedom 
of decision and action as possible 
This dimension may be divided into political, economic and military 
elements, which inter-relate and over-lap. The political element is 
apparent from the repeated stress upon the link between independence, 
national interest and neutrality, and also in their attitude to 
alliances. It will be examined in more detail in the discussion of 
attitudes to European cooperation. 52 
Many of the same concerns are apparent in the economic element, 
since the need to "maintain ••• freedom of decision and action ••• 
includes economic and trade policY",53 and "undoubted viability in 
economic life" is a crucial condition of neutrality.54 Strictly 
speaking, such economic viability and independence requires self-
sufficiency and reliance upon one's own resources. Any diminution in 
this area involves the potential loss of economic sovereignty, which 
in turn has repercussions for political sovereignty by undermining 
independence of action. 55 The three neutrals are aware of these 
requirements, but they are also aware that in a world of growing inter-
dependence they "must frame their policies in such a way that it is 
possible for them to reap the benefits of cooperation without giving 
up their independence and national identity. 
be a difficult tight-rope act".56 
On occasion this can 
One solution has been the stress upon 'total defence', whereby an 
economic defence programme becomes an indispensable component of 
defence, since if "economic defence or ••. civil defence arrangements 
are not sufficiently strong, there is less likelihood that other 
nations will have confidence in our ability to defend our neutrality 
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••• We must be able to hold out in the case of a blockade". 57 Special 
efforts, therefore, have been made in regard to economic preparedness, 
seeking lito ensure necessary supplies in the event of war and in 
situations where war or conflicts outside Sweden threaten our independence 
and disrupt international trade". 58 Such action was also to apply to 
peacetime crises. 
The problem is that the countries are part of the international 
division of labour as Roberts points out, and given their trading 
patterns are so committed in a particular way, it is difficult to 
see how "suddenly in a crisis" they would be able lito reverse the 
dependence on international trade". 59 All the states concerned are so 
committed to international trade, they would find it difficult to meet 
the requirements of self-sufficiency, despite efforts at strategic 
t k '1' 60 s oc -Pl lng. On the other hand, the _crucial question in a crisis 
would not necessarily be maintaining the current (or recent) standard 
of living, but avoiding involvement in a war, whatever the economic 
consequences may be. It is clearly a matter of judgement what minimum 
requirements are necessary lito safeguard the survival of the people and 
the maintenance of the most essential functions of society •.. 11. 61 It 
is worth noting that states do not necessarily put a certain level of 
economic development as their foremost va~ue, and all three states 
have, to some extent, in their peacetime policy been prepared to make 
, 'f' f t l't 62 economlC sacrl lces or neu ra 1 y. 
Whilst economic independence and the political freedom of action 
are indispensable props to neutrality, even more crucial, although not 
entirely separate is the question of defence. 63 It is crucial for 
credibility and independence that a state has the physical ability to 
defend its territory (including, if appropriate, its territorial waters), 
its interests, and its neutral rights. 
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Few in the countries concerned have any illusions that neutrality 
offers complete security, but there is a sense, in those neutrals with 
long experience of neutrality, Sweden and Switzerland, that, on the 
whole, armed neutrality has served them well in the past. It is, 
however, also appreciated that "no solution exists which in the present 
situation is completely satisfactory" regarding defence and security.54 
The fundamental solution has been neutrality with the concomitant 
attitude to alliances. It leads to a disavowel of help, an emphasis 
upon own resources, and to a belief in a significant defence effort 
with a willingness to pay the price. 
The explicit disavowel of help is crucial, and applies to both 
formal and informal arrangements, since "only by making it clear that 
it will not be forced into an alliance, nor tolerate a 'friendly' 
intervention, can a neutral convince its adversary that it really is 
neutral, and not a wavering and potentially hostile power" 55 There 
must be a lack of preparation for or expectation of, receipt of military 
assistance from other states. The neutral must act independently, 
relying upon its own resources and stressing self-help, and "cannot 
let others assume responsibility for ••• (its) security". Moreover, 
they regard neutrality as "a policy that would have little substance 
if it were not secured by a well-equipped defence".55 Furthermore 
given the feeling that avoidance of dependency upon imported arms and 
supplies is crucial, it is also necessary, as far as practicable to 
supply one's own weapons and equipment. 57 
If defence and self-sufficiency is taken seriously then there must 
also be a willingness to accept the consequences in terms of 
expenditure. This appears to have been the case in Sweden, with an 
acceptance that they could not "create the society we want, nor carry 
out the foreign policy we want, unless we are prepared to pqy the 
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price".68 Thus by the 1970s the Swedes could boast that their defence 
expenditure per capjta "is by far the highest in Europe", although 
clearly, this was not the case for either Austria or Switzerland, and 
by the end of the decade Sweden had fallen behind others. 69 Indeed the 
much vaunted Swedish defence effort came under strain in the late 1970's, 
experiencing "a period of retrenchment and contraction", caused by "new 
and more pessimistic evaluations than before of Sweden's economic and 
technological potential". Inside Sweden this development has been 
"accompanied by gloomy predictions ..• on the future capability of the 
defence organization".70 Nevertheless, in comparison with other 
European states, Sweden still ranked sixth in 1982 in terms of kronor 
per capita defence expenditure, and tenth in terms of percentage of GNP 
71 
spent on defence with 3.6%. In comparison with other European non-
members of alliances in 1982, Sweden also emerges relatively highly, 
see Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Comparative Defence Effort of European Non-alliance 
states - 1982 
$ per head % of GNP Numbers in armed forces 
Austria 112 1.3 49,400 
Eire 101 2.0 16,400 
Finland 179 1.8 36,900 
Sweden 379 3.6 64,500 
Switzerland 314 2.1 20,000 
Yugoslavia 132 5.2* 252,500 
* Derived from Gross Material Product. 
Source: 
The Military Balance 1982-3, (London, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1982) p.124, Table 5 
Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and 
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Military Manpower. 
The Military Balance 1984-5, (London, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1984) p.140, Table 4 
Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and 
Military Manpower. 
Sweden takes defence seriously, although the same is perhaps less 
true of Austria and Switzerland. This may reflect the differing 
foundations of their position. 
Statistics alone, of course, cannot answer, indeed it is almost 
impossible to answer, whether these efforts are 'enough?' .72 The 
Swedes have admitted that "no defence of our making would have 
sufficient scope to meet every eventuality. The degree of security 
our defence arrangements can give us must always be limited". 73 
Nonetheless, they do believe "our defence efforts do show that we take 
out neutrality seriously ••. 11,74 that it "prevents the emergence of a 
military vacuum in northern Europe. It should also enable Sweden to 
repulse even far-reaching attempts to violate Swedish neutrality during 
hostilities". 75 
Also significant is the Swedish conception of the circumstances of 
the likely attack. The Swedes believe Sweden would not be an 
objective lito be attacked except in conjunction with a major conflict. 
There is no reason for an isolated attack on Sweden and we do not 
therefore take such an attack much into account. In a major conflict 
.•• even the Great Powers must plan the use of their resources .•. and 
they cannot therefore afford to throw in overwhelming troop 
concentrations against a minor secondary objective. Accordingly we 
are building up a defence which has naturally not much of a chance of 
surviving against a concentrated attack by a Great Power but which, 
nevertheless, may be rather troublesome to overcome if Sweden is a 
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secondary objective " 76 It is a strategy of deterrence, which as 
in the case of Switzerland aims to "deter attack by raising the price 
77 
of entry". As Roberts notes, it is not so much that any attack 
could not succeed but rather that it "would be unpleasant and costly 
78 for the attacker". The Swedish position is reinforced by a belief 
that there are "no areas of primary strategic interest to the great 
power blocs within our borders".79 Sweden would therefore hope "to 
refuse to be at the beck and call of any Great Power" and "to defend 
oursel ves against violations of our integrity and threats of attack". 80 
It is noticeable, however, that to some extent the defensive ambitions 
of the countries concerned are inherently limited. There is much 
stress on the defensive aspects of their policies. What appears not 
to be worthy of mention, or only marginally, is a more positive defence 
in the sense of defence of neutral's rights, such as trade. 
Although periodically the appropriate strategy has been called into 
Question,8l the countries concerned have been consistent in the basic 
principles they have espoused, namely:- non-participation in great 
power alliances with a concomitant insistence upon their own resources 
and a disavowel of outside help, coupled with an attempt to have a 
deterrent strategy based upon a reasonably strong defensive effort. 
Attitude to European institutions 
In the postwar period the foregoing factors have been perhaps the 
major variables in the attitude of the 'three neutral countries' to 
European institutions, particularly the European Community. A 
combination of these variables and attitudes provides further evidence 
to aid the elaboration of their position, and serves also as a further 
basis of comparison with the Irish Republic. 
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland have all become full members of 
the Council of Europe, despite Soviet hostility to the Council. 82 
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Importantly, the Council of Europe can only make recommendations, whilst 
article l(d) of the statute states "Matters relating to national defence 
do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe".83 This 
question, of vital importance to the neutrals, was the subject of early 
constitutional difficulties within the Council, given the call, in 1950, 
in the Assembly for a European Army. After dispute between the 
Assembly, which wished to delete l(d) and the Committee of Ministers, 
the latter finally accepted that the Assembly might discuss "the 
political aspects of European peace and security", though it could not 
address recommendations to the Committee on this issue. 84 In fact, 
the Assembly has taken as a guide the suggestion that "it can properly 
discuss questions which, in a national parliament would be dealt with 
by the minister for foreign affairs, but not those that would be handled 
by the. minister of defence".85 It has avoided military questions in 
the technical sense, but proposals for the European Defence Community 
and the Western European Union have been discussed by the Assembly. 
The real problem initially, however, for Sweden was the federalist 
desire to use the Assembly as at best a constituent assembly for a new 
Europe, or at least, to delete l(d) and allow discussion of 'political' 
questions. A further difficulty emerged with the Eden Plan of 1952, 
which envisaged remodelling the Council of Europe so that it could 
also serve as the institutional framework of the European Coal and 
Steel Community, the proposed European Defence Community, and other 
subsequentdevelopments. 86 The Swedish reaction was vehement, with 
Foreign Minister Unden pointing out that "Sweden would not be able to 
engage herself in any way in an international organisation for joint 
defence, seeing that we have chosen our line of no alliances". Joining 
the EDC would be the same as joining NATO, but even "a looser form of 
adhesion as would result from the EDC forming, so to say, an element of 
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the Council of Europe would naturally have as a consequence that we 
were forced to reconsider our entire position within the Council". 
He was emphatic that an essential condition of Swedish entry to the 
Council had been the existence of l(d), and that whilst Sweden could 
not veto revision of the Statute, he felt Swedenw0uld leave rather 
than stop what other members desired. Interestingly, as of May 1952, 
he felt that "probably all members of the Council of Europe except 
Sweden are in favour of the British proposal ... and it is to be 
expected that it will be proceeded with in a positive direction".87 
In fact this was not the outcome and the issue died after a few other 
88 proposals. 
It was the lack of centralized decision-making power which allowed 
these states to become founding members of OEECjOECD and the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA). Most importantly, there was a lack of 
supranational decision-making, and any common external tariff in EFTA. 
It was felt that whilst the obligations of a customs union would pose 
difficulties for neutrality, a free trade agreement did not, especially 
given certain escape clauses in the Stockholm Convention. 89 Its 
membership was different i.e. less close to NATO, and it did not have 
similar political objections as the EEC. 
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland and the European Community 
In attempting to determine their appropriate relationship with the 
European Community, the three neutrals have been faced with a fundamental 
conundrum: the nature of the Community. No-one has been entirely sure 
what was involved in membership in or association with the Community, 
given that "no one today can know what sort of EEC there will be ••• 
Will it be an EEC without supranational elements and without a political 
content other than of economic affairs and trade cooperation, or will it 
be an EEC according to the terms of the Treaty of Rome?,,90 
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Given this conundrum and changes in the policies and attitudes not 
only of the members but also important non-members, like the UK, the 
neutrals have had to live with unpredictable factors which they could 
not "directly influence but that pose(d) considerable problems of policy 
adjustment".91 It is thus perhaps not surprising that their own 
policies and attitudes have not been entirely consistent over the past 
twenty-five years. Moreover, since states are not monolithic actors, 
the neutrals have also been affected by internal political debate. 92 
Yet notwithstanding these difficulties, it is possible to identify a 
relatively consistent strand of principles and issues which have 
concerned the neutrals in their relationship with the Community and 
which may serve as a benchmark for comparative purposes, although some 
of these points have rather waxed and waned over the years. 
A real difficulty was an awareness that the decisive question of 
"whether membership in the EEC is compatible with or conflicts with 
a consistent policy of neutrality .•• cannot be answered by a formal 
study of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome".93 That one must study 
not only its concrete provisions, but "the history of the founding and 
development and the economic and political aims of the signatory powers" 94 
The general and political aims were regarded as integral to the Treaty 
of Rome "whether they have been directly expressed in the Treaty or not, 
there can be no misunderstanding on that point. The signatory Powers 
declare, ••• that its political content is one of the main points of 
the TreatY",95 and "the Swedish Government have taken the distinctly 
political purposes of the members of the Community quite seriously and 
not merely as empty words", assuming "the Community will energetically 
strive not only for economic integration but for political unification".96 
The Swiss also believed signature "of the Treaty of Rome involves 
acceptance of the spirit in which it was devised".97 
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Whilst Stalvant argues that by the spring of 1970 Prime Minister 
Palme believed that "at least some of the discussion about political 
goals within the EEC appeared to be empty rhetoric",98 nonetheless, the 
definition of the situation by the neutrals did involve a belief about 
the goal of political integration being inherent. Their view, regarding 
the European community, moreover, was reinforced at a critical moment 
by the Hague communique of December 1969 which "agreed to instruct the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs to study the best way of achieving progress 
in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlarge-
ment".99 Those Ministers, in their own reports issued in the summer 
of 1970, emphasised "the correlation between membership of the 
European Communities and participation in activities making for progress 
towards political unification". They also laid down that applicant 
states "will have to adhere" to the "objectives and machinery described 
in the present report ••• when they join the Communities", and accept 
that "in line with the spirit of the Preambles to the Treaties of Paris 
and Rome, tangible form should be given to the will for a political 
union".100 It is thus perhaps not surprising that the Swedish 
government concluded that it is "obvious that the Davignon cooperation 
is regarded as an important stage in the realisation of the political 
aims of the Treaty of Rome the a9ceptance of these aims being laid 
down as a pre-requisite for membership".101 Indeed the Hague 
communique itself had stressed that applicants must "accept the treaties 
and their political finality".102 The neutrals sincerely believed that 
there was a basic incompatability between the goal of a federal united 
Europe, or indeed even of some confederal arrangement, and the desire 
to be neutral. Inherent in conceptions of federalism and political 
unification was the notion that the Community should progressively act 
"as a single entity" so that a "genuinely European foreign policy" and a 
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'European identity' could evolve. 103 Discussions had repeatedly taken 
place on these questions, some dating from proposals for a European 
Defence Community and an associated EuropeanpoliticalCommunity.104 A 
decade later there were the Fouchet negotiations following the Bonn 
"t f 105 summl 0 1961. Added significance, however, was given to these 
matters at the very moment when enlargement of the Community became a 
real possibility since as well as envisaging enlargement, the Hague 
summit also saw agreement to re-affirm the intention to pave "the way 
for a united Europe capable of ••. making a contribution" to the world. 106 
Moreover, when the Foreign Ministers reported later on how to achieve 
political union, as instructed by the summit, they argued that "foreign 
policy concertation should be the object of the first practical 
endeavours" in this area. Solidarity was to be enhanced "by working 
for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action 
where it appears feasible and desirable".107 This prospect worried the 
neutrals, who were adamant that they could not involve themselves with 
"cooperation in matters of foreign policy which is binding and which 
aims at the working out of common policies".108 Furthermore, they 
understood that East-West relations, and possibly defence, would be 
discussed in this framework, and that such discussions would not be 
confined to routine matters only, since the "nature· and intensity" of 
cooperation was to be "directly dependent upon whether there was an 
increase in tension and unrest in the world".109 The proposals, for 
example, did include provision for meetings of Heads of State or 
Government, in "the event of a serious crisis".110 The neutrals felt 
it was precisely at such times that they should not appear to be bound 
by consultations with others. 111 It may be that the neutrals took the 
proposals too much at face-value, but clearly it was legitimate to 
believe the Foreign Ministers meant what they said. 
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A further difficulty was the often assumed trinity of union, 
foreign policy and defence, given the belief that it was difficult to 
conceive of a union which would not be responsible for the defence of 
its citizens, or a common foreign policy that did not on the one hand 
guide that defence and on the other require a military instrument to 
sustain it. This perception was exacerbated by the fact that the 
union was clearly not going to be neutral, nonaligned or even alliance-
free. This had been made clear at Bonn with its declaration, that 
"only a united Europe, allied to the United states of America and 
other free peoples, is in a position to face the dangers which menace 
the existence of Europe and of the whole free world". Coordinated 
action, indeed, was partly for the purpose of "strengthening the 
Atlantic alliance tl • 112 
This declaration was a determining factor in the preparation of 
the seminal speech by the Swedish Prime Minister Erlander to the 
Swedish Steel and Metalworkers' Union on 22 August 1961. He noted 
that "the political aim of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance is no 
inducement for us to participate in European cooperation. On the 
contrary,in view of the fundamental line of our foreign policy, a 
political aim of this kind gives us very definite cause for restraint". 
He went on to stress all the reasons why this was so, particularly 
the need to "avoid commitments restricting our chances of enlisting 
confidence in our policy of neutrality and of carrying it out". An 
application for membership of the Community might do that since it 
"might be interpreted as a political move signifyng that we were 
prepared to depart from our policy of neutrality and to seek membership 
of the Atlantic Pact".113 
This was, of course, possible given the initial over-lapping 
membership of the Community and NATO, which generated fears that it 
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would not be possible "to distinguish clearly political solidarity 
within a group of states from military solidarity".114 It was not 
just, however, a question of virtual identity of membership, but also 
the fact that many outside observers saw the Treaty of Rome as 
"supplementary to the Atlantic Pact" as well as "strengthening it".115 
Paul-Henri Spaak saw "economic cooperation within the Community" as a 
"complement to the military cooperation of NATO", so that in his view 
they "belonged together".116 Moreover, apart from the Bonn Declaration, 
there was also the evidence of the Monnet Action Committee for the United 
States of Europe call for a "partnership between a united Europe and the 
United states".117 In other words, whilst the neutrals could see that 
initially military cooperation was likely to continue "in bodies other 
than the EEC ..• the intention to achieve political, economic and 
defence integration, has been voiced so often and so explicitly" that 
they felt they had "no choice but to pay regard to their declarations".118 
The neutrals could point to numerous statements by Community political 
leaders, and indeed by politicians from the applicant Britain, on the 
possibjljties of the question of military cooperation being taken up 
within tte framework of the EEC. 119 It seemed "unavoidable that 
progress towards a common foreign policy will be followed by a greater 
degree of cooperation in respect of defence".120 The real problem was, 
however, not the particular proposals but the general orientation that 
they revealed, so that whilst the neutrals did "not know how soon a 
common foreign policy will be worked out, neither do we know how soon 
such a common foreign policy will be linked with a common defence 
policy" ,121 they had legitimate grounds for believing that the member 
states of the Community were committed to such possibilities, and that 
Europe might well evolve in such a manner. 
The neutrals did not regard it as realistic to suppose that they 
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"could systematically coordinate ••• course in foreign affairs with that 
of the Western Powers while at the same time maintaining international 
confidence in ••• policy of neutrality".122 Sweden, for example, 
felt that its policy could not "be combined with declared or implied 
pledges that we will enter into systematic cooperation in foreign 
policy or consultations with a certain Power bloc ••• ".123 The precise 
legal text and obligation, the distinction between voluntary and 
obligatory cooperation, was not regarded as important as the impression 
created in the minds of others. Moreover the neutrals felt morally 
that they could not reserve their position on matters of foreign policy 
etc. which they knew prior to entry the Community members felt were 
. t 124 lmportan . 
There were other political problems too, some of which related 
directly to the treaties, such as the question of handing over the 
right of making decisions to the institutions of the common market. 125 
Indeed, Scheich writing from an Austrian perspective felt that "We 
have arrived at the point where the two spheres - neutrality and 
European integration - meet, or rather where they do not meet. 
Integration in the real sense of the word and with its institutional 
requirements is not compatible with the status of permanent neutrality. 
The neutral country is condemned to independence, condemned to staying 
alone".126 Even if by the 1970s there was a realization that over 
time the "efforts to institute supranational ties to determine the 
actions of the EEC states have become less intense",127 there was still 
a lack of preparedness "to give up our national sovereignty by 
transferring our right of decision-making on important economic and 
political questions to supranational organs ll • 128 
It should be remembered that despite the 1965-6 crisis and the 
Luxembourg agreement of 1966, the EEC treaty did still contain 
provision for the eventual usage of majority voting on a wide range of 
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issues after the end of the transitional period. The de jure position 
remained that established by the treaty. Thus, for the neutrals the 
fundamental problem remained unaltered. Indeed, if anything they 
became more concerned about this when the proposals for economic and 
monetary union were published, fearing the possibility of centralized 
d " k' , 1 'tt 129 eC1Slon-ma lng over crUCla economlC ma ers. Moreover, the 
neutrals did not take a sanguine view regarding the possibilities of 
using the veto, since "for a small, neutral country ..• It must be 
assumed that in practice the chances of using the right of veto will 
be very limited in cases where the neutral country stands alone" 130 
In addition, it was felt they "should accede to international cooperation 
only when we are convinced that we shall ourselves be able to make a 
constructive contribution ••• not ••• on the understanding that we must 
limit our participation by having recourse, if necessary, to the right 
131 
of veto". 
The insistence upon sovereignty related intimately to the desire 
to pursue a policy for neutrality, but there was a somewhat wider 
concern on the issue of sovereignty, with at least some voices in 
Sweden, for example, seeing close ties with the EEC as reducing 
Sweden's capacity to decide its own policies, it being an error "to 
purchase free trade with an expanded Community at the cost of 
limited sovereigntY",132 especially with the risk of a threat to 
l 't' 1" 'th' S d 133 ega 1 arlan po lCles Wl ln we en. Such arguments and pressures 
were "apparently a major secondary consideration (after neutrality) 
in the government's final decision against full membership".134 
The sovereignty issue is crucial vis-~-vis the Community since 
the eminent J.D.B. Mitchell has clearly argued that "already by 1973, 
the Treaty of Rome had become a constitution having its effects within 
the internal law of the whole Community and having consequentially 
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effects, even then sufficiently clear, on the constitutional situation 
and internal law of each of the original Member States". In addition, 
he argues, the EEC Treaty itself claims that certain decisions may be 
"directly applicable", for example, in article 189. Mitchell argues, 
therefore, that Community law does enjoy primacy, citing in addition 
the Van Gend en Loos and Simmenthal cases. The original treaties 
had become by 1973 "a constitution" according to Mitchell, which over-
rode national constitutions. 135 
Crucial is the question of whether a state can devolve its own 
sovereignty to an international organization for a period of time, 
or devolve a portion of its sovereignty? Whether, since it has only 
'devolved' that sovereignty it still actually retains ultimate 
sovereignty, because it can either reclaim the sovereignty which it has 
devolved or simply withdraw? Implicit in some of the arguments 
concerning accession in the new member states in 1973 was an assumption 
that despite a lack of a definitive clause within the treaties them-
selves concerning withdrawal, or the mechanism of withdrawal, any state 
could, of course, at any time use its power - physical and democratic -
to re-assert its sovereignty, that withdrawal was always possible from 
treaties, and that in reality the Community lacked any effective 
instruments for prohibitjng or physically stopping secession. Whilst 
this debate perhaps lacks clear resolution, the neutrals were insistent 
upon the formal and explicit right of denunciation being in any 
agreement with the Community, rather than relying upon unilateral 
denunciation, which might have left their status somewhat unclear in 
law. 
The foregoing does at least demonstrate that the arguments of 
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland were not specious nor mendacious, 
particularly if one attached importance to credibility and expectation. 
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To some extent the letter of the treaties, and prosaic legal argument, 
were secondary considerations. It was the perceptions of the neutrals 
and others which mattered. In addition, these arguments took place 
in the context of discussion on union, steps towards political 
cooperation and, latterly, economic and monetary union, as well as in 
the context of the specific treaty articles and policies on such 
questions as the Common Commercial Policy. 
However, the Swedes were clear that "even if" the process of 
political integration "was left out of account, it being maintained 
that the Teaty of Rome in actual fact only had a bearing on economic 
matters, we would nevertheless be compelled to point out that there 
are provisions in the Treaty which cannot be reconciled with our policy 
of neutrality in that certain cardinal points, few in number though 
they may be, affect our ability to implement it in practice".136 
Articles 223-225 of the EEC Treaty were and are a case in point, 
with the Swedes believing that on some interpretations, "in wartime 
all the institutions of the Common Market would continue to function 
more or less in the same way as in peacetime. If this interpretation 
is correct a neutral state would not be entitled in wartime to 
renounce its obligations", and as such there was a legal impediment 
between membership and continuing neutrali~y.137 More generally, 
even as late as 1984 a Chatham House study argued "Article 224, which 
recognised that the operation of the common market depended on security 
factors, could be generously interpreted to permit Community concern 
with defence in cases in which the market's operations might be under 
threat as a result of civil and international disorder", and further 
suggested that defence was not formally excluded "from the Community 
agenda in the Treaty of Rome. Instead it was largely ignored 
Unless the narrow view is taken that anything not specifically allowed 
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is illegal, it would seem that the EC could expand into defence without 
actually violating the Treaty of Rome if its members so chose. 
Evidence favouring a wide interpretation of the Treaty can be found 
in the Preamble, which notes members' determination to 'strengthen 
the safeguards of peace and liberty', and in Article 235 ••• ".138 
Clearly, the 'three neutral countries' took a similar view in the 
earlier period.· 
other problems arose with the EEC Treaty in respect of its 
internal provisions per ~, its internal provisions with external 
effects and its specifically external provisions. Whilst it may be 
true that in the external area as a whole the legal and treaty 
competence of the Community is relatively limited in scope, in that 
the "Rome Treaty ... did not dwell at length or in detail on the 
external relations of the Community, apart from the provisions for 
association and trade agreements and a common commercial policY",139 
in these areas Community organs can playa significant role in shaping 
the economic and trade relations between the Community, its member 
states and third parties,140 
Most important in this respect is article 113 establishing a 
Common Commercial Policy based upon "uniform principles, particularly 
in regard to changes in tariff roles, the conclusion ef tariff and 
trade agreements, the achievements of uniformity in measures of 
liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade , •. ". 
The article also gives the Commission a specific negotiating role, 
albeit "within the framework of such directives as the Council may 
. t ·t" 141 lssue 0 1 • In 1970 a common foreign trade policy came into 
being, and since 1 January 1973 the member states of the Community 
have not been free to conclude independent bilateral trade agreements. 
They were to be replaced by multilateral agreements negotiated by the 
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Commission under the terms of article 113, the European Community 
henceforth acting as a collective entity in such matters. Indeed in 
1974 "the Commission began to insist that all negotiations for trade 
agreements with East European countries be conducted exclusively by 
the Community".142 This made the policy of interest to neutrals who 
will also have been aware that all the countries of the Community, 
bar Ireland, were members of NATO, and that NATO had sought to operate 
an embargo of strategic goods towards Eastern Europe. 
The customs union and Common External Tariff (CET) were also, in 
fact, important foundations of the external policy of the Community, 
the CET being the basic instrument of the Community's trade policy. 
It has meant, for example, that the Community states have negotiated 
collectively in both GATT and other international forums. Moreover, 
the Community has begun, on occasion, to be represented by the Council 
Presidency, or the Commission, or some combination thereof, on trade 
and commercial matters. 143 The neutrals were also aware that third 
countries, especially on economic matters, were more conscious of the 
unity and strength of the Community than they were of the centrifugal 
pressures and divisions within it. 
Whilst the apparently severe restrictions upon members in 
concluding trade agreements did not come to pass, the neutrals made 
their judgement upon the basis of the relevant Treaty articles, as 
well as their understanding of the motivations and principles behind 
the CCP and Community trade policy, in addition to the declaratory 
policy of the member-states and therefore, had reason to suspect the 
possibility of supranational intervention, or worse, in their 
commercial policies. Indeed, they considered "The rules on trade 
with outside countries are .•. most characteristic of the political 
restrictions imposed upon its members by the Treaty of Rome".144 
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In fact,the forma1 transfer of externa1 economic re1ations 
competences has been heavily constrained by the increasing use which 
has been made of so-called economic cooperation agreements between 
individual member-states and non-members, which have been developed as 
a means of by-passing Treaty requirements and obligations under CCp.145 
The significant point, however, remains the genuineness of the neutrals' 
belief prior to 1973 and the general cause for that belief whfch existed. 
Moreover, since that time it has been clear that foreign economic policy 
cannot always be separated neatly from foreign policy or even security, 
and that the economic external relations of the Community have, on 
occasion, been given a 'political' flavour. 146 
Another area of the Rome Treaty having an external dimension is, 
of course, Part IV 'Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories' (articles 131-136), whereby the dependent territories of 
the member states were to be linked with the EEC. This further 
contributed to a certain image of the Community as capitalist or 
" "1" t 147 1mper1a 1S . Whatever one's view on this, the capability of 
Community institutions to negotiate association agreements with these, 
and other countries, is a significant aspect of the international trade 
relations of the Community, particularly given the ever-spiralling 
numbers involved. Another form or category of association is 
provided for by article 238 which allows for "agreements establishing 
an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common 
action and special procedures". It is necessary under article 238 
for the Council to act with unanimity.148 Countries treated in this 
manner have included Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, and prior to membership, 
Greece. 
As noted earlier, however, the role of the Community in the world 
is not to be seen as simply the outcome of specific articles on 
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external trade policy. One of the most important internal policies, 
the CAP, has, in fact, been another important element of the Community's 
external relations and personna. The establishment of CAP also imposed 
specific restraints on certain areas of member-states' trading policy.149 
For a while, given the commitment to economic and monetary union, it 
appeared that the Community would also have this as a basis for common 
external activity. This development, however, has been hampered by 
fundamental policy differences. 150 A somewhat similar disjointed 
picture emerges in another area where there is an overlap between the 
treaties and non-treaty areas, namely energy.151 Whilst the EEC Treaty 
does not specify the development of an energy policy, given the very 
remit of Euratom and ECSC, energy has been central to the Communities 
development. It is also true that the treaties have direct interaction 
with the international environment. The EEC also could not avoid 
involvement either, particularly given the events of 1973. Although 
most would judge that the EEC failed to rise to the challenge, this is 
an area where united common action could have important international 
consequences. It may also illustrate that as well as specific articles 
of the treaties potentially causing problems, it may well be that the 
very base for their survival, wh~ther outlined in the treaties or not, 
also could cause difficulties for members, especially if neutral. 
There are several areas where the linkage between the political 
objectives, the economic means as embodied in the treaties and that 
undefined grey area of spill-over between treaty and non-treaty concerns 
and activities can be domonstrated. One such is the attempt to evolve 
a global Mediterranean policy,152 another is the signing of the Lome 
Agreements by both Community and national authorities i.e. under the 
system of 'mixtes accords' ,153 and a third in an allegedly 'low' 
political area, namely access to Icelandic waters. Rosemarie Allen 
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has suggested that the "small lever in the Community's hands to prjse 
open access to these rich fishing grounds was the wish on the part of 
the Icelandic Government to increase its tiny share of industrial 
exports to the EEC. This lever was not, however, used because 
strategic considerations about Iceland's position in NATO restrained 
the Nine from exerting such pressure".154 
Most discussion of these problems has centred upon the EEC Treaty, 
but it should be noted that problems exist under the Euratom Treaty 
also. In the 'external' area, for example, articles 103 and 106 
curtail the freedom of member states to conclude agreements with third 
parties. Article Two also has implications for sovereignty and also 
for the external relations of the member-states, and does represent 
some curtailment of a member-state's independence. 155 For Sweden 
with its own uranium, the possibility of part or all of the 
responsibility for its use being transferred to Euratom, and possibly 
onwards to the programmes of other states, was particularly worrying, 
if not publicly referred to by the Government. This latter 
observation is also true of the ECSC Treaty, which gave the High 
Authority (now the merged Commission) direct control over certain 
aspects of the activities of firms within states, and a role with 
relation to prohibiting 'unfair competitive practices' or 
'discriminatory practices' by states. 156 
All of the foregoing touched upon the issue of political freedom 
of action and specifically in connection with neutrality, these 
concerns led directly to the so-called "neutrality reservation" 
entered by all of the neutrals in their approaches to the Community 
as early as 1961. In essentials, the reservation was the same for 
each country, although in each case each year saw slightly different 
formulations. As outlined by the Swedish Minister of Commerce 
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before the EEC Council of Ministers on 28 July 1962, there was 
essentially three neutrality requirements. 157 
"The first of the neutrality points relates to trade policy 
towards third countries ••• As a neutral Country, we would have to 
keep a certain liberty of action and to reserve the competence to 
negotiate and sign agreements with third countries in our own name. 
On the other hand we are prepared, within institutional arrangements 
for consultation, to coordinate our tariff and trade policy closely 
with that of the Community." 
"The second neutrality point relates to the safeguarding of 
certain supplies vital in wartime." The neutrals wanted the clear 
right to be able to take certain measures to safeguard supplies and 
resources. 
"The third point has to do with a neutral country's need to be 
able to take or abstain from measures according to the requirements 
of neutrality. It may, for instance in cases of war and grave 
international crisis, have to introduce controls on trade or to 
refrain from taking part in sequestration of property directed 
against a belligerent. The derogation from any common action in an 
integrated market, which this need might imply, would be of varying 
importance according to the circumstance. But it is not excluded 
that it might go as far as the suspension of "parts of, or the whole 
of, the agreement ••. or withdrawal from the agreement," and the 
Minister referred to the provisions of article 224, which allowed 
the possibility of certain derogations to member states in some 
circumstances. The neutrals were adamant that if the international 
situation warranted it, they must be free to "take, or omit to take 
certain steps, even if necessary" terminating the agreement. 158 
Whilst these were the central reservations, on occasions other 
elements were added, or the above were embellished. One such 
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additional requirement was the insistence upon the unanimity principle 
in any joint institutions involving the neutrals and the community.159 
In summing up the reservations expressed in 1961-62, and indeed 
subsequently, the Swedish Minister of COmmerce was anxious to emphasize 
that "the three neutrality requirements •.• have the common feature of 
implying a certain liberty of action or right of derogation for the 
neutral country ... A basic feature of the liberty of action to be 
reserved is to make it possible for the neutral country not to take 
part in measures which, although of an economic nature, are actuated 
by political considerations alone and directed against third 
t . ,,160 coun rles • This, of course, is of relevance not only regarding 
'liberty of action' but is also a revealing insight, again, into how 
the neutrals viewed the Community as rather more than a narrow 
economic arrangement. 
What the neutrals really wanted was "to retain the right to 
determine their policies unilaterally and independently", and to 
arrive at the same result as the Community but in their own way.161 
Any convergence of policy was to be by their own decision and not 
imposed by a third party, and certainly not to flow automatically 
from majority decision in a supranational body. 
The decision about the relationship between Austria, Sweden 
and Switzerland and the Community was not solely in their hands, 
since it also crucially depended upon the attitude of the Community. 
Whilst there was no consistent exposition by the members of their 
attitude to neutrality, it is clear, however, that the most ardent 
Europeans were hostile to the very notion of neutrality. Indeed, 
in November 1961 President Hallstein of the EEC Commission attacked 
neutrality arguing that European neutrality had its origins in 
European conflicts, but that the aim of European unificaton was to 
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make war in Schuman's phrase "not merely unthinkable, but materially 
, 'bl " 162 lmpossl. e. It aimed to abolish the very state of affairs which 
created neutrality and occasioned its existence, and all effort, 
therefore, should go in the attempt to make war impossible. 
Another prominent European, Paul-Henri Spaak had said at the 
beginning of 1963 that he did not believe that the Community should 
open its doors to countries which did not share its political ideal 
and philosophy, especially the philosophy underlying the Treaty of 
163 Rome. Moreover, many felt that there was not necessarily any 
inherent incompatibility between membership and neutrality, and that, 
as a result, the neutrals were trying to gain advantages without the 
reciprocal obligations. The problem of attitude to the neutrals was 
further complicated by the fact that within each member-state various 
pressure groups held their own views. 164 The predominant view of 
the pro-Europeans was that there was a need to preserve their 
aspirations and the integrity of the Community. If non-members were 
prepared to accept these, then the Community would (France 
permitting) welcome them. If not, then perhaps no arrangement would 
be possible. The Community was anxious that no special arrangement 
should weaken its own cohesion, or lead to an impression that some 
form of loose arrangement without acceptance of far-reaching 
objectives was possible. In this latter respect, there was a fear of 
creating precedents. 
One of the most considered responses to the neutrals' arguments 
came in the First Struye Report of 1962, and it must be recognized 
that it came to diametrically opposed conclusions to the neutrals 
, b t 't d ' 't t' d ' , t 165 concernlng oth he soverelgn y an maJorl Y vo lng eC1Sl0ns argumen s. 
Struye argued that one could no longer regard sovereignty as one and 
indivisible, that states could voluntarily, and often did, limit their 
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own powers or delegate them to others. If sovereignty simply meant 
"the powers belonging to the state" permanent neutrality only 
affected them "in a field which is strictly limited by rules of law" 
and that that area apart (in any case very narrow in peacetime) "the 
powers of the state and consequently its sovereignty are not subjected 
to any restrictions". The state could therefore exercise these 
powers "in complete freedom", even delegating them to "supranational 
authorities" except where "such limitations or delegations are 
concerned with fields which are affected by neutrality". The 
conclusion was that such limitations or delegations would be 
incompatible with neutrality as a goal "if they prevent the state 
from deciding freely whether to take part or not in a war, or threaten 
the very existence of the State concerned. This is not so of the 
limitations of sovereignty contained in the Treaty of Rome". 
Perpetually neutral states "can, at least in time of peace, submit to 
the majority decisions of the Treaty of Rome, as these do not concern 
fields affected by the law of neutrality". Similarly, in time of 
peace, "participation in a joint commercial policy as laid down in the 
Treaty of Rome raises no legal objection" for the neutral. Very 
significantly, however, it was admitted, somewhat grudgingly, that 
"such participation by neutpals in a joint commercial policy might be 
considered as incompatible with the duties of neutral states in time 
of war if one follows the extensive interpretation of the duty of 
impartiality" with the result that the neutral might have "to leave" 
the Community, in order to avoid participation in potentially 
discriminatory commercial decisions. But this conclusion was some-
what weakened by a reference to neutrals being allowed to maintain 
"normal intercourse" and trade. Notwithstanding the problems caused 
by the CCP, Struye concluded "in our opinion neither the independence 
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nor the neutra1 i ty of the States we have been dealing with would be 
threatened by their participation in the European Economic Community". 
The problem is, however, that it is difficult to be quite so sanguine 
about the impact of membership of the Community and its implications 
for independence and neutrality, as is Struye. 
Before examining the final outcome in 1972 it is necessary to 
briefly discuss the attitude of the Soviet Union to the European 
Community. Although this does not appear to have been a decisive 
factor in either Swedish or Swiss discussions (the case of Austria was 
different because of the events, undertakings and treaty of 1955) it 
remains important in the sense that if these states were concerned 
about the damage membership might do to their image and credibility, 
then the attitude of the Soviets, would have been an important guide 
for them. The opinion of the other super power regarding the 
Community was clear and indeed US support for the European idea had 
on a number of occasions been crucial and an important stimulus to 
European action. 
In the Soviet mind there seems to have been a clear linkage 
between the economic, political and military moves towards integration. 
They were regarded as tools of US capitalism, cold war instruments and 
an economic underpinning of NATO. In 1957 the, Soviet Union gave its 
considered view on the Common Market in the form of 17 theses, which 
argued that "under cover of the 'unification' of Europe, the 
imperialist promoters of integration have divided Europe into economic, 
political and military groups opposed to one another; they have 
created an aggressive military bloc of Western European powers aimed 
against the Soviet Union and the popular democracies".166 In 1962 
32 theses echoed very much the 17 theses. One significant difference 
by 1962, however, was the recognition that the Common Market was an 
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economi.c and political reality, which had to be countered, contained 
and its expansion prevented. This attitude was combined with a 
refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to the Community or to treat 
. t t· t . d' It' It' 167 1 as an en 1 y ln lp oma lC re a lons. 
This basic hostility has remained the fundamental Soviet position, 
although they have had to come to terms with the Community's continuing 
existence and enlargement, and the change of atmosphere in the 1970s 
given detente and Ostpolitik. Moreover, in the early 1970s the 
movement towards the CCP, especially as it affected state-trading 
countries, was also significant. Given these developments there was 
a certain moderation of rhetoric and by 1972 Brezhnev was 
contemplating the possibility of business relations between Comecon 
and the community.168 What is clear is that in the critical years 
1961-1972, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland could have been in no doubt 
concerning the Soviet attitude. 
Certainly the Austrians could have been in even less doubt about 
the Soviet attitude, given, for example, the Khrushchev warning in 
1960 that the Soviet Union would not tolerate violation of Austrian 
neutrality, nor of the provision of the 1955 State Treaty prohibiting 
"all agreements having the effect, either directly or indirectly, of 
promoting political and economic union with Germany", with the Soviets 
inclining to interpreting a relationship with the Community in that 
vein. 169 The Soviets reiterated their concern in 1972. In fact, 
the Soviets did not make a major issue of this, and the Austrians 
have not yielded to the Soviet warnings, although these may well have 
reinforced Austrian conclusions or stiffened their attitude. 170 
The actual arrangements involving Austria, Sweden and Switzerland 
were virtually identical with one another, and were preferential trade 
agreements establishing a free trade area in industrial products but 
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excluding agriculture. Sjgnificantly the agreements were concluded 
under article 113 (ie. CCP arrangements) and not article 238 
( , t' t ) 171 aSSOCla 10n agreemen s • The neutrals themselves made much of 
article 21 (in all three agreements) which allowed them to take "any 
measures" they considered essential to their "own security in time 
of war or serious international tension", and article 34 (in all three 
agreements) which gave each side the right to denounce the agreement, 
albeit that it would remain formally in force for a futher 12 month 
period. The institutional arrangements were minimal (articles 27-31), 
with the creation of a Joint Committee comprised of representatives 
from both the Community and the state concerned. There was a 
requirement for unanimity and an avoidance of supranationalism. The 
Joint Committee was to supervise the proper functioning of the agreement 
and to act as a clearing-house for information. More importantly, 
it was also the custodian of the so-called evolutionary (or amplification) 
clause, namely article 32 (in all three agreements) which allowed for 
potential entry, by mutual agreement, into fields not covered by the 
original agreements. 
This clause, which appears to have been a particular Swedish 
initiative, was a way for the neutrals to reconcile their original 
aspirations with the restricted agreement finally reached. It has 
also proved to be one of the most contentious articles of the 
agreements. The official view was that the partnership between 
Community and neutrals would be dynamic, that it would naturally 
spill-over into other fields, such as general economic and monetary 
policies. 172 It was precisely this that critics feared. In 
response the Swedish government asserted "this clause is not something 
forced on us by the EEC", but was rather a Swedish idea. Moreoever, 
at any time, it was dependent upon mutual agreement whether anything 
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happened, there being no "automatic implications".173 
Another area of relevance ·to the neutrality argument was 
agriculture. On the one hand, the Swiss, in particular, were 
reluctant to have it included for reasons of neutrality, since 
"According to official Swiss views, maintaining a certain level of 
Swiss agricultural production is necessary for economic self-reliance 
(or at least partial self-reliance) in case of war".174 On the 
other, as well as French worries over particular items, the Community, 
especially the Commission, were reluctant to see any tampering with 
the institutional system behind the CAP, and it was difficult, given 
the emphasis upon Community autonomy, to see how non-members might 
contribute. 
The governments concerned, particularly the Swedish who perhaps 
had had the highest expectations, were ready to admit that "No 
settlement comes entirely up to expectations" ,175 but argued that the 
disadvantages were the price of neutrality, since the "limited nature 
of the agreement is an outcome of the fact that ..• refrained from 
seeking membership".176 The governments were emphatic that the 
agreements signed contained "no undertakings, either formal ones or 
in practice, which might restrict our freedom to pursue an independent 
foreign policy and to preserve our neutrality". 177 Given the 
governments self-proclaimed concern over this issue, this perhaps 
remains the real test. 
The neutrality issue is not closed, since the real problem is not 
the formal agreements but whether with economies increasingly tied to 
those of the Community, the governments of Austria, Sweden and 
Switzerland would be prepared to sever economic links with their major 
trading partners. 
neutrality. 
It is this interdependence which undermines 
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Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, is the argument from 
the Swiss perspective by Frei, for example, who concluded that "there 
will most definitely be no whirling process of rapi.d spill-over" 
since the items on the agenda "are quite remote from the sensitive 
political areas ••• when it comes to •.. central questions, there 
are myriad difficulties and a host of diverging interests". But, 
on the other hand, he was also aware that what happens "will take the 
form of action by the EEC and of reflex action by Switzerland", 
since "Swiss integration policy is, in most fields, a function of EEC 
l ' ,,178 po lCY • 
The kernel of the matter, then remains the pace and depth of 
development within the European Community , with the additional dimension 
of increasing economic interdependence eventually subverting the de 
facto possibility of neutrality, by tying the neutrals irrevocably to 
the Community, perhaps ultimately causing them to join. If the 
Community had developed as expected post-1972, the problems for the 
neutrals would have multiplied, given their exclusion from Community 
decision-making and the Community movement towards EMU etc. As it 
happens, that has not occurred. Moreoever, there is perhaps one 
great advantage in the 1972 agreements compared especially with 
membership, and perhaps with association, in that the world does tend 
to perceive the Community externally as a single unit in many areas 
of activity. -Given the somewhat amorphous relationship in the public 
eye that Austria, Sweden and Switzerland have with the Community, it 
might be argued that the visibility of the relationship is much more 
clouded than would have been the case given membership. They are not 
identified with the 12 to the same extent as Ireland as a member is, 
and their distinctive persona is evident, for example, in many 
international fora. Give the significance attached to the need to 
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be seen to be independent, to credibility and expectations this may 
be very important. 
The critical point, however, is that if such agreements under 
article 113 can lead to continuing doubts over the status of Austria, 
Sweden and Switzerland, how much more serious must the doubts be about 
a putative neutral which actually chose to become a full member of 
the Community, and tried for over a decade to join. 
Summary 
Whilst an almost infinite number of independent variables can be 
associated with neutrality, nonalignment and with the European model 
of 'Neutral and/or Nonaligned', from the foregoing discussion the most 
significant variables can be identified, albeit in a somewhat 
compendious and integrated form. 
variables are:-
With regard to neutrality, the key 
(i) the rights and duties of neutrality - including impartiality; 
abstention; inviolability of territory and sovereignty; 
active measures and due djligence with regard to upholding 
rights and fulfilling duties and; normal trade; 
(ii) recognition of position by belligerents and others - since 
neutrality is not a unilateral art but rather requires 
credibility, the confidence of others and gives no ground 
of suspicion or hope to others; 
(iii) disavowal of help - including the lack of preparation for or 
expectation of help, as well as 'defence against help' and 
action against having a 'protective umbrella' and; 
(iv) freedom of decision and action - in the political, economic 
and military spheres, with the avoidance of entangling 
commitments and alliances or dependence, and the pursuit of 
independence. 
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These variables will be applied specifically to Ireland in the years of 
the great test, namely the period of the Second World War. 
With regard to nonalignment and the European model the number 
of putative variables is huge. However, with regard to nonalignment 
per se, it has already been established that much of its quintessence, 
particularly as it relates to the crucial variables of experience and 
attitude, is quite distinct from the European situation and, therefore, 
for the reasons already established, not particularly helpful or 
relevant to the European or Irish cases. Nonetheless, certain 
elements of that quintessence and of the European model can usefully 
be related to the already established variables, especially since 
they, in any case, need to be modified to take account of the postwar 
move to peace, and thus to the requirements 'for neutrality' rather 
than 'of neutrality'. For example, the quest for independence_and 
the question of attitudes to alliance can be meaningfully discussed 
under a modified'freedom of decision and action'. It is, however, 
necessary to add two new variables for use in the analysis of the 
postwar situation to adequately reflect the nonalignment dimension, 
and to also distinguish it from neutrality per se. The modified 
and extended variables for the period 1945-1982 are, therefore:-
(i) due diligence - with respect to maintaining inviolability of 
territory and sovereignty, and the related question of active 
measures. The strict requirements of neutral rights and 
duties will not be applied, given the absence of war, although 
the crucial issue of impartiality will be discussed under (ii) 
and (v); 
(ii) recognition of position by others - with regard to the 
credibility of the Irish position, the confidence of others 
in it and the lack of grounds for suspicion or hope by others; 
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(iii) disavowal of help - including the lack of preparation for or 
expectation of help, as well as 'defence against help' and 
action against having a 'protective umbrella'; 
(iv) freedom of decision and action - in the political, economic and 
military spheres, with the avoidance of entangling commitments 
and alliances, dependence, or 'ties that bind', and the pursuit 
of independence; 
(v) lack of isolationism, a willingness to help ameliorate world 
problems and impartiality and; 
(vi) attitude to identity, nation-building, unity, stability and 
self-determination. 
Before either set of variables can be applied, however, it is 
necessary to examine the prewar foundations of Irish policy. In the 
prewar period, the complications engendered by the Irish constitutional 
position, its Commonwealth membership, and 'the ports' issue, are so 
severe as to make the strict application of the variables identified 
inappropriate, although as will be seen in the following chapter the 
themes represented by the variables inform the nature of the 
discussion. 
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Chapter Five A Neutral Tradition or a 'Certain Consideration'? 
The Pre-Independence Period 
The postwar confusions that have arisen over the nature and status 
of Irish neutrality, in particular, whether it is the national tradition 
or not, owe something of their origin to a confusion over the historic 
role of Ireland, or more accurately, the Irish, in the international 
political system, not only since independence in 1922, but even before 
that time. Ronan Fanning, for example, observes that "The Irish pre-
disposition towards non-involvement in international relations has 
earlier origins in the nineteenth century and beyond", and suggests 
that by the turn of this century, the nationalist movement had become 
"increasingly introverted and isolationist as the very name 'Sinn Fein' 
with its emphasis on self-reliance testifies".l A case can be made 
for the view that for most of its history Ireland experienced an 
insularity from the mainstream of world events, with Britain acting as 
an effective screen between Ireland and the world. Ireland was an 
integral part of the British political and economic system. 
countries Ireland was "almost out of the world".2 
For many 
Nonetheless, this view of Irish experience before independence can 
be over-drawn. Ireland, at least in the form of its people, made a 
significant contribution to the international community, even before 
1922. Particularly significant was the Irish diaspora, the 
contribution the ~migr~ Irish made to their new homelands, and the 
influence of the Irish religious, who spread not only Christianity but 
something of Ireland. 3 
Clearly sections of the population were pre-occupied with the 
freedom struggle against the British, but this led to an awareness of 
the potential help that the Irish abroad, or sympathetic nations, 
might give to their cause. 4 Moreover, de Valera was adamant that 
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'Sinn F~in' did not mean, as was usually suggested 'Ourselves alone', 
but rather 'We ourselves', a motto of self-reliance, not selfish 
isolation. Ireland, indeed, wanted independence so that "she might 
freely give of her gifts to, and receive in return of their gifts from, 
her sister nations of the world over".5 Yet, before 1922 (and indeed 
even after 1922) the central problem was lack of independence and 
freedom, as Michael Collins put it "The Irish struggle has always been 
for freedom - freedom from English occupation, from English domination".6 
This obsession was not only manifested in the physical struggle against 
the British, but also by the opposition to involuntary (or indeed, 
even voluntary) Irish participation in British wars, and by a willingness 
to engage in alliances with Britain's enemies. 
The former trait was perhaps most sharply revealed by the widespread 
opposition to the very idea of the imposition of conscription in Ireland 
during the First World War, although opposition to recruitment into the 
British army to fight British wars had been manifest earlier, for 
example, during the Boer War. Patrick Keatinge observes indeed that 
the "objection to participation in what were seen as Britain's rather 
than Ireland's wars was widespread, a forerunner of an instinctive Irish 
predilection for neutrality" ,7 and furthermore, that the trauma produced 
by the British decision in 1918 to impose conscription in Ireland, 
althoug~ never implemented, "was to establish significant restrictions 
on future Irish political leaders faced with the issue of some form of 
military participation in international politics; the popular basis of 
Irish neutrality was enshrined in 1918".8 
This profound antipathy to participation in British wars found 
expression in the anti-conscription campaign. It was in 1918 that the 
issue of conscription really came alive, with the cause becoming "almost 
overnight, the most massive demonstration of nationalist solidarity that 
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had been seen since the beginning of the war".9 It is important to 
appreciate that-at this time, the support for the campaign came from 
disparate parliamentarians and parties, trade unions and the Roman 
Catholic Church. The impact of the campaign wasto help Sinn Fein in 
their triumph at the polls in December 1918. 
The sentiment against both conscription and British wars was 
reflected in the formation of the Irish Neutrality League. It appears 
to have evolved out of a series of meetings of progressive nationalists 
in September 1914, which discussed the question of a rising. The 
circulars announcing an inaugural public meeting were issued on 5 October 
1914, with the first, and some suggest only, public meeting taking place 
seven days later, although Greaves is adamant that "there were several 
others", and that "The main decision of the meeting was to start a 
, , t 't'" 10 campalgn agaln recrUl lng • Apart from its title, there is no 
evidence that the League as such had any particular conception of 
neutrality, beyond the basic opposition to participation in British 
wars, or indeed, any very clear idea of what neutrality involved. 
At least in the initial period of the war Irish opinion was more 
genuinely reflected by the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, 
John Redmond, given that "in the autumn of 1914 there had been quite 
considerable enthusiasm for the war".ll It is interesting that 
Redmond increasingly took a strong line, moving from a pledge to defend 
Ireland and to allow the British to remove troops,12 to the claim that 
"Ireland would be false to her history, and to every consideration of 
honour, good faith, and self-interest, did she not willingly bear her 
share in its burdens and its sacrifices".13 The culmination of this 
gradual evolution towards full commitment reached its climax in his 
famous Woodenbridge speech of Sunday, 20 September 1914. Having noted 
that the duty of Ireland was "to defend the shores of Ireland against 
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foreign invasion", that the "interests of Ireland ••• are at stake jn 
this war", he urged his audience to "account yourselves as men, not 
only in Ireland itself, but wherever the firing-line extends, in defence 
of right, of freedom, and of religion in this war".14 
It was this speech which split the Volunteers, although of about 
15 180,000 Volunteers, nearly 170,000 supported Redmond. "The vast 
majority of Irish nationalist opinion - those whose nationalism found 
expression in the idea of Home Rule - remained as nationalist and active 
as before, behind Redmond's policy of support for the Imperial war 
effort".16 In late 1914-early 1915 Redmond was in the ascendancy, and 
antipathy to Britain and British wars was not nearly as widespread, at 
least at that time, as is often subsequently suggested by reference to 
the anti-conscription campaign and the Irish Neutrality League. Even 
after the Rising of 1916, the emotional backlash it produced, the 
disillusionment with the offer of Home Rule, and the rise of Sinn Fein, 
"the British Army, without any particular campaign at all, had managed 
to secure 14,013 voluntary recruits from Ireland".17 At the very least 
it may be queried whether this justifies Keatinge's description of !Ian 
instinctive Irish predilection for neutrality".18 
Nonetheless, aspects of the minority point of view did prevail, 
becoming transformed into a majority between 1916 and 1918, and gaining 
a degree of post facto legitimacy in the election of 1918. Nonetheless, 
it is as well to remember that "Before World War I, Irish nationalism 
pursued almost as many foreign policies •.. as it contained different 
groups, objectives and strategies",19 and that all "of this did not add 
up to a very consistent foreign policy image, ... When asked what Sinn 
Fein's foreign policy was, Griffith is alleged to have said: "In any 
issue I find out where England stands. Ireland will be found on the 
other side".20 
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When contemplating Irish attitudes to Britain and alliances 
advocates of the 'tradition' of Irish neutrality often point to the 
writings of Sir Roger Casement. Casement was keen to show that a 
defeat for Great Britain might, in fact, be to Ireland's advantage. 
He suggested that a German victory and subsequent German dominance in 
Europe would lead to a situation in which "An Ireland, already covered 
by a sea held by German warships, and temporarily occupied by a 
German Army, might well be permanently and irrevocably severed from 
Great Britain, and with common assent erected into a neutralised 
independent European State under international guarantees".21 
That some arrangement with Germany might last even after war and 
independence was also hinted at during the crucial time of the Rising, 
when apparently both Pearse and Plunkett in conversations with Desmond 
FitzGerald, talked of, given a German victory, the possibility of a 
German prince, ruling an independent lreland. 22 In the Proclamation 
of Easter Monday 1916, the IRA, Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizens' 
Army, made reference not only to Ireland's own strength, to the 
support of "her exiled children in America" but also to the support "by 
gallant allies in Europe".23 As Lyons notes, this last claim "was more 
fantasy than fact, though it was fantasy based on fact".24 Despite 
problems at a very late stage, there had been expectations of German 
support in- the form of ammunition etc. 
Casement by the end of 1914 had entered into a formal agreement 
with the Germans on the question of support for Ireland, an agreement 
incidentally which Casement regarded as a Treaty. It is necessary to 
stress that this alliance did leave crucial decisions to the Irish, 
but whilst there is an implication that the fighting would be performed 
by the Irish, it is not clear from the agreement itself that the 
Germans were to be prohibited from direct participation on Irish soil. 25 
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Fanning claims that the German link and episode "in itself was 
hardly the stuff of a diplomatic tradition, especially as the 
attractions of a German alliance vanished overnight and the United 
States entered the war in 1917" and he also makes a general point that 
independence would transform the environment, making it inappropriate 
f II ' , 't' h ,26 or a lances wlth Brl lS enemles. Whilst the point is generally 
true it does, perhaps, tend to gloss over an important feature of this 
period, namely the clear demonstration of a strand of pragmatism. The 
real concern was, and has remained, independence, not the questions of 
alliance or neutrality and this was epitomized by the pronouncemen~ of 
the Dail at its first meeting on 21 January 1919 - the Declaration of 
Independence, the Message to the Free Nations of the World, and the 
D t ' f D' '1 " , 27 emocra lC Programme 0 al Elreann. In all three there was a 
"preoc-cupation with sovereignty", yet no mention of neutrality. 
As well as being willing to ally with Britain's enemies during the 
war, after it Irish leaders seemed to be ready to envisage some 
arrangement with, or guarantee to, Britain regarding British security 
post Irish ind endence. de Valera in February 1920, put it this way: 
"Mutual self-interest would make the peoples of these two islands, if 
both independent, the closest possible allies in a moment of real 
national danger to either".28 Other possibilities for British security 
were also touched upon. The most famous-was the reference to the 
Monroe Doctrine and the Cuban analogy, with de Valera suggesting that 
Ireland's relationship with Britain should be analogous to Cuba's with 
the USA. Another suggestion, the third, is occasionally identified 
as the proposal, namely: "An international instrument could easily be 
framed, as in the case of Belgium". The fourth envisaged Irish 
participation in a League of Nations, in which all would agree to 
respect and defend each other's integrity and independence. 
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The most important point, however, is that de Valera identified 
four possible ways of preserving British security, establishing a 
working Anglo-Irish relationship, and securing Irish independence, and 
there was no question of neutrality being the only option, or 
necessarily, the preferred option. The Irish were prepared to take 
cognizance of British needs, and indeed even saw, to paraphrase de 
Valera, that they should 'see fear in the downfall of Britain and fear, 
not hope, in every attack upon Britain'. This gave rise to the idea 
of irish guarantees not to let Irish territory be used as base for 
foreign invasion or attacks upon Britain. 
The Irish were not, even on the eve of independence, isolationist. 
In April 1919, for example, the Dail debated the motion that "We are 
eager and ready to enter a World League of Nations based on equality of 
right We are willing to accept all the duties, responsibilities 
and burdens which inclusion in such a League implies". 29 Unfortunately, 
the League that was created appeared simply, to the Irish, to 
perpetuate the power of those who had it. They were also unhappy 
about Article X of the Covenant, which with its emphasis upon 'territorial 
integrity' appeared to cement the 30 status quo. 
mark on subsequent Irish thinking. 31 
These events left a 
On all of these questions the central pre-occupation, the litmus 
paper reflecting attitudes, was the struggle for freedom and 
independence. After a 'war of independence' and a protracted 
correspondence by de Valera and Lloyd George, it was finally agreed 
at the end of September 1921 that talks should take place in October 
1921 "with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with 
the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be 
reconciled with Irish national aspirations".32 
In analyzing the Irish proposals and the negotiations, it is 
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important to bear in mind the distinctions between aspirations and 
policy, and that negotiation involves not only compromise but also an 
element of asking for more than one expects. This is all the more 
significant if one remembers that it was neither defence nor neutrality 
that caused problems in either London, or for that matter, Dublin, but 
rather the vexed questions of Oath and Empire, and certainly during 
the negotiations, if not the subsequent Dail debates, Partition. 
Fanning, Murphy and particularly Longford (amongst others) are all 
agreed that defence and neutrality were "not central to the treaty 
split and to the tragic events leading to civil war".33 As Longford 
puts it "In their hearts the Irish had always recognized that Defence 
touched Ireland's honour least and British security in British eyes 
most".34 Nonetheless, significant weight was attached to neutrality 
at the beginning of the negotiations. This is evidenced both by the 
draft Irish proposals the Irish left Dublin with - Draft Treaty A35 -
and by discussions at the second plenary session on the first afternoon 
36 (the 11th October 1921) of the Conference. 
Draft Treaty A was only "Outlines for ideas and principles only. 
Wording tentative and rough" since the wording would be refined once 
agreement upon principles reached. In terms of neutrality, most 
attention is usually focused, correctly, upon article V: "Ireland 
_accepts and the British Commonwealth guarantees the perpetual 
neutrality of Ireland and the integrity and inviolability of Irish 
territory; and both in its own interest and in friendly regard to the 
strategic interests of the British Commonwealth binds itself to enter 
into no compact, and to take no action, nor permit any action to be 
taken, inconsistent with the obligation of preserving its own 
neutrality and inviolability and to repel with force any attempt to 
violate its territory or to use its territorial waters for warlike 
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purposes". Article XI also made reference to neutrality given that the 
British were to seek recognition of Ireland's neutrality by others. 
Fully one-third of the draft dealt with these issues. 
Whilst proponents of Irish 'traditional neutrality' naturally 
focus upon these articles,less attention is usually paid to Article II 
which, it might be argued, compromises that neutrality, given that 
Ireland would agree "to become an external associate of the states of 
the British Commonwealth. As an associate Ireland's status shall be 
that of equality with the sovereign partner states of the Commonwealth 
" This is particularly significant given British views on the 
rights of Commonealth states. 37 It is also significant that the 
first Irish proposals submitted to the British on the 24th October 
were also significantly different from the original Draft Treaty A, 
which was never presented. The memorandum of 24 October proposed, in 
a critical section, that "Ireland shall be recognised as a free state, 
that the British Commonwealth shall guarantee Ireland's freedom and 
integri ty". 38 Longford suggests it was Collins who "had the word 
'neutral' altered to 'free' ': and says Longford "without apparently 
much change iL the meaning". Longford suggests this view by arguing 
that 'freedom' would make "clear once and for all that England had no 
right of occupation in time of war" whilst "some scope would 
apparently be left Ireland to join in a war; she would not therefore, 
from a military point of view, be completely sterilised as she would 
be under neutrality".39 Clearly the change of wording is significant. 
It emphasises the significance of the perception that "The Irish 
struggle has always been for freedom - freedom from English occupation, 
from English domination - not for freedom with any particular label 
attached to it".40 
Nonetheless, there were a number of verbal exchanges on the 
issues of defence and neutrality, even on the first afternoon of 
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negotiations, with Griffith raising the question of permanent Irish 
neutrality guaranteed by England. However, it is significant that 
the general tenor of the verbal exchanges was rather different from the 
various Irish memoranda. Moreover, the British were adamant that 
neutrality meant secession, and as such, and for other reasons, was 
not acceptable. 
Indeed, the question was complicated by the discussions over the 
form of relationship between Ireland, Britain and the Commonwealth. 
For example, at one stage in these discussions, Griffith told Lloyd 
George that in terms of association with the Crown, Britain and 
Dominions, Ireland would be "Something more than allies - not temporary 
but permanent allies", and that regarding matters of 'common concern', 
Ireland understood "war and peace, trade, all the large issues. It is 
a matter of drafting". Indeed, Griffith said "I~would regard defence 
of our country and your country" as a matter of common concern. 
Griffith also told Lloyd George, after having been told that no 
country would recognize Irish neutrality if Britain had the harbours, 
that in principle the Irish had "no objection to taking those safeguards 
which are necessary to your security", although "working out of details 
might be very difficult".41 As Longford comments "Not much more was 
likely to be heard of the Irish claims to neutrality; Britain had won 
42 
on Defence". 
. 43 
In the final agreement, the relevant clauses on defence and 
facilities are contained in articles 6, 7 and 8, and the Annex, whilst 
articles 1 to 3 attempted to define the position of Ireland, its 
Commonwealth responsibilities, and its relationship to the Imperial 
Parliament. On these questions,Ireland was to be, largely, similar 
to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, except that vis-1-
vis the Imperial Parliament the Canadian model was, largely, to apply. 
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Article 6 in large measure gave Britain responsibility for "the defence 
by sea of Great Britain and Ireland", until Irish Free state "undertakes 
her own coastal defence", by agreement with the British. These 
arrangements were to be reviewed after five years "with a view to the 
undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence". There 
was no guarantee, however, that Britain would accept alternative 
arrangements after five years, or agree to an Irish contribution. 
Article 7 was in clear contradiction to any Irish aspiration to 
neutrality, since in peacetime Britain was to be given certain port 
facilities, whilst "In time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign 
Power", the Irish accepted that the British should have "such harbour 
and other facilities" as they "may require for the purposes of such 
defence as aforesaid". In article 8 "if" the Irish established a 
military force it would "not exceed in size such proportion of the 
military establishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the 
population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain". 
These provisions ruled out Irish abstention in a British war, 
impartiality, the ability to fulfill neutral rights and duties, and, 
in addition, not only would Ireland lack the right to be neutral, 
given article 8 (and the lack of its own navy) it would also lack the 
power to be so. Any notion of 'defence against help' was now a 
bitter irony. The British might forego an active Irish contribution 
to their war effort in terms of men etc., but remained emphatic 
throughout that membership in the Empire involved automatic Irish 
involvement in British conflicts. No dominion could be neutral, for 
Ireland, especially, there could be no neutrality.44 
The treaty split the Irish Cabinet and parliament but it was 
accepted by a majority. Much of this debate and controversy avoided 
defence and neutrality altogether, perhaps another sign of its relative 
importance. Only Childers dwelt upon the issues, relating them to the 
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question of independence. Ireland would not be like Canada, gj.ven the 
cession of the ports and British defence of Irish coasts. Indeed what 
was the "use of talking of responsibility for making treaties and 
alliances with foreign nations which may involve a country in war?", 
when Ireland remained "under British authority and under the British 
Crown". Ireland, it appeared to Childers would almost inevitably be 
both legally and militarily pulled into British wars. 45 
Although de Valera complained that the Treaty signed differed 
from the draft treaty the delegates took with them, it is clear that 
his own 'Document No.2' in December 1921 was also significantly 
different, in that, it omitted the very specific reference to 
neutrality.46 It is interesting, incidentally, that this was the 
second occasion at least during the crucial six months of negotiations 
and debate that whilst privately proposing to include neutrality in 
the formal document which ensued, the word was omitted. It was not 
the only objective, and it could be traded-off against other objectives. 
Even de Valera's own idea, what came to be known as 'external 
association' was problematical for neutrality. This was so because 
it was intertwined with defence, war and treaties being matters of 
'common concern'; with the Irish guarantee not to allow itself to 
be used in ways inimical to British security and; its amorphous 
nature at a time when Commonwealth involvement was understood to imply 
commitments to Britain. It should be noted that these problems arose 
irrespective of the ports or other issues. 
Prior to independence in 1922, Irish attitudes on neutrality and 
defence were clearly complex, there was no one consistent tradition. 
Evolving policy: the political dimension 
For the first ten years of the new state's life, policy-making 
was in the hands of supporters of, and sympathisers with, the Treaty. 
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A consequence of exclusion from power, was that on coming into 
g0vernment in 1932 de Valera's party, Fianna Fail, had other, more 
pressing pre-occupations initially than foreign policy, with the 
crucial exception of the bilateral relations with Britain. Indeed, 
Fanning argues "Nor ••• was neutrality high on the agenda of de Valera's 
First Fianna Fail government when it came to power in 1932. Articles 
6 and 7 of the Treaty .•• escaped unscathed in the early thirties when. 
de Valera was busily engaged in rewriting much of the rest of the 
Treaty as he thought it should have been written in the first place".47 
The overriding initial pre-occupation was freedom and independence, 
to put flesh upon Michael Collins' famous aphorism that the Treaty gave 
"not the ultimate freedom that all nations aspire and develop to, but 
the freedom to achieve it".48 
The initial constraints on the new Irish regime were both internal 
and external. On the one hand, there was an attempt to placate anti-
Treaty elements, but on the other the British had also to be placated. 
This later was important because the constitution of the new Ireland 
had to be acceptable to the British and indeed, eventually, was 
embodied in British law. 49 The finally approved Constitution of the 
Irish Free state (SaoFstat Eireann) certainly constrained the Irish, 
since the accompanying Constituent Act made it clear if any article, 
or amendment, as law made thereunder "is in any respect repugnant to 
any of the provisions of the Scheduled Treaty (ie Articles of 
Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland), it shall, 
to the extent only of such repugnancy, be absolutely void and 
inoperati ve ••• " • At first sight, Article 49, "Save in the case of 
actual invasion, the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) shall not be 
committed to active participation in any war without the assent of 
the Oireachtas", would appear to allow for neutrality. 
must be read in conjunction with the Constitutent Act. 
However, this 
Moreover, 
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the constitution, as adopted, interestingly specifies "active 
participation". The use of the adjective is presumably deliberate, 
and it leads to the implicit implication that passive participation 
does not require such consent. Moreover, on Article 49, the British 
Lord Chancellor was reassuring (in British eyes), and clearly stated 
"There is no question here of neutralitYi it may be said that, by their 
giving facilities, neutrality goes" 50 
Nonetheless, no final settlement had been attained and those who 
had supported the Treaty were clearly committed to stretching the 
terms of the Treaty as far as possible in order to expand the scope 
of Irish freedom and independence. In this the Irish benefitted not 
only from their own efforts, for example, in registering the Treaty of 
1921 with the League of Nations in 1924 over British objections, but 
also from the aspirations, drive and actions of the older Dominions. 
The following years saw a successive widening of Dominion freedom and 
51 power. 
It was perhaps the Statute of Westminster which put the stamp 
on the developments of the preceding years - the Imperial Conferences 
of 1926 and 1930, the Irish accepting invitations to conferences and 
signing treaties on their own initiative (1928-9) and the Report on 
the Operation of Dominion Legislation in 1929, amongst other things. 
The Statute of Westminster defined the Commonwealth as a "free 
association" of members, implying that a state could leave. Further-
more, in future no British laws were to extend to the Dominions, 
unless the Dominion consented. 52 In effect, Ireland was now only to 
be bound by moral obligations and the normal conventions relating to 
international treaties. 53 
The unilateral steps of de Valera were more dramatic than the 
painstaking diplomacy in Commonwealth meetings, but they did not 
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significantly alter the degree of independence in foreign policy. 
Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, the clarity of that independence in 
external eyes remained rather clouded given the terms of the Executive 
Authority (External Relations) Act of 1936, whereby the King was to 
continue to have a strictly formal role in diplomatic accredition and 
the signing of international treaties, albeit "as and when advised" 
by the Irish Executive Council. 54 
The 1937 Constitution affirmed Irish independence, and contained 
marked differences from the 1922 Constitution. For example, Article 
28.3.1 stated that "War shall not be declared and the state shall not 
participate in any war save with the assent of Dail Eireann".55 In 
the changed environment no subtle distinction between active and 
passive participation was necessary, but further ambiguity remained 
after 1937 with respect to the position of Ireland in the Commonwealth. 
The Irish regarded themselves as outside it and only externally 
associated with it, whilst only after much agonizing, Britain and the 
Dominions decided they were "prepared to treat the new Constitution as 
not affecting a fundamental alteration in the position of the Irish 
Free State".56 This issue was of more than semantic or symbolic 
importance, since arguments were still occurring within the Commonwealth 
as to whether the Dominions had the right to decide the issue of peace 
or war themselves, notwithstanding the evolution of doctrine 
culminating in the statute of Westminster. 
This despite the fact that the 1937 Imperial Conference had 
"recognized that it is the sole responsibility of the several 
Parliaments of the British Commonwealth to decide the nature and scope 
of their own defence policY",57 and that Mansergh has argued "In the 
supreme issue of war and peace the Commonwealth had henceforward to 
rely not, as in 1914, upon a unity constitutionally imposed from above, 
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but upon a unity of wills".58 For Ireland the question was difficult 
given, for example, its geographical propinquity to Britain, but even 
then, as Lyon puts it "neutrality, after all, was not just the 
instinctive reaction of a small power to keep clear of the quarrels 
of big powers, it was the outward and visible sign of absolute 
sovereignty. To be free to choose between peace and war was the 
mask of independence, to be free to choose between peace and a 
British war demonstrated to all the world just how complete that 
independence rally was".59 This was very important to an Ireland so 
proximate to Britain, with internal and external confusion over its 
precise constitutional position and degree of freedom,and to an 
Ireland which in 1939 still had only diplomatic relations with nine 
states;60 its letters of accredition were still signed by the King. 
But most of all it was important to an Ireland which had divided over 
the treaty, over whether it gave the 'freedom to achieve freedom', 
over the oath and empire, and which wished to assert the sovereignty 
and independence proclaimed in the 1937 Constitution. 
The problem for the Irish was that a "politically independent 
Irish state ••• posed a strategic problem for successive British 
governments, concerned to protect their Atlantic flank",61 despite 
de Valera's oft-repeated pledge that "our territory will never be 
permitted to be used as a base for attack upon Britain".62 This 
pledge is not a commitment to participate in a British war, nor is it 
a commitment to alliance. In one sense, it is fully compatible with 
an aspiration to neutrality, since the central Irish concern was 
simply defending its independence and sovereignty (and potential 
neutrality), but with the by-product of offering additional security 
t B 't' 63 o rl aln. However, on the other hand, a potential belligerent 
might well construe this guarantee differently, since in that same 
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speech of April 1938, de Valera commented that "an independent Ireland 
would have interests, very many interests, in common with Great 
Britain. In providing for our defence of our own interests, we would 
also of necessity be providing to a certain extent for British defence 
of British interests".64 
Over a decade earlier the Cumann na nGaedheal of William Cosgrave 
had considered those common interests. Examining the possibility of 
"some foreign Power" using "our geographical position either as a base 
for an offensive against Great Britain or against sea-borne traffic 
between ports in Saorstat Eireann and other countries" (the only 
contingencies specifically referred to), the document the Cabinet 
considered argued that central Irish defence policy precept must be 
that the army be "so organised, trained and equipped as to render it 
capable, should the necessity arise, of full and complete 
coordination with the forces of the British Government in the defence 
of Saorstat territory whether against actual hostilities or against 
violation of neutrality on the part of a common enemy".65 This 
oblique reference to neutrality, clearly illustrates a desire to 
keep that option open, but the tenor of the document as a whole places 
greater emphasis upon "full and complete coordination" with British 
forces. In the February 1927 debate Desmond FitzGerald had, 
following it would seem the 1925 document~ declared "We need not 
blink the fact that it is quite possible, that in the event of a 
general attack on these islands - it is perfectly obvious - our army 
must cooperate with the British Army". When asked what if the 
United Kingdom alone were attacked, could Ireland be neutral, or 
would Ireland be "bound up in" an attack by conceiving of itself "as 
part of the defence forces of the British islands", FitzGerald did 
not directly reply, simply stating that he had been speaking of a 
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general attack, and anyway, it would be for the Dail to decide. 66 It 
is interesting that whilst not always explicit, that expectation was 
to some extent enduring. 
The possibility of a formal defence arrangement or alliance was 
certainly not as 'beyond the pale' as a fixation upon neutrality 
would suggest, if indeed there were such a fixation. Indeed, in May 
1935, in a rather enigmatic phrase, de Valera himself had said "We 
can make trade treaties •.• I can even conceive conditions in which we 
could make defence treaties".67 One problem, of course, and it 
permeates this whole issue, is whether such rhetorical statements 
were reflections of a genuine policy position or whether they were 
trial balloons for potential negotiations, and indeed what was the 
envisaged content of any such agreement? These questions are 
particularly signifiant in the 1938 period in the context of 
discussions to end the Anglo-Irish 'economic war' and to arrange for 
a settlement on the ports issue. It is the conventional wisdom 
that by 1938 de Valera was committed to neutrality as the appropriate 
policy for Ireland in any forthcoming war, and sought the return of the 
ports to make such a policy viable (or at least, more viable). Indeed, 
in later years, de Valera himself regarded the return of the ports as 
"his greatest political achievement •.• because of its importance in 
the context of neutrality".68 On the other hand,in January 1938, 
de Valera "indicated that he would then be willing to conclude a 
naval agreement to Britain's satisfaction" if Britain would settle 
the Partition issue;69 and in February 1938 he acknowledged that if 
Partition were subsequently satisfactorily settled "'he would be able 
to go a long way' towards the defence agreement then being 
contemplated". Indeed, at the same meeting, he told the British 
that some in Ireland "would urge that 'defence should be made a lever' 
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in order to bring effective pressure on Britain over Partition" 70 
It may be that de Valera was at least persuaded of tactical 
advantages in such a ploy, since "It was at this same time ••• that 
the policy of neutrality began to be linked with the question of 
partition".71 
Malcolm MacDonald, who became Dominions Secretary in 1935 (and 
was also influential in Anglo-Irish relations during the war) believed 
that "For de Valera, Irish control of the ports was not only a symbol 
of independence but an establishment of independence".72 Neutrality 
was an objective at the talks, but the achievement of sovereignty was 
a higher priority. There was, it should be noted, no guarantee of 
cooperation, even if Partition were ended. There was no unconditional 
assertion of neutrality in the negotiations of 1938 either. 
In the negotiations in 1936-8,de Valera clearly envisaged some 
defence relationship, if only the "possibility of making a request for 
British defence experts, a common defence plan and interchangeable 
equipment 'because our forces would cooperate together'. There was 
even talk of the construction of a munitions factory in the Free State. 
But de Valera said that the Irish people "were 'nervous of being 
dragged into some Imperialist war' which Britain might wage".73 It was the 
Irish who formally proposed discussion "in regard to economic and other 
measures to be adopted in time of war".74 No such deal was struck, 
largely because de Valera was able to get the ports and the ending of 
the tariff war without one, whilst there was no movement on Partition. 
Nonetheless, talk of a defence arrangement was not abandoned until a 
late stage in the 1938 negotiations and at one stage a draft 
75 
agreement on defence was placed before delegates. 
When de Valera spoke in the Dail introducing the motion in favour 
of the return of the ports and an end to the Anglo-Irish economic war, 
he made no specific mention of neutrality. Rather on the 27 April 
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1938 he emphasized independence and sovereignty. de Valera also 
sought to make the point that "we have got these defences 
unconditionally ... There has been no bargain ••• there is no secret 
understanding. But there is a belief, I am certain ••• that it is 
far better for Britain, far more advantageous for Britain, to have a 
free Ireland by its side than an Ireland that would be unfriendly 
because of liberties which Britain denied".76 Perhaps the omission 
of a reference to neutrality was a gesture towards British 
sensibilities until after the British had ratified the agreement, 
since after that de Valera was more direct in his references to 
neutrality. Nonetheless in an important speech of 13 July 1938 to 
the Dail,77 although he was explicit in the "desire not to get into 
a war if they can keep out of it", de Valera's actual assertion of 
neutrality as an objective, was highly equivocal, namely: "Assuming 
other things were equal, if there were any chance of our neutrality in 
general being possible, we would probably say that we want to remain 
neutral. I do not know that you can follow that up by saying in any 
war but, in general, our desire would be for neutrality as far as 
possible". This is a remarkable section of a speech normally 
identified with a statement of neutrality. 
de Valera asserted "we have no commitments, we can keep out of 
war, we can be neutral if we want ••. There are no advance commitments 
on us to take any side". But he went on, to consider the situation 
"in which our rights, or liberties, or interests generally were being 
attacked by some State other than Britain". In response de Valera 
was convinced, that Britain would have to act to help Ireland in 
Britain's own interest "because of her geographic position". Britain 
would act "not in our interests ••• (but for) immediate selfish 
interest". As a result Ireland "may be able to ••• count on assistance". 
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Now here is the rub - de Valera asked, would we want such 
assistance? He doubted whether Ireland could effectively resist "a 
frontal and straightforward attack from any foreign state" unaided. 
Given, therefore, that it would be in Britain's interest to help and 
Ireland would require such help "commonsense dictates that we should 
try to provide in advance so that that assistance would be of the 
greatest possible benefit to us". This being so, consultation with 
Britain might be "necessary and advisable " 
Whilst de Valera had played 'hard to get' earlier in the year, 
by the summer of 1938 it was clearly the Irish who were placing the 
emphasis upon some arrangement, be it tacit or formal. In August 1938 
Dulanty, the Irish High Commissioner to Britain, asked "if he could 
attend the meetings of the Cabinet's Committee for Imperial Defence",78 
and in September Dulanty began to attend "the daily briefings for the 
High Commissioners given by Malcolm MacDonald in the Dominions Office".79 
That same summer, the Irish also requested copies of the British 
80 Government's War Book measures. This activity by officials would 
be exceedingly curious without the imprimatur of de Valera, given that 
he was not only Taoiseach at the time, but also Minister for External 
Affairs. de Valera, himself, met with the British Minister for 
Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, on 8 September 1938, 
and made it clear he was anxious to attain "help in deciding what were 
the matters that needed attention and on the type of defences required".81 
Despite hesitations, in October two senior Irish army officers 
were sent to London for secret talks. Again, the primary objective 
was information, for example, how the ports might best be defended. 
Apparently, the British felt these discussions were 'very satisfactory' .82 
Nonetheless, there were to be no more such military talks in the prewar 
period, although the Irish did suggest that the British recommend a 
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French officer who could become the principal military adviser to the 
Irish army. As explained to the British, "political expediency made 
the appointment of a British officer impossible" and therefore the 
Irish wanted "the next best thing in securing a high military officer 
of our ally. The appointment of such an officer would be a clear 
indication to Germany and the world that Eire was on the side of the 
Western democracies".83 
Nonetheless, despite these talks and exchanges, de Valera was 
making it clear that partition remained the problem, that in "the 
event of war the attitude of Ireland would be very different if 
partition still existed from what it would be were Ireland one, and 
many of the steps which he would like to take in the event of our 
being at war would be impossible for him so long as partition lasted".84 
In the talks that took place in the late 1930s, it is clear that the 
Irish position was not unambiguously one of neutrality. The 
'traditional neutral' image is, therefore, open to question. This is 
true also, if one examines the attitude of the Irish to the League of 
Nations, collective security and neutrality in that context, especially 
given the Irish commitment to collective security. 
The Irish saw League membership as an assertion of statehood and 
independence, and sought to make this manifest by their activities at 
the League, for example, the insistence in 1924 on registering the 
1921 Treaty. A sign that independence was regarded as the key was 
the insistence by Kevin O'Higgins, as early as 1923, that despite 
support for the League, participation in any war, including a League 
war, would require, under the new Constitution, the Dail's consent. 85 
Unlike Switzerland, however, Ireland never appears to have sought nor 
attained a neutrality reservation, although the Swiss had established 
the precedent in 1920. 86 Up until 1935-36, the Irish were committed, 
and moreover, knew full well the nature of the commitments and 
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obligations involved. This route to security took precedence over the 
neutrality route, which only significantly re-emerged in 1935-36. 
de Valera had demonstrated his commitment when he addressed the 
League Assembly as Acting President in September 1932 and spoke of the 
need to "show unmistakably that the Covenant of the League is a solemn 
pact, the obligations of which no State, great or small, will find it 
possible to ignore".87 de Valera, in fact, laid great stress upon 
upholding the Covenant and united collective action. 
Three years later, de Valera was arguing that the "theory of the 
absolute sovereignty of States, interpreted to mean that a State is 
above all law, must be abandoned ••• peace and order (are) impossible 
•.•• if States may hold that self-interest is for them the supreme law, 
and that they are subject to no other control ... The rule of unanimity 
for decision and legislation must go ••• There must •.• be- some tribunal 
by which the law shall be interpreted and applied, and, finally, there 
must be some means by which its judgments can be enforced against a 
State". It must be acknowledged that de Valera described this as "the 
idea" and acknowledged the League was "very far from coming up to the 
ideal". Nonetheless, it hardly epitomizes a recalcitrant member. In 
closing de Valera spoke of the need to maintain the League, and to do that 
"we must live up to its obligations".88 
Four days later de Valera emphasized that the Irish by their "own 
choice and without compulsion ••• entered into the obligations of the 
Covenant. We shall fulfill these obligations in the letter and in the 
spirit. We have given our word and we shall keep it".89 Ireland was 
ready to pay the price for peace. As a submission to the Irish 
Cabinet in September 1935 makes clear, whilst aware that military action 
under the Covenant was unlikely to occur, de Valera did acknowledge that 
"it would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant for the member 
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concerned to refuse to take part •• (in) •. coJJective miJitary action to 
be taken by the League".90 Indeed, de Valera's biographers even 
suggest "Had World War II come from a joint decision of the League of 
Nations his attitude would, no doubt, have been modified".91 
This attitude prevailed until the League failed to apply the 
military sanctions he had supported earlier. In September 1935, de 
Valera was clear that the Abyssinian crisis meant the "final test of 
92 the League ••• has come". As a result of the test, Irish attitudes 
changed, with there henceforth being a search for alternative means of 
safeguarding security. Indeed, in a debate on the Estimate for 
External Affairs in June 1936, de Valera went so far as to ask the 
Chair "if it would be appropriate at this stage to discuss the question 
as to whether or not we should withdraw from the League".93 
After 1935, de Valera spoke of "bitter humiliation" regarding the 
League, and began to make it clear that there could no longer be "an 
obligation to go to war to maintain the principles of the League". 
Ireland, along with other small states, could only resolve "not to 
become the tools of any great Power", and to "resist with whatever 
strength they may possess every attempt to force them into a war 
against their will".94 This was not equivalent to saying that 
Ireland would necessarily avoid involvement, if it was by their own 
decision. 
Nonetheless, after 1935 the Irish attitude to security clearly 
changed and only now, after four years and after de Valera had been 
"busily engaged in rewriting much of the rest of the Treaty", was 
attention turned to 'the ports' issue. 95 Only then did it come to 
be argued that British occupation of the ports provided others with a 
reason to ignore Irish neutrality, that it was not Irish "will that 
would be effective in keeping a position of neutrality but the will of 
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other people",96 and that Ireland "could be treated as an automatic 
belligerent".97 Only then did the cry "We want to be neutral,,98 
become clearer, although even then there was the complication of the 
relationship and the negotiations with Britain in the 1936-1939 period. 
A further complication is that neutrality is inseparably 
dependent upon sovereignty. Although the Irish had made great strides 
in the politico-legal area, there still -remained the problems of 
economic sovereignty and military self-sufficiency. 
Self-sufficiency the econoinic dimension 
Whatever the etymology of Sinn Fein, it is usually associated 
with the concept of "self-reliance",99 and this attitude remained a 
Fianna Fail ideal, namely "an Ireland self-contained and self-
supporting economically".100 de Valera's biographers have argued 
that his views on this matter were related to his view that Ireland 
should be neutral, that his "economic policy was calculated to make 
that possible. It was part of a pattern of self-sufficiency" .101 
The problem, however, is that there was a severe disjunction between 
rhetoric and policy, and thn t even in rhetoric the stress upon self-
sufficiency was almost always upon the grounds of economic and 
political independence, given the Fianna Fail pledge "not merely to 
try to secure independence politically in this country, but to try 
and secure its economic independence also".102 That-was the real 
rationale of self-sufficiency, and other rationales were not 
persistently advanced and remained peripheral. 
By any measure the degree of economic dependence upon the UK was 
severe, as was the degree of general Irish dependence on trade with 
others. This is illustrated by the following: 
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Table 5.1 Percentage of Irish Imports and Exports to and from 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1924-1939 
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 
Imports 81.1 81.1 75.6 77.4 77.9 78.1 80.1 80.8 
Exports and Re-exports 98.1 97.2 96.7 95.8 96.2 92.3 91.4 96.3 
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Imports 76.6 69.9 66.7 72.4 51.9 48.7 50.5 55.7 
Exports and Re-exports 96.2 93.9 93.3 91.7 91.5 90.8 92.6 93.6 
Sources Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1931, 1935, 1938 and 1945: 
1931 Table 82: 
1935 Table 97: 
1938 Table 98: 
1945 Table 93: 
'Value of Consignments from and to each country 
expressed as a percentage of total value of Imports 
and Exports in each year, 1924 to 1930', p.63. 
'Value of Consignments from and to each of the 
principal countries expressed as percentage of total 
value of Imports and Exports in each year,1928 to 
1934 (excluding Bullion and Coin)', p.75. 
'Value of Trade with each of the principal countries 
expressed as a percentage of total value of Imports 
and Exports in each year, 1931 to 1937 (excluding 
Bullion and Coin)', p.87. 
'Value of Trade with each of the principal countries 
expressed as a percentage of total value of Imports 
and Exports (including Re-Exports) in each year, 1938 
to 1944 (excluding Bullion and Coin)', p.100. 
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Table 5.2 Ireland Foreign Trade Dependence, 1926-1938 
Merchandise 
Exports 
Merchandise 
Imports 
Exports of 
Goods and 
Services 
Imports of 
Goods and 
Services 
(As a percentage of GNP at current factor cost) 
1926 
19-29 
1931 
1938 
26.8 
29.3 
24.7 
15.1 
39.8 
38.0 
34.4 
25.8 
n.a. 
n.a. 
38.7 
27.4 
n.a. 
n.a. 
37.7 
26.2 
Sources: T.K. Whitaker, 'Monetary Integration Reflections on Irish 
Experience', Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank of Ireland 
(Winter 1973) p.69. He cites Kieran A. Kennedy, Productivity 
and Industrial Growth. The Irish Experience (London, Oxford 
University Press 1971) as his source. 
Although in Table 5.1 the import pattern does reveal a 
significant decline over the years in reliance upon British goods, down 
from 81.1% in 1924 and 50.5% in 1938, the last full year before the 
war, there is only a marginal decline with regard to exports 98.1% in J924 
and 92.6% in 1938L The earJier figures 81.1% and 98.1% reveaJ in effect 
total dependence for export markets on Britain, whilst even by 1938 
the level remai~s high enough to be virtually total dependence. 
Whilst Table 5.2 appears more reassuring, given the declining per-
centages, it is as well to recall Hancock's comment concerning the 
1932-1938 dispute "Great Britain and the Irish Free State deliberately 
inflicted economic damage upon each other. That damage, undoubtedly, 
was not light. Yet it had not been able to do more than scratch the 
grapplings binding the two economies together ,,103 
de Valera clearly saw the dangers inherent in such dependency, 
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and both at the beginning and end of the 'Economic War' sought to argue 
that Britain was using its economic predominance for political purposes. 
To illustrate the Irish concern regarding being squeezed by Britain, de 
Valera used the analogy of a wall, arguing that "a good way would be to 
approach it as if this country were surrounded by a wall ... what I mean 
is how we could maintain our population if by any chance we were cut 
off ••• we have the food that is necessary here ••• ,,104. 
It must be acknowledged that the Anglo-Irish dispute highlights 
that the high degree of economic dependence of Ireland upon the 
United Kingdom did not lead to, or cause, political servility on the 
part of the Irish towards the United Kingdom. The Irish were aided in 
their counterdependency strategy by the constraints exercised upon the 
United Kingdom by other factors, whilst the generally interdependent 
nature of the relationship also imposed costs upon the United Kingdom 
'f "f' t t d 105 1 any slgnl lcan rup ure occurre . 
According to Longford and O'Neill, Irish neutrality in the Second 
World War "would scarcely have been possible if it had not been for the 
extent to which self-sufficiency had been achieved",106 that the policy 
of "self-sufficiency ... was to be a crucial factor in the years of 
World War 11".107 More objective authorities, however, are rather 
more equivocal in their judgment, whilst even de Valera himself was 
less sanguine than Longford and O'Neill. In direct reference to these 
questions in 1941, de Valera was anxious to emphasize the progress that 
had been made in the 1930s, but he acknowledged that "the war came and 
found us still far from our goal of self-sufficiency. We were still 
importing considerable quantities of wheat, fertilisers and many such 
fundamental raw materials as pig-iron, steel, timber, paper, vegetable 
oils, as well as coal and liquid fuels for our factories, for our field 
tractors and for transport. Tea has come to be regarded almost as the 
national beverage, and it all reaches us, of course, from abroad ,,108 
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Whilst it may be true that in reviewing "the progress made towards 
self-sufficiency in the cramped circumstances of those pre-war years, 
one cannot record spectacular success but nevertheless there was 
progress ••• ",109 there remained significant, important gaps and Ireland 
was not self-sufficient. An internal memorandum of 16 April 1939 
reveals the extent of the dependency. Quite apart from virtually all 
of Irish foreign investment being in British securities, the trade 
dependency, it was also true that although the import figure was lower, 
much of the import were "essential supplies ••• which we cannot provide 
ourselves". As the report noted, the country depended "entirely on 
other countries for the shipping space necessary to carry our entire 
imports of wheat, maize, petroleum, timber, and any other 'bulk' cargoes 
from abroad". Clearly, "if war should break out we are very largely 
at the mercy of other countries, and particularly of the United Kingdom, 
in respect of our external trade, and that the economic activities of 
this country could in such circumstances be completely paralysed".110 
The document shows that Irish dependency upon the UK in specific areas 
was: 
Table 5.3 Irish raw materials dependency upon Britain 1939 
Product 
Coal 
Iron piping 
Pig iron 
Aluminium 
Copper plates and sheets 
Cattle feed stuffs 
% provided by UK 
100 
94 
84 
78 
74 
51 
Source: SPO S11394 Department of Industry and Commerce 18.4.39. 
No wonder that in February 1939 de Valera had had to express his fear to 
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the Dail that "It is possible that, despite any declarations on our 
part of our desire to keep out of these conflicts, if we desired and 
tried to carryon the trade which is essential to our economic life 
here, we would be regarded as a combatant, and our neutrality would not 
111 be respected". 
Moreover, although some "effort had been made to set up a proper 
Irish merchant marine before the war", it had been thwarted. 112 Not 
surprisingly Keatinge is somewhat sardonic in his comment on "the lack 
of a viable national shipping line - for a supposedly self-sufficient 
113 
state mostly surrounded by sea!" Similarly thwarted were continuing 
efforts in the 1930s to provide an independent source of petrol supply, 
until ironically "with war imminent, the oil refinery project had to be 
shelved ,,114 
.... Again this may be indicative that few really saw the 
link between self-sufficiency and the potential position of Ireland in a 
possible war, despite the occasional rhetorical linkage. 
According to Farrell the "administrative process of preparing 
the Irish economy for war conditions began in 1938", although apparently 
the Irish "administrative machine had begun making preparations to 
organise for a major international emergency since the mid-thirties".115 
A review of the principal Irish industries took place and sought to 
encourage them "to prepare for an emergency". Not unnaturally the 
"main emphasis was on securing and building up supplies. The response 
was generally positive, but somewhat mixed, since, for example, "the 
oil distributors ••• did little to develop extra reserves ,,116 In 
1939 the "case for a major reorganisation of governmental functions and 
priorities became more urgent. It was also increasingly evident •.. 
that it was time to regularise arrangements for securing supplies; 
informal assurances by British civil servants should be replaced by 'an 
agreement between the two governments'''. Nonetheless it appears that 
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de Valera was slow to move, since "it was only with the actual outbreak 
of war that de Valera bowed to the inevitable, regrouped his cabinet 
and created a new Department of Supplies" with Lemass as its Minister. 117 
Despite the clear aspirations expressed between 1927-1932 (and 
both before and after) the actual record of achievement was mixed. 
SeJf-sufficiency the defence dimension 
Contrary to the argument of Fisk, that "an authentic policy of 
neutrality, the desire to maintain the country's commercial life and 
safeguard its political integrity from external pressures, while taking 
only minimum defence precautions on the grounds that neutrality - if 
strictly adhered to - would obviate the need for enormous military 
expenditure",118 concern and regard with 'due diligence' are a 
fundamental requirement of a 'for neutrality' policy, and in that sense, 
ought to have been a significant factor in the defence policy framework 
of Ireland. Intellectually Irish leaders appear to have recognized 
these needs. In March 1939, for example, Frank Aiken said that Ireland 
could not have neutrality merely by wishing for it; that there was "no 
use in trying to substitute a wishbone for a backbone".119 
Perhaps one of the most surprising things concerning Irish defence 
is that whilst much attention has been paid to the island as single 
entity, very little, if any, attention has apparentJy been paid to the 
island qua island. This is particularly significant for an island 
deficient in resources, lacking self-sufficiency, and dependent upon 
foreign trade. Particularly revealing concerning Irish attitudes to 
the sea is the reported statement of the Irish representative "at the 
Naval Conference of 1936, that the Irish Free State had no concern with 
the treaty as she possessed no navy and had no intention of possessing 
one".120 Initially, of course, the Irish were constrained by the 
1921 Treaty but no serious effort was made to develop a navy, even in 
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the period 1935-1939 when Ireland was legally free to do so, nor did 
the Irish pursue this matter with the British in the way that a range 
of other issues were pursued. It appears that the main reason for 
this persistent Irish attitude was a belief that they were defended 
anyway by the British navy.121 
Secondly, there was hesitation because of the degree of 
expenditure involved. An awareness of financial constraints was made 
apparent in the related matter of 'the ports'. Speaking in the debate 
on the 1938 agreement and the return of the ports, the President of 
the Executive Council between 1922 and 1932, William Cosgrave, sought 
to argue that his government "could have taken over these ports six 
or seven years ago". Cosgrave explained, however, that he "hesitated 
to do it. For what reason? At that time the cost would have 
involved the people of this country in an expenditure of between 
£350,000 and £500,000".122 Depending upon which year is used, this 
would have been equivaJ ent to between 17.8-28.4% of Irish defence 
expenditure at the time. 123 Even the de Valera government was not 
to prove enthusiastic about such defence expenditure, with de Valera 
telling MacDonald that whilst he, and "strong nationalists" would be 
glad to gain control of the ports, "he feared such a proposal would 
not be accepted if the Irish had to pay maintenance costs"! 124 
More generally in the 1930s, old arguments were revived 
concerning the most appropriate basis of Irish defence. In brief 
the argument revolved around whetheritwas more sensible to rely upon 
naval and air defences, or whether, as Fianna Fail proposed, land 
forces. Fine Gael argued that whilst it was true that Ireland had one 
land frontier across which it could be attacked, there was also the 
possiblity of attack by air and/or sea. Therefore, "the defence of 
the country had to be oriented towards having a strong navy and air 
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force capable of preventing an invasion from sea, or at least capable 
of causing heavy losses, with an adequate air support".125 
Initially, at least, the Fianna Fail government was committed 
primarily to land forces, although as the thirties came to an end there 
was some effort to improve the air force, or Air Corps. Nonetheless, 
it remained small. Even by 1939, Ireland had "very little air cover,,:'26 
According to Fisk, "by the autumn of 1939, the Irish Air Corps 
comprised four Gloster Gladiators, fifteen Miles Magisters, three Wal~4s 
amphibious aircraft, six Lysanders and an as~ortment of Vickers Vespas, 
Avro 636s, de Havilland Dragons and Avro Ansons. Only the Gladiators 
could be regarded as fighter aircraft of any consequence".127 
Although as the thirties progressed planes were purchased and the 
number of Flying Officers increased, doubling from 17 in 1936 to 34 
in 1939,128 Ireland remained exceedingly vulnerable. This vulnerability 
provided an important incentive for non-involvement in war, particularly 
since some of the Irish were alive to the horrendous prospect of massive 
aerial bombardment of their "meaga-cephalic capital city, with all th~ 
consequences that that entails",129 although it was only in July 1939 
that ARP for house-holders was considered by the ,Cabinet. 130 
This lack of defence pertained not only in the air, since "Ireland's 
territorial waters were virtually undefended" also. 131 There were, 
even after the return of 'the ports' only two vessels, which were 
"operated by the Department of Agriculture on fishery protecton duties,,:32 
It appears that de Valera may have been more interested in passive 
measures such as coast watching and a coastal patrol service rather 
than a genuine navy, but even these activities came under pressure 
from the Department of Finance. Whilst there had been some plans for 
a new coastal patrol service, by February 1939 the Department of the 
Taoiseach was suggesting that its proposed size could be halved. 133 
Ireland was clearly in 1939 not in a position to exercise, by any 
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reasonable interpretation, 'due diligence' in the protection and 
maintenance of neutral' rights', nor indeed was it capable of adequately 
fulfilling neutral 'duties' .134 It was relying upon the sufferance 
and forebearance of others. 
In fact, Irish defence policy in the 1930s rested upon deterrence 
through making the cost of occupation too high, rather than through 
denial or retaliation against the aggressor's homeland. The idea was 
'-
to make it too hot for the invader, and clearly the memories of the 
War of Independence (1919-21) and before, when the British found the 
resistance of the people, flying columns and guerrillas too difficult 
to overcome at reasonable cost ~ere in the minds of Fianna Fail 
leaders. In 1934 Fianna Fail, thinking along these lines, established 
a new 'Volunteer Force', which greatly increased the number of part-
t ' 135 l.me reserves. 
The army Fianna Fiil inherited was certainly small, numbering 
only 5,793 in 1932 and 5,763 in 1934,136 and Aiken proposed to build 
upon its smallness by the establishment of the Volunteer force which 
could be grafted on to the small force in being. Such a force had a 
reasonable basis if thE: objective was not so much to stop the invader 
at the sea-shore but to either deter through cost, or eject through 
cost. Mr. Aiken hoped that "such a type of organization is 
sufficient to make even strong neighbours respect a country, and we 
137 hope to make ours respected". By 1935 Ireland_had a 'Reserve' of 
6,483 men and 11,531 in the new Volunteers, although by March 1939 
these figures had drifted down to 5,100 and 9,952 respectively, which 
138 
compared to 7,263 'Regulars'. "At the outbreak of the Second 
World War on 2nd September 1939 the strength of the Defence Forces was: 
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Regulars 630 officers 
1,412 NCOs 
and 5,452 privates 
A and B Reservists 194 officers 
544 NCOs 
and 4,328 privates 
Volunteers 327 officers 
and 
557 NCOs 139 
6,429 privates" 
This added up to 19,973 all ranks, regulars, reserves and Volunteers. 
Could Ireland reasonably hope to be able to ensure that no 
portion of its territory could be occupied and used as a base by third 
parties? The answer was surely no, given the limited nature of Irish 
defence capabilities - no navy, a small air force, and a total of less 
than 20,000 in the armed forces. 
A further issue was Ireland's financial commitment to defence. 
Between 1922-23 and 1939-40 Irish expenditure on defence was: 140 
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Table 5.4 Irish Defence Expenditure 1922/23 - 1939/40 in millions 
of £, and as a percentage of Government Expenditure 
Year Expenditur~~* % of Government Expenditure** 
1922-3 7.502 27.8 
1923-4 10.581 29.9 
1924-5 2.994 12.2 
1925-6 2.596 11.1 
1926-7 2.352 9.8 
1927-8 2.018 9.1 
1928-9 1.731 8.1 
1929-30 1.334 6.3 
1930-31 1.133 5.5 
1931-32 1.161 5.4 
1932-33 1.179 4.9 
1933-34 1.209 4.6 
1934-35 1.324 5.0 
1935-36 1.352 5.2 
1936-37 1.376 5.2 
1937-38 1.469 5.3 
1938-39 1.766 6.2 
1939-40 2.973 10.1 
* According to Tables these figures are "Actual Amounts issued in each 
year" 
** At least, "Total Supply Services" 
Sources Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1931,1935,1937 and 1945: 
1931 Table 155 'Amounts issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services 
in each year ended 31st March, 1923 to 1931 
pp.128-131. 
1935 Table 173 'Amounts issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services 
in each year ended 31st March, 1927 to 1934 
pp.130-133. 
1937/ 
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1937 Table 179 'Amounts issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services 
in each year ended 31st March, 1929 to 1937 
pp.134-137. 
1945 Table 171 'Amounts issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services 
in each year ended 31st March, 1937 to 1945 
pp.180-183. 
After the civil war there was clearly a progressive decline for 
several years. Even when the decline was arrested, the increases 
were only marginal until 1939-40. The statistical evidence is hardly 
consistent with the June 1936 commitment to undertake all necessary 
expense or indeed to mobilize the "full strength of this nation ll • 141 
Indeed after the agreement re the ports in April 1938 but the 
failure to come -to defence agreement with Britain, "there is evidence 
that de Valera ••• was ready to pare down even the limited defence 
scheme which he, Aiken and other ministers had prepared in case of 
II 142 
war • Indeed a number of plans made in 1938 suffered reductions 
over the winter of 1938-0 , with reductions in arms for rifle 
battalions, the proposed coastal patrol service, the arming of the 
new field brigades, and the number of Swedish armoured cars to be 
purchased. 143 
Nonetheless, in the spring of 1939 the government did announce 
plans to improve the defence situation, largely by allocating £5~m. 
for expenditure on the acquisition of capital equipment and stores. 
This planned expenditure included £lm. on aircraft, and a further £lm. 
on anti-aircraft guns and ammunition. It also involved plans for 
aerodromes and a munitions factory, an increase in army size and the 
t 1 t 1 . d' . 144 new coas a pa ro serVlce an mlne-sweeplng. The problem was, 
however, that since Europe stood on the eve of war, it made it 
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virtually impossible for Ireland to acquire the proposed equipment and 
stores. 145 According to the figures on actual defence expenditure, by 
1939-40, defence expenditure was only up £1~m. from 1937_38. 146 
Despite the talk of self-sufficiency, the Irish were not in a 
position to arm or supply themselves with home-produced equipment. 
When war broke out, Ireland had no source of war supplies within its 
shores,147 even though Desmond FitzGerald, Minister of Defence, had 
argued in 1931 that "no country which lacks any part of the raw materials 
necessary for the manufacture of warlike stores is capable of being 
f ,,148 ree • But between 1931 and 1939 little or nothing was done to 
remedy the situation. 
Some in the Fine Gael Opposition, acknowledging this dependence, 
particularly upon Britain, appeared to argue for Commonwealth 
solidarity, arguing that Ireland would be virtually powerless, unless 
she had "a guarantee of assistance from Great Britain", and they asked 
about the possibility of a unified Anglo-Irish command to meet an 
attack and the possibility of a new arrangement with the British 
regarding the defence of the ports. 149 Thus by the late 1930s, the 
Fine Gael opposition was still sceptical about Ireland's ability to 
go it alone, with Dr. O'Higgins saying that whilst prepared to try 
neutrality, he "was never a firm believer in the feasiblity or benefits 
of neutrality".150 
The dilemma between the demands of neutrality and geographical 
proximity remained acute for the Fianna Fail government, as it had for 
its predecessors. Indeed, on 13 July 1938 de Valera made a speech 
to the Dail on the problems of Irish neutrality,151 much of which 
echoed the FitzGerald speeech of 1927. de Valera wondered "Would 
Britain just stand aside and allow us to be attacked by an outside 
State?" • The answer was clearly in the negative, especially if an 
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enemy "was likely to get possession of our territory from which they 
would be in a position to menace British interests or rights". In 
such a case "there is no doubt that Britain would have an interest 
and an immediate interest because of her geographic position", a 
factor reinforced by the "certain association"existing between the 
two countries, although that was secondary. But crucially, Britain 
would act "not in our interest ••• (but) for some immediate selfish 
interest". Therefore, if attacked "it is not unreasonable that we 
should - if we wanted it, count on assistance". de Valera then 
touched upon the question of whether Ireland would ask. This 
depended "on the circumstances ••• whether we thought it advisable 
to act alone or not. If we considered that we had an advantage in 
acting alone we would act alone in all probability". But, in an 
admission of dependency and lack of self-sufficiency in the military 
sphere, de Valera believed in meeting the problem of attack, in terms 
of planning Irish defence based upon "not alone, but with assistance". 
In a remarkable admission de Valera acknowledged, "if we had a great 
Continental power attacking us we would recognize that we would need 
such assistance, because of ourselves we probably would not be able, 
in fact I think it is almost certain, to meet a frontal and straight-
forward attack from any foreign state", although Ireland would resist. 
As a consequence of such thoughts, de Valera felt it acceptable to 
talk with Britain to discover "their plans in such a case" and to 
"prepare our plans accordingly". Before concluding he referred to a 
strong Britain being a shelter for Ireland, and that as a consequence 
Ireland had "an interest in seeing that sheltering position was 
maintained". Clearly "a direct attack upon Great Britain, even though 
it was not a direct attack upon us, but which might remove from us the 
shelter or protection that we had up to then, would be a matter of 
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serious importance to our people". 
No wonder some argued that "the real defences of Ireland were not 
those which might be put up by her people - the defences, that is, on 
which the government declared itself to rely - but rather the British 
navy, and the fact that Ireland is geographically remote from central 
Europe. It would be quite wrong ••• to minimize the effect which 
another .people's battleships and aeroplanes and the all-important 
matter of distance had on the situation".152 
'The expectations of others' or 'the recognition of Irish neutrality' 
In July 1938 de Valera had clearly acknowledged the central 
importance of others recognizing, tolerating and accepting the 
neutrality of a country if it were to be viable and sustenable. He 
was aware that herein lay "the trouble" 153 The Irish position in 
the 1 ate thirties with respect to expectations was difficul t. One 
problem was that they themselves were not sure if they could sustain 
neutrality, partly for economic reasons but also for political reasons. 
For example, John Dulanty, the Irish High Commissioner in London, told 
Sir Thomas Inskip (Secretary of State for the Dominions) that he 
thought that "in a week Eire woul d come in on our side as a resul t of 
attacks on shipping".154 Central was their dependency upon Britain. 
However, if the Irish were not confident , then how could other states 
be confident that the Irish would be either desirous or capable of 
upholding strict neutrality? Prior to 1938 this problem was clearly 
aggravated by the ports issue. Even given the return of the ports, 
155 however, some clearly felt there must be a catch. ' 
To some extent the factors that caused the Irish to doubt the 
position were also prevalent in British minds, for example, Inskip 
did not think that Irish neutrality could survive, given that Ireland 
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was dependent upon trade, especially agricultural trade, with Britain. 156 
At the very least there would be attacks on lines of communication and 
Anglo-Irish transport. 
Complicating the issue was the question of Irish membership of 
the Commonwealth. Whilst Mansergh has convincingly argued that by 
1939 the Dominions were free to make their own decisions regarding 
157 peace and.war, to some extent the changes had been so recent that 
there appears to have been something of a time-lag in terms of the 
perceptions of the states themselves and others as to what the 
situation actually was. The problems are well illustrated by a 
memorandum written by Anthony Eden, British Dominion Secretary, shortJy 
after the outbreak of war. Britain did not want to recognize Ireland 
as neutraJ, whiJst Britain regarded her as a CommonweaJth member, but 
equaJJy did not wish to assert that Ireland was no Jonger such a 
member. 158 Given these ambiguities and perpJexities, the question 
of 'expectations of others' was hardly cJear_cut. 159 This was even 
more so given the vexed question of 'the ports'. Not only the Irish 
wondered if it were 'too good to be true'. Thus whilst Longford and 
O'NeilJ are emphatic that "No hint was ever dropped by de VaJera to 
encourage the idea that IreJand would participate in the war", they 
are prepared to admit that ChamberJain may perhaps have misunderstood 
160 de VaJera. 
If the British attltude to Irish neutraJity on the eve of war 
Jacked a certain cJarity, the same is not quite the case regarding 
the Germans. On 26 August the civiJ service head of the Irish 
Department of ExternaJ Affairs met the German Minister' in Eire 
Dr. HempeJ for Junch and made cJear that "IreJand wouJd remain neutraJ 
except in the case of a definite attack, for exampJe dropping bombs 
on Irish towns".161 Wa]she expressed concern re trade with Britain, 
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especially given its "vita] importance to Ire]and for obtaining 
supplies of essential consumer goods", and asked that if Ire]and were 
involved indirectly, because of "German acts of war against Britain" 
that "any suffering incurred should be kept to a minimum". 
The German 'expectations' regarding Ire]and were made quite clear 
in the reply that Hempe] received from Ribbentrop.162 Ribbentrop 
explicitly asked Hempe] to see de Valera with the following statement, 
in which the Germans asserted they were "determined to refrain from 
any hostile action against Irish territory and to respect her 
integrity, provided that Ire]and, for her part, maintains unimpeachable 
neutrality towards us in any conflict. Only if this condition should 
no longer obtain as a result of a decision of the Irish Government 
themselves, or by pressure exerted on Ire]and from other quarters, 
shou] d we be compe]] ed as a matter of course, as far as Ire] and was 
concerned too, to safeguard our interests in the sphere of warfare 
in such a way as the situation then arising might demand of us". 
Germany was "of course, aware of the difficulties involved in the 
geographical position of Ire]and". 
This statement was, naturally, highly conditional. Moreover, 
the Germans were seeking "unimpeachab]e neutra]ity", which it might 
reasonably be argued meant something specific to the Germans, since 
elsewhere German theorists had developed the concept of 'integrq] 
neutra]ity', that is, that neutrality of the state was insufficient 
of itself and had to be complemented by neutrality of the peop]e. 163 
Hempe] duJy deJivered the statement in a meeting with de VaJera 
on 31 August 1939. 164 de VaJera repeated his statement of 16 February 
to the DaiJ that IreJand wished 'to remain neutraJ' .165 InterestingJy 
de VaJera made something of the phrase 'unimpeachabJe neutraJity', 
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apparentJy fearing that "transJated as 'non-objectionabJe'" it might 
easiJy give Germany "cause for objections". According to HempeJ, 
de VaJera then "said that in spite of the Irish Government's sincere 
desire to observe neutraJity equaJJy towards both beJJigerents, 
IreJand's dependence on Britain for trade vitaJ to IreJand on the one 
hand, and on the other the possibiJity of intervention by Britain if 
the independence of IreJand invoJved an immediate danger for Great 
Britain, rendered it inevitabJe for the Irish Government to show a 
certain consideration for Britain". He then warned HempeJ of dangers 
regarding vioJation of Irish territoriaJ waters or expJoitation of 
radicaJ nationaJist sentiment. A further warning, incompatibJe with 
neutraJity, was given regarding "any hostiJe action against the 
popuJation on the other side of the Northern IreJand frontier who 
wanted to return to the Irish state". It is extremeJy difficuJt to 
see how this couJd be reconciJed with a neutraJ stance since it impJied 
that the Irish might react to an attack upon territory the Germans 
might JegitimateJy regard as British. 
HempeJ cJearJy was impressed in the sense that his "general 
impression was one of a sincere effort to keep IreJand out of the 
confJ ict" aJ though he aJ so perceived "great fear". Before the 
meeting closed de Valera proposed identical and simuJtaneous 
announcements regarding "friendly German-Irish reJations" and that 
the Germans" had promised respect for Irish neutraJity".166 The 
Germans were prepared to accept this, as Jong as it was cJear that 
after their "promise is referred to, the words 'conditionaJ on a 
corresponding attitude by Ireland' must be added".167 , The Germans 
were prepared to accept the Irish position regarding 'neutrality', 
but their reiterated insistance upon the conditionaJ nature of their 
recognition of Irish 'neutrality' leaves the impression that they did 
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not really expect it to survice. 
The Irish and neutrality: attitudes and policy prior to 3 September 1939 
It is of major significance that contrary to the cited literature 
and much Irish opinion, there is, in fact, a clear distinction to be 
drawn between the Irish position(s), albeit variously expressed and not 
always consistent, and the requirements of both the classical theory of 
neutrality as understood by international law and convention and of 
what subsequently came to be understood as the principal and necessary 
components of a policy Ifor neutrality'. 
The object was simply to stay out of the war, not necessarily 
fol lowing an impartial pol icy, nor a pol icy contil tional upon insistence 
on and respect for neutral rights and duties, nor a policy limited by 
well-known rules and obligations. Rather it was a policy based upon 
bending with the wind, through discrimination and compromise. 
Ireland wished to avoid involvement at almost any cost and by all means. 
All of this was starkly revealed when de Valera spoke to the Dail in 
the first weeks of the war, when he said "Our attitude we hope to keep 
not by adherence to some theoretical, abstract idea of neutrality or 
anything like that, but by addressing ourselves to the practical 
question that we do not want to get involved in this war, and we merely 
want to keep our people safe from such consequences as we would be 
involved by being in the war".168 
neutrality. 
This is non-belligerency not 
The notion of 'a traditional policy of the Irish state since 
independence' must, therefore, be questioned. At best the evidence 
for it is equivocal, and at worst, it is equally possible to posit an 
alternative tradition, quite apart from the question of non-belligerency. 
Indeed, it can reasonably be argued that those with government 
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responsibility in Ireland have always taken a more pragmatic view, 
and that such pragmatism has even been dispJayed by de Valera. 169 
Finally, of course, there was the clear admission by de Valera to 
Hempel of the discriminatory and partial nature of Irish policy in 
the forthcoming war. As Kevin O'Higgins had put it on 17 February 
1927, neutrality might be "a consummation devoutly to be wished for, 
but •.• we are unable to alter the geographical relations between 
this State and Great Britain and we are unable to alter the 
strategical aspects of the matter ••• ".170 
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Chapter Six 'UnneutraJ NeutraJ Eire,l or Non-beJJigerent IreJand? 
There are now severaJ chronoJogicaJ accounts of Irish poJicy, 
and the poJicy of others towards IreJand, between September 1939 and 
May 1945. 2 With the exception of SmyJJie, however, they generaJJy 
take as axiomatic that IreJand was 'One of the NeutraJs,.3 It is, 
however, possibJe to chaJJenge this consensus if one moves from the 
simpJy chronoJogicaJ to a more anaJyticaJ perspective. Then 
SmyJJie's assertion that "Eire was nonbeJJigerent •.• but she was 
never neutraJ in the generaJJy accepted sense of the term 
becomes very significant. 4 
" 
It is possibJe to draw up an aJmost infinite Jist of factors 
infJuencing the Irish position. The principaJ infJuences have been 
evident in much of the foregoing, incJuding: the desire of a newJy 
independent state to assert its sovereignty; partition; Jack of 
defence; hostiJity to participation in British wars; and a generaJ 
disposition to fear the Jack of infJuence of smaJJ states and the 
generaJ immorQJity of great powers. This historicaJ background was 
of vitaJ importance, as were the associated internaJ dynamics of the 
Irish situation. 
After aJ], the IRA had engaged upon a bombing campaign in the UK 
in January 1939, and at J east "one faction in Fianna FEdJ approved of 
the haJJowed repubJican maxim that 'EngJand's difficulty was IreJand's 
opportun i ty' • The first wartime Ard Fheis heard deJegates advocate 
the use of force against Northern IreJ and". 5 On the other hand, de 
VaJera had to contend with many others whose sympathies were cJearJy 
pro-CommonweaJth and invoJvement. 6 Given this divide and the recent 
civil war, internaJ unity was a factor not to be under-estimated, 
and there was widespread acceptance that neutraJity was the course of 
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action most JikeJy to unite the peopJe of Eire. 
It can be argued that such was the support for the proposed 
course that "there was no discussion in the DaiJ of the issues 
invoJved, or of the factors which shouJd determine Irish poJicy".7 
Even after the entry into the war of the United States, de VaJera 
stiJJ feJt that "Our circumstances of history, ••• partition ••• 
made any other poJicy impracticabJe. Any other poJicy wouJd have 
divided our peopJe, and for a divided peopJe to fJing itseJf into 
this war wouJd be to commit 3uicide".8 Unanimity was onJy achieved, 
however, by a stress upon the disjunction between Irish sympathies 
and interests. 9 
The historicaJ background and internaJ dimension were aJso 
cruciaJ in the Irish case because of the significance of symboJs in 
Irish poJiticaJ history and Jife. ArguabJ y ,- the divide over the 
Treaty and the CiviJ War has been about the symboJs of 'RepubJic' 
arid 'oath'. Concepts and symboJs in IreJand were aJways prone to 
having a particuJar interpretation and significance attached to them. 
Even towards the end of the war the British Representative, Maffey, 
wouJd compJain that de VaJera was concerned with "the symboJs of 
neutraJity and independence. It was obvious that he attached 
immense importance to this symboJic factor".10 It is aJso cJear 
that the commitment to independence was more than mereJy 'symboJic'. 
The outbreak of the Second WorJd War was to prove the "acid 
test"ll of many of the questions facing IreJ and about its position 
and was, in fact, to resoJve many of the ambiguities, aJthough in 
some cases onJy with hindsight. It must be remembered that as of 
September 1939 "Irish neutraJity was by no means cJearJy 
established - in the sense, for example, that Swiss neutrality was 
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universally recognized,,12 and as noted earlier many internal and 
external observers doubted whether it could or would ever be 
implemented. Moreover, neutrality was not enshrined in the new 1937 
Constitution, or in the amendment to the Constitution rushed through 
on the outbreak of war, although occasionally in the literature there 
are loose references to "legislation affirming Ireland's neutrality 
for the duration of the conf] ict" • 13 The First Amendment to the 
Constitution Bill sought to clarify the original phrase "in time of 
war" (article 28.3.3) to make it clear that it included situations 
"when there is taking pl ace an armed conf] ict in which the state is 
not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the 
Oireochtas shall have resolved that, arising out of such armed 
conflict, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests 
of the state ••• ".14 
de Valera himself in introducing the amendment spoke of it as 
"indirectly" indicating the policy of the Government, that is, "to 
keep this country, if at an possible, out of" war. 15 Clearly, 
however, as either the original version or revised version stands, 
there is no necessary implication of neutrality and the word is not 
used. Its inclusion would certainly have strengthened the Irish 
position, and its omission tends tolend support to the view of 
neutrality as a means rather than as an end. Clearly far from 
putting itself in a position where it could not choose to go to war, 
Ireland had in effect closed no doors nor options. It could be 
neutral, non-belligerent or belligerent within the terms of the 
framework of the decisions of the summer of 1939. 
Attention wi]] now turn to the period of the Second World War, 
and the variables identified at the end of Chapter Four will now be 
applied, namely: the rights and duties of neutrality; the 
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recognition of Ireland's position by belligerents and others; the 
disavowal of help and; the freedom of decision and action. 
(i) rights and duties 
As neutrality evolved rights, duties, and crucially, impartiality 
were emphasised. In Ireland there was some grasp of these matters. 
Aiken, for example, although referring to the "old Hague Convention", 
clearly grasped the key to neutrality was the need to avoid breaching 
"the impartial conduct which neutrality imposes" 16 de Valera also 
saw the need "to avoid giving to any of the belligerents any cause, 
any proper cause, of complaint".17 
The Irish were aware that a simple declaration of neutrality was 
not enough, that it was necessary to make clear a determination "to 
stand by their own rights, conscious of the fact that they did not 
wish to injure anybody, or throw their weight, from the belligerent 
point of view, on the one side or the other" .18 They al so knew that 
with regard to neutrality, "you have to defend it and uphold it. 
The upholding of neutrality, if you are sincere about it, means that 
you will have to fight for your life against one side or the other -
whichever attacks you".19 
An initial manifestation of the Irish approach was an aide-memo ire 
handed to the British on 12 September 1939 on the subject of 
neutrality.20 The memorandum made explicit-reference to the Hague 
Convention of 1907 on the rights of neutral power&, and in formal terms 
announced prohibitions against vessels of war and submarines of the 
belligerents in Irish waters and it forbade the use of Irish airspace 
to their military aircraft. It applied equally to all of the 
belligerent powers, and was based upon international law. Indeed Eden 
had to advise the British Cabinet that "it would hardly be possible to 
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offer any serious criticism of the proposals set out in the memo-
randum",21 although Maffey, the British Representative in Dublin, 
made clear to de Valera that "this rigid aide-memoire, dotting the 
Ii's' and crossing the It's' in the way of stringent rules affecting 
British ships and aircraft had been read with profound feelings of 
disappointment".22 
The problem was that the formal position was undermined 
simultaneously by the Irish themselves in both words and actions. 
Ireland would and did "show a certain consideration for Britain".23 
Whilst Hempel may have felt at the beginning of October 1939 that 
there had been "careful, consistent adherence to" the declaration of 
Irish neutrality,24 the strict letter of neutrality law and certainly 
its spirit was already being eroded by the Irish. Already a British 
plane which came down at Skerry had been allowed to depart "without 
interference", whilst a British plane at Ventry Bay had managed, or 
25 been a11owed, to get away. 
Whi1st some may regard Irish behaviour as scrupu10us with regard 
to the'forms of neutra1ity' ,26 there is a much greater consensus that 
Irish behaviour was friend1y or benevo1ent. de Va1era, himself, 
stated that whi 1 st "we procl aimed our neutral ity ... it has a11 the 
time been a friend1y neutralitY",27 and immediate1y after the entry 
of America into the war, in a famous speech in Cork on 14 December 
1941, whi1st emphasising the reasons for Irish neutra1ity and that 
the "policy of the State remains unchanged", he did continue "We can 
on1y be a friend1y neutra1".28 Again, subsequent to 'the American 
Note' in 1944, de Va1era comp1ained that the American government did 
not seem to rea1ize "the uniformly friend1y character of Irish 
neutra1ity in re1ation to the United States and of the measures which 
had been taken by the Irish Government, within the 1imits of their 
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power, to safeguard American interests". Although in conclusion he 
did make the point that the Irish government Ilmust, in all 
circumstances, protect the neutrality of the Irish State".29 Only 
Smyllie appears to raise the question of the consistency between such 
expressions and behaviour, and neutrality.30 
Despite these statements and Irish behaviour, de Valera sought 
to emphasize to Hempel "Eire's continued adherence to strict 
neutrality" and that this was being "so far" respected by the English. 
He made clear that Ireland would fight against either England or 
Germany if they invaded and in an effort to appear impartial, assured 
Hempel that "Except for the minimum of 1 oose connection with the British 
Empire provided for constitutionally, which was exclusively intended 
to facilitate the future return of Northern Ireland to the Irish 
state, and except for the strong economic dependence of Ireland on 
England, Ireland stands in exactly the same position toward us as 
toward England".31 In fact, the Irish were not impartial. The 
Germans were prepared to accept this, because what they regarded as 
Irel and I s "understanding neutral attitude" was to their advantage. 32 
With respect to the foregoing, it could be argued that "sympathy 
was one thing and positive action was another" ,33 but in fact, the 
Irish expressions of sympathy were not confined to words but 
reflected the way in which Ireland was actually partial given its 
geographical and economic position. Words and actions, moreover, 
cannot be completely divorced since words can create expectations or 
suspicions on the part of others. Indeed in a memorandum to 
colleagues in January 1940 Aiken had argued that partiality in 
propaganda could "be regarded as an act of war". Indeed a 
belligerent might "regard it as a departure from the impartial conduct 
34 
which neutrality imposes" 
tough domestic censorship. 
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This was Aiken's justification for 
Interestingly, according to Hempel 
"Germany's view was that taking sides was not permissible in neutral 
countries and that they should remain silent ••• And it was not in 
accordance with strict neutrality that Mr. de Valera should have 
protested" about the invasion of Holland and Belgium. 35 
Before turning to specific Irish -overt action and behaviour, 
full weight must be accorded to two factors which offer some support 
for the 'neutral' argument. Firstly, Ireland did abstain from 
belligerency during the Second World War, although like many other 
non-belligerents it suffered the occasional damage of war. 36 
Secondly, the Irish consistently resisted threats and blandishments 
to involve them as belligerents. It might then be argued that the 
Irish retained a sufficient degree of independence, sovereignty and 
freedom of decision and action, to say 'no'. This, however, can 
be exaggerated, since Irish non-belligerency was only really possible 
because of "strategic factors outside the Irish government's control 
••• Ireland was never of critical strategic value to any of the 
belligerents".37 As de Valera himself was to admit in 1946, outside 
circumstances and personalities were decisive,indeed, Irish neutrality 
"depended ultimately upon the wi11 of, perhaps, two men".38 
The real pressure came from the Allies over, initially the question 
of the access to the ports and then over the 'American Note' affair in 
spring 1944 when theAlliescal1ed for Axis representatives to be 
removed and complained about espionage. 39 The blandishments were 
usually in the form of some arrangement for a united Ireland. A 
particular example was the British plan of 26 June 1940. 40 The Irish, 
however, would not accept these offers, because as de Valera put it in 
a letter to Chamberlain, "The plan would commit us definitely to an 
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immediate abandonment of our neutrality. On the other hand, it gives 
no guarantee that in the end we would have a united Ireland ••• ".41 
Churchill raised the ports' issue publicly in the autumn of 
1940, referring to the inability to "use the south and west coasts 
of Ireland to refuel" as "a most heavy and grievous burden", made 
worse by the irony that it made more difficult the protection of the 
"trade by which Ireland as well as Great Britain lives".42 Although 
not in itself a direct or immediate threat, coming after private 
pressure, it troubled the Irish. Therefore, de Valera responded by 
emphasising there could "be no question of the handing over of these 
ports as long as this state remains neutral. There can be no question 
of leasing these ports. They are ours. They are within our 
. t " 43 sovere~gn y ..•• 
On certain major issues, touching upon the core of sovereignty, 
the Irish dug in their heels. On issues not so central to 
sovereignty, the Irish were prepared to act and behave in 'unneutral' 
ways or as a 'non-belligerent' rather than as a neutral. If 
abstention is to be understood as offering no partial assistance to 
either belligerent, the Irish did not conform to this criterion, 
since their sympathies did spillover into acts. 
The charge of partiality it may be argued is mitigated by 
German acquiescence, and by the fact that despite favours for Britain, 
the very fact that the British were denied the ports balanced out the 
effects of Irish behaviour, so that over all, it was balanced and 
even-handed. This argument falls foul of the fact that the Germans 
were watchful against blatant partiality and in some other cases, of 
course, were not always aware (at least fully) of the partiality. 
Moreoever, partiality to one side or the other is not to be added 
up and simply judged acceptable if the score comes out alright at the 
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bottom in overall evenhandedness. There can be little doubt that 
the Irish engaged in unneutral acts and in partial behaviour. 
Meeting on 20 September 1939 with Maffey, de Valera exhibited a 
c1ear, but subtle distinction between form and substance. 44 He 
agreed that the Irish coast-watching service would wireless en clair 
information on the presence and location of German U-boats. Super-
ficially this was in conformity with impartiality, since any 
belligerent could theoretically receive and act upon the information. 
But given the geography of the war and Ireland's location, it was 
exceedingly partial in substance. Indeed within a short time Hempel 
was advising that "Submarines should avoid Irish territorial waters".45 
Later a similar arrangement was apparently made about movements of 
German aircraft, although in this case at "British request the radio 
messages were made in code".46 This would appear to breach both the 
form and substance of neutrality. 
Something similar occurred with regard to censorship, although 
this time operating in favour of Germany. Whilst not even factual 
and documented accounts of German atrocities were allowed to be 
published, there was no similar restriction with regard to the enduring 
problem of Partition, partly because it was regarded as unconnected 
with the war and an internal issue. 47 As one of the constant 
victims of the censorship wrote after the war, "In theory the 
censorship was entirely neutral; in practice it worked almost 
exclusively against the Al1ies".48 
Given the inadequate nature and level of their defences, the Irish 
were unable to effectively prohibit violations of their air-space and 
territorial waters, despite the contents of the 1939 aide-m~moire. 
The Irish record was not totally consistent throughout the war as 
on occasions British aircraft were fired upon by Irish anti-aircraft 
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gunners, whilst the more general pattern was that, rather than being 
defended, Irish airspace was porous, there being, at least, 160 
. d . 1 t' 49 recognlze VlO a lons. 
Initially, British aircrews who crashed in the 26 counties were 
interned and then released. Subsequently, British and American 
crews were returned to Northern Ireland without being interned. The 
Irish distinguished 'operational' as against 'training' flights, and 
the Americans were always regarded as being on the latter, despite 
the frequency of their infringements of Irish airspace. The Irish 
distinction as between types of flight was partial ,50 and no Germans 
were released for the duration. In addition to these cases, de Valera 
also allowed RAF flying-boats a corridor beside Lough Erne for over-
flights over Irish territory. 
The Irish also had difficulties with their territorial waters, 
despite the injunction in the 1939 aide-m~moire that no "vesselsof war, 
whether surface or submarine craft" should enter Irish territorial 
waters, unless in distress,51 and the publication in September 1940 of 
prohibitions upon belligerent ships in Irish waters. 52 de Valera 
agreed that British warships (surface craft) should be allowed to 
pursue and attack hostile submarines infringing Irish territorial 
waters aWl neutral i ty "whatever the regul at ions may be". 53 Certainly 
the British did, at times, take the precaution of covertly patrolling 
the Irish coast. It is also clear that German U-boats operated close 
to Irish shores on occasion. 
In some other areas, the Irish were more scrupulous, most 
notoriously, when on 2 May 1945 de Valera and Walshe called upon Hempel 
to express condolence at the death of Hitler. 54 The Irish also, 
ultimately, rejected a trade agreement with Britain in the summer and 
autumn of 1940, despite the fact that the talks had opened on the 
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initiative of the Irish at the end of April. The reason for the 
breakdown was that the Irish felt the proposed terms on offer were 
incompatible with their neutrality.55 A trade agreement per se need 
not have violated neutrality, given the traditional Anglo-Irish 
relationship, but the Irish were concerned at the British request for 
transhipment and storage rights, whilst even more significantly, 
Churchill became British Prime Minister and the Germans advanced to 
the Channel ports. Pragmatism clearly played a role. 
Shipping was something of a sore point for the Irish. At the 
beginning of the war the Irish had voluntarily transferred to Britain 
seven modern oil tankers, and subsequently had agreed, in order to 
avoid competition and at Britain's request,to charter ships through 
the British Ministry of Shipping's Charter Office. Although the 
real hardships came after 1940, the Irish already felt they were 
receiving something of a raw deal. Even more problematical was that 
for some time Irish ships, and neutral ships engaged in Irish trade, 
took part in British convoys. Furthermore, the Irish do not appear 
to always have been vigorous in protesting about their shipping 
losses, at least this was a stated reason at the end of 1943 for the 
American rej ection of an Irish request for "permission to purchase 
another ship as a replacement for the two ships chartered in 1941, 
which had been lost while carrying wheat to Ireland" 56 On the 
other hand, there clearly were cases when the Irish government did 
protest. 
The complexities in the Irish position is further evidenced on 
the issue of intelligence cooperation with the Allies. 57 Whilst 
there is some conflict of evidence, it does appear that close contact 
was maintained, with senior Irish officials meeting their British and 
American counterparts. Information from captured German agents was 
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al so handed over. Dwyer has even cl aimed that Wal she "even offered to 
allow the United states to station agents in Ireland".58 Although no 
definitive judgement can be made on the extent of the cooperation, co-
operation and thus partiality there certainly was. 
A similar de facto partial i ty was evident in the contribution 
allowed by the Irish to the British war-effort in terms of manpower 
for the British armed forces and industrial and agricultural production. 
As R.M. Smyllie put it "Mr. de Valera easily might have followed the 
example of other neutral countries by passing a Foreign Enlistment Act, 
making it an offense, punishable by loss of all civil rights, to join 
the fighting services of any of the belligerent Powers. He did 
nothing of the kind. All through the war, Irishmen were completely 
freeto join the British Forces; and .•• they did so in comparatively 
large numbers ,,59 It is impossible to be precise about the 
numbers involved, but the consensus appears to be that around 40,000 
people from the twenty-six counties served in the British forces. 
Some 10% of these volunteers deserted the Irish Army to join the 
British Army, taking with them their training. 60 Mansergh suggests 
that "If their enlistment did not infringe the letter of Irish 
neutrality,it materially strengthened the forces at the disposal of the 
British Commonwealth".61 In fact, it did infringe neutrality by its 
partiality. 
A related question was the manpower contribution by the Irish to 
British production. Again, estimates vary, but it was probably of 
the order of 150-180,000. 62 Originally whilst not officially 
encouraging the traffic, the Irish government did nothing to stop it. 
Although certain advertisements were prohibited from Irish newspapers, 
the government ordered "that the British Ministry of Labour's National 
Clearing House Gazette should be displayed at employment exchanges 
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63 throughout Ireland". As the war progressed certain restrictions 
were placed on emigration, although not for reasons of neutrality but 
rather for reasons concerning the state of the domestic economy.64 
If impartiality involves lack of material assistance, then Ireland 
would appear to have been partial. Although a distinction might be 
drawn between state and citizens the degree of complicity of the Irish 
state in this material assistance cannot- be ignored. This partial i ty 
far outweighs the impartiality represented by banning of collections 
for Spitfires. 
Northern Ireland provided other sensitive and difficult issues 
for the Irish, given Article Two of their Constitution and de Valera's 
public claim in May 1941 that "The Six Counties are a part of Ireland 
••. Their inhabitants are Irishmen, and no Act of Parliament can alter 
this fact " 65 Article Three of the Constitution, limiting 
Dublin's jurisdiction to the 26 counties "Pending the re-integration 
of the national territorY",66 might have provided a basis for ignoring 
belligerent actions in the six counties, but such action was not 
ignored. Dublin complained about the possibility of conscription 
being introduced and the American presence. This latter leading 
David Gray, the American representative in Dublin, to ask why de Valera 
"protested American troops coming as friends for the protection of 
Ireland, and did not protest German bombers coming to Belfast and 
killing Irish nationals".67 de Valera saw the presence 9f American 
troops in terms of Irish sovereignty,68 but the problem was made worse 
by the fear that his protests could have stirred up trouble for the 
GIs from the nationalist minority in Ulster, which would have been 
difficult to reconcile with either abstention or impartiality. 
A complication was the thought that occurred to Irish and other 
minds, of what to do if the Germans should invade Northern Ireland and 
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proclaim themselves as liberators. de Valera told Gray that if this 
happened "what I could do I do not know". The Irish Labour Party 
would not countenance aiding the British in such a situation, whilst 
Fine Gael would have. Fianna Fail had no ready answer. 59 This issue 
is of interest since a factor in neutrality is the expectations of 
belligerents as to what a neutral might do in certain situations, but 
it did not arise because the Allies were strong enough to prevent it. 
Most of the 'active' measures undertaken by Ireland were of a 
negative nature, namely the refusal to yield to pressure. Whilst 
these refusals were frequent, the Irish position was somewhat under-
minded by the fact that de Valera himself realized that "We are a 
small nation, we are quite aware that in modern wars the equipment and 
armaments required are far beyond the possibilities of a small nation";O 
although again it was made clear that "Any attempt to bring pr~ssure 
to bear on us by any side '" could only lead to bloodshed" since 
Ireland would defend its rights "in regard to these ports against who-
ever shall attack them, as we shall defend our rights in regard to 
every other part of our territory", and "if we have to die for it, we 
shall be dying in that cause".71 Indeed, in a private interview with 
the Canadian High Commissioner, de Valera emphasized that the Irish 
would resist the Allied threat to "the sovereignty of Eire". If that 
sovereignty were interfered with "the army and the country would 
fight, and were even now preparing for eventualities. He intended to 
summon the Dail and receive their endorsement of this renewal of the 
old struggle, this time against England, against America, against any-
body ••• ".72 On occasion the words were matched by action, for 
example, the army was put on alert on the night of the American Note. 
When publicly speaking to the nature of Irish preparations, 
naturally some emphasis was usually put upon Irish strength. Thus in 
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November 1940 de Valera was keen to make clear that Ireland had "at 
present in men and material a stronger defensive force than ever 
existed in this island before, and we are constantly strengthening it". 
However, in the same passage de Valera had also had to admit that 
Irish equipment was not complete, although he argued that was "not our 
fault".73 
Clearly the Irish defence effort was substantially increased over 
the period 1938-9 to 1945-6. The increase is marked in both amount 
and as a proportion of 'Total Supply Services' as the following table 
indicates: 
Table 6.1 Irish Defence Expenditure 1938/39-1945/46 in millions of £, 
and as a percentage of Government Expenditure 
Year Expenditure (£m)* % of Government Expenditure** 
1938-39 1.766 6.2 
1939-40 2.973 10.1 
1940-41 6.682 20.35 
1941-42 8.155 22.9 
1942-43 8.394 22 
1943-44 8.189 20.5 
1944-45 8.147 18.7 
1945-46 8.768 18.4 
* Actual Amounts issued in each year 
** Or at least, percentage of "Total Supply Services" 
Source: Ireland: Statistical Abstract 1946, (Dublin, Stationery 
Office, 1947 - P.No. 7745), Table 174 'Amounts issued from 
the Exchequer for Supply Services in each year ended 31st 
March 1938 to 1946', pp.152-155. 
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The figures show sharp increases between 1939-40 and 1941-42 after 
which expenditure levelled off, although peaking in gross terms in 
1942-43. The effect is somewhat modified, however, by the substantial 
rise in the cost of living index over the period. 74 The figures tend 
to support the argument that it was only "with the overthrow of France" 
that "for the first time, de Valera and the Opposition parties set 
about attempting to introduce some kind of effective defence force 
75 
••• ", that the "emergency became a reality".76 It was only in May 
1940 that certain infantry battalions were placed on a war footing, as 
were an anti-aircraft brigade and two companies of engineers. 77 It 
was during this period that de Valera sought American help; 
established the inter-party Defence Conference; intensified action 
against the IRA; and suggested Anglo-Irish military talks. It was 
on 28 May that a new security force was created, the Local Security 
Force (LSF), and between 31 May, when recruiting for LSF began and 
16 June 1940, 44,870 men were enrolled. It was only in June that 
general recruiting began in earnest. At the beginning of June, the 
Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) (No.2) Bill was passed through 
all its stages in two days. It provided for enlistment for the 
duration of the emergency, billeting, the placing of troops on active 
, d t' th t' ,78 serVlce an cer aln 0 er con lngencles. Whilst, despite the 
activities of 2 September 1939, it was only on 7 June 1940 that the 
Irish Government declared a state of emergency existed! ,Nonetheless, 
even in 1940, it was not until November that a supplementary army 
estimate for £3 million was adopted. 
Until the crisis in 1940 numbers in the army were comparatively 
small. In September 1939 the Reserve had been called out on 
permanent service, as were the Volunteers. The Reserves numbered 
nominally 5,066 officers and men, the Volunteers 7,223, and in addition 
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79 
to which there were 7,494 Regulars. Of the Reserves and Volunteers, 
however, 2,053 exemptions were granted by Christmas 1939, and by the 
end of 1939, the Cabinet was committed, for financial reasons, to 
reduce the numbers permanently on service to "the smallest number of 
troops necessary to garrison fixed positions", and that meant below 
15,350.80 By April 1940, "one way and another, there were 1,256 
officers and 15,900 other ranks on permanent service", a total of 
17,156, although even then apparently "the authorities began to wonder, 
in the slang of the time, if their journey was really necessary" 81 
In a revealing comment the editor of the Defence Forces Handbook, Capt. 
J. Sheehan, states that "By the end of 1940 the army had more or less 
comp 1 eted its expans ion to a war-time footing" .82 The 'end of 1940' 
seems rather late to be ready for war, especially given the excitements 
of the summer, the fear of invasion, and the vexed issue of the ports. 
The LSF trained regularly and by 1942 the LSF had 98,429 men; 
103,~30 in 1943 and; 96,152 in 1944, it being estimated that the 
strengths were 90% effective. 83 Whilst these figures appear 
impressive, it remains true that in 1942 the number of Irishmen on 
permanent service was 38,787 all ranks, and in the summer of 1944, 
36,211 all ranks. 84 In other words, the effective Irish figure was 
about half de Valera's aspiration to a quarter of a million men. 
One possibly significant factor was, as Gray reported being told by 
de Valera himself, de Valera "dares not arm volunteer force", because 
of fears about IRA infiltration.85 
Even if given the benefit of the doubt, the effective size of the 
Irish defence forces remained small, a problem compounded by the fact 
even when "The recruits ... were forthcoming; •.• the arms were not".86 
Even in 1940 de Valera was very conscious of Ireland's "nakedness of 
defence", and felt that in such circumstances the government "could 
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not have it on their consciences" that they had taken Ireland to war. 87 
A somewhat jaundiced opposition member of the Defence Conference, Dr. 
T. O'Higgins had privately observed in March 1941, "We have 100,000 
LSF men with empty hands - as helpless as any civilians", whilst 
20,000 of the LSF had "rifles of a bore that limits the supply of 
ammunition to less than 100 rounds or about a couple of hours service". 
Ireland has "no aerial fighters worth mentioning and no anti-aircraft 
88 ground defences". 
Irish weakness was most dramatic with resp:ect to the navy, or the 
Marine Defence Service. At the outbreak of war, there was no navy 
nor Marine Defence Service. Fort Rannoch and Muirchu, the fishery 
protection vessel s became Publ ic Armed Vessel s in January 1940, with 
the first Motor Torpedo Boat arriving a week earlier. This, and 
subsequent MTBs were built by Thorneycrofts in Britain. Within two 
years the number of MTBs had increased to six, but they were very 
small and were unsuited to rough seas. 89 There was also the schooner 
Issault which was purchased as a training ship, and the barge, SS 
Shark, which was designated as a 'mine planter,.90 With respect to 
the sea, Ireland defaulted with regard to 'active' measures. 
With respect to the skies,Ireland did a little better, but still 
fell short of stlfficiently vigorous 'active' measures. Ireland did 
have a number of planes of various types by the autumn of 1939, but 
most were of little or no use in the war of 1939-45, given the 
technological developments that had taken place, and perhaps only the 
Gloucester Gladiators were of practical significance. 91 During the 
war itself, no significant fighter aircraft were acquired, but only 
six Hector Hinds in 1940 and a further ten Hector trainers in the 
summer of 1941. Again the British were the suppliers. The only 
other acquisitions were those repaired and pressed into service by the 
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Air Corps from the 163 be1ligerent aircraft which crashed in Eire. 
This produced a Fairey Battle and a Lockheed Hudson, as well as a 
couple of Hurricanes. 92 Aerial defence also involved anti-aircraft 
guns, of course, but the Irish remained short of them, although in 
November 1941 the British let Ireland have twelve 3.7 inch anti-
aircraft guns. Nonetheless, they were too few, and failed to stop 
the high-level of incursions or indeed the bombing of Eire. 
As for the Irish Army, it was "Lightly armed, with very little 
air cover and no armour, it was not a formidabl e force". 93 Once the 
war was underway, supplies became a critical problem. The Americans 
tended to argue that they only had enough for their own rearmament, 
d t f ' t' ,94 an hose 19h 1ng aggress10n. The British that no arms could be 
given unless "assured that it was Southern Ireland's intention to enter 
95 the war". The Germans were also a possible source, but in that case 
there were substantial problems of transport, and Irish fears about 
B 't' h 't' 't' d t' 96 r1 1S senS1 1V1 1es an reac 10ns. Everyone was only willing to 
give arms it seemed in return for quid pro quos that violated Irish 
neutrality. Despite the occasional bile in British and American 
responses, Britain was Ireland's chief source of supply, and later on 
the Americans supplied rifles. But Ireland still only had a couple 
of tanks, less than 30 armoured cars, and in addition, some armoured 
vehicles adapted by the Irish from Ford and Dodge chassis. Its 
armour was inadequate. The Irish were deficient in tanks and anti-tank 
guns, anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, rifles and ammunition, and 
they were further handicapped by the antiquity of some of their 
equipment. 97 
The recurring question of 'how much is enough?' is incapable of 
being empirically answered, but at sea, and in the air, the Irish 
clearly did not have 'enough' since they were incapable of preventing 
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invasions into territorial waters and air-space, or violations of 
their neutrality. Their relative defencelessness meant that on 
occason they did bend. On land the situation was somewhat different 
given that throughout the duration the land area of the twenty-six 
counties remained inviolate. There was perhaps an element of 
deterrence. Nonetheless, the crucial factors appear to have been the 
1 't' 1 98 geo-po l lca • Certainly, the Irish could have made whole-scale 
occupation unprofitable, and even partial occupation of, say, the 
ports would have been relatively expensive in men, time and resources, 
a factor the British Chiefs of Staff had taken into account in 1936. 99 
Irish active measures were not wholeheartedly or vigorously 
pursued. With respect to 'due diligence' the Irish clearly defau1ted, 
particularly in the air and at sea. The Irish objective was to, 
simply, avoid participation in the war. That is not neutrality. 
(ii) recognition of position by belligerents and others 
In his speech to the specially convened Dail on 2 September 1939, 
de Valera attempted to make clear that Ireland would seek to pursue a 
policy of neutrality.100 On the other hand, many internal and external 
observers doubted whether such an Irish policy could ever be 
implemented. It lacked antiquity, whilst Ireland appeared to be in 
an ambiguous juridical position. Moreoever, there were questions 
concerning the political, military and economic viability of such a 
policy. 
For the most part the Germans accepted Irish neutrality, although 
there were some violations. Irish rights were breached by U-boats, 
by occasional bombing, and by such incidents as aerial reconnaisance, 
which, incidentally led the Irish to fire on German planes. 101 The 
Germans also found it difficult to abjure some involvement with the 
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more militant of Irish republicans and there was also some espionage 
activity.102 In 1940 and 1941, there was some discussion and 
planning of an attack upon Eire, but this was largely envisaged as 
'diversionary', and of a lower priority than the main target of 
O t ' , 't' 103 pera ~on Seal~on, Br~ a~n. 
On 17 June 1940 Hempel was asked by Walshe "to declare that 
we would not make" a landing in Ireland". Hempel said such a request 
"could only meet with a negative reaction on my part and I added that 
such a dec1aration was impossible in the present mi1itary situation".104 
Within a month, however, the Germans were more reassuring saying that 
"As 10ng as Ire1and conducts herse1f in a neutra1 fashion it can be 
counted on with abs01ute certainty that Germany wi11 respect her 
neutra1ity unconditiona1ly".105 In 1941 Hit1er himse1f apparent1y 
argued "Eire's neutra1 i ty must be respected. A neutra1 Irish Free 
State is of greater va1ue to us than a hosti1e Ire1and", although he 
recognized that certain margina1 encroachments could not be avoided. 106 
The Irish were fortunate that although Hempe1 was aware "Irish 
neutra1ity was weighted on the A1lied side ••• he did not be1ieve 
such breaches of impartia1ity warranted German reta1iation",107 and 
that geography and the A11ied forces remained strong enough to prevent 
the Germans from doing much otherwise. 
The initia1 British discomfiture was c1early revea1ed in the Eden 
memorandum of 16 September 1939 on the 1egal and constitutiona1 
position. 108 The British never simply accepted the 1939 Irish aide-
memo ire and throughout the war Britain forma11y refused to recognize 
the Irish position. Moreoever, not on1y was a guarantee of respect 
for Irish neutra1ity missing, but so too, and quite de1iberate1y, was 
a guarantee not to invade Irish territory. Ear1y in 1941, the Irish 
were t01d the question was "academic" but nonethe1ess, "in a war 1ike 
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this it is impossib1e to foresee what might deve1op. A situation of 
1ife and death might arise in which it might be essentia1, in our 
view, to the surviva1 of the 1iberties of Britain and Southern Ire1and 
109 
too that we shou1d have the use of the ports". 
On occasion there was a certain apparent de facto recognition of 
the Irish position, and a certain ambiquity of language, for examp1e, 
when on 17 June 1940 MacDona1d spoke to de Va1era of Ire1and's 
"immediate abandonment of neutra1ity" in return for cooperation in 
d 't 'b1 "llO a vance agalns a POSSl e German lnvaSlon. Moreover, one of the 
British proposa1s put forward by MacDona1d during negotiations 
contained the idea that "Eire to remain neutra1, at any rate for the 
t ' b' ,,111 lme elng. More indicative of British attitudes was the 
continuing be1ief that it might be possib1e to do a dea1 over unity, 
'the ports', or the supply of equipment. Whilst rebuffed, it is of 
significance that such dea1s were at 1east subject to negotiation, 
giving some sustenance to British hopes. 
The Americans a1so refused to guarantee the Irish position, and 
even prior to entry into the war, were not sympathetic to the Irish 
position. As it came to be put the American government "did not 
question the determination or the right of the Irish peop1e to 
maintain their neutrality, but between a policy of this character and 
one which potentia11y at least gave real encouragement to Germany 
there was a c1 ear distinction" .112 The United States remained 
antipathetic and came back to charges concerning the nature of Irish 
neutrality, although Roosevelt in February 1942 did send reassurances 
to de Valera there was not, and "is not now, the slightest thought or 
intention of invading Irish territory or threatening Irish security,,:13 
This was repeated in the wake of Irish fears over the 'American Note' 
in 1944. 114 The Note specifically charged "that despite the declared 
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desire of the Irish Government that its neutrality should not operate 
in favour of either of the belligerents, it has in fact operated and 
continues to operate in favour of the Axis Powers and against the 
United Nations on whom your security and the maintenance of your 
national economy depend".115 The British concurred with the Americans. 
In 1940, Hempel was confident that "the Army, together with the 
nationalist population, would be prepared to carryon strong 
resistance in the form of gueri 11 a warfare against an Engl ish attack,;116 
although in November 1939 he had explicitly warned that if the British 
took action against the harbours, the Irish government "might put up 
armed resistance or it might not, in view of the small size of the 
117 
armed forces". Ribbentrop, moreover, was annoyed at an Irish 
rejection of German arms, believing this reluctance to accept arms in 
advance implied that Irish resistance to a British attack was hardly 
likely to be all it was made out to be. 11B 
Hempel was aware that the position of the United states was 
crucial, warning in October 1939 that "a possible abandoning of 
American neutrality would constitute a threat to Irish neutrality" ,119 
and a month later, commenting that whilst US entry into the war was 
"not expected for the time being", such "a step would exert a decisive 
infl uence on the situation here" .120 The American representative in 
Dublin, David Gray initially felt the same, since de Valera had told 
him, us entry into the war "would alter our situation over_night".121 
The Allies also occasionally had hopes with respect to Irish 
opinion, possible internal divisions within the Fianna Fail govenment, 
the possibilities of an alternative, more congenial government, and 
the cultivation of Mr. James Dillon TD. Whilst some of these thoughts 
were chimerical, there was also some foundation for certain hopes along 
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these lines. Maffey and Hempel were both originally agreed, in 
October 1939 that neutrality enjoyed public support, but the degree of 
unanimity can be exaggerated. 122 For example, whilst a senior Fine 
Gael politician felt in 1940 that entry into the war would be 
opposed by "perhaps more than half of" Fianna Fail, "one third of Fine 
Gael and perhaps the whole of Labour", this suggests the abandonment 
of neutrality did have some support. 123 This despite the fact that 
neutrality was fortified by censorship. 
For some, private doubts revolved around the moral issue of 
abstention from a war against Nazism. For others the doubts involved 
the practical grounds of viability and expediency of the policy. 
There was no organized group of 'doubters' and those holding such 
views did not always do so consistently, or with the same strength. 
For example, doubts concerning viability and expediency rose 
significantly with the fall of France. The most consistent opponent 
of the government's policy was James Dillon TD, deputy Leader of Fine 
Gael until he was forced to resign on the issue in February 1942, when 
he suggested that "Whatever the sacrifice, whatever America may want 
from us to protect her from her enemies, she will get for the asking,,~24 
Whilst they refused to support Dillon's motion in March 1941 
that the shadow cabinet seek a declaration of war, the shadow cabinet 
were interested in a bargain over Ulster. The great constraint was 
the perception of public opinion. There was, in fact, more concern 
over neutrality among the shadow cabinet than their public utterances 
suggested. 125 Cosgrave had publicly repudiated Dillon, but in 
private was somewhat more flexible. He had, after all, written to 
de Valera in July 1940 (for the first time in eighteen years), pointing 
out that "If the Government in changing circumstances feel it necessary 
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to depart from the policy of neutrality in which they have had our 
support up to the present, my colleagues and I would be prepared to 
give them our fullest support in such a change of policy". de Valera 
did not act upon this hint, and Cosgrave's reply emphasized his 
original "letter had been written, not to suggest a change of policy 
but to indicate what would be his party's view if the Government felt 
obliged to abandon neutrality".126 
In private with Maffey in October 1942, Cosgrave observed that 
no Irish government could ab&ndon neutrality because support for the 
policy was increasing, rather than diminishing. Maffey had to 
report in fact that "the conversation revealed the present firm and 
unyielding adherence of all parties to the policy of neutrality", 
although it is interesting that in repudiating Dillon, Cosgrave used 
the expression 'at the moment', and Maffey reported 'the present' 
127 
adherence. Even in Fianna Fail some were ready, perhaps including 
Lemass, to at least discuss some of the British offers. 128 
During the 1943 election campaign Fine Gael was, nonetheless, 
careful to insist that it supported neutrality, although there were 
hints of the need for closer cooperation with Britain after the war. 
Fianna Fail sought to use neutrality for their own purposes, suggesting 
"If you vote Fianna Fail, the bombs won't fall" and arguing neutrality 
would be endangered if they were not returned. de Valera told 
audiences: "Remember that this nation is being watched, and if you 
turn down the Government, foreign people will represent it as a 
turning down of the policies for which the Government has generally 
t d" 129 s 00 • Despite this, the Fianna Fail vote fell significantly in 
130 1943 compared to 1938. Although this primarily reflected domestic 
factors, it was hardly a ringing endorsement of de Valera. 
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As for the 1944 election, the Round Table correspondent reported 
in July that "The election campaign was remarkable, ••• for the 
discreet silence which was observed on topics which to an outsider might 
well have seemed all-important for the future of Eire ••• Neutrality 
. ,,131 
was not an lssue Little was said about the future, although in 
the spring of 1944 General Mulcahy had argued Eire should become a 
full member of the Commonwealth again when the war was over, a 
departure from his party's policy. In 1944 Mulcahy also advocated 
an Anglo-Irish military alliance as a future plank in the party's 
pl atform. 132 In 1944 Fianna Fail recovered support, although not 
back to the 1938 level. Most of the votes appear to have come from 
Labour,133 and as such were not necessarily related to neutrality, 
although 'the Note' crisis does appear to have enhanced de Valera's 
position. With regard to attitudes to neurality, however, it must 
be remembered that thousands of Irishmen voted with their feet by 
going to Britain. 
(iii) the disavowal of help 
For the Irish there was uncertainty as to who the enemy might be. 
This uncertainty, indeed, "contributed to a rather schizophrenic 
feeling in the army with the men in the 1st Division i~ the south 
mentally anticipating a German landing, and those in the 2nd Division 
in the northern part of the country facing towards the border with the 
possibility to having to oppose a British invasion".134 If there 
was uncertainty about the source of possibl e invasion what was the 
attitude to receiving and accepting help from others? 
At the height of the German successes in 1940, de Valera asked 
to see Hempel, and warned him that fears about German intentions 
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concerning Ireland had increased, that Ireland stood by its pledge 
not to become a base against Britain. He then went on: "If it came 
to an invasion then Ireland would inevitably become a battlefield for 
the belligerents. In an English invasion we would fight with Irishmen 
against the English, in a German invasion the English would fight along 
135 
with the Irish". Indeed, whenever this subject came up, the Irish 
catechismal response was to focus, as de Valera did in his talk with 
Hempel, upon 'invasion'. There was to be no physical presence by 
German or British armies until the other side had invaded. 
The Germans periodically enquired of the Irish attitude towards 
help either to forestall or in response to a British invasion, with 
the assurance that the "Reich Government would be in a position to 
give Ireland vigorous support and would be inclined to do so".136 On 
3 December 1940 Hitler himself decided Hempel should find out "whether 
de Valera desires support" and this was coupled with the offer of the 
British arms left in France. 137 In response to such offers the Irish 
were very circumspect, at least at official level, fearing British 
discovery and response. For those reasons they declined "until a 
British attack, which was unlikely for the time being, had become a 
fact".138 de Valera thought "I don't think we have to make provision 
now. Should it really happen, I think Germany is so efficient that 
they could find ways and means".139 Hempel occasionally worried, 
however, that even in the event of a British attack, de Valera might 
140 
not call upon the Germans. One senior Irish army officer, the 
GOC of the 2nd Division, Major-General Hugo McNeill, the officer 
commanding the Irish troops on the Northern Ireland border, met with 
the German Counsellor in Dublin to solicit German arms and assistance 
but again, this appears to have been in the event of a British 
. . 141 
~nvas~on. 
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With regard to the British, the Irish shied away from formal 
arrangements, partly because de Valera felt that an agreement "no 
matter how independent it left both parties, would inevitably be 
interpreted by outsiders as making them allies".142 Indeed, in 1940 
de Valera refused an invitation to go to London for much the same 
reason.
143 Nonetheless, German success aroused Irish fears, and 
talks about defence cooperation did take place. On 23 May 1940 the 
Irish suggested "immediate secret contacts should be established 
between the Irish military authorities and the service chiefs in this 
country (Britain) with a view to concerting the military action which 
would be taken when the occasion arises".144 It was Walshe and Col 
Archer who attended the meeting that day in London with Machtig 
(Permanent Under-Secretary of the Dominions Office) and British air-
force, naval and army officers to explore possible avenues of German 
attack,145 and who showed Lt-Col Dudley Clarke around Dublin. Clarke, 
incidentally, subsequently reported on the satisfactory nature of the 
arrangements for coordination, and that his visit had been encouraging. 
It was also agreed that the British should appoint a military attache 
t th ' D bl' .. 1 b . t . .. 1 . . 146 o elr u In mlSSlon, a el In a ClVl lan gUlse. The British 
Chiefs of Staff told their own Cabinet at the end of the month, that 
the Irish had been told "they may expect to receive direct support as 
far as land forces are concerned from General Officer Commanding 
Northern Ireland district. Staff officers from headquarters, Northern 
Ireland, have attended the conversations in Dublin and detailed planning 
is now proceeding. There have also been talks on how the RAF can help 
from United Kingdom bases". The British Cabinet sanctioned the Chiefs 
of Staff action on 1 June 1940. 147 After this excitement the impetus 
was lost. 148 
Throughout this period there was a repeated caveat. This was with 
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regard to the stimulus for British help. The original Irish 
suggestion of 23 May made clear that the political situation in Eire 
was such that there was no question of inviting in United Kingdom 
troops before fighting between Ireland and Germany had actually began. 
On 17 June 1940 MacDonald referred to the Irish reservation, making 
it clear that this might mean help arriving too late, and proposing 
" d" t " " " "t t" 149 an lmme la e pre-lnvaslon lnVl a lon. The Irish were unyielding, 
and according to Bowman "there were strong arguments against acceptance. 
Any abandonment of neutrality in advance of a German invasion, would 
create a rift in the Fianna Fail party and cabinet; •.• it seemed 
likely to the cabinet that some British troops would be attacked by 
republican extremists; in the event of a German invasion, a government 
which had invited prior British aid, would be open to the charge that 
it was the British presence which had precipitated the attack; 
further, there was a suspicion in de Valera's mind, at least, that 
if the British ever returned to the Treaty ports - even by invitation -
they might never leave; moreover, Germany at this hour in the war, 
seemed invincible; and, lastly, there was Ulster •.• Was de Va1era 
not being cast in the ro1e of Redmond?".150 
The real question is whether the caveat was sufficient to 'save' 
neutrality. Preparations for and expectations Df help certainly ran 
counter to the more contemporary po1icy of 'for neutrality' as 
followed by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, and although lacking a 
forma1 treaty it might be regarded as nearer to the Finnish position, 
given the 1948 treaty with the Soviet Union. A further problem for 
the Irish was the asymmetrical nature of their preparations and 
expectations, which showed a clear partiality, given the number of 
talks with the British. In October 1940 discussions began again, 
whilst in March 1941 plans for combined resistance were revitalized. 151 
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In addition, some specialist Irish personnel were sent for training 
in Britain, whilst the British sent experts to Ireland to give advice. 152 
This period of liaison continued until the threat of the German 
invasion was deemed to have passed, and bitterness entered Anglo-
American relations with Ireland in the winter of 1943-1944. However, 
between March 1941 and that time the "improved liaison between the 
army staffs -north and south eventually eased the Irishar'my's shortage 
of modern equipment and there were frequent secret rendezvous on the 
border when Irish army lorries which had gone north with hams, eggs 
and butter returned south with badly needed mi1itary supplies".153 
There was no Irish disavowal of help, no lack of preparation or 
expectation, no real 'defence v. help' and every instance of a 
'protective umbrella'. 
(iv) freedom of decision and action 
Much of the foregoing has dealt with the constraints upon Irish 
policy-makers because of their economic and military dependency upon 
others. Crucial1y, the "availabi1ity of supplies of anything 
depended on many matters which were outside the control of 'the Irish'. 
They depended increasingly, as the war wore on, on the degree of 
cordiality between Ir~land and the major a11ies" 154 The dependency 
resulted from the simple facts, as de Valera told the nation in 
January 1941 that "Ours is an island country. Everything which we 
use and do not produce ourselves comes to us in ships across the 
seas. We have few ships of our own and little hope of purchasing 
any". de Valera went on, "we must now create for ourselves a war 
economy capable of withstanding the economic stresses that we shall 
155 henceforth feel acutely". Perceptive listeners might have 
wondered in the lapse of time since September 1939, or even before 
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that when war seemed likely. Indeed, de Valera had not even taken 
action on a memorandum drawn up by his own department in 1935 which 
noted that in a war any significant interruption of supplies "of petrol 
and other fuels and lubricating oils would practically bring road 
transport in this country to a standstill in a short time". All 
supplies of raw materialswould be "critical".156 There was also a 
warning from Department of Industry and Commerce in April 1939 on 
Irish dependence on other countries shipping for imports of "wheat, 
maize, petroleum ••• and any other 'bulk' cargoes from abroad". It 
had concluded "if war should break out we are very largely at the 
mercy of other countries, and particularly of the United Kingdom, in 
respect of our external trade, and that the economic activities of 
this country could in such circumstances be completely paralysed".157 
Despite all the rhetoric about self-sufficiency, Ireland had no 
'strategic reserve'. Consequently, third parties saw room for 
influence and manoeuvre, and doubted not only the credibility of Irish 
neutrality, but the real extent of the Irish freedom of action and 
decision. 
However, the formal position on key issues was clear. Ireland 
was not constrained or obligated by any military alliance or commitment, 
by any formal agreement re the ports, nor by any,formal treaty in the 
political area, although in some minds questions did remain about the 
nature of the relationship with the Commonwealth. 158 The Irish 
retained that essential ingredient of political sovereignty, namely 
the right and ability to say 'yes' or 'no,.159 
Although there are well-known pitfalls in a legalistic approach 
to sovereignty, it remains true that after the constitutional upheavals 
of the 1930s the Irish themselves were in no doubt about their 
exclusive right to declare war. The 1937 Constitution stated "War 
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shall not be declared and the state shall not participate in any war 
save with the assent of D~il Eireann" (28.3.P). The provisions of 
article 28 are, in fact, crucial for they meant that Irish participation 
could not be delivered soley by the government, or even head of 
government, except in case of actual invasion. This was of critical 
importance with respect to both credibility and the perceived freedom 
of action and decision. Equally importantly, the constitution was 
al so cl ear that "Every international agreement to which the state 
becomes a party shall be laid before Dail Eireann" (29.5.1°), which made 
any agreement on the ports more difficult. 160 
The Irish clearly did face a number of difficulties, but in 
addition to those discussed as de Valera put it in his broadcast of 29 
January 1941 "another danger has presented itself ••. the economic 
one". He went on to make his famous comment that "The belligerents 
in blockading each other are blockading us". What clearly worried 
de Valera at that time was whether suffering might compel the nation 
to give way to pressure. He felt "it need never compel the nation at 
any time to give way", but this was predicated upon making "whatever 
adjustments in our economic life the new situation may demand" 161 
It was because of this Irish vulnerability and indeed dependence that 
Gray thought Irish neutrality was ridiculous. 162 de Valera himself 
recognized the problem of getting supplies and of meeting the high 
cost of them, urging his people "to try to get our own home substitutes 
for the things we imported".163 He also explicitly recognized that 
the British contro}] ed shipping space which they coul d "deny to us 
if they choose leaving us in a dependent position".164 
It might well be argued that too much is made of Irish dependency 
since it clearly never reached a level, nor did their lack of resources 
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or supplies, as to force them 'to give way to pressure', This is not 
a conclusive answer, however, for it begs the question of whether it 
was Irish action and resources that were decisive, or whether the Irish 
were able to resist pressure because the pips were never squeezed so 
tight as to make them squeak, At the height of their success, for 
example, in June 1940 the Germans were cautious about blockading 
Ireland, partly because they believed "she can subsist in a pinch",165 
This clearly suggests Irish resources, especially food would be 
sufficient, that a blockade would not lead to a change in Irish 
political policy, If the Germans were somewhat constrained, so too 
were the British, even if they did embark, early in 1941 upon a 
policy of deliberate sanctions,166 Further measures were taken 1ater 
in the war, for examp1e, petroleum in 1943 and a range of action in 
the prologue to the launching of the second front in 1944, But the 
British War Cabinet's Committee on Economic Policy towards Eire, 
formed in 1942, apparently had as its genera1 policy "keeping Eire's 
. .. b'" 167 economy go~ng on a m~n~mum as~s , Carr011 rightly concludes that 
"It was never, therefore, starvation but a question of constant1y 
reminding the Irish that they owed their surviva1 to Britain but had 
refused to pull their weight and so must expect to pay some price in 
168 personal comfort", 
The potential power of Britain was daunting, In July 1940 the 
Irish Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Measures worried that 
more than a quarter of a million Irish people could be made idle if 
the country was cut off for a significant period,169 while a year 1ater 
Gray was writing to Roosevelt that "If Britain completely shuts off 
coal and gasoline this place would be disorganised and howling 
wi1derness in three months",170 The pattern of Irish trade was one 
problem, During the period 1939-45 the value of Irish trade with 
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Britain expressed as a percentage of total value of external trade was: 
Table 6.2 Percentage of Irish Exports and Imports to and from 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and its Allies 1939-45 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Imports 
Britain 55.7 53.1 71.5 57.3 50.6 47.0 47.5 
-
British " a llies"* 15.3 20.2 15.5 25.3 25.9 30.8 25.9 
Total 71 73.3 87 82.6 76.5 77.8 73.4 
Exports 
Britain 
British la11ies"* 
93.6 
1.4 
96 
2 
97.1 
2.6 
98.8 
1.1 
98.8 
1 
98.8 
1 
97.9 
1 
Total 95.0 98 99.7 99.9 99.8 99.8 98.9 
* Including for this purpose even prior to 1942, the United states. 
Source: From: Ireland Statistical Abstract 1946, (Dublin Stationery 
Office, 1947, P.No. 7745) Table 94 'Value of Trade with each 
of the principal countries expressed as a percentage of total 
value of Imports and Exports (including He-Exports)' p.84. 
These figures are crippling, being especially dramatic on the 
export side. But even on the import side, the impact of the war was 
dramatic, as is demonstrated in Table 6.3: 
Table 6.3 Quantity of Imports in Key Economic Sectors 1939 to 1945 
Unit of 
Article Quantity Year 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Cereals & Feeding-stuffs 
Wheat cwt 7,257,581 6,637,177 1,000,014 3,897,906 1,942,202 4,462,682 4,567,718 
Barley " 338,713 275,277 19,684 4,552 736,970 764,190 
Oats " 285 121,269 110 95,621 2 355,677 
Maize " 8,160,980 5,782,519 789,004 n/d 
Wheaten Flour " 96,322 79,611 30,769 10,353 577 668 n/d 
Other Food 
Sugar " 899,553 1,803,114 5 25,062 351,091 18 8,818 
Tea lb 21,858,693 23,605,229 11,203,771 11,610,025 6,144,209 6,216,032 7,824,137 
Non-metalliferous mine 
products 
Coal ton 2,875,773 2,757,318 1,487,920 1,048,636 1,015,371 734,654 920,573 
Iron and steel 
I Pig iron " 7,566 4,012 939 2,994 2,749 2,301 1,597 r--
(Y) Steel bar rods " 13,609 10,904 2,161 1,130 1,045 1,527 8,692 N 
I 
Non-ferrous metals 
Aluminium cwt 6,025 6,340 450 53 59 52 5,977 
Lead 63,053 30,766 7,173 3,634 5,064 6,699 11,500 
Machinery & Vehicles 
Agricultural 
machinery No. 8,984 8,744 1,637 1,470 441 1,317 4,661 
Tractors " 572 769 31 65 138 387 1,066 
Ships, boats & 
Parts " 
Aeroplanes " 
OUs/ 
I 
co 
c:rl 
N 
I 
Table 6.3 (cont'd) 
Unit of 
Article Quantity Year 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
OUs 
Gas & fuel 
oil gall. 11,623,035 11,473,077 8,652,951 6,132,927 6,103,093 6,470,282 6,284,045 
Oils - motor 
spirit " 39,021,517 32,343,909 17,814,232 14,090,493 10,831,209 12,916,818 14,925,890 
Fertilizer 
Rock phosphate ton 88,986 73,624 6,776 18,370 27,525 18,240 
Seeds for Sowin~ 
Wheat cwt 614,973 205,172 176,509 44,252 250 n/d 
n/d data not available, or not available in comparable form. 
Sources:- Ireland Statistical Abstract 1945, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1945, P.No. 7099) Table 97 
'Quantity and Value of Imports in each year 1939 to 1944', pp.104-119. 
Ireland Statistical Abstract 1946, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1947, P.No. 7745) Table 98 
'Quantity and Value of Imports', pp.88-95. 
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Whilst in some sectors, for example, sugar, the impact of trade 
dislocation was mitigated by increased domestic production, this was 
not possible in all areas, for example, tea, coal, iron and steel, oils, 
fertilizers and seed. Indeed, "by 1943 the community had 25 per 
cent of its nominal requirements of tea, 20 per cent of its requirements 
of petrol, less than 15 per cent of its paraffin, 16 per cent of its 
gas coal, no domestic coal whatever and 22 per cent of its textiles".171 
Elements of the normal stable diet, bread, butter and tea, became 
scarce and expensive, whilst what was available, namely meat, was 
also expensive. Despite this, the worst never quite came to the 
worst, and "apart from tea and white bread the Irish were better fed 
than the British with meat, bacon, butter and eggs ••• for those who 
172 
could afford them". 
It was Irish good fortune to live, as de Valera put it, on a 
"fertile is1and". As a result he felt "no one should starve. We 
can have abundance of the best food if we set out now to produce it 
ourselves". He also explicitly told farmers that "every extra acre 
they grow" was "giving the nation added strength to pursue unwavering1y 
its own policy, and to resist pressure, should pressure be attempted 
by any side".173 Compulsory ti1lage was introduced, and 'crop and 
turf' output rose by over 30% during the war. 174 
Meehan judged that "the economy just managed to keep going; and 
above a11, the po1icy of neutra1ity was not prejudiced by economic 
weakness",175 a judgement shared by Longford and 0'Nei11. 176 Carrol 1 , 
on the other hand, believes that early in 1941 de Valera made "a 
definite pro-British shift in po1icy" , the British economic campaign 
having brought home "the country's dependence on British goodwi11 for 
essentia1 supp1ies", and he cites the renewed interest in military 
t ' 'd 177 coopera lon as eVl ence. Whi1st there is supporting evidence for 
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Carroll's view,178 the Irish did not yield on their fundamental line 
of policy. On the other hand, allied forebearance meant that the 
Irish were never put to the full test, and de Valera had subsequently 
to admit that Irish neutral i ty hung upon the "sl ender thread" of the 
. 11 f . 1 179 Wl 0 Roosevelt and Churchll • 
Conclusion 
Ireland did not fulfill all the criteria 'of' or 'for' neutrality, 
even during this war period, despite Keatinge's claim that this period 
saw "the most clear-cut manifestation of neutrality in Irish history,,:80 
More important than neutrality per se was the imperative of proving 
to the world and themselves, their independence. Even in 1944 when 
Ireland could have joined the allies with little risk to itself, de 
Valera felt "Irish independence of action had to be preserved".181 
On 7 February 1939 in a crucial speech to the Irish Senate on Irish 
unity, de Valera had stressed the need for independence of action and 
Article One of the Constitution, with its basic affirmation of 
sovereignty. He "would not sacrifice that right, because without 
that right you have not freedom at all".182 
There was also an abhorrence of war and of participation in 
Bri tish wars, ref1 ecting a "dumb but powerful urge al)1ong the peopl e 
for peace at any price", an urge which provided much of the strength 
of neutrality.183 Whilst thousands felt differently and contributed 
to the British war effort, this dumb urge heavily influenced de 
Valera. In May 1940, for example, he commented that having been 
scourged by whips, the Irish wanted "no scourging with scorpions 
instead". Given this, he had the "desire and intention to save our 
people from the horrors of this war".184 Some time later, he re-
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affirmed that it was his "duty to Ireland to try to keep out of this 
II 185 
war • Conscious of the effects of bombing, he noted that if 
defended "London is suffering ••• what would happen to Dublin, Cork 
and other Irish cities relatively unprotected". No country should 
court such dangers, so that whilst the Irish would think of the world, 
"Our principal purpose now must be to save our own people ll • 186 
Neutrality was merely an apparent vehicle to meet these 
fundamental urges, although in fact, meeting those urges was actually 
achieved by non-belligerency. The period 1939-1945 saw highly 
pragmatic policy-making. Despite this, the Irish experience in these 
years generated a powerful myth of Irish neutrality. Important in 
this regard was the actual success in keeping Ireland out of the war which 
had been achieved under the label of neutrality. Whilst Irish policy 
had been ad hoc and pragmatic, de Valera had "carried it through so 
successfully and brilliantly that for many people, including his 
political opponents, neutrality became a veritable creed ll • 187 For 
most Irishmen it was perceived as a specifically Irish success, the 
crowning glory of independence, and confirmation of distinctiveness 
from Britain. Consequently neutrality was elevated beyond the 
realms of normal political debate, and acquired an almost hallowed 
status, despite not being in the Constitution. 
Influential in this process was the distorted Irish worldview 
as a result of isolation and censorship. The end of the war saw 
anti-American scenes in Dublin (which possibly had some relevance 
four years 1 ater} , and the Irish "were less informed than al most any 
other people" in Western Europe. 188 There is general consensus on 
the deleterious effects of this ignorance, perhaps captured most 
graphically by F.S.L. Lyons' observation that lilt was as if an entire 
people had been condemned to live in Plato's cave, with their backs to 
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the fire of life and deriving their only knowledge of what went on 
outside from the flickering shadows thrown on the wall .... When ••. 
they emerged, dazzled, from the cave into the light of day, it was 
to a new and vastly different world".189 As Constance Howard 
190 
observed, "the dream had become more real than the hard facts ••• ", 
and as a consequence according to Dr. O'Higgins, the Irish brought 
"up a generation blissfully unconscious of facts ••• We have magnified 
our immunity from war and our neutral position into a major 
achievement ,,191 . .. . 
These factors were reinforced by the linkage of neutrality with 
partition which reached its apogee in de Valera's famous reply to 
Churchill on 16 May 1945 when de Valera asked whether a partitioned 
England would have fought on behalf of the partitioner. To many, 
this speech was de Valera's finest hour and it was "the final, crucial 
episode in ••• transformation of Irish perceptions of neutrality".192 
The myth, then, became an established part of Irish politica1 
culture, despite its flawed basis. The actual position of Ireland was 
sui generis, and even Keatinge accepts that "the use of the term 
neutrality is best qualified in the Irish context",193 requiring to be 
seen "in its specifically Irish context".194 Geographical propinquity, 
resource deficiencies and consequent dependence upon Britain meant 'a 
certain consideration' for Britain and non-belligerency rather than 
neutrality. 
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Chapter Seven: 'Erstwhi1e Is01ationist'71 1945-1955 
Most of the causes and rationa1es under1ying Irish p01icy did 
not evaporate with the ending of the Second Wor1d War. Rather they 
came to be exacerbated by the fact that in Ire1and the psych010gica1 
effect of the war was "eventua11y to prove far more significant,,2 
than the materia1 effects, and by deve10pments in the immediate post-
war period. Some of these deve10pments were within, and some out-
with, Irish contr01. They served to further entrench the myth of a 
tradition of Irish neutra1ity, contributing to "the process whereby 
neutrality acquired the sanctity of a dogma that was not merely 
uncontested but uncontestable. Perhaps 'mystery of faith' wou1d be 
more appropriate than 'dogma' since it had still failed to acquire 
ideological foundations ,,3 This process was aided by Ireland's 
limited international r01e given its exclusion from the embryonic 
United Nations, although the extent of Irish abstention from inter-
national affairs in the postwar decade can be exaggerated. Nonethe-
less, there wasa degree of insularity and reality fai1ed to penetrate 
the psyche of either Irish politicians or public. The legacy of 
the war and its apparent confirmation in the period 1945-1955 has 
been a crucial factor in Irish policy ever since. 
.} 
The termination of hostilities in 1945 removed a necessary 
condition of neutrality as classically understood, although 'the 
emergency' in Ireland continued for another generation. Moreover, 
the legacy of the wartime years was so potent that the term neutrality 
continued to have a pervasive influence in Ireland as a description 
of Irish policy in the years of peace after 1945. Irish policy in 
that period will, therefore, now be analyzed using the criteria 
already applied to the war years in a modified form to reflect 'for' 
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neutrality rather than 'of' neutrality. In this period also, whilst 
it would be somewhat proleptic to analyse Irish policy in terms of 
nonalignment, two new variables derived from the 'political' pillar of 
nonalignment will be applied, especially since they are reflective of 
the fact that nonalignment is best seen as an attitude of mind or 
identity rather than as a particular policy. 
(i) due diligence 
The conclusion of the war did nothing to resolve what for many 
Irishmen was the fundamental problem regarding the inviolability, or 
otherwise, of Irish territory and sovereignty, namely the British 
presence in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the war years had exacerbated 
the problem. Parti tion remained for de Val era and others, "the 
burning question" which would "dominate every political issue" in the 
country, be it "in times of crisis or in times of no crisis".4 
Whilst this issue was to have a dramatic impact upon Irish 
security policy, the initial concerns in 1944-5 were with the defence 
of the 26 Counties, and planning both for demobilisation and the 
future shape, size and role of the Irish defence forces. It was, 
in fact, an Irish General Staff submission to government in August 
19445 which examined these issues and which, together with the 
decisions taken on it, "formed the basis for postwar reorganisation 
and the -size and shape of the army for more than a decade ".6 The 
General Staff made a number of assumptions about the basis of future 
defence policy, which de Val era subsequently told them could be "taken 
as substantially representing the Government's defence policy" although 
modifications might prove "necesary at a later stage".7 
essentially four major assumptions, namely: 
There were 
"( a) That the State wi 11 endeavour to remain neutral in 
future wars. 
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(b) That the defence forces will be organised, trained, 
equipped and maintained on the basis of operating on 
and in defence of our own territory. 
(c) That in the event of Great Britain being involved in 
another major war, our defence forces would be 
sufficiently strong to enable the Government to 
assume complete responsibility for defence of this 
country so that Great Britain and her allies could 
not justify a claim that it was necessary to occupy 
our territory or part thereof to protect both this 
country and Great Britain from invasion by another 
Great Power. 
(d) That the defence forces to be raised, equipped and 
maintained shou1d be sufficiently strong to ensure 
that on the one hand Great Britain's enemies would 
be deterred from attempting to invade this country for 
the purpose of defeating G;reat Britain, and on the 
other, that Gr~a~ Britain and her allies would be 
deterred from attempting to invade this country for 
the purpose of securing bases from which to attack 
their opponents". 
The memorandum then went on "to consider the most practicable method 
of implementing" the foregoing. 8 
The General Staff clearly appreciated the need to have sufficient 
strength such that a putative belligerent would not perceive any need 
to act against Ireland, and the responsibility of a neutral to be 
. sufficiently strong and to take active measures to meet the require-
ments of neutrality. The political debate over the next decade 
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revolved around the extent to which this recognition of principles 
was to be translated into policy and capability. 
Not all members of Dail Eireann accepted as axiomatic that the 
Irish state needed an army in the traditional sense. Mr. Coogan, 
for example, thought the army should be organized "on a purely 
gendarmerie basis", as simply "a reserve for the civil authority". 9 
Dr. O'Higgins, Fine Gael's spokesman on defence and later a Minister 
of Defence, was himself sceptical of the need for a large army, 
al though in his case he wished the resources to be allocated to air 
and naval protection instead. 10 In addition, in opposition, he 
occasionally gave the impression that he saw the "main purpose" of 
the army as preserving internal peace, although he acknowledged a 
ceremonial function "and, if you want the third, a small nucleus 
which would be capable of expansion in times of greater emergency" 11 
For Fianna Fail this orientation was anathema since it meant 
"your defence will then have to be provided for outside". Moreover, 
garrisoning by foreign troops would be necessary "at the very 
commencement of ••• operations and any chance you have of maintaining 
neutrality goes".12 Fine Gael disputed this, believing on the one 
hand that Britain would never invade and on the other, that, therefore, 
the only danger to Ireland was from an enemy powerful enough to defeat 
't' 13 Br1 a1n. In that eventuality they felt there was little Ireland 
could do. This line of reasoning was of dubious historical validity 
and was itself hardly compatible with neutrality. When in opposition 
Fianna Fail claimed that the Inter-Party governments (1948-51 and 
1954-7) had allowed doubts to arise as to whether Ireland was capable 
of protecting itself, and inter alia neutrality.14 As their spokes-
man put it in June 1955, "if we are really serious about preserving 
the neutrality of thmState, then we ought at least provide the means 
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by which we can protect that neutrality. No nation will take our 
statements that we are a neutral nation seriously if we do not our-
selves make an effort ••• by keeping the Army at the highest possible 
t th ,,15 s reng • •• • Fianna Fail also claimed that wartime neutrality 
was respected "mainly by reason of ••• the forces which were there".16 
In government all parties paid lip-service to possessing "a 
defence force capable of operatingin defence of the national territory", 
with sufficient strength, training and equipment to allow the Irish 
government "to assume complete responsibility for the defence of the 
country".17 
They also had to contend, however, with the recognition that "for 
a country such as this", the objective of "providing a Defence Force 
to resist and repel any aggressor" was beyond them. Despite this, 
Major de Valera, Fianna Fail's most articulate spokesman on defence, 
was adamant that the alternative was not to do nothing since defence 
was one of the privileges of independence. Whilst absolute defence 
might be out, "a more modest view of the problem" was reasonable, 
involving the objective of minimising the danger of interference. 18 
Nonetheless, in actual policy and provision ambivalence persisted. 
When asked in 1951 whether Ireland could protect its neutrality, the 
Inter-Party Minister for Defence, General MacEoin replied "I think so", 
saying the country would put up "a very decent show" holding out 
longer than an opponent might expect. 19 However, it was not a very 
positive statement. 
The Irish did recognize that in the new international environment 
Ireland occupied a pivotal position, lying as it did "right across 
the communications of the North Atlantic", so that it "could not ignore 
the storm breaking".20 Consequently Oscar Traynor,Fianna Fail's 
shadow spokesman on defence in 1951 and subsequently Minister, argued 
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that if Ireland 1 eft a vacuum and fai 1 ed to ensure its terri tory could 
not be used by others, "then it is almost certain that we would find 
this state of ours in the hands of one or other of the belligerents",21 
not through malevolence on their part, but rather because there would 
be "no other military way out" for them, "as a protection for them-
selves" as Major de Valera put it. 22 
The official answer to these problems was deterrence, since whilst 
Ireland could not necessarily stop an invader, it could it was argued 
"have such a force as would compel any belligerent ••• to deploy 
relatively large forces ••• (making) the cost both in men and materials 
relatively high for them". If Ireland could have sufficient forces to 
pose a putative belligerent problems, it could deter him. 23 Some 
deputies even quoted with approbation the Swedish example. 24 In the 
Irish case, the hope was to deter partly by making it clear that the 
costs of continued occupation would be high. Moreover, the Irish 
explicitly took comfort in the marginal attack scenario, denying that 
the full weight of an aggressor was likely to fall upon Ireland,25 
insisting such an attack was more likely to be "incidental".26 
How much wasenough was further complicated by a division of 
opinion over the likelihood of war and where the threat to Ireland 
came from. On coming into office in 1948 the Inter-Party Government 
established a cabinet committee to examine the po~sibility of war,27 
and this concluded Ireland was "facng a period of peace and not a 
period of war".28 This influenced policy towards army strength, 
resources and roles. Fianna Fail were less sanguine, fearing 
especially that there would not again be the "favourable accident" of 
1939-40 which allowed for build-up of forces, and that the world 
situation was inherently dangerous. 29 Fianna Fail were also less 
sanguine about the likelihood of Britain and/or America not invading, 
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given their refusal to give guarantees on respecting Irish neutrality 
during the Second World War. 30 The Inter-Party Government was more 
relaxed about the situation, believing it to be "beyond question" 
that Britain would "never ••• lay a finger on this country".31 
Given this background of rhetoric, it is revealing to examine 
what actually happened with respect to defence expenditure, equipment 
procurement and defence force strength. 
Table 7:1 Actual amounts issued in each year for Defence, 1946-1955, 
and as a percentage of amounts issued from the Exchequer for 
Supply Services 
Government Year £ % 
To 18.2.48 Fianna Fail 1946 8,768,712 18.46 
" " 1947 4,983,022 9.43 
To 14.6.51 Inter-Party 1948 3,671,891 6.27 
" " 1949 3,674,322 5.68 
" " 1950 3,679,172 5.02 
" " 1951 4,204,303 5.56 
To 2.6.54 Fianna Fail 1952 5,116,519 5.66 
" " 1953 7,037,767 7.54 
" " 1954 7,864,730 7.50 
From 2.6.54 Inter-Party 1955 6,667,966 6.32 
Sources: Ireland: Statistical Abstract 1950, (Dublin, Stationery 
Office, 1950 - Pr.124), Table 182, 'Amounts Issued from 
the Exchequer for Supply Services in each year ended 31st 
March, 1942 to 1950', pp.144-7. 
Ireland: Statistical Abstract 1955, (Dublin, Stationery 
Office, 1956 - Pr.3018), Table 226, 'Amounts Issued from 
the Exchequer for Supply Services in each year ended 31st 
March, 1947 to 1955', pp.234-7. 
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N.B. There may be variations each year in terms of what services 
came under the Defence heading, but they are minor. 
Allowing for 1946 and 1947 as periods of adjustment, on average 
between 1948 and 1955 defence accounted for 6.19% of government 
expenditure, with some tendency to slightly increase under Fianna 
Fail and decrease under Inter-Party governments. By comparison, 
according to figures given in the Dail in 1949 and 1950 the Swedes 
were spending between 19-25%, the Swiss 25-30%, the Spanish 30-34%, 
Belgium 11% and Holland 22% of total government expenditure on defence. 32 
The kish figure was clearly of a different order of magnitude from 
both fellow 'neutrals' and small alliance members. 
The Irish situation was made worse by their inadequacy with 
respect to 'warlike stores'. Whilst money wffiallocated for this 
purpose, in the period 1946-1950 between £397,545 and £117,888 annually, 
in 1947-8 budgetary year only £4,000 was actually spent, and in the 
following year only £73,000, since the equipment could notbe attained. 33 
To some extent the picture changed towards the end of the period with 
£4.5m being spent between March 1952 and June 1955,34 but over the 
ten year period the amount was pitifully small, especially since it 
was admitted in 1946 that Ireland lacked sufficient armoured vehicles, 
guns and carriages, parts for rifles and machine guns, and other 
items, the army being lIunder-equippedll.35 
The figures of tresize of the Permanent Defence Force (PDF) were 
hardly better. 
I 
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Table 7:2 Numbers in Permanent Defence Force 1946-1955 
Date 1/4/46 1/3/47 30/4/48 1/3/49 31/3/50 31/3/51 31/3/52 31/3/53 31/3/54 31/3/55 
Total 13,040* 8,750* 8,511* 8,006 8,113 7,880 10,004 10,562 10,412 9,692 
* In these years there were additionally 1,286, 1,188 and 86 members respectively of the 'Construction 
Corps' but these were not regarded as soldiers per se. 
Sources: Ireland Statistical Abstract 1955, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1956 - Pr.3018), Table 211 
'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31st March, in each year, 1951 to 1955, p.220. 
Dail Debates 104:1732, 111:1360, 114:2225 and, 120:522. 
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These figures hardly suggest a strong force, especially when the 
number of men actually capable of being put in the field is 
contemplated. On the other hand, official policy made much of the 
large number of trained men (as a result of the war) in reserve, who 
36 
could be quickly called up. This was, however, a diminishing asset 
so that by 1955 there were only 4,406 in the First Line Reserve, and 
19,980 in the Second Line Reserve. 37 Moreover, after 1946 the 
peacetime establishment was officially fixed at 12,860 officers and 
men in the P.D.F., with some subsequent minor modifications, but there 
was continually a shortfall of at least about 20% in the actual numbers 
. . 38 
~n serv~ce. Altogether P.D.F. and Reserves were well short also 
of the figures contained in the General Staff plans of 1944 which 
. 39 env~saged total forces of between 60-120,000. In addition, of the 
reserve that existed, especially the Second Line reserve, on occasions 
few went for training. 40 This was a failure to fulfill self-assigned 
objectives, a failure compounded by the General Staff's unease about 
relying upon a voluntary system of recruitment. In 1944-45 the 
General Staff had warned the government of the difficulties in rapidly 
expanding a small cadre. 41 In fact, compulsory military training was 
more seriously considered than public statements imply,42 but it was 
rejected and although,the problems of army size and the reserves were 
often debated, little of substance was achieved. 43 
The situation was even worse with regard to Irish air and naval 
services, despite Ireland's island nature. There was some awareness 
by Traynor and others that if they were "serious in regard to the 
policy of neutrality ... the least that would be expected from a 
nation with a coastline such as we possess would be that we would be 
capable of patrolling that coastline and ensuring that it would not in 
any way be used to the detriment of other countries ••• ",44 but little 
was actually done. 
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In October 1945 the General Staff had recommended the immediate 
"purchase of two corvettes, to be followed by the annual purchase of 
one corvette until six have been acquired" and detailed the tasks the 
new naval service should perform. 45 In discussions on the submission, 
ministers appear to have been concerned whether the service "would give 
value for the money expended on it" and only 3 corvettes were agreed, 
with doubts as to whether Cabinet would agree to more. 46 3 Corvettes 
were purchased from Britain late in 1946, and by the early fifties 
they comprised the Irish Naval Service, remaining "the mainstay of the 
service right up to the nineteen seventies".47 It was impossible for 
such a navy to fulfill the tasks originally assigned by both General 
Staff and successive governments. 
In 1944 the General Staff had also planned for a "small air force,,48 
of perhaps "10 fighter squadrons", with a first step being "5 fighter 
sqUadrons".49 In discussions on the plan de Valera made clear that 
"ordinarily this country would not possess sufficient aircraft for war 
50 purposes". In the following years purchases were made of Spitfires, 
Seafires, Ansons and re-conditioned Magisters, and by the summer of 
1953 it was announced that all aircraft in use by the Air Corps had 
been purchased since 1946 and all had been new when purchased. 51 The 
force was, however, dated whilst in addition it was only decided in 
1953 to provide concrete runways at Baldonnel. 52 In the summer of 
1955 plans were put into operation to purchase 3 jet trainers and 4 
. t . d t' . ft 53 p~s on-eng~ne ra~ner a~rcra • In the early fifties the Air Corps 
had between 20 and 32 aircraft. 
The Irish clearly failed to meet the requirements of 'due diligence', 
and indeed, in conversations with the American Secretary of State and 
President in March 1951, the Inter-Party Minister for External Affairs, 
Sean MacBride, admitted "Ireland was unable to defend itself",54 it was 
"quite defenceless".55 
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(ii) recognition of position by others 
Ireland was not, however, isolated from the world. By 1952-3 
it was making payments to 33 international organisations56 and had 
some form of diplomatic representation in 18 states, although some 
of their representatives were accredited to more than one state. 57 A 
striking feature of Irel and' s_ diplomatic profil e, however, was the 
lack of representation in the Soviet Union and EasternEurope, a factor 
which did affect Soviet perceptions of the Irish. 58 The perceptions 
of others may also have been influenced by the fact that with the 
ending of the war the practi£e resumed of using the King's signature 
on letters of credence, a practi5e which lasted until the Republic of 
Ire1andAct came into operation on Easter Day 1949. 59 
An early test of the Irish position after the war and of others' 
perceptions of it, came with the question of United Nations member-
ship. In the summer of 1946 de Va1era on a number of occasions 
specifica1ly compared the Irish position with the "attitude taken by 
the other neutral States", initia1ly in advocating 1ack of urgency in 
making an app1i(otion,60 but a month later in urging the need for 
d .. 61 eC1S10n. Whi1st the Swiss position was described as unique, de 
Va1era a1so t01d the Dai1 that "Sweden is in a practical1y ana10gous 
position to ours Her par] iament has agreed in princip1 e". 62 
de Va1era t01d the Dail that the Postdam dec1aration suggested 
Ire1and wou1d be accepted,63 but his own department, Department of 
Externa1 Affairs, had already t01d the government that despite Postdam 
"candidatures are apt to be regarded not so much on their merits as 
from the point of view of their probab1e effect on the distribution of 
p01itical forces and voting power within the organization".64 This 
assessment proved correct and the Soviets vetoed the Irish application. 
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Interestingly by way of contrast the Swedish application proved 
acceptable. 65 The Irish were vetoed four times by the Soviets. The 
Soviet arguments were the absence of conventional bilateral relations,66 
Irish failure to aid the layin& of the foundations of the organization 
and, Irish "open sympathy with the Axis and with Franco Spain". The 
Irish, therefore, lacked "the qualities which are required by the 
Charter".67 In 1955 Ireland was finally admitted as a result of a 
'package deal', a deal which was "So intricate that Ireland's 
membership was in doubt up to the last moment", with the Soviets nearly 
vetoing again "all the Western nominees".68 The lrish were clearly 
perceived by the Soviets as part of the hostile camp. 
The leader of the other camp was influenced in its attitudes to 
Ireland by the experiences of 1941-45, and also by its perception that 
the United States was now in another "real war".69 Despite the 
former, the United States had at its avowed obj ecti ve, "to ensure the 
collaboration of Ireland as an ally with the Western Powers in any 
future conn ict" • 70 The U.S. Legation in Dublin did not believe 
this to be unachievable if "properly presented and the moment well 
chosen", believing important elements of Irish opinion were "not 
disposed to support a policy of neutrality in terms of present day 
threats to peace". The Irish would not accept the humiliation of 
capitulation to British terms, but "something could perhaps be 
achieved" by an American or Canadian approach. 71 Indeed, even when 
it became clear that the government would not sign the North Atlantic 
Treaty, George Garrett the head of the U.S. Legation, was still sure 
that if he had been "permitted to go to higher places .•• I could 
have cracked the situation and avoided the impasse as it has now 
materialized".72 He also reported that MacBride had told him he was 
committed to accepting the Atlantic Pact provisions "if Partition 
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issue removed ••• there was no question whatsoever about this" 73 
As of 1 April 1949 the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) 
believed Ireland to be "already ideologically aligned with the West, 
strongly Catholic and anti-Communist, and, in spite of military 
weakness and the Partition issue, would probably not remain neutral 
in an East-West war". It did acknowledge that the Irish attitude 
might not change in "anything short of war", and that Irish participation 
might provoke "civil disorder". Nonetheless, it argued that even de 
Valera was not likely to insist upon neutrality in a "Holy War", whilst 
MacBride did not believe "Ireland would remain neutral in the event of 
74 
war". 
The Irish rejection of the North Atlantic Treaty changed the 
American perception, as evidenced by a National Security Council Staff 
Study in October 1950. Considering whether the U.S. should offer 
inducements to Ireland to join NATO or some bilateral arrangement, the 
NSC decided against. This was partly so as not to encourage others to 
seek bilateral arrangements rather than NATO membership, but also 
because whil st Irish neutral i ty "undoubtedl y woul d be more benevol ent" 
than in 1939-45, there were "no indications that the Irish 
would abandon neutrality even if by so doing a strong contribution to 
the anti-communist forces would be made". In any case, the "denial 
of Irel and to enemy forces is al ready encompassed in existing NATO 
commitments".75 
76 November 1960. 
This 1950 decision was still considered valid in 
Whilst such assessments were being made, the possibility of an 
arms for bilateral agreement dea] was discussed, apparently on the 
initiative of Garrett. It was proposed that the British offer 
technical assistance and military aid. Most interestingly Garrett 
wrote to President Truman that in "the event this proposal was approved, 
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MacBride ••• volunteered to make an all-out effort to secure bipartisan 
support for a bilateral treaty of defence". Garrett felt this "would 
••• bring Ireland into the defence picture" against the communists. 77 
Subsequently in 1951 in meetings with the American Secretary of State 
and President, MacBride raised "the subject of the desirability of 
some military assistance being provided for Ireland", and advised the 
Americans on how best to carryon the struggle against communism. He 
reiterated that but for the political difficulties caused by Partition, 
Ireland would join NATO. 78 
Any American doubts about Ireland were removed when the Fianna 
Fail government rejected the amendment to the Economic Cooperation Act 
of 1948 by the Mutual Security Act passed by Congress in 1951. The 
1951 Act made future American assistance conditional upon the recipient's 
willingness to contribute to the "defensive strength of the free world".79 
Irelandtold the Americans they could not accept this condition and 
"altering its established foreign policy ... by ... undertaking to render 
military assistance to other nations •.• ".80 Ireland was now putting 
a price on its principles, albeit that the price was small given that 
the bulk of assistance had already been received. 81 
A factor in other states' perception of Ireland was Irish 
catholicism. This appears, for example, to have encouraged Spanish 
officials to see Ireland as a possible member of "a neutral bloc" for 
the "defence of the Catholic religion and resistance to Communism", 
given that "Irel and was an essentiall y Cathol ic" country. 82 The Irish 
did not wish to become involved with Spain, Portugal and the Argentine, 
but the perception of Ireland as catholic was strong. 83 It was also 
valid given that in 1946 94.3% of the popul ation were Roman Catholic, a 
figure which did not signifacantly alter for a generation, whilst there 
was also a practice rate of over 80%.84 This affected others' 
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perceptions the more so, given the activities of "professional Catholics" 
who were always ready to raise the spectre of atheistic Communism, and 
that opinion was "anti-Soviet in a sense in which it was not anti-
N 'II 85 aZl • On the other hand, despite occasional hic-cups, there was a 
strong identity of values with the United States, with MacBride even 
claiming Ireland supported the "cardinal principles" of American policy,86 
although the C.I.A. regarded Aiken as "extremely anti-British and anti-
American".87 Most of the Irish political elite agreed with MacBride 
that Irish "sympathies lie clearly with the nations of Western 
Europe",88 that Ireland was "an essentially democratic and freedom-loving 
country ... anxious to play her full part in protecting and preserving 
Christian civilization, and the democratic way of life", albeit thwarted 
b t 't' 89 Y par 1 lon. Ire1and agreed "with the general aim of the ••• 
Atlantic pact",90 and in 1955 Liam Cosgrave, Minister for External 
Affairs, reiterated Irish commitment to "a policy of cooperation with 
peoples who, like ourselves, have a Catholic and democratic way of 
l ' f " 91 1 e • His Taoiseach, John A. Coste1lo had affirmed that Ireland was 
not ethically neutral, had a duty to help the West and that its 
influence would "always be directed against the threat of Communism".92 
Whilst hostile to some and supportive of others, however, there 
were limits to how far the Irish would go to offer support "against 
the threat of Communism". 
(iii) disavowal of help 
To some extent treatment of this variable has been implicit in 
the foregoing discussion particularly with regard to the clear evidence 
of Irish sympathies and the lack of 'due diligence'. This latter, 
it could be argued, was based upon implicit assumptions, particularly 
in Fine Gael, about British attitudes and behaviour and the degree to 
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which Ireland had been and was protected by "the second mightest navy 
in the world ••• That is our naval defence".93 
Certainly there was no explicit disavowal of this 'protective 
umbrella' and it can be argued that the Irish did not foreclose the 
more general question of disavowal of help. Whi 1 st the question of 
attitudes to alliances will be dealt with in the following section, it 
is relevant to note in the current context that in opposition two 
sometime Ministers for Defence, General MacEoin and Oscar Traynor, 
acknowledged Ireland would need and accept help if attacked. Oscar 
Traynor of Fianna Fail, for example, whilst arguing that Ireland must 
have a strong army and a deterrent capability, acknowledged that "it 
would be a question, as it was in the past, of retaining our territory 
for the longest possible time until such time as we could receive help 
from one of the other interested parties in a world strife".94 
Furthermore, Major de Valera repeatedly attempted to show that "whether 
... neutral .•. or whether you envisage cooperation with the Western 
Powers",95 the desiderata of Irish policy and "the general plan for 
its implementation can and should be so framed as to fit either 
situation".96 
Dr. O'Higgins (another sometime Minister for Defence) occasionally 
seemed willing to go further,97 whilst General Mulcahy, the Fine Gael 
leader in 1947, argued Ireland was "unique in the world" if it thought 
it could defend itself with its own resources. Lack of consultation 
with friends meant money spent on defence "is being wasted". For 
Mulcahy, "if we do not realise the lines on which they are thinking 
we are simply going to act irresponsibly".98 Others complained of a 
lack "even of a gentleman's agreement",99 or proposed cooperation with 
the British and American navies,100 or suggested a defence arrangement 
with Britain and common defence of the British Isles. 101 
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Fianna Fail complained that Fine Gael appeared to be flirting with 
such ideas, and asked "Is there any alliance?".102 In April 1950 as 
Minister for Defence, O'Higgins, poured scorn on such suggestions, 
denying "Emphatically" and "categorically" such arrangements had been 
made and reminding the House that any arrangement would in any case 
'D"l 1 103 requ1re a1 approva. O'Higgins, however, limited his reply to 
formal arrangements and it is interesting that in December 1948 the 
U.S. Legation in Dublin was noting the not "infrequent visits made to 
the Irish Chief of Staff by the G.O.C. Belfast and vice versa".104 
Nonetheless, the Taoiseach was adamant that no Irish representative 
"either directly or indirectly, by implication or otherwise, entered 
into any commitment on defence matters with any other country".105 
Despite this, it is clear that contact between the military of both 
states occurred, and the links were reinforced by numbers of Irish 
officers being sent on courses in both Britain and the United States. 106 
In fact, the Irish were acting in a highly pragmatic way, there 
being no question of a principled foreclosure of assistance. Whilst 
formal plans do not appear to have been laid, the Irish clearly were 
keeping the door open, trying to maintain their freedom of decision 
and action. Unfortunately such a policy faced a number of constraints. 
(iv) freedom ,of decision and action 
One problem for Ireland was that whilst its "legal status" was 
"that of a neutral ... laws have never been able to contravene economic 
forces", and that the Americans, for example, regarded Britain and 
Ireland as economic "Siamese twins",107 or in C.I.A. terms, Ireland as 
an "economic satellite" of Britain. 108 This situation was so despite 
all the previous talk of self-sufficiency. Indeed, this phrase 
disappeared from the Irish political lexicon. 
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The main problem was the financial and economic dependence upon 
Britain. 
Table 7:3 Percentage of Irish Exports and Imports to and from 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1946-1955 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Imports 52.2 41.5 53.9 57.3 52.9 46.8 50.9 50.7 55.7 52.7 
Exports 92.3 88.6 87.3 89.9 86.7 84 86.1 90.5 88.6 87.2 
Sources: Ireland Statistical Abstract 1950, (Dublin, Stationery 
Office, 1950 - Pr.124) Table 100, 'Value of Trade with 
each of the Principal Countries'expressed as a percentage 
of total val ue of Imports and Exports (incl uding Re-
Exports) p.82. 
Ireland Statistical Abstract 1956, (Dublin, Stationery 
Office, 1957 - Pr.3542), Table 112, 'Value of Trade with 
each of the Principal Countries' expressed as a percentage 
of total value of Imports and Exports (including Re-
Exports), p .130. 
Over the 1946-55 period, on average 51Yz% of Irish imports were 
from Britain and 88% of exports to Britain. The dependence upon 
Britain was exacerbated by financial ties, so that when Britain 
devalued in 1949 so too did Ireland. A further complication was 
Ireland's "meager endowment of natural resources" and the need to 
import all of their petrol and 75% of their coal, for example. A 
saving grace, as in the war years, was over 90% self-sufficiency in 
food, although even in this sector "wheat for flour, animal feed-
stuffs, and fertilizers" needed to be imported. 109 Whil st food 
caused "no apprehensions", there was concern at the lack of economic 
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b . th 110 ase 1n 0 er areas. Aiken, for example, noted that if Ireland 
lacked a properly equipped army, "if we have not got a reasonable 
amount of the essentials of life within our shores ••• the decision 
wi] 1 be made by somebody el se and we will be kicked around". It was, 
therefore, necessary not only to organise "national military defences 
but our economic defences" so as to be capable of making "our own 
decision" and having "a reasonable chance" of sticking to it "during 
the war, in spite of what anybody else may say".lll 
In fact, postwar planning appears to have taken little cognizance 
of economic defence,112 and most indicative of this was the attitude 
to arms production. The Genera] Staff in 1944 had mentioned the need 
for a munitions factory,113 but the Fianna Fail government decided to 
defer the issue,114 despite the fact that Ireland was "not able to 
produce a .22 bullet or even a shot-gun cartridge", and that all 
equipment and ammunition "came from across the water".115 Even by 
1950 the Irish did not produce a bullet or a rifle, and the wherewithal 
came from "outside the shores" of Ireland. 116 The Fianna Fai 1 
government re-opened the munitions factory issue in 1951 but nothing 
came of it,117 essentially because it was not regarded as viable, given 
the lack of raw materials and that "three day's working" would meet the 
, 1 . t 118 army s annua requ1remen s. Even de Valera on a visit to America 
in 1948 had to admit that as a sma]] nation, Ire 1 and was "unable to 
provide its own means of defence", and could only obtain supplies if it 
. t d t 119 SU1 e grea power purposes. The problem for Ireland was that for 
most of the period it did not so suit great power purposes, and given 
their own pre-occupations they did not wish to meet Irish requirements, 
so that only "driblets" of supplies were received. 120 
As the Korean situation eased, so too did the Irish problem, and a 
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Supplementary Estimate was introduced in March 1953 for weapon 
procurement,121 it being confessed that summer that a "heavy leeway" 
122 had to be made up. Problems remained, however, with fears of 
obsolescence and escalation of cost of equipment,123 so that within two 
years the new Inter-Party government was suggesting "a cautious attitude 
towards the purchase of conventional weapons of the heavier and less 
mobile types", and indeed even in 1954 both Fianna Fail and Inter-Party 
governments cut back equipment purchase estimates. 124 As before, 
h " 'd bl 125 moreover,s lpplng remalne a pro em. All in all it is difficult 
to see how the !rish could perform their avowed policy of relying on 
their "own strength to hold this island against anybody".126 
Economic autarky received further blows from the change in Europe 
away from protectionism towards liberalization and the impetus to 
international economic cooperation provided by the Marshall Plan 
127 
announcement of June 1947. Initially the Irish hesitated regarding 
these developments with, for example, Sean Lemass attacking the 
fallacious notion that economies are complementary rather than 
t 't' 128 compe 1 lve. Moreover, de Valera was wary of surrendering any 
independence, arguing that it would be "most unwise for our people to 
enter into a political federation which would mean that you had a 
European Parliament deciding the economic circumstances, for example, 
of our life here". Ireland "did not strive to get out of that 
domination of our affairs by outside force or we did not get out of 
that position to get into a worse one", although Ireland would cooperate 
to the extent commensurate "with our liberty to look after the 
fundamental things " 129 
In fact, participation in the European Recovery Programme and the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation were judged to be so 
commensurate but perhaps more important was the realization that Ireland 
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could not raise her living standards unless she looked beyond the 
confined home market. Albeit hesitantly and whilst trying to maintain 
protectionist tariffs, a "host of binational economic agreements" were 
. d . t t 130 slgne wlth European s a es. Interestingly, Partition was not 
allowed to obtrude into these economic developments. 
The aspiration to independence remained powerful, however. As 
de Valera put it in July 1950 "What could be regarded as of greater 
value than the maintenance and integrity of this state ••• of our 
independence f l 'f ?" 131 our way 0 1 e ..... In fact, some were already 
b . . t b' t' t . ·t 132 d't eglnnlng 0 answer y pOln lng 0 economlC prosperl y, an 1 can 
be argued that the difficulties encountered in the economic realm only 
served to provide an added edge to the desire to assert unequivocally 
sovereignty in the political sphere. This pre-occupation was not the 
preserve of one party, and it was also inextricably intertwined with 
"the first object" of Fianna Fail and Inter-Party governments' domestic 
and foreign policies, "the ending of partition".133 
This period, then saw a marked concentration upon and agitation 
regarding partition, this being epitomized by de Valera's anti-partition 
campaign after leaving office in 1948. 134 This agitation fundamentally 
shaped the political environment within which other questions were 
debated and decided. In fact, the period 1946-1955 saw a reinforcement 
of the symbiosis between this issue and the avowed aspiration "to keep 
out of any entanglements " 135 any wars •••• This symbiosis, however, 
had to contend with a changing external environment where European 
interdependence was growing. Moreover, the Irish had a number of other 
objectives, such as a concern with the maintenance of international peace 
and security, prosperity and global order and justice. 136 The Irish 
found themselves, therefore, having to reconcile a number of objectives 
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rather than paying exclusive attention to one or two. The question of 
Irish attitudes to membership of the U.N. was an early manifestation of 
some of the difficulties in this resolution. 
In July 1946, for example, de Valera presented the issue of U.N. 
membership as essentially involving one question, was membership the 
course "most likely to preserve the independence of this country?". 
Yet, in the next paragraph, the key question appeared to be: "are we 
more likely to keep out of war by joining an organisation of this sort" 
b .. t 'd ?137 or y rema1n1ng ou S1 e. de Valera appeared to equate the two 
questions, but there is no necessary equation, and the objectives could 
have proved contradictory. 
A full study of the obligations of membership was undertaken, and 
the obligations were made clear to both government and Dail. The 
discussion, moreover, was based on a rather literal reading o~ the 
Charter, which tended to emphasize the obligations, since no one was 
sure how the U.N. might evolve, especially with respect to Article 43 
and the negotiation of military agreements between the Security Council 
and member states. According to the Department of External Affairs 
it was clear that "once the Security Council has decided that enforcement 
measures should be taken, the members are obliged to carry out the ••• 
decision". The Military Staff Committee, incident~Jly, was one of a 
number of matters which were not regarded as giving rise "to any major 
t · f . . 1 " 138 ques 10n 0 pr1nc1p e • The Attorney-General believed Ireland was 
obliged to negotiate a military agreement, and was, moreover, concerned 
that the Charter involved members agreeing, "inter alia, to engage in 
war on the call of the Security Council", a situation which clashed 
with the Dail 's constitutional rights in that regard. 139 
briefings, the Fianna Fail Cabinet favoured membership.140 
Despite such 
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de Valera specifically brought to the attention of the Dail Articles 
25,33 to 37 and, 43 to 45, making clear the perceived obligation to make 
a military agreement, and that "If the Security Council decides that 
action should be taken against a particular State, and that action leads 
to war, we must participate in that action and enter the war". There 
was no question of accepting "the advantages of collective security and 
of avoiding obligations". As to the constitutional issue, the Dail 
would have to deal with that when the issue arose, bearing in mind that 
international undertakings should be honoured. 141 If anything, de 
Valera drew a 'worst case scenario' and the Dail still agreed to 
membership. 
The rJail appreciated membership "may undoubtedly involve us in war 
in certain contingencies" but was generally supportive. 142 Despite 
concern as to to whether the calls upon Ireland would be disproportionate 
t . 143 1 . 11 . 11 . o l ts resources, there was a genera Wl. lngness to accord co ectl ve 
security a higher priority than neutrality. It was recognized that 
collective security demanded Ireland be "really loyal members", committed 
to taking "collective action with other people" and ready to engage, if 
necessary, in "a war of enforcement". The Irish accepted the principle 
of having "to face the waging of war in order to prevent war,,144 and 
that traditional sovereignty was "not consistent with the idea of 
collective security" since in a collective security system you 
surrendered "the right to do at any time just as you please", being 
"prepared to accept some deciding authority other than your own will" .145 
Not all Dail members supported membership. Those against were 
concerned that the Irish had "sold our right to declare our position 
as one of neutral ity" ,146 that Ireland would be involved in war147 and 
that contrary to 1939-45, "the ports" and airfields would be used by a 
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bel 1 igerent. 148 Opponents lost the argument, however, essentially 
because of a pervasive belief that the U.N. and collective security 
afforded a better prospect of peace than did neutrality. 
The initial failure to achieve entry led to the accrual of doubts 
about the U.N., as did the first decade of the U.N's operations. 149 
de Valera, MacBride and Costello all considered the possibility of 
withdrawing the Irish application, and actual entry aroused little 
th ' 150 en USlasm. Costello announced entry on 15 December 1955 noting 
that since the 1946 debates the Korean War had made clear that Article 
43 and the making available of armed forces were not mandatory.151 It 
should be noted that Irish disenchantment with the U.N. stemmed from 
concern at the U.N's weakness, not its strength. 
The Irish were also confronted with conflicting pressures and the 
need for policy choices with respect to their attitude to help, as 
already disussed, and to bilateral and regional security arrangements. 
Some in Ireland appreciated the signifiance of the geographical 
propinquity to Britain and the pivotal position in the Atlantic. 152 
Many accepted that Irish security "would be bound up with Britain's 
securitY",153 and that even if one had a "very deep quarrel" with 
neighbours, if a fire broke out all would cooperate to extinguish it. 154 
Some backbenchers, moreover, drew attention to the facts that Ireland 
was a 32-county nation,155 that defence would be stronger if the whole 
nation made common cause against communism, and that cooperative schemes 
on drainage and railways already existed. 156 Some in the North clearly 
felt the same and in January 1949 the Northern Ireland Premier proposed 
talks on a joint defence arrangement on the basis of the constitutional 
157 
status quo. Over two years earlier,in July 1946, there were brief 
Anglo-Irish exchanges on the "old question" of a deal involving defence 
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and unity, but they petered out following the lines of previous 
exchanges. 158 The British were fearful that "any suggestion that we 
are prepared to give the matter consideration, is, ••• certain to lead 
to serious trouble".159 For his part de Valera retained his scepticism 
regarding the British ability to deliver,160 and warned the Dail more 
generally about the dangers of "entering into arrangements which involve 
military alliances", given that Irish "history is there with a warning 
finger to us as to what is likely to happen if we do it " 161 
Moreover, independence was regarded as a right to be acquired, not to 
b b . d 162 e arga1ne over. 
A further bilteral possibility was an arrangement "with the most 
powerful of all the nations that stand for the protection of freedom", 
especially giventhe historical Irish-American ties. 163 If the United 
States called for talks should not the Irish "at least enter into 
discussions" to see what was involved and what the United States might 
offer in return?164 As already made clear, in private MacBride did 
seek to explore certain possibilities, but just as the British were 
wary of trouble in such arrangements, so too the Americans feared that 
any such bilateral deal with the Irish would undermine American pressure 
for "collective defence" and might pose a counter-attraction to the new 
North Atlantic Treaty, as well as creating "'friction and resentment" 
with N.A.T. signatories.165 Whilst the Inter-Party government might 
have favoured some arrangement, principally perhaps to secure equipment;66 
Fianna Fail tended to feel that if the West felt threatened they should 
support Ireland even without a formal treaty.167 In addition, in 1953 
de Valera claimed that a majority would be against a bilateral treaty 
with the Americans, especially if it involved American bases in Ireland}68 
Many in Ireland felt it impossible to "consider entering into any 
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••• military commitment ••• for joint defence so long as she is denied ••• 
national unity and freedom" .169 Ireland could not "possibly ally itself 
with an army that occupies portion of its territory".170 Partition was 
"the keystone" in the "arch of foreign policy" thrown across "the chasm 
that separated a small neutral from ••• belligerent powers".171 This 
feeling was especially pertinent given de Valera's anti-Partition 
campaign and the atmosphere created by the Republic of Ireland Act and 
the British riposte, the Ireland Act, which confirmed the status quo 
d o P tOtO 172 regar lng ar 1 lon. This atmosphere influenced a makeshift and 
ideologically diffuse coalition which occupied government between 1948 
and 1951. A coalition, moreover, which lacked confidence173 and also 
included the strongly republican Clann na Poblachta. 
The factors mitigating against Irish support for bilateral arrange-
ments also operated with respect to multilteral, regional arrangements. 
Again, given the blatant division of the world into two opposing camps, 
several leading Irish figures called for some Irish relationship with 
the western-minded states. Mulcahy, for example, talked of the need 
for "regional conceptions of defence pol icy" ,174 whil st Dillon wanted 
Irish involvement in a United States - Commonwealth arrangement, such 
an arrangement possibly being open to certain European states. Such 
an arrangement woul d "bui1 d a citadel for independence ••• and above all 
for the undying freedom of Bishops" .175 Mulcahy, Dillon and O'Higgins 
whose sympathy was strongly with the British, were all in the Inter-
Party government.176 
Fianna Fail opposed such ideas for the reasons already advanced 
regarding bilateral arrangements, and because of a general antipathy 
towards alliances. An alliance involved recompensing partners as 
177 
well as receiving help and ones' partners would primarily remain 
interested in themselves.178 Particularly important was the view that 
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small nations should be cautious when entering alliances because such 
entry could bring them "wil1y-ni1ly, into ... wars". Ireland "would 
not be consulted in how a war would be started ••• when it was ended 
(nor) the terms on which it should end,,}79 Moreover, defeat for 
a small nation meant it would be "utterly destroyed - effaced from the 
earth ••• " .lS0 
In the planning for the Atlantic Pact in 1945, Ireland was usually 
mentioned in the lists of those to be invited to participate, albeit 
possibly as "limited members", with "graded membership".lSl Ireland 
was also conceived as a possible full member and on 14 April the 
Canadian Under-Secretary of State asked the Irish High Commissioner in 
ottawa how the Irish would respond "to a proposal on the lines ••• of 
the basic commitment in the Rio Pact" for the "Atlantic Nations".lS2 
The report of the conversation was circulated to all Cabinet members 
and what ensued moved the Irish from simply talking about their attitude 
to having to make a decision concerning regional security arrangements. 
Whilst there is a dearth of information about the Cabinet's discussions,lS3 
it is extremely revealing that at no stage did any Irish official 
statement simply declare membership in the proposed Atlantic Pact to 
be unacceptable given Irish neutrality. Indeed, other reasons were 
advanced and neutrality per se appears to have played little part in 
the decision. 
Discussion of the issue did not occur at a propitious moment given 
the 1945-9 furore over Partition, although on the other hand, several 
members of the coalition government were sympathetic in principle to 
some kind of regional security arrangement, and it has been claimed 
that "a Fine Gael government, with a safe majority of its own, ••• would 
eventually have committed itself to NATO".lS4 Certainly the American 
Legation in Dublin felt Costello might be sympathetiJS5 and also 
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reported on the privately expressed "dissatisfaction over the course 
of events" by ministers ;-86 and the "disi 11 usionment" of many Fine Gael 
supporters .187 The decision was by no means straightforward, however, 
since other elements in the coalition, especially Clann na Poblachta, 
had fought the 1948 election primarily on the· issues of the establishment 
of an Irish republic, ending Partition, as well as social radicalism:88 
The Irish Labour Party, moreover, had a traditional attachment to 
189 
neutrality. Thus, whilst the American Legation felt it could have 
mobilized support for some arrangement, there were difficulties, 
especially given the political environmentrelating to Partition. In 
addition, after sixteen years in opposition, coalition members appear 
to have put a premium on keeping de Valera out, especially since for 
some of them he was a greater enemy than either Britain or Stalin:90 
Furthermore,de Valera's anti-partition campaign posed the danger of 
the coalition being outflanked on the national question, a risk they 
sought to avoid. Whilst it is too suggestive of prescience to argue 
de Valera may have engaged on such a campaign "to forestall attempts 
to involve Ireland in future military alliances", his emphasis made 
any movement to such involvement "far more difficult" and had the effect 
of contributing to Irish abstention:91 
In this environment it was not clear what the Irish response to 
any invitation to adhere to the Atlantic Pact should be. Ultimately 
they declined, but the key question is whether this was because of 
expediency or principle, and if the latter was the principle that of 
Partition or neutrality? 
On 7 January 1949 the Americans handed MacBride an aide-memo ire 
on the proposed Pact, which invited Ireland to help draft the treaty 
and to be one of the "original signatories". The aide-memoire spelt 
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out the proposed obligations, specifically that "all parties would take 
such action as might be necessary to restore and assure the security 
of the area" by a "definite obligation" to contribute to collective 
defence both prior to and after any attack, although such a contribution 
would be commensurate with the "resources and geographic location" of 
the state. Crucially it was suggested the obligations "would not 
n~cessarily involve in eveqcase declaration of war in the event of 
armed attack" since in democracies it was usually a "parliamentary 
prerogative" to declare war, and there might be advantages to the 
alliance if not all members were involved in a warf92 
On 8 February 1949 the Irish replied by re-affirming Irish 
commitment to democracy, freedom and Christianity, but also arguing 
that a corollary was concern for human rights and national self-
determination. The Irish wished to play their "full part" in protecting 
such values and "with the general aim of the proposed Treaty" were "in 
agreement". However, Partition involved a denial of Irish territorial 
integrity, and the "elementary democratic right of national self-
determination", as well as allowing "undemocratic practices" in Northern 
Ireland. British occupation of six of Ireland1s "north-eastern 
counties" against the wi11 of the Irish people, meant that Ilany military 
alliance with, or commitment involving military action jointly with, the 
~ 
state that is responsible for the unnatural division of Ireland, which 
occupies a portion of our country with its armed forces, and which 
supports undemocratic institutions in the north-eastern corner of 
Ireland, would be entirely repugnant and unacceptable to the Irish 
people. No Irish Government, whatever its political views, could 
participate with Britain in a military alliance while this situation 
continues, without running counter to the national sentiment of the 
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Irish people. If it did, it would run the risk of having to face, in 
the event of a crisis, the likelihood of civil conflict within its own 
jurisdiction". 
In addition, it was argued that on a small island only an 
integrated defence under a single authority with popular support had a 
chance of success, whilst Partition denied to the Dublin government 
the productive capacity of "the industrial area of thE:! country", thus 
weakening its capacity. Alliance with the occupying power would lack 
"the necessary sympathy and support" of the people. Nevertheless, 
there was no hostility to Britain, it being "inconceivable ••• Ireland 
should ever be a source of danger ••• to Britain in time of war". On 
the contrary, a united Ireland would be in the interests of Britain and 
the other participating states. Given this, the Irish sought American 
h I t I .. 193 e p 0 reso ve Partltlon. In sum, Partition was the central 
objection, partly in its undemocratic aspects, and partly because of 
its economic, political and military consequences. With some variation, 
these arguments were repeated over the following months and years. 
The a11ies' reply was simply that the Pact was "not a suitable 
framework" to resolve bilateral Anglo-Irish difficulties and that 
Partition was "not considered ••• connected in any way with membership" 
in the Pact .194 MacBride took some umbrage at this and tried for over 
two years to persuade the United states to intervene and take up the 
. 195 Irlsh case. He failed. 
On 4 April 1949, in the presence of the Irish Minister in 
Washington, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed:96 Nearly two months 
later, the Irish Government made a full and considered reply to the 
American position. Before reiterating the previous arguments, it 
argued that the British 'Ireland Bill' appeared, amongst other things, 
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to be "specifically designed to bring the six north-eastern counties 
of Ireland within the scope of the mutual undertakings" regarding 
territorial integrity in the North Atlantic Treaty and thereby 
attempted to accord Partition "a new measure of international guarantee 
and recognition". The Irish rejected the alleged lack of connection 
between adherence and Partition. They insisted that Partition was 
"the sole obstacle to Ireland's participation in the Atlantic Pact". 197 
Again there was no reference to neutral i ty and again Washington refused 
to rise to the bait regarding Partition.~98 Interestingly, the Irish 
sought agreement to make these exchanges public, thus making it a 
matter of international knowledge that there was a sole obstacle to 
Irish participation in the Atlantic Pact~99 
Partition was undoubtedly the key factor, although Raymond Raymond 
has tried to establish that it was used "as a reason ••• merely in 
legitimation of a policy dictated by political expediency", as a 
"useful smokescreen" against the failure of the coalition's domestic 
200 programme. Clearly a number of factors were relevant but the role 
of Partition ought not to be underestimated given the political 
environment of 1948-9 and the background of Irish Republican Army 
involvement by MacBride. Moreover, even when first broached with the 
High Commissioner in ottawa, the High Commissioner had indirectly 
alluded to Partition as a problem. 20l Both before and after the 
question became public, ministers told the Dail "time and again", 
according to O'Higgins, that successive governments had argued "alliance 
is unthinkabl e and impossibl e for a divided partitioned country" .202 In 
July 1948, MacBride had spoken of Partition preventing Ireland from 
taking its "rightful place" in a number of developments, 203 a view with 
which de Valera concurred since it was "ridiculous that we should be 
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asked to join in" to create a large bloc, "whilst Ireland was 
deliberately kept cut . t " 204 1n wo • The American Legation was also 
privately reporting that "the government ••• opposed to signing while 
the question of partition remained unreso]vedli~05 whilst the C.I.A. 
reported that feeling over Partition was "genuine, not artificial; 
constant, not occasional. If political parties keep the issue before 
the people, i.t is because they cannot do otherwise and continue to 
exist". 206 
MacBride told the Americans privately that if Partition were 
ended, "there was no rpt. (sic) no question whatsoever" but that 
Ireland would accept the Pact's provisions;07 and in April 1949 he 
was reported in the Irish Press as saying that Ireland "would join the 
Atlantic Pact as a full charter member immediately after British 
forces were withdrawn from the Six Counties" since then, it would be 
maintaining its own "territorial integrity and political independence,,~08 
Moreover, he thought that in such a situation the Irish people would be 
100% behind the treaty ~09 0' Higgins described membership as "the 
natural thing" if circumstances were different, 210 whilst de Valera 
suggested that a proper basis of Anglo-Irish relations would lead to 
211 
"the normal reaction here" on the Pact, and that given independence 
and unity Ireland would "probably have the same inducements to join 
as other nations,,;12 and that in such circumstances "he would advocate 
entrance into the Pact". 213 These utterances suggest a Dublin belief 
in the possibility of a deal involving unity and participation, and 
also omit significant references to neutrality as a reason for 
abstention. 
With respect to a deal, "the Irish politician" failed "to appreciate 
or eval uate with proper emphas is the interest that is taken abroad in 
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matters affecting Ireland", this being a particular failing the 
Americans believed of MacBride. 214 In addition, the wartime pressure 
led them to exaggerate the allies' need of Ireland. In reality an 
American National Security Council (NSC) study in October 1950 
concluded that whilst "Strategically located" and affording "valuable 
sites" for air and naval operations, those sites were "not considered 
essential at this time", certainly not so essential as to jeopardise 
the principle of collective defence. Irish participation would be 
215 
welcome if "unqualified". Few in Ireland appreciated this basic 
216 
assessment. If some were ready to bargain, only a few insisted 
that neutrality was a principle not to be bargained away. Despite 
the almost incidental role of neutrality in the debate, the 
shibboleth of 'no NATO' became subsequently synonymous with neutrality. 
Even those like Raymond Raymond who attack the conventional 
wisdom regarding the role of Partition do not seek to substitute 
principled adhesion to neutrality in its place. Rather, Raymond, for 
example, cites the fear of a "loss of independene in foreign policy". 217 
It is possible to support this argument by reference to the attitude 
of An Tanaiste, William Norton, who wished Ireland "to detach" itself 
" ,.218. from the groups and the blocs of power' and de Valera, hlmself, 
who claimed Ireland gained respect in the 1930s because it was "taking 
an independent attitude".219 On the other hand, there is little 
evidence in the 1945-55 period of any consistent attempt to evolve a 
distinctive Irish position. Although MacBride made clear his view 
that "Europe cannot continue for ever to live as an armed camp" and 
needed "an ideal round which they can rally" as an alternative to 
communism, he was unable to give the Americans any substance when 
220 
asked to elaborate. MacBride acknowledged, moreover, that 
alliance was "wholly right" in certain circumstances. 221 In addition, 
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perhaps to compensate for non-participation in the Atlantic alliance, 
MacBride went out of his way to decry anti-Americanism,222 to support 
American foreign policy in general and to regret, for example, that 
American efforts in Korea should be misinterpreted as military 
. 223 
aggress1on. Nonetheless, for Irishmen of the 1948-51 political 
e1ite's generation, independence was the issue. 
Raymond also draws attention to other issues such as economic 
fears and worries over the possibility of foreign bases on Irish soil. 
He suggests it was believed that "additional mi1itary expenditure of 
the order of Ir. £14-20 million" wou1d be required given membership, 
at a time of defence spending constraints. 224 If this were a factor, 
it is surprising that there is no evidence of the Irish seeking 
financia1 aid from the Americans to ameliorate it. Similar1y, the 
argument regarding the insta11ation of bases enhancing the prospect 
of Ireland becoming a target, tends to ignore the need to overcome 
British air defence first. Perhaps more significant was a calculation 
that Ireland could "secure a1l the advantages of being within the ambit 
of the Pact without any of the disadvantages of subscribing to its 
terms".225 Equa1ly important is that Irish participation was never 
considered vital enough to generate sufficient a1lied pressure upon 
them. 
None of the above arguments point to princip1ed neutrality per se. 
For those who mentioned it an equal number complained that Eire was 
fiddling "not on1y while Rome but all Christianity tremb1ed on the 
b . k f . , 226 r1n 0 a Red 1nferno' • What really mattered was partition and 
independence, part1y because many of the Irish political e1ite actually 
cared about it and partly because after years in the po1itical wilderness 
the Coalition parties did not wish to be outflanked on the national 
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question by de Valera but wished rather to deprive the Opposition of 
. 227 
~ssues. The principle of Partition was reinforced by expediency, 
but neutrality hardly came into play. 
Parallel with these debates were the plethora of developments 
and initiatives concerning European integration. Whilst Ireland 
abstained from the Brussels Treaty of 1948228 and from the European 
Coal and Steel Community, it was a founder member of the Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation and the Council of Europe, whilst 
unofficial Irish representatives were at the Congress of Europe at 
229 The Hague in May 1948. The Irish attitude appeared to revolve 
around a high-low politics distinction, with abstention not only from 
defence organizations, but also from those involving the integrity of 
the state and the sensitive sovereignty issue. The Council of Europe 
and OEEC were acceptabl e since they imposed "no obl igations which are 
inconsistent with our national rights" whilst, as has been seen, it 
was felt NATO did given the 'territorial integrity' dimension. 230 The 
Irish also favoured the OEEC and Council of Europe because of their 
. .. 231 bas~s of unan~m~ty. Whilst MacBride appeared to favour European 
integration in principle, he was also a nationalist, so that whilst 
accepting few could object to surrendering "a part of their national 
sovereignty" if by so doing "they could avoid utter destruction" and 
war, he could also see that sovereignty was "a matter for consideration" 
and that the rights of small nations needed to be safeguarded. 232 
As previously discussed,de Valera was anxious to distinguish 
233 
military from non-military cooperation, although he was somewhat 
wary even of the latter, believing Ireland "would not be wise in 
entering into a full-bloodied political federation". Nonetheless, 
he recognized that Ireland had "interests ••• in common with other 
countries" and, therefore, should cooperate so long as it was "consistent 
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with our own reasonable well-being" and Ireland was not precluded from 
building up its own economy. 234 Partly for this reason, the Irish 
tended to follow the British minimalist and ad hoc approach, steering 
clear of any transfer of sovereignty and lacking the continental sense 
of need and urgency regarding European unity.235 In addition, of 
course, "neither coal nor steel played any major role in the Irish 
economy (other than imports) ••• ", so that Ireland was not an obvious 
, 1 't 236 candldate for the European Coa and Steel Communl y. 
Partition was felt to be important, and the raising of it as a 
grievance in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe became 
routine.237 So routine, in fact that it not surprisingly dominated 
Irish contributions to the debate on a European army in August 1950, 
with severe denunciations of a European "freedom army" 238whilst 
Ireland was still "not free", even before Churchill was able to put 
his motion. de Valera joined with Norton in his tirade and all four 
Irish members voted against Churchill's motion.239 On the other hand, 
the Irish do not appear to have complained too much when the rule 
change al10wed the Consultative Assembly to discuss certain "political 
problems connected with the security of Europe", and they did not vote 
240 
against the motion. 
Next to nothing was said concerning the 'European army' or the 
, ( ) "1 241 European Defence Communlty EDC wlthln Ire and itself, although 
Miriam Hederman suggests the latter "was regarded with some favour in 
Irishcircles which followed the debate 'on the mainland"', given that 
lithe new idea of a genuinely multi-nationaldefence had no particular 
prejudices to overcome". But fundamentally it was a question of 
being suitable for others, not Ireland given its position and the 
unacceptability of lithe concept of Irish soldiers serving with, under 
-289-
and over British soldiers", albeit that the force would be diluted by 
others. 242 In fact, the EDC was never an issue. 
In December 1954 the Consultative Assembly discussed the Paris 
Agreements leading to the Western European Union (WEU). The Irish 
members generally supported it, although Boland said he intervened 
"diffidently" given Irish inability "to take part in the movement for 
European defence". Nonetheless, he had a "personal interest" in the 
question, "realising that a strong Western Europe is the best 
guarantee for the preservation of peace". He also described himself 
as "feeling that on this subject I was more an observer than a 
Representative". 243 Another Irish member implied that he objected 
to the stretching of "the Statute ••• by bringing in the question of 
defence",referring to defence as "the cancer in the heart of the 
Council of Europe" and a diversion from its "primary aims" of re-
building ravaged Europe in the economic, cultural, social and 
ultimately political fields. Nonetheless, he still expressed support 
for "an integrated European defence system under a specialized 
244 
authority" • 
Fundamentally, however, these proposals generated none of the 
excitement of the 1948-1950 debates about the Atlantic Pact, and 
indeed those debates appear to have foreclosed a genuine debate about 
the European dimension, a situation which lasted for over a decade. 
(v) lack of isolationism, a willingness to help ameliorate world 
problems and impartiality 
Despite the foregoing focus upon the Irish position, Ireland was 
not at the centre of events in the postwar decade. Indeed, by 1948 
Ireland was "almost wholly isolated from the mainstream of world 
events and without the means to influence them", the exclusion from 
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the United Nations, coming so soon after Ire1and's wartime abstention, 
245 
having "led to considerab1e dip10matic isolation". The Irish were 
inv01ved in Europe, but their pursuit of the 'sore thumb' strategy of 
raising Partition at every opportunity, meant that they appeared 
introspective and somewhat detached. They appeared "content to let 
the world go by, heeding it on1y when necessity forced ••• (them) to 
do so", and their out100k was "essentia1ly is01ationist" 246 The pre-
occupation with domestic issues, Partition and Ang10-Irish questions 
led to "litt1e positive thinking" about foreign p01icy,247 a situation 
further exacerbated by resource constraints, geography and the 
ide010gica1 divide in the world. 
On the other hand, the Irish themse1ves were aware of "the 
missionaries ••. the Wild Geese, the diaspora" and the millions of 
Irish living abroad,248 so that they felt they had an influence "far 
in excess of what its mere physical size and the sma11ness of its 
popu1ation warrants", given their "spiritual dominion".249 de Valera, 
himse1f, thought Irish "spiritual" resources allowed a materially small 
Ireland to "playa very important part in international affairs".250 
In addition, there was a feeling that the Irish freedom struggle was 
a mode1 for others, especially since Ireland lacked "any imperialistic 
ambitions,,251 or involvement in "power politics".252 There was also 
an awareness that "even, if it were desired to maintain a policy of 
complete isolation, this ••• (was) no longer possib1e" in the shrinking 
253 postwar world. 
Yet, if the Irish had perceptions of influence, the lack of 
constructive thinking meant that there was little distinctive positive 
Irish contribution to the world. Instead it was a case of what the 
Irish were against, with only faint glimmerings of an aspiration not 
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to be as identified with one camp in the Cold War struggle as the 
overwhelming welter of their statements suggested. There was an 
even fainter glimmering of an aspiration to be part of a third force, 
with backbenchers occasionally floating the suggestion of Irish 
participation in a "barrier ••• to prevent America and Russia -
from involving the world in war", although the proposed composition 
254 
of this barrier varied widely. Some hoped the British Commonwealth 
might organize a third force of neutral nations~55 whilst other 
suggestions involved a league of small nations 256 or of small European 
t . . f' 11 257 1 f th d' . 258 coun rles specl lca y, or even a eague 0 e lsarmlng. 
During this period the Irish made no significant mediation efforts. 
The MacBride version of mediation saw Ireland as a "link" between 
. 259.. Western Europe and the Unlted states, Whl1st wlth respect to the 
Korean War, de Valera argued "we cannot stop the conflict" but only 
try to "survive as a nation through it". 260 More generally, the 
Irish had "little sympathy for the neutralist attitudes ••• being 
261 
advocated, principally by India" at that time. Most. preferred, 
like MacBride, to think of Ireland, the United states and Western 
262 Europe as "we". For many in Ireland the Cold War had the 
characteristics of a Jihad, being a struggle between the Cross and 
263 
the anti-Christ. Whilst a few felt Ireland "should keep ••• nose 
. t· ,,264. h . t t· out of the buslness of other na lons ln suc a .Sl ua lon most 
Irishmen were neither indifferent nor impartial. 
A glimmering of an aspiration for a distinctive Irish position 
and contribution was in MacBride's search for an "ideal which had 
stronger influence and attraction than Communistic ideology" but he 
was unable to put substance into the deal except to lament increasing 
material ism and the armed divisionof Europe. 265 Despite the brow-
beating, the Irish contribution to the solution of the world's problems 
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was negligible and by 1951 there was "very little evidence" that the 
Irish government cared. 266 Ireland was no innovator, nor mould-
breaker. It was no incipient leader of a third force. Whilst 
somewhat detached, it belonged to the 'old world' not the nonaligned 
world. 
(vi) identity, nation-building, unity, stability and self-determination 
The concern with these variables has permeated much of the 
preceding discussion and the variables will thus only be dealt with 
briefl y here. It is noteworthy, however, that the debate "about 
identity, legitimacy, symbolism, status" not only "underlay all 
Ireland's early efforts in the international field" as O'Brien suggests, 
but stretched into the postwar period as the pervasive basis of Irish 
267 
policy. In 1945, for example, Dillon and de Valera were still 
involved in heated exchanges over the "dictionary Republic" and 
268 
Ireland's status in the Commonwealth. Moreover, the goa] of 
Sinn Fein of a free, independent and united Republic had still not 
been achieved, and neither had self-sufficiency and economic 
independence. Indeed, even in 1972 an Irish Foreign Minister still 
saw the basic issues of policy as "the assertion of identity" and 
"the recogni tion of that identity by others", .269 and in the postwar 
period as a whole, the Irish worried about "Ireland's right to pursue 
270 
her own foreign policy" and establish "her full sovereignty". 
These concerns permeated the entire period, but particularly in "the 
ultimate paroxysms of anti-partitionist fervour" produced by the 
. t 271 Ireland Act of 1949 these lssues mat ered. 
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Conclusion 
In the 1945-1955 there was a striking lack of assertions that 
the fundamental Irish policy was one of 'for neutrality'. Indeed, 
leaders such as de Valera and MacBride argued that Irish policy was 
as it was only "so long as" Partition existed. 272 Moreover, 
irrespective of party, no government was willing to provide the 
wherewithal 'for neutrality'. In addition, there was no single 
aspiration in the direction of such a policy since some were ready 
to countenance some form of security understanding with others. Just 
as non-participation in war is not equivalent to neutrality, neither 
is non-participation in alliances a sufficient condition. The post-
war decade saw rather the foundation of a sui generis position. 
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Chapter Eight 'B1oody Mavericks ,1 or Partners? 1956-1972 
The quiescence of Irish po1icy in the mid-fifties was shattered by 
Irish entry into the United Nations in December 1955 and the concomitant 
need to work out "nothing less than the basic princip1e on which our 
po1icy towards the outside wor1d is to be based".2 Within a few years 
this task was exacerbated by additiona1 questions arising from the need 
to take a view on the possible nature of different re1ationships with 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and upon the ob1igations which 
might follow any re1ationship. In addition, the embryonic concept of 
nonalignment was attractive to some Irish minds,3 and combined with 
the 1egacy of neutra1ity, required to be taken into account. 
Consequent1y, the period 1956-1972 saw a renewa1 of debate and of the 
need for decision regarding the foundations of Irish po1icy. Further 
questionning arose with the eruption of "the troub1es" in Northern 
Ire1and in 1968-9. 
(i) due diligence 
In the spring of 1964 the General Staff's postwar p1an was 
described as "archaic" since in "no year since that p1an was formu1ated 
have we had or were we ever in reach of having the number of men 
envisaged".4 Throughout the period the overall shortfall between 
number of men and the peacetime establishment of 12,915 averaged 33%, 
with an average of 13% for officers and 37% for other ranks. 5 In the 
period 1956-1972 the figures were: 
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Table 8.1 Number of Officers and men in the Permanent Defence Force 
in each year 1956-1972 and the percentage shortfall in 
each year compared to peacetime establishment of 12,915 
Year 
Numbers 
% Shortfall 
Year 
Numbers 
% Shortfall 
1956 1957 1958 
8735 8846 8130 
32 31 37 
1959 
9188 
29 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
8199 8159 8331 8312 
36.5 37 35 36 
Sources: Derived from: 
1960 1961 
8965 8868 
31 31 
1969 
8232 
36 
1970 
8574 
34 
1962 
8451 
35 
1971 
8663 
33 
1963 
8449 
35 
1972 
9932 
33 
1964 
8221 
36 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1958, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1958 -
Pr.4564), Table 222, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 
31 March 1953-58' p.230. 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1962, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1962 -
Pr.6571), Table 247, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 
March 1957-62', p.259. 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1967, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1967 -
Pr.9587), Table 234, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 
March 1962-67', p.266. 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1970-71, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 
1974 - Pr.1974), Table 227, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces 
at 31 March 1966-71, p.275. 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1974 and 1975, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 
1977 - Pr.6072) , Table 220, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces 
at 31 March, 1970-75', p.235. 
By their own criterion the Irish failed to provide enough men for 
the P.D.F. Whilst ministers bemoaned the shortfall ,6 to some extent it 
was a matter of policy since the general ethos was that defence was only 
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"one of many State services" and that "if more is given to one, the 
others must do with less - unless, of course, extra revenue can be 
7 procured". 8 By 1971 everyone thousand men cost a £lm., and 
certain1y the Irish fe1t that "sma11 countries such as ours are forced 
by circumstances to do with the military forces they can maintain".9 
The sma1lness of the P.D.F. created a number of prob1ems given 
that there were hardly enough to cope with day to day tasks, especially 
given periodic periods of internment duty and border patrols. 10 
Moreover, the number of men actua11y available for patro1s at certain 
times was only a part of the overall tota1. 11 Furthermore, the 
numbers in Ire1and were further depleted by Irish contributions to 
United Nations' peace-keeping operations, despite doubts as to whether 
the dwindling army could meet such commitments. 12 For certain periods 
between 1960 and 1965 the figures for personne1 abroad and personne1 
in Ireland were: 
Tab1e 8.2 Numbers serving with United Nations at certain times 1960-1965, 
this as a percentage of P.D.F. total, and tota1 in Ire1and as 
of preceding 31 March 
Total of % of Number in 
Date U.N. Commitment Irish Involved tota1 PDF Ireland 
August '60 - Organisation des 
January '61 Nations Unies du 1395 15.5 7570 
Congo (ONUC) 
May '61 ONUC 988 11 7880 
December '61 -
May '62 ONUC 715 8 8153 
May '62 -
November '62 ONUC 723 8.5 7728 
November '62 -
April '63 ONUC 826 9.75 7625 
August '64 - United Nations Force 
October '64 in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 1005 12.2 7216 
April '65 -
July '65 UNFICYP 1044 12.7 7155 
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Source: Derived from: 
Capt. J. Sheehan, Defence Forces Handbook, (Dublin, Department of 
Defence, n/d), Appendix B 'Record of Unit Service with United Nations' 
pp.79-80 and Table 8.1 above 
Whilst the percentage might seem small, the more significant 
figure is the number left in Ireland which was generally lower than the 
insufficient strengtn of the period 1945-1955, and of those left in 
Ireland a similar number to those abroad were preparing to go abroad. 
In 1964 Tully asked whether the army left in the country was "in 
position to carry out duties for which intended or are we slowly 
proving that ••• we do not need an Army?".13 The official reply was 
that U.N. service provided valuable experience for an army which had 
not seen action for over a generation. 14 In all some 3934 Irishmen 
served in ONUC and somewhat more in UNFICyp. 15 
In addition, between 1956 and 1972 the First Line Reserve 
numbered only between 5128 in 1957 and 1333 in 1972, whilst the Second 
Line Reserve numbered between a high of 21,033 in 1960 and a low of 
17,623 in 1972. 16 With regard to the latter only half trained 
regularly,17 so consequently for most of the period the Irish had some 
20-22,000 reasonably effective and trained troops. This was, again, 
well below their own planning assumptions. A comment on Irish defence 
force size was that with "the troubles" in Northern Ireland, elements 
of the First and Second Line Reserve had to be called-up for guard 
duty.18 
Part of the explanation for the scale of the Irish defence effort 
was a general sense of inadequacy. Repying to criticisms of cutbacks 
in the 1956 Defence Vote for 1956-7, General MacEoin, the Minister, 
argued that "to defend this small island would require nearly as much 
if not more defensive equipment than Britain requires to defend itself".19 
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Giventhis attitude and the constant emphasis upon living "within our 
means",20 not surprisingly little was done. The general pattern was 
one of declining resources in real terms being allocated to defence, 
and of even less of government spending going to defence than had been 
the case in 1948-55 period. 
Tab1e 8.3 Irish Defence Expenditure Tota1s, and as a percentage of 
tota1 supp1y services and Gross National Product, 1956-1972 
1956 
Defence Expend i ture (£ m. ) 6.494 
% of Tota1 Supp1y Service 6.1 
% GNP 1.16 
1962 
Defence Expenditure (£m.) 7.459 
% of Tota1 Supp1y Service 5.2 
% GNP 0.96 
1957 
6.355 
5.8 
1.10 
1963 
8.235 
5.2 
0.98 
1958 
6.094 
5.5 
1.01 
1964 
1959 
6.090 
5.4 
0.96 
1965 
1960 
6.591 
5.7 
0.98 
1966 
1961 
7.108 
5.6 
0.98 
1967 
8.505 11.396 11.910 10.418 
4.9 5.5 5.2 4.2 
0.90 1.12 1.11 0.97 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Defence Expenditure (£m.) 11.184 12.212 14.184 18.681 19.165 
% of Total Supp1y Service 4.0 
% GNP 0.84 
Sources: Derived from: 
3.7 
0.82 
3.7 
0.85 
4.1 
0.98 
3.9 
0.84 
Statistica1 Abstract of Ire1and 1958, (Pr.4564) Tab1e 239 Issues from the 
Exchequer for Supply Services, 1952-58 ••• in each year ended 31 March, 
p.245. 
Statistica1 Abstract of Ireland 1962, (Pr.6571) Table 251 Gross Nationa1 
Product at Current and Constant Market Prices, 1953-61, p.266j Tab1e 
263 Issues from the Exchequer for Supp1y Services, 1956-62 ••. p.274. 
Statistical Abstract of Ire1and 1967, (Pr.9587) Tab1e 238 Gross National 
Product .•• 1958-66, p.273j Table 250 Issues from the Exchequer for 
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Supply Services, 1961-67, pp.280-1. 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1970-71, (prl.1974) Table 231 Gross 
National Product ••• , 1965-70, p.281; Table 243 Issues from the 
Exchequer for Supply Services, 1965-71, pp.288-9. 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1974 and 1975, (prl.6072) Table 224 
Gross National Product "', 1968-1975 p.241; Table 236 Issues from 
the Exchequer for Supply Services, 1968-1974 p.252; 
This level of effort did attract internal criticism. Whil st 
official policy emphasised the continuing deterrent basis of Irish 
policy, that the more force an aggressor had to use or contemplate 
using, the "more likely we will retain our neutrality" ,21 that the 
"hostilities that might affect us would be only part of a much larger 
scheme", and that Ireland "can still even be neutral" given there was no 
reason why a great power should "suddenly single out this island for 
annihilation",22 senior backbenchers and future Ministers for Defence 
23 
argued there was "no real defence", and that to "talk about our 
having any defence at all is a joke. We have a small Army which 
probably is adequate to quell a civil commotion ••• That is all we 
have " 24 In the mid-sixties some felt there was little need for 
a traditional army, wanting the P.D.F. to become a "sort of auxil ic;try 
to the Garda" ,25 or the amalgamation of the Justice and Defence 
26 Departments. Whilst this was a minority view, it reflected wjde-
spread doubts about the strength and role of the P.D.F. 
Generally it was accepted "there must be an armY",27 and according 
to official policy its size and role was "not calculated" upon the 
premise of "participating in world war" but rather "merely to defend 
our territory against occupation as far as that is possible". In 1957 
four roles were identified for the P.D.F., namely the maintenance of 
internal security; as far as possible to prevent occupation by others; 
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warning of attacks and; if possible, assistance in civil defence. The 
preservation and upholding of neutrality per se was not a specific role, 
although it was argued that the ability to perform the stated roles 
would help in the retention of neutrality.28 For most of the period 
the stress was upon the P.D.F. as the "protector of sovereignty and 
independence",29 and "territorial integrity".30 These responsibilities 
31 
were not to be left to others. Subsequently other roles were added, 
such as contributing to U.N. peace-keeping and fishery protection. 32 
As the emphasis changed somewhat, it did not result in according the 
requirements of neutrality higher priority but rather the needs of 
internal security priority, so that by 1972 it was argued that "the 
primary role of the Army is the defence of the State against external 
aggression and helping the Civil Power II 33 A difficulty for the 
Irish was that whilst they recognized that it "would be unreasonable 
to expect the Great Powers to allow a military vacuum to develop here",34 
this recognition was not translated into operational policy and 
resources. 
Reflecting, for example, financial constraints was the proble~ of 
equipment, an area in which it was repeatedly stressed Irish efiorts 
35 had to be "wi thin our resources". One argument was that in the 
nuclear age, Ireland could not compete, its equipment being as obsolete 
"as the bow and arrow",36 and another was the cost of up-dating that 
equipment. In fact Irish shortcomings regarding equipment were 
revealed during U.N. service in the Congo, when Irish forces were able 
to compare their equipment with others. 37 This led to the purchase 
of small arms and F.N. submachine gun. 38 But problems persisted with 
the lack of modern equipment for training the reserves39 and a lack of 
suitable transport and communication systems for the P.D.F. 40 In 1970 
the youngest truck in the Curragh military base was 15 years 01d,41 and 
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many of the other vehicles were thin-skinned. The "troubles" in 
Northern Ireland led to Supplementary Estimates for additional equipment 
and transport. In 1971 it was £1.7m., namely 10% of the original 
Estimate,42 and in 1972 £1.985m., an additional 11~%.43 This was 
hardly sufficient to offset "the extra costs of inflation".44 
These general problems had a specific impact upon the Air Corps 
and the Naval Service. The Air Corps was unable to stop incursions 
into Irish air-space, and most notably in 1971 failed to do anything 
when an R.A.F. Canberra flew in Irish air-space for an hour, approached 
within 20 miles of Dublin and flew over crucial communication lines 
around Mount Oriel. 45 Such was the Air Corps' condition that in 1971 
Mark Clinton asked whether it was "to remain in existence?" although he 
felt it should. 46 It allegedly had four roles - military, Aer Lingus 
training, aerial surveys for Ordance Survey and responsibility for 
helicopters47 - but was too ill-equipped for any substantial role and 
there was little the 48 pilots could do to protect Ireland. 48 
There was little similarly the Naval Service could do with its 3 
Corvettes. In 1957 the Minister had to admit that whilst the defence 
plan provided for seaward defence, the naval service was not geared for 
that role and was merely protecting Irish fisheries. 49 Despite this, 
the 3 corvettes remained the Naval Service until 1968-1971 when they 
were withdrawn from service. 50 Clearly they could not perform their 
official roles of anti-submarine patrols, mine-sweeping, seaward 
defence of the ports, control of maritime activities within Irish 
territorial waters, fishery protection and the protection of ships,51 
nor the official principal rationale, namely that if Ireland "had not 
a Naval Service some other country would claim to be protecting our 
waters" and thereby influence the traffic to Irish ports. 52 
The Corvettes were increasingly aging, slow and unreliable. 53 
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Their retention was in marked contrast to the view of Traynor in 1956 
that if Ire1and wished to demonstrate its sincerity about neutrality 
54 it shou1d purchase a new vessel every year for ten years. The 
prob1em was that by 1965-8 it was estimated the cost would be between 
£1-1.4m. for each vessel, so that 10 would have cost more than one 
55 year's total budget for defenoe. 
In 1969, given a combination of condition of vesse1s and inadequate 
numbers of personne1, at one stage not one Naval Service vesse1 was 
capable of being put to sea, and the Irish had to re1y upon an unarmed 
fishery research vessel. 56 This situationwas repeated in the spring 
of 1970. 57 Little wonder that a Minister, a few years earlier, had to 
admit he was not satisfied the Naval Service would be of any rea1 use 
. 58 1n an emergency. In 1971 3 coasta1 minesweepers bui1t in the mid-
fifties were purchased from Britain,59 and in May 1972 the Naval Service 
took delivery of a purpose built fishery proteotion vesse1, the Deirdre. 60 
Subsequently further efforts were made, but generally between 1956 and 
1972 the Naval Service was a "joke".61 
In this period the Irish again failed to meet either their own 
criteria of adequate defence and the requirements of 'due diligence'. 
Moreover,. at the time of crisis in Northern Ireland in 1969-70, the 
P.D.F. was unprepared. For example, in the two years ended 31 March 
1972 there were 88 known border incursions by the British Army into 
the Repub1ic,62 and by February 1972 27 confirmed overf1ights. 63 
Whilst the Dub1in government protested, little positive was actually 
done despite a recognition that some incursions were "deliberate".64 
In addition, in the winter of 1970-71 the British boarded a number of 
Irish vessels in Carlingford Lough, looking for arms. Whil st some 
TDs ca1led for "defensive measures to protect Irish vessels", and the 
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deployment of Irish naval vessels to the area,65 a government minister 
dismissed such ideas as "empty gestures".66 In an Adjournment Debate, 
Richie Ryan argued Irish vessels were "entitled to the full protection 
of the military forces" of the State, and called "if necessary" for 
"armed forces aboard Irish vessels", ready to arrest and intern "troops 
who forcibly enter Irish vessels or Irish soU".67 The government 
preferred the "velvet glove approach" and did not use the recently 
, 't' h ' f t' 68 acqulred Brl lS mlnesweepers or ac 10n. There was a clear failure 
to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of the state, and more generally, 
as will be discussed under variable (vi), a clear inability to interven~ 
militarily in the North. 
(ii) recognition of position by others 
Apart from the establishment of a United Nations mission in January 
1956, entry into the U.N. did not produce any expansion of Irish 
diplomatic representation. Subsequent modest expansion appears to have 
been predominantly influenced by trade considerations. 69 In the mid-
60s the pattern of Irish representation was chalJenged, particularly by 
the Irish Labour Party, which drew attention to the vacuum regarding 
70 Eastern Europe. Trade seems to have influenced them, although the 
official position was that the "volume of trade does not warrant cost 
of formal diplomatic representation ll • 71 Some in Fine Gael not only 
derided the trade argument, but argued also that the Soviets represented 
the antithesis of everything the Irish believed, so that the Irish 
should not "suckle the Russian bear".72 Labour representatives did 
introduce the question: "How can we suggest that we are neutral? What 
is the meaning of neutrality if we have no diplomatic relations with 
the damned on the other side?",73 but when the situation did change, 
with diplomatic relations being established in 1973, it appears to have 
been more to do with Irish entry into the European Community and trade, 
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rather than considerations of neutrality. 
On the Soviet side, in 1959 they accused the Irish of not being 
independent agents, but of acting as tools and agents of another 
74 
country. The following year they opposed the election of F.H. Boland 
for the Presidency of the General Assembly, their candidate being from 
75 Poland, "the West's was from Ireland". Later, it appears that the 
Soviets did not send the Irish a Note indicating that they regarded 
membership of the European Community as incompatible with neutrality, 
although Finland, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland did receive such 
Notes. 76 
During this period the Irish did not participate in either the 
first nonaligned summit at Belgrade nor subsequent nonaligned meetings. 
In June 1961 the Dail was twice told that no invitation to Belgrade had 
been received, but it ffiunclear whether President Sukarno of 
Indonesia hadmade informal soundings on a visit to Dublin earlier in 
77 the year. The lack of Irish participation and invitation is revealing 
about the perception of the Irish position. In the following year, 
moreover, the Irish supported the Americanposition during the Cuban 
missile crisis, and did not participate in meetings of what Aiken 
referred to as 45 "unaligned" and "Afro-Asian states".78 Many in 
Ireland were suspicious of the nonaligned movement, seeing behind it 
"Communist sympathizers".79 
Evidence of a more positive perception of the Irish position is 
provided by the invitations to contribute to the peace-keeping forces 
established by the United Nations, suggesting a view of Ireland as 
having "no ties, commitments or obligations to any other nation or 
group of nations", as neutral and, therefore, acceptable. 80 Certainly 
Irish politicians perceived it in this light. 81 S imil ar 1 y Conor 
Cruise O'Brien has postulated that Dag Hammarskjold chose him to be the 
'I 
I , 
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Representative of the United Nations in Katanga, because the choice 
82 
narrowed "to a European neutral" Some in Ireland saw similar 
perceptions behind Boland's election to the General Assembly Presidency 
in 1960 and Ireland's election to the Security Council in 1962. 83 
In fact, the claims associated with acceptability for peace-
keeping are highly tendentious. MacQueen has argued that Ireland 
only superficially met the criteria regarding so-called "middle powers", 
and that the "middle power" argument is itself based on a "misinter-
pretation", since at crucial junctures the U.N. itself "was not 
politically neutral between East and West".84 Moreover, an 
examination of major participants in U.N. peace-keeping and observer 
missions up to 1970 reveals that out of 12 operations, the contributors 
were: Sweden 10, Canada 9, Denmark 8, Ireland 7, Norway 7, and India, 
Italy, Netherlands and New Zealand 6 each. Six of the nine were 
alliance members. Out of the total list of participants, only 
Yugoslavia "could be said to be identifiably non-western", whilst 
nearly all NATO members, but no Warsaw Pact states took part. 85 
MacQueen concludes that, contrary to Irish conventional wisdom, peace-
keeping was "a western conception", a conception, moreover, viewed with 
.. b th . t 86 SUsplclon y e communlS s. Peace-keeping participation was not a 
world imprimatur of independent position, but only a few in Ireland 
recognized this. 
Only a minority, for example, argued that participation in 
Organisation des Nations Unies du Congo (ONUC) could involve a sacrifice 
of Irel and's all eged "non-committed" standing, since it might be 
regarded as supporting colonialism. 87 Interestingly, MacQueen 
observes that the Congo experience demonstrated "the fundamental 
differences in perspective and interests between the Afro-Asian small 
88 powers and those of Western Europe". 
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Perceptions of Ireland may also have been influenced by Irish 
behaviour and pronouncements at the U.N. itself. O'Brien argues, for 
example, that while initially regarded as "Absolutely safe on straight 
East-West issues",89 a change occurred in 1957 when Aiken became 
minister, firstly with his statement on disengagement in Europe and 
secondly,and more importantly,in the vote to allow a discussion of 
the question of Chinese representation. 90 This latter, according to 
O'Brien, was regarded as a reliable indicator of votes on a range of 
issues,91 and led to a perception of Ireland as one of "the bloody 
mavericks".92 O'Brien argues that this only lasted four years, given 
that in 1961 the Irish voted for a different American formula, so that 
observers could subsequently predict that Ireland "would now be aligned 
with ••• the United States. In this expectation these observers were 
not disapPointed".93 There is other evidence (discussed under variable 
(iv) below) that the Irish position, or at least alignment, did change 
about this time. 
Those attempting to discern the true nature of the Irish position 
had the additiona1 problem of confronting divergent Irish statements 
regarding Irish views. For example, early in 1960 the Taoiseach, 
Sean Lemass drew "important distinctions" between the Afro-Asians who 
refused to take a position on East-West issues and stressed anti-
colonialism, and the "'independent' countries such as Sweden and 
Ireland" who wished to judge according to the criteria of the Charter. 94 
In October of the same year, however, Aiken as Minister for External 
Affairs spoke to the General Assembly of the role, "we smaller ••• 
independent •.• uncommitted countries, call us what you will ... We, 
95 the recently emerged ••• ", could play. A year later, Aiken denied 
using the word 'uncommitted' claiming he had stressed Ireland was 
'independent' .96 This ambiguity of view was present in the Irish U.N. 
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delegation itself, so that although "all important matters" were 
decided by the Chairman of the delegation, there were variations in 
the Irish position according to committee, issue and representation. 97 
Adding to the problems was the manner in which the Irish distanced 
themselves from the Afro-Asians on certain aspects of the colonial, 
South African and Rhodesian questions. Whilst given their history, 
the Irish knew "what imperialism is and what resistance to it involves",9El 
they believed in gradualism and preparation for self-government,99 so 
that peoples should not "immediately and without preparation of any 
kind" be "thrown on their own resources", since this might lead to 
"tyranny and exploitation",100 although the principle of self-
determination "ought to be the great master principle by which this 
Assembly should be guided "".101 
There was a depreciation of the Afro-Asians "proposing unrealistic 
resolutions".102 Given their memory of the Italian case, the Irish 
also had doubts as to the efficacy of sanctions. Although the Irish 
complied with the mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia and prohibited 
arms sal es to South Africa, this was not done with any confidence ;-103 
Fundamentally, the Irish would have preferred "separate vote(s) on the 
contentious issues" but the denial of this led them not to support a 
number of resolutions. 104 
Perceptual difficulties were exacerbated by the 1961 decision to 
apply for membership of the EEC, particularly given that on this issue 
"Ireland definitely parted company with the European neutrals".105 
This was clearly recognized in Europe. In February 1963 the EEC 
Commission referred to "the three neutral countries" as Austria, Sweden 
and Switzerland and dealt with Ireland in another context,106 whilst in 
1962-3 the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in examining 
the problem of the relationship between neutrals and the Community made 
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no mention of Ireland in its committee analyses and reports. Ireland 
was not cited as an example of a neutral which had been able to 
reconcile neutrality and membership.107 In fact, few European 
1 . t . . d th' 108 po 1 1c1ans argue 1S. One exception was Maurice Schumann, the 
French Foreign Minister, who argued it was "wrong to say that joining 
the Community involved a change in Ireland's neutral policy" on the 
grounds that the Community was purely economic. 109 More generally, 
there was hostility to neutral membership since it implied dilution 
of the political objectives of the Community. 
The distinction between Ireland and 'the three neutral countries' 
was perceived by some in Ireland, who concluded Irish "so-called 
neutrality is a joke and a joke in poor taste".110 There were queries 
as to why the Irish government was not coordinating its approach with 
that of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland to "ensure that in common 
Ireland may ensure her neutrality in future" 111 The answer was that 
it was not deemed useful to coordinate policy with non-applicants,112 
and moreover, Ireland had "no traditional policy of neutrality ... like 
countries such as Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, who have declared 
themselves to have permanent policies of neutrality". Rather, in the 
Irish case, it was for the Dail to decide "in the light of the 
circumstances prevail ing" at the time. 113 
(iiir disavowal of help 
The Irish position and debate on this variable remained little 
changed from the previous period. Other arguments arose in 
connection with the nature of Ireland's relationship to the European 
Community, and will be dealt with in the following section dealing 
with freedom of decision and action. 114 Mostly they concerned the 
extent Ireland would have to help others, not the situation vice versa. 
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What did emerge with respect to 'disavowal of help', however, was 
an explicit admission by the Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, in 1962 that it 
would be highly undesirable to give the impression that the Irish 
regarded NATO membership as discreditable, since "the existence of 
NATO is necessary for the preservation of peace and for the defence of 
the countries of Western Europe, including this country. Although we 
are not members of NATO, we are in full agreement with its aims".115 
Richard Burke in 1969 berated those who found it convenient to be 
derogatory about NATO, since the Irish at times, "were very glad of 
its umbrella of protection".116 Some backbenchers continued to 
assume, given the lack of Irish 'due diligence', that the Irish system 
must be based upon cooperation with both Britain and America in the 
117 
event of an attack. It was argued the Irish wou1d be unwise to 
cut themselves off completely from cooperative p1anning, since if 
hostilities commenced Ireland would undoubtedly be part of the general 
118 
scheme of the defence of Western Europe. Official policy was to 
disavow such reasoning, and during this period there was no apparent 
question of an alliance or defence arrangement, nor of any deals on 
the basis of 'neu~~ality/unity' .119 
What did arise was the vexed question of foreign military bases. 120 
The government denied such possibilities and strongly denied in 1962 a 
specific rum our that they were considering a proposal to allow 
American bases in Ireland in exchange for the freedom of Northern 
Ireland. 121 What did occur was the landing of a significant number 
of foreign military airplanes at Shannon, and between 1 January -
20 Ju1y 1967, there were 167 such landings with aircraft from the 
United States, Canada, France, West Germany, Belgium, Israel, Iran 
d ' A b' 122 and Sau 1 ra la. Whilst not definitive evidence, it is 
suggestive of an Irish informal orientation. 
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In general, however, the Irish remained against foreign military 
bases be it on Irish soil or on the soil of other nations. Frank Aiken 
spoke out repeatedly on this issue at the U.N., for example, in his 
disengagement proposal of 1957,123 and in his so-called 'areas of law' 
proposals. 124 He was particularly critical of the Cubans in 1962, 
arguing that instead of introducing new foreign bases into the area, 
the Cubans should have followed the-Irish example of "under no 
circumstances" allowing "our country to be used as a base for attack 
. b II 125 aga1nst our neigh our 
(iv) freedom of decision and action 
Despite many years of offical policy and rhetoric, Ireland had not 
attained economic self-sufficiency. It remained a very open economy, 
still "extremely dependent on foreign trade ll ,126 and this dependency 
increased in -the period 1956-1972, as is shown in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4 Ireland Foreign Trade Dependence 1955-1972, as a percentage 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1972 
of GNP at current factor cost 
Merchandise 
Exports 
22.8 
25.9 
27.2 
32.4 
33.8 
J\~erchandise 
Imports 
42.7 
38.4 
43.7 
47a 
44.1 
Exports of 
Goods and Services 
37.2 
39.8 
39.7 
46.2 
44 
a Distorted by exceptional imports of aircraft. 
Imports of 
Goods and Services 
44.5 
39.9 
45 
50.7a 
46.9 
Source: From: T.K. Whitaker, 'Monetary Integration Reflections on 
Irish Experience', Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank of Ireland (Winter)1973 
p.69. 
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Such dependence had a decisive effect upon Irish economic choice,127 
and was exacerbated by the continuing "monetary union in the form of a 
fixed link between the Irish pound and sterling", so that the Irish 
devalued at the same time and by the same amount as the British. 128 
Although the significance to Ireland of the United Kingdom declined 
somewhat between 1956 and 1972, it remained extraordinarily high as 
can be seen in Table 8.5. 
Table 8.5 Trade by areas in selected years as a percentage of total 
imports and total exports 
1956* 1969 1972 1961 
(ls-t-
application 
to EEC) 
1967 
(2n-d-
application 
to EEC) 
(Revitalized (Last Year 
application) before 
entry) 
% Imports from: 
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
Rest of EFTA* 
EEC members* 
Dollar Countries 
Eastern Europe 
% Exports to: 
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
Rest of EF'T'A* 
EEC members* 
Dollar Countries 
Eastern Europe 
57.8 
n/a 
11 
10.9 
~1 
76.2 
n/a 
9 
3.5 
~1 
50.8 
3.2 
13.5 
10.2 
1 
74.3 
1 
6.3 
9.1 
'1 
50.2 
3.8 
14.6 
10.8 
11;; 
72.1 
1.1 
8.5 
10.8 
L1 
52.6 
5.8 
15.6 
10.8 
1 
65.4 
1.7 
11.1 
12.5 
£..1 
51.0 
6.7 
17.5 
9.1 
1 
60.8 
2.4 
16.8 
12.0 
.£..1 
* For 1956 the figures are for trade with the eventual member states 
of EFTA and EEC 
n/a Figures not available in Statistical Abstract 
Sources: Derived from: 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1958, (Pr.4564) Table 114 Value of 
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Imports from each of the Principal Countries and, Table 115 Value of 
Total Exports consigned to each of the Principal Countries, p.135j 
and Table 121 Trade by Monetary Areas p.139. 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1962, (Pr.6571) Table 131 Value of 
Imports from each of the Principal Countries and Table 132 Value of 
Total Export consigned to each of the Principal Countries, p.155j and 
Table 138 Trade by Areas p.159. 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1969 , (Pr.1101) Table 123 Value of 
Imports from each of the Principal Countries and, Table 124 Value of 
Total Exports consigned to each of the Principal Countries, p.149j 
and Tab 1 e 130 Trade by Areas p .153 • 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1970-71, (Prl.1974) Table 118 Value 
of Imports from each of the Principal Countries and Table 119 Value 
of Total Exports consigned to each of the Principal countries, p.151j 
and Table 125 Trade by Areas, p.155. 
Statistical Abstract of Irel and 1972-73,( Prl .4053) Tabl e 114 Val ue of 
Imports from each of the Principal Countries and Tablel15 Value of 
Total Exports consigned to each of the Principal Countries, p.154j 
and Tabl e 121 Trade by Areas p. 161. 
The dependence upon one state is the critical distinction between 
the Irish pattern of trade and that of 'the three neutral countries,.129 
At key moments of decision the Irish were importing about two-thirds 
of their requirements from Britain and the Six, and exporting over 
three-quarters of their exports to those same countries. Once Britain 
decided to apply for EEC membership, the Irish faced the daunting 
prospect of being at a tariff and competitive disadvantage in key 
and large markets, with little apparent alternative market available. 130 
Equally significant, and again a key distinguishing feature from 'the 
three neutral countries', was the size of the agricultural sector in 
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Ireland. In 1961, 1967, 1969 and 1972, agricultural, forestry and 
fishing produce accounted for 51.8%, 53%, 46.5% and 41.8% respectively 
of Irish Domestic Exports,131 whilst the agricultural figures for 1969 
of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland were 4.1%, 2.4% and 2.9% of total 
t t ' 1 132 expor s respec lve y. Agriculture, including additionally processed 
products, approached 75% of the Irish export trade and nearly all of it 
was exported to Britain. 133 Garrett FitzGerald in 1961 commented that 
such dependence upon another state was a "serious undermining of the 
true independence of a country like ours ••• we are not independent 
economically".134 Lemass, too, felt that "the historic task" of their 
generation was to secure economic independence,135 and that a failure 
to do so "would set the political gains to nought".136 
The extent of the influence of dependence upon Britain was further 
evidenced by the government White Paper of 30 June 1961 on the 
'European Economic Community'. A "major factor" in determining Irish 
policy was the proportion of external trade with Britain, and any 
Irish-EEC relationship would have to take that into account. Irish 
national interest might be best served by joining if "the United 
Kingdom was a member" but "would not be served by joining if the 
United Kingdom remained outside". Ireland had to "avoid any action 
which might adversely effect ••• (the) special trading relations" with 
Britain. Ireland might seek membership or association, but a decision 
could only be made when it was clear if Britain was joining and on what 
d 't' 137 con l lons. 
Lemass told the Dail that if Britain applied, "we also will apply, 
while at the same time informing them of our difficulty in accepting, in the 
present stage of our development, the full obligations of membership".138 
If Ireland's trading partners joined "together in an economic union, 
we cannot be outside it", since there would be "no economic future for 
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this country if we were to be cut off by a uniform tariff" applying 
to Irish exports from "all our European markets". It was not a 
"choice of joining ••• or leaving things as they are" since the status 
d ' ,139 quo was lsappearlng. Generally the Dail accepted there was little 
or no alternative to membership, with Browne arguin~ the Dail no 
longer had real freedom of decision, being merely a "puppet".140 
others too complained that whilst allegedly a sovereign state they had 
no real choice, and had less control over their destiny than in 1922. 141 
Ireland was dependent "on the decisions taken in Britain and elsewhere 
over which ••• (it had) no control".142 
That lack of control was further emphasized by de Gaulle's veto on 
British entry in 1963, with Lemass having to admit that the Irish 
position was dependent upon how relations between Britain, the 
Community and others evolved. 143 Again, the Irish could not determine 
their position "until the position concerning the British application, 
and Britain's future commercial policy" were known. 144 Not surprisingly, 
in 1967 Lemass announced "our own application for membership should 
follow closely on that of Britain".145 The primacy of economic 
considerations is further evidenced by the key role at this time of 
the Departmentsof Finance, and Industry and Commerce, rather than 
External Affairs. 146 
The Irish did "continue to plan and prepare ••• entry".147 They 
continued with the change of d~rectionin economic policy initiated in 
1955_56. 148 A reassessment at that time of Irish economic progress, 
culminated in the historic White Paper 'Economic Development' in 1958 
which acknowledged that previous policies "have not resulted in a 
viable economy" and that a "sense of anxiety is, indeed, justified". 
Given this, and developments in Europe, the government concluded that 
"sooner or later, protection will have to go and the challenge of free 
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trade be accepted. There is really no other choice for a country 
working to keep peace materially with the rest of Europe".149 
Despite the problems with the EEC there could, therefore, be no 
turning back for the Irish especially since the Six began tariff 
reductions in January 1959 and the British pursued the idea of a free 
trade industrial area in Europe, culminating in the foundation of 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. The Irish sought 
informal partial interim agreements with the Six and the EFTA Seven, 
but to no avail and were also excluded from EFTA. Exclusion followed 
British insistence that EFTA was for developed economies only,(the 
Irish having explained in the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) Maudling negotiations their weaknesses and inability 
to fully participate in a free trade area) and that agriculture be 
excluded. Consequently Lemass took the view that "participation in 
EFTA cannot be expected to offer substantial advantages to us". The 
Irish would have no additional rights in the British markets, whilst the 
exclusion of agriculture outweighed any putative advantage of free 
trade with the other EFTA members. 150 
Instead in 1965 the Irish accepted the Anglo-Irish Free Trade AreJ 
Agreement. This was generally in Britain's favour reflecting the 
asymmetrical bargaining positions of the two sides. 151 It was indeed 
partly the need to change that situation, where Britain could act as 
"referee and umpire", that made the Community attractive, since if 
members, both would be "subject to the European institutions" and 
Ireland would be safer than in "the big jungle of the world".152 The 
Irish were still constrained, however, facing the problems that "in 
the world today there is no such thing as a really independent nation,,153 
and that reduced dependence upon Britain was simply "at the cost of 
increasing their dependence on the markets of Western Europe and the 
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United States".154 This was evidenced by the pattern of investment 
in Ireland after the replacement of the Control of Manufacturers Act 
by the Industrial Development (Encouragement of External Investment) 
Act. 46% of investment came from the United states and West Germany, 
with 29% from Britain. There was now an acceptance of foreign 
penetration of the Irish economy,155 which incide~tally, also raised 
the question of whether Irish subsidiaries of multinational firms 
would have to comply with NATO restrictions on trade in 'strategic 
goods' with Eastern Europe. 156 
The Irish could see little alternative to the EEC, but they 
initially failed to gain entry for non-Irish reasons, although there 
were doubts about their preparedness. 157 In the 1961 White Paper 
both association and membership were considered as possibilities. 158 
To some extent the matter was again outwith Irish control given 
Community ambivalence regarding association, but the Irish themselves 
also quickly decided that only membership would give them "a voice 
in the formulation of policies and ensure access on a footing of 
equality", as wen as allowing "possible recourse to sources of 
• II 159 
asslstance • Crucially, participation in the Common Agricultural 
Policy offered assured and remunerative markets for Irish agricultural 
produce. On the other hand, it was recognized that membership "on 
the basis onl y of f1\l1 obl igations ... woul d create a critical 
. t t· II 160 Sl ua 10n • 
No substantive decisions were required, however, until further 
changes in circumstances, again outwith Irish control, changed the 
situation with The Hague summit of December 1969 leading to 
substantive negotiations for the first time on an Irish application. 
That Irish dependence upon Britain remained was evident in the January 
1972 White Paper 'The Accession of Ireland to the European Communities'. 
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If Britain joined and Ireland remained aloof "the results for industry 
would be very serious, to say the least and, for agriculture, 
disastrous". It was "not a realistic" alternative, bearing in mind 
"the limitations" imposed by "the key position of agriculture" and 
"the critical dependence on external trade". An examination of a 
range of alternatives concluded they involved "such major disadvantages 
as to cause serious damage to our economic growth, to employment and to 
our standard of living".161 Irish choice was, therefore, constrained 
as Aiken had admitted earlier, by forces "operating in Europe ••• which 
are beyond our sole control, beyond direction by our single will".162 
It was against this background that the debate about the implications 
of Community membership took place. 
Another feature of that background was that speculation regarding 
what might happen if Ireland joined involved "an hypothesis about an 
hypothesis".163 As a consequence of this and a changing external 
environment, the Irish attitude over the years 1961-1972 encompassed 
several changes of emphasis depending upon the Irish perception of what 
was required of them at certain times. When expedient to stress 
commitment to the European cause, including defence, this was done but 
at other times such commitment became sotto voce and conditional. 
Questions associated with defence wer~ somewhat "peripheral" to the 
main debate,164 although between 1961-1972 about one hundred 
parliamentary questions, in addition to points in debate, adjournment 
debates and motions, were asked in the Dail relating to NATO membership, 
whether Community membership involved a defence commitment and a number 
of related questions, such as attitudes to the Western European Union 
(WEU) • 
On the one hand, it became clear that there was no enthusiasm 
for joining any existing alliance system. In 1961, for example, the 
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Dail was assured that "Irrespective of Partition" there were reasons 
for non-membership of NATO. 165 Particularly significant, apart from 
freedom of action and not having to clear every word with states 
before speaking, was the ability "to make suggestions ••• that a member 
of a bloc could not make,,166 so as to contribute to "reducing tensions" 
by, for example, nuclear non-proliferation proposals and contributions 
k . 167 to U.N. peace- eeplng. Rather than help alliances destroy each 
other, the Irish should "try to win the peace" 168 On the other hand, 
within days of such statements the Irish applied to join what some 
regarded as "one of the most powerful groups and blocs" in the world, 
namely the European Community.169 The government denied the Community 
was a bloc, querying "Is the U.S.A. a bloc?,,170 and arguing there was 
"no commitment to belong to any bloc or to take part in any conflict 
involved in negotiating membership of the Community" 171 Ireland was 
still "neutral as between blocs, ... neutral in conflict", and no 
incompatibility existed between that and Community membership, or 
between that and the commitment to "take part in the defence of Europe 
just as now we defend our own territory" since it involved "absolutely 
no question at this time of participating on one side or another in a 
bloc or taking part in any conflict".172 
Yet tPf\sions did emerge between what many saw as Ireland's 
traditional position and the apparent obligations of Community membership. 
These tensions were exacerbated initially by a number of statements by 
the Taoiseach, Sean Lemass. Given his conviction of the primordial 
importance of Irish economic interests, he attempted to de-sanctify 
neutrality announcing, for example, "there is no neutrality and we are 
not neutral".173 If help from Ireland was crucial to a Western 
victory, "could we in the last resort refuse it", especially since 
everybody knew Ireland was on the democratic side?174 Ireland could 
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help NATO even if not a member175 and by 1962 Lemass was arguing it 
was "not in the national interest to represent that (article 4 of 
North Atlantic treaty) as implying an undertaking to preserve Partition 
situation", having regard to similar phrases in the U.N. Charter and 
League Covenant, although he still felt the 1950 White Paper arguments 
176 
were relevant. NATO membership was not discreditable, indeed NATO 
177 helped defend Ireland. Whilst no Cabinet committee looked at NATO 
membership at that time,178 Lemass did arrange for Michael Moran, 
Minister for Lands, to air the issue. 179 Moran noted that all current 
EEC members were NATO members also and that they had come together, at 
least partly, because of common policies on foreign and defence issues. 
Lemass, he said, had made it clear that there was no "laid down" policy 
with respect to neutrality between Communism and freedom, and that 
neutrality in that "context is not a policy to which we would ever wish 
to appear committed".180 Lemass, himself, was emphasising that Ireland 
recognised "that a military commitment will be an inevitable consequence 
of our joining the Common Market and ultimately we would be prepared to 
yield even the technical label of neutrality. We are prepared to go 
into this integrated Europe without any reservation as to how far this 
will take us in the field of foreign policy and defence".181 Neutrality 
was no longer an aspiration nor a fundamental principle. 
In the autumn of 1962 Lemass made clear to the Dail the willingness 
to cooperate "without qualification" in achieving the wider objectives 
of the community182 having said this to the EEC Council of Ministers 
in January 1962. Ireland, he declared, accepted the general aims of 
NATO, the ideal of Europeanunity and "the conceptions embodied in the 
Treaty of Rome and the Bonn Declaration ••• of the duties, obligations 
and responsibilities which European unity would impose".183 In 
subscribing to the Bonn Declaration, Lemass was accepting that "only a 
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united Europe, allied to the United states of America and to other free 
peoples, is in a position to face the dangers that menace the existence 
of Europe and of the whole free world". It involved accepting the need 
to create conditions allowing for a "common policy" with the aim of 
political union and strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. 184 
The Irish application was made without any reservation regarding 
the supranational implications of membership185 or request for any 
discussion of possible neutrality reservations. In the summer of 1969 
the government was again emphatic that it had "no reservations whatever 
about our application ••• We know there are political and economic 
obligations and that whenever the defence of Europe arises we will play 
186 
our part". Did 'no reservations' mean literally that? Lemass, on 
occasion also tried to argue that the Irish motives for their application 
were "primarily political", especially the desire to playa role in 
building Europe, and that this involved accepting the wide scope and 
depth of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. 187 
This approach may have been a corrective to an initial Irish 
memorandum submitted on 4 !uly 1961 which had raised doubts about Irish 
political commitment and doility to cope with full membership. Although 
another memorandum was substituted for it,188 Lemass may have used 
hyperbole to advance the Irish cause. Nonetheless, as a matter of 
public and international record Ireland accepted the letter and spirit 
both of the Community treaties and the Bonn Declaration. It might 
argue "NATO is completely irrelevant to our EEC application,,189 and 
that no one had requested Irish membership,190 but the tenor of Irish 
statements suggests that for Lemass the economic arguments were so 
strong that he was prepared to yield neutrality. 
A difficulty was uncertainty as to whether the treaties and 
Communi ty membership invol ved a defence commitment. If the Irish 
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joined, "Would we have to take part in a war?,,191 The official reply 
d th t · . d . 1 . t " 192 . t argue e reatles contalne no ml 1 ary provlslons, no requlremen 
to join alliances193 and said nothing about neutrality.194 Obligations 
contrary to neutrality were not "mentioned directly or indirectly" by 
the EEC. 195 No military or defence commitments "are involved in 
Ireland's acceptance of these Treaties".196 The Irish argued that any 
attempt to impose non-economic matters would be ultra vires and that 
any defence treaty would require Irish consent and, indeed, a 
referendum if it involved raising an army or decisions about going to 
197 
war. Irish movement on these matters would be voluntary. It was 
also asserted that the Treaty of Accession contained no recognition or 
guarantee of territorial boundaries. 19B 
This legalistic approach can be challenged on both specific and 
general grounds as indeed it was by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. 
Moreover, a recent study concluded "there was no formal exclusion of 
defence from the Community agenda in the Treaty of Rome", and that 
the Community "could expand into defence without actually violating 
the Treaty of Rome if its members so chose", especially given article 
235 which allowed, under certain circumstances, the Community to move 
. t 199 ln 0 new areas. Such moves would require Irish consent but it is 
not clear they would be ultra vires or require a referendum. In 
addition, many feared Ireland would be too constrained to have a free 
choice, since membership would be like "jumping on to a moving 
escalator from which one will never be allowed to get off .•• In ten 
years time we shall be so totally economically committed to the 
infrastructure of the EEC and our trade will be so firmly based 
that if .•• a decision is taken of a political or military kind", 
Ireland would have lost the real choice of digging its heels in. 200 
Economic association was bound to lead to some form of political and 
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military involvement and legalistic safeguards would be no genuine 
safeguard. 
This was why Labour rejected the Fine Gael amendment to the Third 
Amendment of the Constitution Bill (1971). The original bill provided 
for Irish membership of the Communities and as originally drafted said 
no provision of the Constitution could invalidate "laws enacted, acts 
done or measures adopted by the state consequent on membership of the 
Communities 
" 
The amendment substituted "necessitated by the 
obligations of" for "consequent on" and was successfully and specifically 
introduced to seek to ensure a narrow interpretation of the treaties and 
that any defence treaty arising out of Community membership would have 
to be put to the people. Labour continued to argue the de facto 
position would outweigh the de jure one. 201 
Within Ireland scant attention was paid to the specific treaty 
articles which worried 'the three neutral countries', although attention 
was focused upon the Preamble and likely political and defence 
obligations. Whilst imprecision remained as to what those obligations 
would be, many realized "it would be less than frank if we imagined 
that defence was not at the forefront of the thinking behind the 
drafting of the Rome Treaty,,202 and that as responsible members the 
Irish had to shoulder "our share of responsibility for securing its 
well-being". Those "participating in the new Europe ••• must be 
prepared to assist, if necessary, in its defence", although as a 
member Ireland would have a voice in shaping those developments. 203 
Clarity on this issue was not helped by successive government 
declarations which emphasised the legal position when stressing 
neutrality, but which emphasised Irish moral and political obligations 
when emphasising Community commitment. A distinction was also drawn 
between current and future commitments, and between the Community and 
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an alliance. Not a little ambiguity existed on these questions but 
underneath the statements lay a public recognition and acceptance 
that at some time in the future, and conditional upon certain 
deve1opments, Ireland would join in the defence of the Community. 
The prob1em arose from a reluctance to accept the corollary, namely 
that such a position involved the abandonment of neutrality. Instead 
Taoiseach Lynch tried to argue that he did "not think ••• the word 
'neutrality' is relevant" in the context of Community membership, 
since neutrality "would not be relevant in the context of our being 
attacked by anybody: we would defend ourselves". In an admitted 
departure from previous policy, it was accepted that Ireland would "be 
interested in the defence of the territories embraced by the communities. 
There is no question of neutrality there ,,204 Ireland told its 
prospective partners it would be prepared to assist in Community 
defence, "if this became necessary, at any time".205 
Lynch was also emphasising the conditional nature of Irish 
neutra1ity,that it was not traditional like the three neutral countries 
and that the Irish were free to "make up our minds as to our neutrality 
in certain circumstances". Lynch believed that in a "war between 
atheistic communism ••• and the way of life we know" neither Dail nor 
people would "permit us to be neutral".206 Scorn was now poured on 
the way in which ad hoc wartime neutra1ity had become "inculcated in 
some peop1e" as "an idea that ..• was a policy for all time in all 
. t " 207 Clrcums ances • It was an "accident" for "reasons which are 
not relevant today". It was a "practical expedient".208 Past 
decisions would not "in any way impede ••• Parliament from taking a 
decision that would make us non-neutral in other circumstances", 
specifically as EEC obligations developed. 209 Ireland had "never 
adopted a permanent policy of neutrality in a doctrinaire or 
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ideological sense" 210 Although Hillery on one occasion spoke of 
neutrality as "Traditional since the last war", this was part of a 
rebuttal of the wider traditional argument,211 and more generally it 
came to be argued that Ireland had "never been neutral" since 1945 
given its role" in international organisations and making decisions 
and taking our own independent line".212 Entry into the U.N. was 
"not the action of a country with a tradition of neutrality,,213 since 
Ireland was "now on the side of all peace-loving countries,,-.214 
Given such developments it was highly tendentious to argue they 
had "abandoned nothing" ,215 that neutrality would be preserved, and 
that the commitment to "cooperate more and more closely together" did 
not "at any stage ••• confl ict with our neutral i ty", nor did 
"neutrality conflict with our participating in this aim to participate 
in the close union of the countries of Europe".216 The reality was 
the recognition that a "political union without the capacity and the 
means to defend that union would be utterly meaningless", since such a 
union "necessarily" impl ied "the formul ation of a common defence 
policy and the working out of common defence arrangements". After 
all, as Haughey asked "what is wrong with nations getting together and 
deciding they are going to have a common bond of defence between them?,,~17 
The enduring Irish position has seen the question of any 
c6mmitmentto European defence as being dependent upon considerable 
evolution within the Community and as highly conditional. It has 
depended upon whether political unity "develops far enough", or "if 
political development goes to its finality and an institution is 
created of which we are a part and defence is discussed in that 
Community". The Irish would "not renege on" their "duties" if "in 
the context of political evolution, the question of the defence of 
the Community arises ••• ".218 An additional condition was that 
-338-
commitment depended upon "enjoying all the benefits of being part of 
Europe".219 It was also emphasised that as of 1971 there was no 
commitment to defend any Community country which was attacked, even 
after Ireland became a member. There was "no guaranteed continuation 
of the European concept",220 with the 1972 White Paper emphasising 
that "progress towards the achievement of an ever closer union ••• must 
be pursued with due deliberation ••• joint action in the political 
sphere must develop gradually but at the same time on a progressive 
b ." 221 aS1S • 
Such statements led Keatinge to ask whether the Irish were paying 
little more "than the obligatory lip service which any applicant's 
negotiator must pay" 222 This misses the point that even in its 
conditional statements the government was abandoning the principle of 
and aspiration to neutrality. Friend and foe alike knew the Irish 
position, its distinctiveness from 'the three neutral countries' and 
the problems economic dependence generated for political independence. 
Whilst Lynch might argue it was "not a question of neutrality but of 
meeting obligations within a complex", he was nearer the mark in 
admitting that neutrality "in the context of the EEC would not be the 
old conception of neutrality at all".223 
Pro-European figures, like FitzGerald, thought it "would be 
dishonest and dishonourable" to join if there were reservations about 
the "moral obligations" to "move towards a common foreign policy". 
He distinguished, however, foreign policy from defence arguing the 
latter was "nowhere in the offing at the present time" and would only 
arise "if this becomes a full political union" 224 
Opponents of entry argued the government was accepting "a military 
·commitment,,225 and was engaged in a "shocking" betrayal of traditional 
policy.226 Echoing Swedish arguments, they argued the Community was 
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"essentially a NATO European membership" or involved a "side-door" 
involvement with NATO. 227 The Community was not "a philanthropic 
body" but a "ruthless capitalist superpower with an empire and a 
nuclear capability", comprised of notorious aggressors. 228 Was 
"communism any less atheistic ••• in 1949-50 ••• 7".229 Labour 
resurrected the de Valera rationales for neutrality and compared those 
with_the government "sacrificing" Irish identity and sovereignty230 
as well as appearing to be "willing to do anything ••• to be allowed 
. " 231 ln • 
There was some attempt to reconcile the perceived traditional 
position and Community membership in the vision of the Community as 
"a Third Force between the Soviet Union and the United States •.• not 
a third power of the same kind ••• but ••• capable of looking after 
itself to a large degree and ••• able to take an independent line",232 
being neither "pro-American ••• or ... pro-anything but ••• independent,,~33 
The Irish claimed not to accept that the European ideal "is a 
confrontation against the powers of the Warsaw Pact" but rather that 
it "was to put an end to war in Europe". The idealism involved "in 
the idea of a united Europe is not represented by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation. When we say that we are prepared to undertake 
the defence commitments of a European Community we are not pledging 
our loyalty to NATO. We are saying that the European Community 
which we wish to join is something worthwhile and therefore worth 
defending, but it is only worth defending for itself and not defending 
for any other ideology outside itself".234 However, as Tully 
pointed out such a Europe would need a "military force" and would not, 
therefore, preserve neutrality per se. 235 One senior Fine Gael 
figure, Ryan, was willing to argue for the EEC as "a neutral zone" 
with Irish neutrality being an example and encouragement to others. 
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Ryan believed the Six wanted Ireland to assert neutrality "as a proper 
doctrine for any member nation of the EEC",236 partly in order to 
demonstrate it was "not a war-l ike instrument'. 237 The Six did not 
want a European army and, therefore, membership did not involve 
alliance. 238 
Ireland differed from the neutrals in finding no insurmountable 
obstacle to Community membership in neutrality. Unlike Austria, 
Sweden and Switzerland the Irish accepted: 
(a) the political obligations of membership and the political objectives 
of the Community, including political unification and a European 
identity in the world; 
(b) the Bonn Declaration and the need ultimately to partake in 
Community defence; 
(c) the supranational nature of the Community, the possibility of 
majority voting and the supranational direction of external 
trade, and the general constraints on sovereignty; 
(d) the constraints placed upon 'economic defence' in particular 
by treaty articles, and the general constraints upon the 
domestic economy, especially given the pre-entry prospect of 
Economic and Monetary Union and; 
(e) article 224 and the lack of either neutrality reservations or 
provisions for terminating the treaties. 
The crucia1 distinction was the differing extents of economic dependency. 
Some of the Irish pre-entry hypotheses were tested before entry 
in January 1973. On 18 May 1971 the Ten Foreign Ministers met and 
the "subject of European security was amongst those discussed".239 
This attractedlittle attention but a meeting at The Hague on 20-21 
November 1972 caused some consternation, given that the Conference on 
" 
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Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the recent German treaty 
and the Middle East were all discussed. The government also announced 
it would "take into account the views of its partners", especial1y 
West Germany, on the question of the timing of German entry into the 
U.N. and the recognition of East Germany. The opposition saw this as 
"the first major question" upon which "the principle of acting in 
concert with other members" appeared to have operated and worried it 
was an "anticipation of future changes in our foreign policy", clearly 
being surprised by it. The government answered in what became a 
familiar pattern, namely that it simply involved an attempt to find 
"where there is consensus" and that there was "no pressure on any 
country to change its individual stand". Ireland would continue to 
1 . t t 240 consu t 1 spar ners. This was precisely what Aiken had derided 
in 1961 and it was part of a wider question relating to Irish 
sovereignty and the ability to pursue an independent foreign policy, 
particularly at the U.N. 
Much of Irish policy had traditionally been concerned with 
sovereignty issues, and sovereignty was itself linked to neutrality. 
Just as neutrality was re-defined in 1961-72 period, so too was 
sovereignty. The 1972 White Paper, for example, argued "no form of 
cooperation between nations" involved no "limitations on their freedom 
of action" and states willing accepted such limitations if they were 
perceivea vO be in the national interest. The Community was to be 
seen in this- light, but any "1 imi tations on national freedom of action" 
would be "more than counter-balanced by the influence" Ireland would 
be able to bring to bear "on the formulation of Community policies 
affecting ••• (Irish) interests". This was contrasted with the 
real i ty of being "independent but with 1i ttl e or no capacity to 
influence events abroad that significantly affect us", in other words 
, ~i 
~ 
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"the nominal right" to freedom. Real freedom was constrained in an 
interdependent world but Community membership meant the powers Ireland 
was to share "would in fact be enhanced rather than diminished by the 
cooperation involved".241 The Community would place Ireland in a 
much better position than the prevailing pervasive bilateral relation-
ship with the U.K. 242 Despite complaints from Labour, this view 
generally prevailed243 despite undermining further the aspiration to 
neutrality. 
It also caused problems for the aspiration to have a genuinely 
independent foreign policy, although other problems also arose in that 
connection. These problems were epitomised by the famous Cosgrave 
statement in July 1956 outlining the basic principles of Irish policy 
with particular relevance to Irish policy at the U.N. The first 
principle was that Ireland would observe the Charter and insist that 
others also do so. - It was in the interests of the weak that the 
Charter be upheld, and upholding such principles would also increase 
Irish infl uence • Secondly, Ireland would "try to maintain a position 
of independence, judging the various questions ••• strictly on their 
merits, in a just and disinterested way" and therefore "avoid becoming 
associated with particular blocs or groups so far as possible". 
Finally, there would be a wish to reflect national traditions, 
objectives and moral concept~, which meant an obligation to do 
"whatever we can as a member of the United Nations to pJ'eserve the 
Christian civil ization of which we are a part and with that end in view 
to support wherever possible those powers principally responsible for 
the defence of the free world in their resistance to the spread of 
Communist power and infl uence" • In terms of general policy, in the 
"great ideological conflict ••• our attitude is clear, by geographical 
position, culture, tradition and national interest. We belong to the 
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great community of states, made up of the United States of America, 
Canada and Western Europe. Our national destinies are indissolubly 
bound up with theirs". Cosgrave did admit there would be difficulties 
in applying the principles, specifically given the issue of self-
d t ' t' 244 e erml.na l.on. 
Given the change of government in March 1957, it was Aiken who was 
responsible for Irish U.N. policy for the next twelve years. In 1956 
he had supported Cosgrave's first two principles but noted that the 
third "departed to some extent from the first and second" and that 
Cosgrave was "rather tying himself up" in the third point, since there 
were "sins that are common" to communist and non-communist states alike. 
The crucial point was not to "become a part of any tied group bound by 
agreements to support one another, no matter what the subject matter 
f d ' '" 245 up or l.SCUSSl.on. Despite this Conor Cruise O'Brien has argued 
that whilst the second principle held "relative ascendancy" over the 
third initially, as "symbolized by 'the China vote'" in 1957, this 
position "became eroded and eventually collapsed".246 The change 
being dated from the 1961 vote on the sUbstantive issue of Chinese 
representation. 
This raises the issue as to whether such a change occurred and if 
so, to what extent it was motivated by the August 1961 application to 
join the Community, given the concern of some that Ireland's "economic 
interests" were not being enhanced by "fatuous observations which have 
no effect other than a disturbing one on our friends,,?247 Certainly 
Costello thougbtit "quite obvious that the Government's foreign policy 
••• changed radically ... from the time they took their decision to 
join the EEC".248 Could Ireland be uncommitted at the U.N., whilst 
blathering its support for Europe?249 
The most detailed analysis of the question of whether there was a 
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change is by Norman MacQueen in a statistical analysis of Irish voting 
behaviour in the U.N. General Assembly between 1956-70. Most 
interestingly this analysis does not support the charge by Costello and 
O'Brien, although except on colonial questions there was an increase in 
levels of cooperation with the United states and Britain. MacQueen 
argues that the degree of identity between Irish and Swedish voting, 
Sweden being regarded as "a traditional European neutral", remained 
"largely steady" whereas had a 1961 change "taken place as a result of 
domestic political circumstances, voting cooperation with Sweden might 
be expected to show a discernible decline". Given that there is "no 
evidence to support the suggestion that any change took place in 
Swedish foreign policy .•. the changing emphasis throughout the 1960s 
must be seen to have taken place within the U.N. itself and not as a 
positive redirection of Irish policy as a result of extraneous 
influences ••• the transformation was rather in the nature of the 
Assembly which underwent a general radicalisation during this period. 
Ireland and Sweden, progressive neutrals in the earlier period, now by 
standing still, objectively moved to the right". Sweden did not apply 
for Community membership, yet "a close affinity is detectable through-
out the period" with Irish voting behaviour, and this affinity "appears 
to have been little affected by the supposed rightward shift in Irish 
policy after 1961". Indeed MacQueen argues that the "gradual move 
towards greater cooperation with the western powers ••• cannot ••• be 
dated as beginning in 1961 ••• Rather, the process appears to begin 
in the plenary votes around 1959 ••• ".250 
Outwith the U.N. there clearly was some change in policy after 
1961 as is clear in the attitude to sovereignty and neutrality. There 
was a fragmentation in pol icy-making I whereby probl ems were "segmented 
. t . t " 251 ln 0 constl uent elements. This fragmentation had a certain 
~ 
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historical basis in that historically the Department of Industry and 
Commerce had acquired certain trade responsibilities and it was the 
economic departments who determined the need to move away from 
protectionism, having predominant roles in the early dealings with the 
EEC. Moreover, finance, trade and constitutional issues had also 
traditionally involved the Taoiseach's Office. 252 Lemass was, there-
fore, in a strong position to take charge of the Community issue. 
He was also the inspiration for the post-revolutionary elite which was 
"economically oriented with a view to the establishment of ••. sound 
economic policy for steady economic growth",253 
Given the economic and constitutional implications of the EEC, 
Aiken believed it "right and natural" for the Taoiseach to playa 
leading role on the issue,254 and consequently he hardly mentioned it 
in the Irish parliament, only uttering_58 words on Europe in 20,000 
words espousing policy in the External Affairs debates in the Dail 
1963_1965. 255 This division of labour allowed Ireland to pursue a 
number of pol icies which were "mutuall y confl icting, ,.. (and) 
t d ' t " 256 con ra ~c ory •••• One foreign policy was operated by Lemass 
towards Europe and the creation of "a viable Irish society" ,257 whilst 
Aiken continued in the de Valera mould, prone to "the rhetoric of his 
ideals" in New York. 258 
(v) lack of isolationism, a willingness to ameliorate world problems 
and impartiality 
In his July 1956 speech setting out the basis of Irish foreign 
policy, Cosgrave had welcomed the admission to the U.N. as a necessary 
consequence of Irish sovereignty, and argued that to turn their backs 
upon it would lead to isolation and insignificance in world affairs. 
That, it was argued would be contrary to the ideals of those who 
worked for freedom, the principles of Irish policy since 1922 and 
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against Irish national interest. Ireland would rather seek to 
contribute to the world for both moral and material reasons. 259 Trade 
followed the flag and in the contemporary, competitive world Ireland 
could not, in any case, isolate itself. 260 
It was also in Ireland's self-interest to participate since "the 
weaker states" benefitted from "the protection and support afforded by 
the moral influence" of the U. N., which was "the protector of weak 
nations and friend of·the poor, and our own best hope for the security 
and reunification of the Irish nation".261 Support for the Charter 
had been Cosgrave's first principle in July 1956. 262 Aiken believed 
support for U.N. and the Charter were the best hope for small nations, 
for the evolution of world order based on justice and the rule of law, 
and this in turn was the only basis of permanent peace. 263 Given this 
perspective, de Valera argued that as members of the U.N. it was their 
"duty" to make suggestions to resolve conflicts, and this was the "only 
point" of being involved. 264 Not all agreed since Deputy Sherwin 
asked why Ireland should concern itself with the rows of others when it 
had a major unresolved row at home. 265 More generally it was felt 
that Ireland could playa particualrly valuable role and exert 
infl uence because it had not been a colonising power, it had had to 
struggle for its own freedom, it had ties of Catholicism with Europe 
and Latin America and infl uence in numerous countries through its 
. t 266 em1.gran s. Irish "historical experiences" were thought to present 
"a unique opportunity to stand as an example" to the newly independent, 
whilst Ireland had "throughout the world an influence far beyond any 
material strength or wealth", given the role of Irish missionaries and 
their contribution to education in many parts of the world. 267 
Ireland had a "special role in certain spheres".268 
To maximise this role many, including de Valera and Aiken, thought 
'I' 
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the emphasis should be upon Cosgrave's second principle, since it was 
not in accord with Irish "interests ••• or ... traditions ••• to 
stand silent and not offer our opinion truthfully and honestly ... ". 
On the contrary, it was "valuable to countries that bear the real 
burden to have an independent nation which is prepared to make 
proposal s and suggestions in the present disastrous worl d situation". 269 
Some, like MacBride, felt Ireland could make little material 
contribution but could contribute to the battle for men's minds, and 
thus "carve out a niche" for itself. 270 Others went further, wanting 
Ireland to "follow the Indian line",271 although Fine Gael urged 
Aiken not to copy the Indian position or try to outdo it in 
neutralism, but rather to sympath~sewith it.272 Conor Cruise O'Brien 
has described how for many younger official s in Iveagh House, "the 
ideal of what constituted good international behaviour was exemplified 
at this time by Sweden", whose actions were "independent, disinterested 
273 
and honourable". A few favoured the Swiss model of making a 
contribution whilst maintaining neutrality.274 
As already seen, there was some similarity between Irish and 
Swedish voting. In the first half of Aiken's tenure (1957-1969), 
the Irish also made a number of proposals in attempting to ameliorate 
the world situation, as well as contributing to U.N. peace-keeping. 
The attempt to mark out a distinctive position was most sharply 
epitomized by the-China vote of 1957 when Aiken voted for a "full 
and open discussion of the question of the representation of China".275 
According to O'Brien this issue was regarded as a key index of a 
state's alignment, the vote indicating how the state was likely to 
vote "on all other critical . " 276 1ssues • The estrangement with the 
United States did not last, however. During this period Aiken also 
made a series of proposals to enhance international security. In 
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the 'disengagement' proposal of September 1957 Aiken suggested "a fair 
and reasonable drawing back of the non-national forces on both sides 
from the border of Russian-occupied Europe ••• along latitudinal lines 
from either side of the border for an equal number of kilometres", 
this process to be supervised by a "United Nations inspection unit".277 
This idea was developed into a series of proposals for "ever-widening 
areas in which the contest for the adherence of smaller States will be 
brought to an end".278 These would be "area(s) of law" by which was 
meant "a specific region in which the neighbouring States would 
agree to limit their arms below blitzkrieg level, to exclude foreign 
troops from their territories and to accept supervision by the United 
Nations of the fulfilment of these conditions".279 These neutrality 
regions would gradually be built up throughout the world, as areas 
committed to peaceful change and settlement. 280 These proposals were 
linked by Aiken to other proposals on nuclear test limitations, 
1 . ft" d d' t 281 pro 1 era 10n 1ssues an 1sarmamen. In 1958, for example, 
Ireland submitted a resolution calling for "an ad hoc Committee to 
study the dangers inherent in the further dissemination of nuclear 
weapons and recommend ••• appropri3te measures for averting these 
dangers,,282 and in 1961 the General Assembly unanimously adopted an 
Irish resolution on the "Prevention of the Wider dissemination of 
nuclear weapons", it being pussible to argue that Aiken made a 
significant contribution to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. 283 
During this time Aiken also spoke out "firmly in support of the 
office of the Secretary-General" since no "triumvirate or committee" 
could replace the Secretary-General as providing "the means of effective 
implementation of the Organisation's decisions".284 Aiken linked 
attacks on the Secretary-General with other attempts to destroy the 
organisation, like the "non-payment of subscriptions,,285 and "the 
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failure" to meet "the cost of implementing the decisions of the 
Security Council and the General Assembly". 286 In 1965 Ireland co-
sponsored a number of draft resolutions on the financing of peace-
k ' t' 287 eep1ng opera 1ons. In addition, it initially refused to be 
reimbursed for its peace-keeping endeavours from "voluntary funds" in 
case this undermined the principle of collective action or tainted 
the Irish contribution. 288 By the spring of 1966 this policy 
changed to accepting money from any fund the Secretary-General might 
have, but Aiken continued to fret about the situation. 289 
In the period 1956-1972 the Irish made a significant contribution 
toU.N. peace-keeping, beginning initially with co-sponsorship of the 
idea of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) for Suez and following 
this by contributing to the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon 
in 1958 (UNOGIL) and the Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in 
the Middle East from 1958. Other similar missions followed. More 
substantial were the contributions to ONUC and UNICYP, which at times 
represented one-eighth of the P.D.F. 
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~ab1e 8.6 RECORD OF UNIT SERVICE WITH UNITED NATIONS 
Non- Period of Service 
No. of Commissioned Place of 
Unit Officers Officers Privates From To Service 
32 Ballalion 45 184 460 July 1960 January 1961 Congo 
3J Battalion 47 191 468 August 1960 January 1961 Congo 
34 Ballalion 58 192 398 January 1961 JUlie 1961 Congo 
I Infilntry Group 27 93 220 May 1961 November 1961 Congo 
35 Balla'lion 58 200 396 June 1961 December 1961 Congo 
36 Ballalion 62 220 433 December 1961 May 1962 Congo 
37 Ballalion 59 208 456 May 1962 November 1962 Congo 
2 Armoured Unit 9 21 66 October 1962 April 1963 Congo 
38 Ballalion 56 222 452 November 1962 May 1963 Congo 
3 Armoured Unit 9 29 51 April 1963 October 1963 Congo 
39 Ballalion 38 165 261 April 1963 October 1963 Congo 
2 Infantry Group 32 116 189 November 1963 May 1964 Congo 
40 Ballalion 45 202 359 April 1964 October 1964 Cyprus 
3 Infantry Group 34 146 219 August 1964 January 1965 Cyprus 
41 Ballalion 46 207 358 October 1964 April 19~5 Cyprus 
4 Infantry Group 36 148 242 January 1965 July 1965 Cyprus 
42 Ballalion 47 209 362 April 1965 October 1965 Cyprus 
5 Infantry Group 42 178 283 October 1965 April 1966 Cyprus 
6 Infantry Group 42 177 284 April 1966 October 1966 Cyprus 
7 Infantry Group 43 177 284 October 1966 April 1967 Cyprus 
8 Infantry Group 43 180 284 April 1967 September 1967 Cyprus 
9 Infantry Group 46 197 284 September 1967 March 1968 Cyprus 
10 Infantry Group 46 192 289 March 1968 September 1968 Cyprus 
II Infantry Group 37 140 230 August 1968 March 1969 Cyprus 
12 Infantry Group 36 144 225 March 1969 September 1969 Cyprus 
13 Infantry Group 36 136 233 September 1969 April 1970 Cyprus 
18 Infantry Group 36 132 241 March 1970 October 1970 Cyprus 
19 Infantry Group 37 137 240 September 1970 April 1971 Cyprus 
20 Infaritry Group 37 137 240 April 1971 October 1971 Cyprus 
21 Infantry Group 31 121 225 October 1971 April 1972 Cyprus 
22 Infantry Group II 44 74 April 1972 October 1972 Cyprus 
23 Infantry Group 12 49 76 October 1972 April 1973 Cyprus 
Source: Capt. J. Sheehan, Defence Forces Handbook, (Dub1in, Department of Defence, 
n/d) , Appendix E, pp.79-80. 
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The Irish contributed partly because of general considerations 
concerning their view of the international milieu, particularly support 
for the U.N. and its principles. It was also felt it was in Irish 
interests to maintain the rule of law, with the U.N. being the only 
channel for that in international affairs. Ireland could also, perhaps, 
contribute to an avoidance of world war, although it could not, of 
itself, stop such wars. It could, however, contribute to the 
prevention of local wars and their escalation. Some saw more local 
reasons for contributing, such as giving the P.D.F. experience and 
k ' 't tt t' 290 rna 1ng 1 more a rac 1ve. The Irish did baulk at the notion of 
establishing a special, permanent U.N. unit on the grounds of expense, 
especially when uncertain as to demand, and also because they did not 
wish to appear readily available for each and every emergency.291 
Nonetheless, the Irish contribution to peace-keeping has been 
substantial and reflects a lack of isolationism and a desire to 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
On the other hand the Irish have never been active mediators, a 
fact which drew particular domestic criticism in the 1960s, particularly 
during the Nigeria-Biafra, Vietnam and India-Pakistan conflicts. In 
each case, in marked contrast to earlier behaviour and pronouncements, 
there was considerable official Irish silence and an emphasis upon the 
limited influence of small states. Indeed, Aiken's successor talked 
of the advantages of "quiet diplomacy" since one cou1d not "appr6ach 
problems with an open mouth all the time" without causing "harm and 
damage ll • 292 A future minister ridiculed suggestions of giving 
Ireland's "American friends" advice on Vietnam, since no one welcomed 
public advice. 0' Kennedy went on to bemoan the "type of thinking that 
can prevail too widely here - that all we have to do is to express 
our view as a nation ••• we are limited in scope from the financial 
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point of view and also, ••• from the point of view of international 
reality".293 
These limitations were revealed clearly on the Biafran issue, 
when despite Opposition clamour, a review by the new Minister in July 
1969 concluded there was no initiative Ireland could take "which 
could have any real influence in helping to solve the major issues". 
Instead the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was regarded as 
"ideal1y suited" to mediate. 294 Similarly with respect to India-
Pakistan conflict, there was a reluctance to become actively involved 
in mediation, because Irish "usefulness could be diminished 
considerably if (mediation) offer is i1l-timed" or if the proposed 
s01ution was "not acceptable" to one side. 295 On Vietnam, there was 
again "no initiative" the government "could usefully take" 296 All 
a small country could do was "to hope that good sense will prevail".297 
A further difficulty was that of partiality, and the continuing 
tension between Cosgrave's second and third principles. Corish 
suggested a possible way out in that Ireland should generally ally 
with the West but "not be led by the nose", making specific reference 
to Suez. 298 Furthermore as O'Brien has pointed out, there was "a 
considerable area of common ground" between these principles, "since 
Ireland is a Western country" and "its genuinely independent 
. 299 
assessments wi 11 often al so be 'Western' assessments". Indeed, 
Aiken's original stance at the U.N. drew charges in the censure 
debate on the government's foreign policy at the U.N., that the 
government was not supporting the West enough, and an affirmation that 
Irel and was "not uncommitted" in the great struggl e of the times. 300 
Indeed in the DElil there was general agreement that Ireland could "no 
longer sit on the fence in ideological clash".301 Even Fianna 
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Fail members argued Ireland should not upset the United states on the 
Ch ' , 302 'lna 'lssue. Greater emphasis came to be focused on the 
formulation advanced by Costello in 1957, namely that whilst pursuing 
"military neutrality", Ireland was "not uncommitted in the war of 
ideas",303 and this was contrasted with the Tanaiste's (Sean MacEntee) 
pronouncement that Aiken was a "non-committed statesman".304 
Deputies like Dillon hoped Irish policy was not to treat-the super-
305 powers exactly the same. A further illustration of the 
ambiguity in Ireland's position was the desire of some that Ireland 
should use its "independent and detached" position to lead the 
"emergent countries along the paths we believe can strengthen the 
defence of the free world", given that Ireland's own future was 
"indissolubly bound up with the West".306 
One indicator of Irish partiality or impartiality is U.N. voting 
behaviour. MacQueen examined Irish voting behaviour at the U.N. 
between 1956 and 1970 by analysing plenary session votes in the 
General Assembly, votes in the First and Special Political Committees 
(on international security, arms control, disarmament and political 
conflicts) and in the Fourth Committee (trusteeship, non-self governing 
territories and colonialism). MacQueen used as a basis of comparison 
the Soviet Union, United States, the U.K. (as a leader of the western 
alliance and having special relationship with Ireland), Sweden (as a 
traditional European neutral), Burma (as an Afro-Asian non-aligned 
state), and Yugoslavia (as an eastern neutral, but also in the NAM). 
He also used a weighted system regarding similarities and 
d ' " 1 ' t ' , t ' b h' 307 'lSS'lm'l ar'l 'les 'In vo 'lng e aV'lour. No votes took place in the 
19th session because of disputes over funding, but the results for 
fourteen plenary sessions between 1956 and 1970, were as shown in 
Table 8.7. 
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Table 8.7 Calculated percentages of voting cooperation between 
Ireland and six selected countries 1956-1970 in 
plenary sessions 
Year Session No. of Votes U.S. U.K. Yugoslavia USSR Sweden Burma 
1956 11 45 92.2 83.3 48.9 40.0 83.3 67.8 
1957 12 35 68.6 64.3 77.1 68.6 84.3 75.7 
1958 13 33 71.2 51.5 75.8 60.6 90.9 89.4 
1959 14 54 55.6 46.2 73.1 72.2 74.1 78.7 
1960 15 102 76.0 70.1 56.9 51.5 90.7 71.6 
1961 16 76 97.4 86.4 42.1 30.3 84.2 52.0 
1962 17 45 90.0 85.6 40.0 33.3 88.9 64.4 
1963 18 28 80.4 76.8 67.9 41.1 92.9 67.9 
1965 20 41 82.9 81.7 57.3 52.2 90.2 72.0 
1966 21 52 86.5 80.8 51.0 48.1 85.6 58.7 
1967 22 39 76.9 71.7 48.7 57.7 73.1 55.1 
1968 23 51 84.3 80.4 52.0 39.2 79.4 60.8 
1969 24 44 73.9 73.9 60.2 62.5 80.7 70.5 
1970 25 66 75.8 73.5 62.8 50.0 89.4 78.8 
Source: Norman J.D. Macqueen, 'Irish Neutrality: the United Nations 
and the Peacekeeping Experience 1945-1969', D.Phil thesis, 
New University of Ulster, 1981, p.189. 
In only one year (1959), largely because of the China question, 
was there greater accord with the Soviets than the Americans, and in 
only three years was Soviet-Irish accord higher than Irish-British 
accord. The correlation with Sweden was "consistently high", with 
the figures for Burma and Yugoslavia being rather more mixed. 308 
Analysis of the First and Special Political Committees shows broadly 
the same pattern, namely an increase in support for 'the west' , 
although in the Fourth Committee this pattern is reversed. 309 
Macqueen's general conclusion is that "Irish neutrality at the United 
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Nations did not involve equidistant levels of support for each power 
bloc •.• Irish voting behaviour was more closely aligned to that of 
the western powers", although it also demonstrated the "consistently 
high degree of similarity with that of Sweden".310 
(vi) attitude to identity, nation-building, unity, stability and 
self-determination 
In 1966 Garr~tt FitzGerald complained that a European minister 
had recently asked him how he liked his new Opposition leader, 
Mr. Heath; the minister "was not aware that we had a separate 
Government. It had slipped his mind. So unconscious are people of 
the realities of our position".311 Identity and independence issues 
were still, therefore, a major concern. As late as 1969 FitzGerald 
was still drawing attention to the need "to give effect to our 
belief in the value of maintaining the national identity of this 
country - our belief ••• that Irish interests are best served by a 
separate, individual, Irish presence in the world" given the 
distinctiveness of Irish culture, way of life and values. The Irish 
wanted "to preserve that difference" because it was thought to be of 
312 
value to them and to the world. Identity was particularly 
important given the approach to the European Community, and was given 
added significance by the 1966 celebrations of the 50th anniversary 
of the 1916 Rising. The eruption of violence in Northern Ireland in 
1968-9 also had a crucial importance. 
For most of the period Northern Ireland and unity were not major 
issues. The question was periodically raised at the U.N., "particularly 
whenever the Irish experience of the evils of partition seemed relevant 
to the specific international problem then under discussion",313 but 
there was no return to 'sore thumb' approach. In the island itself, 
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the period 1956-1962 saw an IRA border campaign. More significantly 
Lemass became Taoiseach, and commenced his intervention on 
the question. Essentially he took a functionalist approach believing 
that economic cooperation could create a climate conducive to 
reunification. He also made a number of political gestures, such as 
visiting O'Neill, the NorthernIreland Prime Minister on 14 January 
1965. 314 A few months earlier Lemass had acknowledged that the 
government and parliament of Northern Ireland "exist with the support 
of the majority" in the area, "artificial though that area is". 315 
The Dail established a Committee on the Constitution in 1966 which 
reported in December 1967. It recommended that Article 3 be replaced 
libyan expression of the aspiration that the island be Ire-united in 
harmony and brotherly affection between all Irishmen I , and that the 
state's jurisdiction was limited to the twenty-six counties 'until 
the achievement of the nation's unity shall otherwise require "' 316 
Nothing came of this because of opposition within Fianna Fail, and 
after O'Neill returned Lemass ' visit, followed by O'Neill-Lynch visits, 
this approach was overtaken by events. 
This is not the place to detail the events relating to Northern 
Ireland during and after 1968-9, but some issues are particularly 
relevant. 317 One such was the question of whether the Irish 
Government would intervene to 'save ' the minority population or take 
the opportunity to use force to secure reunification. In September 
1969 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Patrick Hillery, told the U.N. 
General Assembly the Irish did not have, "nor do we now have, any 
wish to achieve it (reunification) by force".318 The Taoiseach in 
the 1 ate summer affirmed the government has "no intention of mounting 
an armed invasion of the Six Counties ••• use of force would not 
advance our long-term aim of a united Ireland. Nor will the Government 
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connive at unofficial armed activity " 319 In the spring of 1971 
the DaD formal1y approved an Opposition motion "That DaD Eireann 
formally rejects the use of force as an instrument to secure the unity 
f I 1 d ,,320 o re an •• • 
However, at critical moments in August 1969 this message was not 
so clear, and Opposition deputies had some grounds for arguing the 
"Government hinted at armed intervention".321 In addition, some 
backbenchers argued that if the Bogside had been attacked further 
there "would have been an invasion across the Donegal border to 
322 protect people". The situation was exacerbated by the Taoiseach's 
television statement that the Irish government would not stand (idly) 
by, and by the decisions to establish field hospitals and refugee 
323 
centres on the border. The Evening Press on 14 August carried 
the headline "Irish Troops Are on the Border", reporting "Very large 
forces and convoys are moving near the Border areas". It went on to 
say that the peopl e of the Bogside had their "eyes ••• turned chiefly 
to the Border only five miles away where they have heard Irish troops 
are building up", asking "But why don't they come?".324 
Five field hospitals and two refugee centres were immediately 
established, but the P.D.F. did not cross the Border. 325 What the 
troops were to do aroused some confusion since two explanations were 
given of the P.D.F.'s role. Initially ref~rence was made to the field 
hospitals and refugee centres and the need to defend them, but then it 
was argued that troops had been moved in anticipation of an Anglo-
Irish peace-keeping mission, the British having rejected a U.N. 
force. 326 The tension was heightened by the mobilization of about 
2,000 First and Second Line Reserves,327 and by dissension in the 
Cabinet over what to do, al though there is evidence that "the 
Government adopted a Contingency Plan for the defence of the threatened 
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population ••• and that this consisted of the disposition of small arms 
where they could most~eadily be made available to recognised 
representatives of those under attack ll • 328 This plan was adopted 
because of Army advice that there was no other effective help they 
could provide. Part of the dilemma was what to do in the so-called 
'doomsday situation' of a possible pogrom. A further complication 
is whether certain ministers attempted to smuggle arms and money 
unofficially to the beseiged population, or whether they acted legally 
and within the terms of the Contingency Plan. 
As the immediate crisis passed, this became a major issue 
b oo th dO 0 lOt 0 d t 0 1 f 0 0 t 329 r1ng1ng e 1sm1ssa, res1gna 10n an r1a 0 some m1n1S ers. 
Clear answers are not possible given contradictory evidence, but it 
seems as if whilst no invasion per se was planned, a contingency plan 
for helping Northern nationalists did exist and that may have 
involved some incursions if ultimately deemed necessary. The inter-
vention would be to 'save' the nationalist population, not to bring 
about unity which the Irish lacked the power to do. Unity remained 
1 t OtO 330 a ong- erm asp1ra 10n. These questions nearly brought down the 
Fianna Fail government and they continue to divide the party. It is 
significant, however, that the Army's own assessment stressed their 
weakness, al though some pol i ticians wished to go, in effect, to. "'''Ir, 
although a neutral state can hardly engage in war. 
The Northern issue has remained on the agenda. After 1968-9 
there has been a reaffirmation of the goal of unity, and initially a 
re-emphasis upon functional cooperation with suggestions, for 
1 f 0 0 t 0 01 331 examp e, 0 a J01n econom1C counC1 • Internment in 1971 and 
Bloody Sunday on 30 Janaury 1972 when Catholics were killed in Derry 
by the British Army,temporarily halted that process. After Bloody 
Sunday the Irish ambassador to London was withdrawn and the British 
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embassy in Dublin burnt. Some had fears that the Irish might "be in 
a war situation",332or have "to face the reality of the issue of peace 
or war".333 Certain1y certain speeches by Nei1 Blaney, one of the 
ministers dismissed in 1970, in 1972 suggested the ca11ing up of the 
"entire reserves" and for the Army to be "on the Border" although the 
crucial ambiguity as to what the army would do remained. 334 A Blaney 
supporter, Brennan, did suggest that if there were any more Derrys 
335 
the army should be sent "across the border". This did not happen. 
Conclusion 
In this period there was again no unambiguous, clarion assertion of 
neutrality and despite the rhetoric, Ireland maintained a distinct 
position vis-a-vis the nonaligned. Confusion persisted as to Ireland's 
position as is illustrated by an exchange between Corish and Lemass in 
1963. Corish was criticizing the government for preparing "to abandon 
our traditional policy of neutrality". Lemass interjected "will the 
Deputy define neutrality for me?". The exchange continued: 
Corish "Non-participation" 
Lemass "In what?" 
Corish "In military encounters - non-participation ••. we would not 
side with anybody ... Is that not what we mean by neutrality? 
Lemass then asked whether this included struggle of free world against 
Communism. 
Corish replied "Even the Hottentots know we are anti-Communist", to 
" 
which Lemass rejoined "In that case we are on one side and not neutral".336 
Increasingly it was argued that it was "owing to an accident of history" 
that Ireland was "independent, untied and neutral, in the accepted sense 
of the term, in the military sense of the term".337 This de-sanct-
ification and re-definition reflected the exigencies of the economic 
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situation and the consequent perceived need to join the European 
Community. Adherence to neutra1ity had become conditiona1 and 
transient, depending upon how the Community deve1oped. Any 1ingering 
1ong-term aspiration to it yie1ded in the commitment to the future 
deve10pment of the Community. More important than neutra1ity had 
become the maximisation of materia1 we11-being which the Community 
appeared to promise, whi1st membership a1so appeared to offer the 
chance to change the c1austrophic bi1atera1 re1ationship with Britain. 
In joining the Community, the Irish fina11y decided to put aside the 
austere idea1s and aspirations of de Va1era, and to seek comfort, at 
the expense of independence and neutra1ity. Moreover, they sti11 
remained unprepared to provide the necessary wherewitha1, or to pay 
the necessary opportunity costs, for a genuine1y independent and 
neutra1 stance. Neither neutra1 nor members of an a11iance. 
Ire1and's po1icy was again sui generis. 
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Chapter Nine Independence or Solidarity? 1973-1982 
The beginning of 1973 saw both entry into the European community1 
and, a few weeks later, the formation of a new Coalition government 
after sixteen years of Fianna Fail government. 2 In April 1973 the new 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Garret FitzGerald, held a 'Conference of 
Heads of Mission and other senior officials', telling the Dail in his 
first major policy speech on 9 May that it had been "essential ... to 
re-examine at this time existing general guidelines and formulate new 
ones for future foreign policy". This re-examination being necessitated 
by the movement "towards greater interdependence" in the world economy; 
"the evolving situation in Northern Ireland" and; "the accession to 
membership of the European Communities ,,3 That accession had also 
as "a consequence and corollary" involved Ireland, for a year already, 
in European Political Cooperation (EPC).4 A quantitative and 
qualitative change in the scope of Irish foreign policy had again 
occurred, and in November 1974 FitzGerald observed that it was "still 
perhaps not fully recognised in Ireland .•• the extent to which our 
membership of the EEC has brought us into a new and direct relationship 
with countries throughout the world between whom and ourselves until 
last year there was virtually no political or economic contact".5 
The decade after January 1973, the first ten years of Community 
membership, saw successive Irish governments trying to steer a path 
for Ireland in the changed and changing environment. It culminated 
in severe challenges to Irish policy-makers arising out of Anglo-Irish 
relations and attempts to ameliorate the Northern Ireland crisis; the 
plans for the development of the European Community and EPC and; the 
Falklands conflict of 1982. 6 All raised the question of whether after 
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sixty years of independence and ten years of Community membership, the 
basic principles of Irish security policy had been defined, established 
and agreed. 
(i) due diligence 
Throughout the postwar period the Irish had failed to meet the 
requirements of due diligence, and in the early 1970s some senior Irish 
army officers regarded the Irish defence effort as "criminally 
inadequate".7 A notable feature of the 1973-82 period, however, was 
the significant increase in the scale of that effort, as, for example, 
numbers in the P.D.F. became the highest in over twenty years. 
Table 9.1 Numbers of Officers and men in the Permanent Defence Force 
in each year 1973-1982 
Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Numbers 10,618 11,312 12,059 13,996 14,666 14,464 13,425 
Year 1980 1981 1982 
Numbers 13,383 14,282 14,983 
Sources: 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1978, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1981 -
Prl.9034), Table 234 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 
31 March, 1973-78', p.251. 
Uail Debates 334:780 (1982). 
Nonetheless there continued to be a shortfall compared to the 
Establishment figure of between ten and twenty percent during this 
period, although the relative shortfall was smaller than previously 
and was based on higher figures. 8 The reason for the increased effort 
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was clearly "the very important task" of "supporting the State and 
state institutions and in particular supporting the largely unarmed 
Garda Siochana in their Border duties".9 During the Coalition period 
in office, 1973-1977, it was accepted that the "main pre-occupation" 
was internal security, and when Donegan, Minister for Defence, spoke 
of the government's determination to provide adequate resources for 
defence, he specifically linked this to ensuring "not only that our 
democratic institutions are safeguarded but also that the conditions 
of security and internal stability ... are maintained".10 They had 
to deal with "subversion", with "a group of people who are saying that 
the State must be pulled down". The army had a role in this 
struggle. 11 Only the army and the police stood "between anarchy and 
democracy".12 In 1976 the Oireachtas, in fact, declared "that, 
arising out of the armed conflict now taking place in Northern Ireland, 
a national emergency exists affecting the vi tal interests of the State". 13 
The burdens this, and .aiding the civil power, imposed upon the 
P.D.F. were significant. 14 In the 1970s between two and three 
thousand members of the P.D.F. were "engaged in security duties in the 
Border area",15 and by 1982 the P.D.F. was providing 21,032 military 
parties for checkpoint duties and 11,244 parties for joint patrols with 
16 the Garda. They also had other "non-soldiering duties" in terms of 
assisting in the protection of explosives, vital installations and 
V.I.Ps, as well as participating in searches and prison guard duties, 
and bomb disposal. 17 In addition to aiding the civil power in this 
area, the P.D.F.was also concerned to 'show the flag' and demonstrate 
the authority of the government. Evidence of it being stretched is 
provided by the fact that for most of the period some members of the 
First Line Reserve and of Second Line Reserve (An Forsa Cosanta Aitiuil -
F.C.A.) were on full-time duty.18 
~ 
-,j/~-
Such was the strain that the government only acceded after very 
serious consideration to a request to contribute to United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF II) in the Middle East in the autumn of 1973. 
Donegan, the Minister for Defence, admitted that "security duties are 
heavy", that the army was "under-established" and that the "removal 
of 300 officers and men has a much greater effect on us than the 
proportion of 300 to 11,000 would seem to represent". At the time, 
moreover, some members of the P.D.F. were serving 100 hours per week 
(35 hours of which was in barracks waiting on a call out).19 The 
government only agreed, given their own difficulties, because they 
felt so few other countries were acceptable, so that there was "little 
alternative but to do what we could even if ••• puts our own domestic 
security under strain".20 
The strain apparently became too much with the Dublin and Monaghan 
bombings on 17 May 1974, which caused the government to seek "the 
temporary release of the Irish contingent" with UNEF 11.21 It was the 
"exceptional strain imposed on the forces at home at present on security 
duties (that) made this step necessarY",22 and which continued to limit 
the Irish contribution for a further three years.23 It was only in 
the spring of 1977 that it was decided "in principle" that a major 
contingent could again be made available,24 and in the summer of that 
year, a new Minister for Foreign Affairs, O'Kennedy, sought permission 
to allow 300 personnel to be mad2 available to the United Nations Force 
in Cyprus (UNICYP), telling the Dail that the governemnt was "satisfied 
that a contingent can be made available .•• given the increase in 
strength in recent years" of the P.D.F., which had increased by over 
25 three thousand between 1974 and 1977. 
The increase in strength ameliorated some of the difficulties of 
the P.D.F., but the strains upon it were so severe that in the aftermath 
. Ii 
'" ~ 
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of the May 1974 bombings, the Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave, floated the 
idea of "voluntary local security service units" based on Garda stations 
to patrol local areas, although prevarication later hit the scheme, so 
that whilst plans were drawn up for it, they were not implemented. 26 
The P.D.F., as noted, was helped by the Reserves, but the numbers in 
the First Line Reserve never topped a thousand, averaging nearer 600 
during this period,27 whilst the F.C.A. although nominally of the order 
of sixteen to twenty thousand, only had half of that number who did as 
much as 8-14 days annual training in addition to their weekly sessions. 28 
Indeed, in 1975 the Minister for Defence, Donegan, said he was 
"thoroughly dissatisfied with the present situation regarding the 
F.C.A.", given their fall-out rates and cost, as well as the 
difficulties in giving them adequate training. 29 This dissatisfaction, 
together with the problems of the enlarged P.D.F. resulting from an 
expansion of nearly forty percent between 1973 and 1977, led to a re-
think as to the organisation and structure of the Irish forces, which 
produced in September 1979, the first major re-organisation since 1959. 
The P.D.F. and F.C.A. were now to be separated into "combat and local 
defence forces respectively", which was, in effect, a return to the 
30 pre-1959 system. Incidentally, despite the strain on the defence 
forces, the idea of some form of compulsory military service continued 
to be ruled out as antipathic to the Irish tradition. 31 
As Table 9.2 shows the period 1973-1982 alsu saw an increase in 
the financial resources allocated to defence, although interestingly 
its share of total supply services was below that of earlier years. 32 
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Table 9.2 Irish Defence Expenditure Totals, and as percentage of 
total supply services and Gross National Product (GNP), 
1973-1982 
Year ended 31 March Apri1-December* 
1973 1974 1974 
Defence Expenditure (£m) 29.735 32.873 30.006 
% of Total Supply Services 4.76 4.37 4.37 
% of GNP 1.1 1.1 
Years ended 31 December 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Defence Expenditure (£m) 59.154 71.92 84.229 99.033 110.602 
% of Total Supply Services 4.71 4.77 4.75 4.49 4.17 
% of GNP 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 
1980 1981 1982 
Defence Expenditure (£m) 140.676 169.276 208.3 
% of Total Supply Services 4.15 3.90 3.8 
% of GNP 1.6 1.6 1.7 
*In 1974 the financial year was changed to end on 31 December. 
Sources: 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1978, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1981, 
Pr1.9034), Table 250 'Issues from the Exchequer for Supply Services', 
pp.266-7, and Table 238, 'Gross National Product at Current and Constant 
Market Prices, 1972-1978', p.257. 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1980, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1983, 
Pl.1618), Table 258 'Issues from the Exchequer for Supply Services' 
pp.286-7, and Table 246 'Gross National Product at Current and Constant 
Market Prices, 1974-1980' p.278. 
The Military Balance 1982-1983, (London, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1982) p.47. 
The Military Balance 1983-1984, (London, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1983) pp.45 and 126. 
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These increases were significant, however, and outstripped 
inflation, so that they were increases in real terms. Between 1975 
and 1980, for example, whilst the Consumer Price Index rose from 100 
(Base: Mid-November, 1975 = 100) to 197.7 (mid-November 1980), defence 
expenditure rose from £59.154m to £140.676m, an increase of 138%.33 
A problem was, however, that this extra effort was again related to 
internal security and Northern Ireland requir~ments. In 1980, the 
Minister of Finance calculated that in 1975 the costs incurred in 
extra security arising out of the Northern Ireland situation was £20m 
for the P.D.F., in 1979 £40m and in 1980 about £57m, namely between 
approximately 33 and 40% of total expenditure on the P.D.F. 34 A 
report to the New Ireland Forum in 1983, put the total extra costs 
on security arising from Northern Ireland in the years 1973-1982 as 
between 19.7 and 25.6% of total expenditure on security, including 
. d 1-' 35 P.D.F., prlsons an po lce. If this extra effort is discounted, 
the remaining effort, as a percentage of GNP, is of the traditional 
order of magnitude. 36 
The level of commitment continued to attract criticism, most 
significantly perhaps from Lieut.-General Carl O'Sullivan in September 
1982. O'Sullivan, who had been Chief of Staff of the P.D.F. between 
July 1976 and June 1981, was scathing about the inadequacies of the 
1969 period, when the P.D.F. had even lacked combat uniforms, and 
claimed that whilst now strong enough to cope with internal security, 
the country's defence forces were still in no position to maintain the 
country's neutrality in the face of external aggression. They could 
not, for example, counter a Soviet attack from the North Atlantic. 
In 1979 the P.D.F. had complied a review on what would be required to 
meet external aggression and maintain neutrality, a review which was 
influenced by O'Sullivan's trips to Sweden. The review concluded 
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that if Ireland wished to adopt a minimum deterrent posture to preserve 
its neutrality "around £500 mi1lion even at that time" would be needed 
to be spent immediately, "and even that would not have been enough to 
fight ••• protracted war ••• ". The £500 million would only have 
provided the basics, such as radar and planes, and perhaps six or 
seven days ammunition. In 1979 the defence expenditure was only 22% 
of the. £500 million, which was regarded only as a first step. 
O'Sullivan personally favoured neutrality, "but ••• if I was in the 
same position as Sweden".37 Throughout the 1973-1982 period Ireland 
was not in such a position, and some officers believed there was "no 
will to militarily defend the Irish stance".38 The enhanced resources 
had been used to confront internal security problems, and much of the 
effort could not be easily switched to meet external aggression. 
The Irish performance led some senior Irish politicians to 
acknowledge that it was "scarcely possible to argue" that the purpose 
of the P.D.F. was "to provide 100 percent security against aggression". 
John Kelly, when Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach, had gone 
on to argue that even states with greater resources than Ireland could 
not "guarantee to repel invaders .•• without the help of an alliance", 
an option the Irish had chosen not to adopt. 39 In opposition he 
went somewhat further, arguing that if the rest of the western world 
felt the need of, and was "already taking part in a defensive 
alliance, then self-respect, if nothing else, should require us to 
review our supposed policy of neutrality".40 This latter drew an 
immediate riposte from a Fine Gael colleague, Richie Ryan, who argued 
that the best contribution the irish could make to their own defence 
and to the defence of Europe was to defend the island against a 
conventional attack, and that "Nobody could do it better ll ,41 but Ryan 
attempted no detailed analysis of the relative strength of Ireland's 
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efforts as against putative belligerents, or as against the European 
neutrals, and it is difficult to ignore the professional O'Sullivan's 
judgement on Irish inadequacy. 
This judgement is all the more relevant, since "defending the 
State against external aggression" was still regarded as the "primary 
role" of the P.D.F., although the Minister for Defence who made that 
statement, Barrett in 1981, admitted that the "primary role often tends 
42 to be glossed over". In the key March 1981 debate on defence and 
neutrality, Barrett went on to list the other roles as aiding the 
civil power; participating ill U.N. peace-keeping missions; fishery 
protection; aiding civil defence and; general search, rescue and 
emergency service duties,43 although it was officially acknowledged 
that whilst "a secondary defence objective, Aid to the Civil Power 
has become a major part of the Defence Forces operational employment 
throughout the 19708 and the 1980s".44 It is noteworthy that whilst 
Barrett listed these roles, and spoke of the army as "the outward and 
practical manifestation of a nation's sovereignty and of its 
determination to maintain and protect that sovereignty", he made no 
explicit reference to the defence and upholding of neutrality. 
Indeed, in the key debate on neutrality, he preferred the formulation, 
of being determined "to resist attempts by any party to a conflict to 
usurp the State's non-belligerd~cy status in time of war. It 
behoves a State such as Ireland, which is not committed to co-belligerency, 
to take in peacetime such defensive measures as will safeguard its 
security in time of war".45 Unfortunately, the Irish did not take 
such measures to sufficient degree, as is exemplified by the equipment 
issue. 
Keegan and English have noted, for example, that whilst a few 
armoured vehicles had been developed and produced abroad, and a few 
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Naval Service vessels built, "Ireland cannot be said to have a defence 
industry in the accepted sense of the word and almost all items of 
equipment, including even small arms ammunition, must be imported", 
the principal suppliers being Britain, Sweden, France, Belgium and West 
46 Germany. As a senior Irish officer put it bluntly, "we do not even 
47 
make one bullett". It has been the policy to shop around for arms, 
.1 ooking for a combination of qual i ty, price and service_, without any 
'political acceptability' tests,48 but there have been prob.1ems in 
acquiring the weapons desired at the time desired. 49 Nonetheless, 
increased resources did lead to improvements in mobility and 
communication, with, for example, the purchase of armoured personnel 
carriers,50 but the purchase of four tanks could still cause excitement, 
whilst only in 1979 did the Artillery Corps move into the missile age. 51 
Only inmid-1980 was a 105mm light gun introduced, an event described 
in the Defence Forces Handbook as a "mUestone".52 Despite these 
improvements, significant equipment problems remained, for example, by 
the early 1980s the F.C.A's equipment was "largely out of date",53 and 
O'Sullivan clearly had reservations. 
One arm of the P.D.F. to be transformed was the Naval Service. 
Crucial in the transformation, however, was outside help in the form of 
a European Community grant to aid the Irish in bui.1ding up their Naval 
Service to police the EEC 200 m~le fisheries limit and the exclusive 
economic zone introduced in 1977, by which the Naval Service had 
136,000 square nautical miles to patrol instead of 15,000 square nautical 
miles as previously. This aid was crucial since even prior to that 
expansion the Coalition government was clear that the "provision of a 
naval force on a scale sufficient to patrol our length of coastline is 
beyond the financial capabilities of this country".54 However, the 
Community eventually agreed to contribute to Irish capital costs in 
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providing for patrolling the extended waters, and in July 1978 agreed 
to provide 46 million European units of account, or IR £31,173.00 for 
the period 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1982. 55 The Irish 
subsequently, in December 1978, submitted a programme totalling 
IR £60.5 million, the programme describing the need for six vessels 
(4 Deirdre class and 2he1icopter-bearing vessels) and five maritime 
. ft 56 alTcra • If completed, the programme would have added to the 
three minesweepers used for inshore patrols and the training ship 
Setanta, whereas in March 1977 the then Minister for Defence, Flanagan, 
had argued Ireland needed at least eighteen extra ships.57 In fact, 
whilst four Deirdre class vessels were acquired (Deirdre 1972, Emer 
1977,Aoife 1979 and Aisling 1979), the helicopter-vessels were delayed, 
the second being ultimately shelved, since they had, in effect, to be 
paid for by the Irish themselves. The armaments on the vessels, 
each of the Deirdre class having a Bofors 40mm gun on a powered mount, 
and two single Oerlikon guns, was of Irish choice and at their 
58 
expense. 
Despite the Community help, Faulkner, Minister for Defence, was 
quite clear in June 1980 that whilst the expansion had taken p1ace for 
fishery protection purposes, the vessels were "available to participate 
as required in other Naval Service functions" 59 The provision of 
Community money led inevitably to questions as to wh<}\er "this 
agreement might get us involved in a military a1liance?", to which the 
reply was "There is not the slightest danger of that", since the vessels 
would be under the Irish flag. 60 Nonetheless, in 1978 Flanagan, in 
opposition, asked about proposals for an "EEC navy", only to be told 
that no such proposals had been put to Ireland, although the Agriculture 
Committee of the European Parliament had made some recommendations along 
those lines. 61 
, 
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In spite of the increase, the Naval Service remained small for an 
island state, and it still faced problems of manpower, in 1982, for 
example, being 17% short of Establishment,62 although two years earlier, 
Faulkner, Minister for Defence, when asked directly whether there 
were enough men to man all the vessels in an emergency, had replied 
"Yes, just about enough ll • 63 It also had problems in detecting and 
prohibiting violations of Irish territorial waters, since as Taoiseach, 
Mr. Haughey was amazed to discover that Ireland could not flush out a 
Soviet submarine,64 whilst in 1982 the Minister for Defence, could not 
65 
say whether any had been detected. 
The Air Corps also benefited from the increased concern with 
fisheries protection,66 but other improvements were also made. The 
Vampires were replaced by Fouga Magister CM 170s in 1976, and in 1977 
10 Siai Marchetti SF260W Warriors rep1aced the Chipmuncks and Provosts. 
The Air Corps also possessed 9 hel icopters, including a sma11 provision 
for troop-carrying. Nonetheless, its capability was small with a 
'fighter squadron' of 6 Fouga Magister CM170s, and perhaps a dozen or 
so combat aircraft. 67 
The Irish, despite the increases, still failed to meet the criteria 
of due diligence. Indeed, speaking on behalf of Ireland to the First 
Committee of the U.N. General Assembly in 1982, Noel Dorr admitted "we 
are small, militarily insignificant ••• and have acknowledged our own 
vulnerability. Our armed forces are about the same size, and serve 
the same peacekeeping and other purposes, as those which every country 
would be allowed to maintain even in a disarmed world ll • 68 Such a 
state is, in the words of Clarke, "incapable of carrying out its 
obligations ll • 69 
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(ii) recognition of position by others 
In the full glare of publicity in March 1981 the Dail rejected the 
suggestion that it reaffirm "the principl e of the neutral i ty of Irel and in 
international affairs and declares that our foreign and defence 
policies will continue to be based on this principle". It also 
rejected the view that "in accordance with our traditional policy of 
neutrality", it needed "to establish without doubt the reality of 
neutrality and ••• resolve to seek membership of the Non-Aligned Nations 
of the world", in order to strengthen the forces of peace. 70 The 
government majority rejected these notions on the argument that 
"Political neutrality or non-alignment is incompatible with ••• member-
ship of the European Community, and with our interests and our ideas 
••• ",71 although in winding-up the debate, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Brian Lenihan, declared "We are neutral in a military sense, 
but we are not neutral in a political sense. That is the net position".72 
The Dail also rejected an amendment confirming "that a defence pact 
with the United Kingdom has not been mentioned in the current 
discussions with the U.K. Government and that it is not part of the 
joint studies now under way".73 
It was doubts on this queston that led to the debate, the doubts 
arising from the 8 December 1980 Haughey-Thatcher me~ting which agreed 
to give "special consideration" to "the totality of relationships 
within these islands. For this purpose they have commissioned joint 
studies covering a range of issues ••• including ••• security matters 
" 74 Press speculation in both Britain and Ireland suggested that 
defence had been raised by Haughey himself, although in the D~il he 
initially refused to answer whether joint defence arrangements were 
under discussion on the grounds of confidentiality.75 On the other 
hand, Humphrey Atkins, the British Secretary of State for Northern 
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Ireland, in February 1981 had said defence was "something, no doubt, 
that can be talked about".76 It was only in the March debate that 
Haughey stated "unequivoca11y that the Government are not discussing 
or negotiating any kind of secret agreement on defence with Britain 
or with any other country or group of countries",77 although the 
Opposition wondered as to "the significance of the word 'secret' 
The furore was significant, since some perceived that Irish 
" 78 
neutrality was "now at an end", that "there was not a willingness on 
the part of Ireland to maintain her neutral position in future" 79 
Moreover, a full diplomatic gallery heard the explicit rejection of an 
affirmation of either neutrality or non-alignment, and instead 
acceptance of an anodyne motion that "Dail Eireann confirms the 
principles which have guided the defence policy of the Government and 
their predecessors".80 This despite the fact that as previous 
chapters have shown, and FitzGerald as Opposition Leader pointed out, 
"there is no set of common principles that have guided ••• defence 
policy " 81 In the early 1980s the Dail also failed to act on the 
1980 Labour Party Conference decision that "neutrality ... be affirmed 
permanently by amendment of the national Constitution", although Labour 
was in Coalition government for much of the time. 82 
At this time, further doubts were raised about the Irish position 
and perce_ ~ions of it arising out of the Irish response to the 
Genscher/Colombo proposals for formal ising and expanding E.P.C. 83 
Whilst this will be dealt with more fully below, under variable (iv),84 
it is noteworthy that the Irish stance in mid-1981 caused at least one 
leading European figure, Piet Dankert, to query whether Irish policy 
on neutrality remained the same. 85 Confusion persisted over the 
summer as to what Ireland had agreed or would accept, and the position 
was only partially restored by the London Report of October 1981,86 and 
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Lord Carrington's explanation, as President-in-Office of the Community, 
that it was of particular interest to Ireland, "because they are not 
members of NATO, they are neutral" and that what had been agreed was 
"certainly not going to impinge on defence or embarrass the Irish".87 
The Irish position was also weakened by the continuing failure 
to be directly involved in the Non-Aligned Moveme~t, although private 
consideration was given to attending the New Delhi summit as a 
'Guest' ,88 and the public repudiation of membership in March 1981. 
When asked whether the lack of any invitation to attend the Movement's 
conference meant that most of the non-aligned felt "we are not non-
aligned .•• ", the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lenihan, did not 
answer directly, but argued there was "a difference between non-
alignment and neutrality", and Ireland happened to be one of the 
countries "genuinely totally committed to neutrality".89 
The Irish regarded the Non-Aligned Movement as "diffuse",90 and 
felt "many countries within the non-a1igned movement ••• perhaps are 
less nonaligned ••• than we are ••• membership or otherwise of this 
movement is not in any way a comment on the consistency of the foreign 
policy being pursued".91 Many members of the movement were in any 
case "very heavy users of ••• mil i tary hardware". 92 The Irish 
preferred to be "objective", to avoid "group membership", so as to 
avoid "constraining" themsel ve. } 93 al though, at times, they tried to 
establish close contacts with states such as Yugoslavia. 94 
Ireland a1so remained outside the Neutral and Non-aligned group 
(N.N.A.) at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.) 
meetings. Indeed, prior to the Madrid review conference it was made 
clear that a "major part of our preparatory work is being carried out 
jointly with our partners in the European Community", since it was felt 
"a joint approach" was "likely to carry more weight than proposals with 
, 
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a single sponsor".95 WhU st Ireland had "working contacts with ••• 
other groups" it did "not participate in their meetings".96 Nonetheless, 
at times the close Community/NATO relationship created an impression in 
some third party minds that Ireland was involved in the NATO caucus. 97 
The Irish, on the contrary, have argued that their "special position" 
was recognised, for example, by Genscher,the German Foreign Minister, 
asking them to "make the necessary contacts with other countries 
outside NATO ••• in an attempt to get talks going" 98 
Nonetheless, in general, the Irish fell foul of the fact that 
ties binding a state to others are often barriers separating them from 
others, that membership in one group implies non-membership in others. 99 
Interestingly, a survey on neutrality and nonalignment taken among 
Arab League and Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) members, for 
example, found that "not a single state which responded regarded 
Ireland as either 'neutral' or 'nonaligned,,,.100 
At the U.N. Ireland continued to distance itself from the non-
a1igned in a number of votes. It refused "to support guerilla 
activities,,101 and "unsubstantiated allegations" against friendly 
countries, as well as opposing the increasing tendency to introduce 
into resolutions on principles, matters which they found offensive, 
f 1 f t Z · .. 1 t' . 102 or ex amp e, re erences 0 10n1sm 1n reso u 10ns on raC1sm. On 
the other hand, at the same time, Ireland was voting with an a1ternative 
group, and member states of the Community were "increasing1y viewed by 
third countries as a coherent force in internationa1 relations", Ireland 
increasing1y being "regarded as a Community state" and "identified with 
the Community caucus in international conferences" .103 Keatinge agrees 
that Community states "clearly form an important diplomatic 'bloc''',104 
whilst the biannua1 Developments in the European Communities reports of 
the Irish government are rep1ete with references to the Community states 
-392-
adopting "common positions",105 achieving "coordination of their position" 
or having found it "possibl e. to harmonise successful] y the various 
attitudes", leading to pursuing "on agreed policY",106 or, on occasion 
"a common foreign pOlicy".107 
Ireland has self-confessedly, as O'Kennedy told the General Assembly, 
been "one of the 'Nine''',108 this being perhaps most·pronounced when the 
Irish have held the Presidency of the Community. In 1979, for example, 
O'Kennedy spoke to the U.N. General Assembly, "On behalf of .the European 
Community and its nine member states and as Foreign Minister of Ireland" 
and his speech was full of references to "we", and "the Nine", and only 
towards the end did O'Kennedy say, "I should now 1 ike as Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Ireland to touch on a number of issues of particular 
concern to us in Ireland".109 As President, the Irish were responsible 
for almost daily coordination of the Community states' position, for 
"negotiating on behalf of the Community with other regional groups ••• 
speaking on behalf of the Community ... and ••• delivering explanations 
f t " 110 o vo e •••• 
Ireland clearly "does not today act in isolation. We face the 
world in partnership within the European Community", seeking "together" 
111 
to resolve common problems. This reached a certain apogee perhaps 
in the "concerted action" taken with regard to sanctions against Iran 
in 1980, and the similar action over Poland, Afghanistan and the Middle 
East. 1l2 On Iran it was made quite clear that it was the Foreign 
Ministers of the Community who "deGided to take certain measures", 
that Ireland "acted in conjunct.oron with our Community partners", and 
that "as one of the nine partners", it "could not stand apart", although 
as will be seen it did just that in 1982. 113 Irish governments 
themselves have admitted the Comm~nity "is increasing1y regarded by the 
externa1 wor1d as a coherent entity in wor1d affairs",l14 
, 
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On the other hand, the record of Community states on E.P.C. is at 
best "mixed" and there is no really common foreign policy.115 Whilst 
"a pattern of solidarity has been reached, it is by no means complete 
or wholly predictable", and there is evidence that the Irish have 
"consistently maintained their freedom of manoeuvre".116 Certainly, 
on occasion the Irish have deviated from the Community 'norm', and in 
1975-1977 period they were amongst the "minority voting group" of 
Community states most often. 117 Foot writing in 1979 claimed her 
analysis tended "to reduce the credibility of the claim that the 
Community has become recognised as a united political force at the 
U.N.", and that the issues they disagreed upon were "the major ones",118 
although increasingly rarely was "the Community sp1it for or against a 
resolution".119 The Irish divergences occurred mostly on issues 
regarded as important before "involvement in E.P.C., namely, support 
for the process of deco 1 on is at ion and se1f-determination and advocacy 
of effective measures of arms control and disarmament",120 as we]] as 
Southern Africa and Third Wor1d issues general]y.121 
Irish officials, therefore, argue that whilst "aligned" they have 
not lost "independence on voting or action" and that third parties, 
especially the Third World, look at Irish U.N. behaviour and perceive 
that it is different from other Community states on these issues. 122 
Irish ministers have asserted their continuing ability "to act in 
isolation if we so wish,,123 and to speak "in a reasonably independent 
and disinterested manner".124 Moreover, officials observe that 
whilst the Community Presidency may "heighten the profile of the 
country ... 'deviant' voting behaviour •.• also serves to heighten 
Ireland's profile and increase the impact of its vote " 125 They 
also point to the election to the Security Council in 1980 as 
recognition of Ireland's position,126 and to the continuing acceptability 
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of Ire1and for U.N. peace-keeping missions. The request for Irish 
participation in U .N.E.F. II in 1973, for examp1e, was regarded as 
"a recognition of our impartial i ty and independent and constructive 
attitude,,~27 and more generally that the "fact that we are not members 
of any military alliance certain1y enables us to playa role" in 
peace-keeping,128 although as demonstrated in the previous chapter it 
did not necessari1y represent an imprimatur of the Irish position. 129 
Perhaps the most distinctive Irish action in heightening its 
profile was its refusa1 to continue to participate in Community 
sanctions against Argentina after the sinking of the Genera1 Belgrano. 
On 2 May 1982 the Irish government announced their anxiety to "re-
affirm Ireland's traditional role of neutrality in relation to armed 
conf1icts",130 with as Keatinge has noted the resort to neutrality 
making "Irish neutrality a diplomatic issue, not for some ill-defined 
future but for the present ••• it exposed the Irish position on 
avoidance of collective defence to a much greater extent than 
hitherto ,,131 
. .. . Ireland also heightened its profile by seeking an 
"immediate" meeting of the Security Council on 4 May, and in attempting 
to use its Security Council membership to ameliorate the situation, 
but in a way which, like sanctions, distanced it from Britain. 132 
These actions in 1982 fol'~wed earlier attempts to self-consciously 
distinguish the Irish position from that of Britain. This was partly 
done by emphasising Ireland's initial communautaire approach to the 
Community, and also by the distinctive policy in 1974-5 of trying to 
remain a member, whatever Britain did. FitzGerald, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, was clear that this led others "to see Irish 
membership in a different light to hitherto", breaking the perceived 
1 · k' .. h d . h b h' 133 ~n ~n Br~t~s an Ir~s mem ers ~p. This severed link was 
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reinforced by Irish participation in the European Monetary System 
(E.M.S.) in 1979, whilst Britain stayed aloof, and the consequential 
breaking of the link with sterling. 
The distinctiveness of the Irish position in the Community and 
E.P.C. was given added emphasis by the Irish insistence upon the 
distinction between defence and security in the discussions following 
the Genscher/Colombo proposals, with ultimately both the London Report 
of 1981 and Lord Carrington recognizing Ireland's special position, 
specifically by the reference in the London Report to "the different 
situations of the member states" and the agreement "to maintain the 
f1exible and pragmatic approach" to E.P.C., which had a]]owed 
discussion of "the political aspects of security".134 FitzGerald 
as Taoiseach saw this as explicit recognition of the Irish position 
in its reference to differing situations among the member states; in 
maintaining and not expanding E.P.C. and; in limiting discussions to 
the political aspects of security.135 It continued to be argued 
that there was "no necessity" to make clear the Irish intention to 
stay outside military pacts to Community partners since it was not an 
. h db' d 136 ~ssue and a never een ra~se • This, in itself, is perhaps a 
comment on the perception by others of Ireland. 
Indirect evidence that the Soviets were aware \.-'.c' the Irish 
position, at least theoretically, may be found in the Pravda attacks 
upon those whom it regarded as trying to undermine Irish neutrality,137 
Soviet-Irish relations were transformed in 1973 by the signing of a 
joint communique in New York on 29 September announcing the decision 
to exchange diplomatic missions at embassy level. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the communique made no reference to Irish neutrality,138 
although Marcus Wheeler has argued that one of the Soviet motivations 
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was "the wish to be seen to enjoy normal relations with a small, but 
increasingly internationally respected neutral state", but no evidence 
, th' 139 ~s produced to support ~s. Following this a trade agreement was 
signed and FitzGerald visited the Soviet Union in 1976. 140 More 
generally too, in this period the Soviet view of the European Community 
became a little more relaxed, and whilst it continued to refuse to 
establish diplomatic relations with the Community, it did enter 
negotiations with it over fisheries, whilst between 1977 and 1980 
negotiations also took place between the Community and the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance, although no agreement was reached. 141 
The development of relations with the Soviet Union was only part 
of a rapid expansion of Irish diplomatic relations in 1973-1977. In 
that period Ireland virtually doubled its diplomatic relations, although 
in marked contrast to the pre-1973 period, many were now 'Non-resident' 
" 142 
m~SSlons. Whil~t trade was important, and the growing participation 
in the world, it was the "European Community which provided the impetus", 
especially the prospect of holding the Presidency.143 FitzGerald, 
however, had recognised in May 1973 that Irish policy could "be limited 
by the range of our existing diplomatic representation" which was 
predominantly orientated towards Western Europe and North America. 
He recognised that an active Irish role required "a greater range of 
contac""''' 144 
-> • Nonetheless, ten years later, Keatinge still felt Irish 
diplomatic relations looked "thinly spread", and that Ireland traDed 
behind its Community partners (except Luxembourg).145 Interestingly, 
where no Irish mission existed, Irish citizens in trouble were still 
advised to contact the British embassy. 
In the 1973-1982 period third parties must have found it difficult 
to determine the real nature of Irish policy given the convolutions, 
particularly of the 1980-1982 period. 
t 
~ 
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(iii) disavowal of help 
The inadequacies of Irish 'due diligence', moreover, had led to a 
"conventional external view" that "implicitly Ireland relies upon the 
armed forces of the West for its security, and thus maintains armed 
forces totally inadequate for effective self_defence",146 that "Irish 
neutrality is ••• an illusion and something of a pious fraud indulged 
in under the impl ici t security of the NATO umbre11a" .147 Whilst some 
in Ireland have recognised that "neutrality was incompatible with the 
incidental protection of a NATO umbrella",148 a recent Minister for 
Defence, Patrick Cooney, argued in 1983 that the Irish could 
"confidently rely on (the Western bloc) to protect our territory 
should any state or combination of states hostile to the Western 
world threaten it".149 More generally, the official position was 
that Ireland would "protect and defend" itself,150 albeit within the 
1imits of its-resources,151 although even some who took this view 
actua1ly had to countenance that in certain circumstances "the best 
we could hope for would be to defend and hold an area which would 
allow us to hold out for third party assistance ••• ".152 
Despite this, at 1east until 1980, no forma1 arrangements for 
joint defence were considered or made, and no proposal was made or 
received concerning membership of NATO, or any military alliance. 153 
In 1980-81 this was called tnto question by both the Anglo-Irish 
talks and the Genscher/Colombo discussions, but these will be dealt 
with under the next variable (iv),154and no concrete arrangements for 
help in any case emerged. Whatever of formal alliance, the Irish 
continued to maintain close ties with several states on defence 
matters and in the years 1974-76, for example, 170 personnel went on 
86 courses abroad in Britain, United States, France, Luxembourg, 
Ho11and, Italy and sweden,155 whilst some senior officers were frequent 
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visitors to Aldershott and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as, 
in 1978-1979, to Sweden to examine Swedish defence. 156 A key factor 
promoting the British link was language. 
Other forms of cooperation also took place, most notably in the 
four-way relationship between the Irish Army, Garda Siochana, Royal 
Ulster Constabulary and the British Army. Whilst the P.D.F., "restricted 
as it is to aiding the civil power, was not able to talk directly with 
the R.U.C. or the British Army", a "four-way link-up across the border" 
developed as communications improved, and cross-border cooperation was 
157 generally close. This, however, was not formalised in the 1973-
1982 period and did not amount to an alliance,158 and neither did the 
Community contribution to building-up the Irish Naval Service. 159 
Clearly, however, certain aspects of the relationship with Britain 
remained close. 
(iv) freedom of decision and action 
The Irish have appreciated that the prospect of autonomy of action 
stems partly from having one's eggs in different baskets and in 
avoiding over-dependency,160 and in the post-1973 period a striking 
feature of the Irish economy has been the "very marked pattern of 
export diversification" as the "trend towards a diminished 
concentration on the U.K. market, which had been evident in the decade 
preceding membership, continued".161 The U.K's share of the Irish 
export market dropped from 54.7% in 1973 to 38.8% in 1982, as can be 
seen from Table 9.3, although the import dependence upon the U.K. 
appeared relatively static. 
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Table 9.3 Trade by areas as a percentage of tota1 imports and 
exports, 1973, 1977 and 1982 
% Imports from 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
Rest of EEC 
EFTA 
Do1lar Countries* 
Eastern Europe* 
% Exports to 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
Rest of EEC 
EFTA 
Do1lar Countries* 
Eastern Europe* 
1973 
50.7 
21 
5.9 
8 
L1 
54.7 
21.3 
2.7 
11 
,,1 
1977 
48.2 
19.9 
4.3 
10 
2 
47 
29.2 
3.1 
7.5 
0.7 
* Figures for these areas reflect orders of magnitude on1y. 
Sources: Derived from 
1982 
48.0 
21.8 
4.5 
14.1 
1.3 
38.8 
31.8 
4.2 
8.4 
0.8 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1972-73, (Prl.4053) (Dublin, Stationery 
Office, 1976), Table 121(a), 'Trade by Areas' p.161, Table 114, 'Value 
of Imports from each of the Principal Countries' p.154 and Table 115, 
'Value of Total Exports consigned to each of the Principal Countries, 
p.154. 
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1978, (Prl.9034) (Dublin, Stationery 
Office, 1981), Table 129, 'Trade by Areas' p.170, Table 131, 'Va1ue of 
Imports from each of the Principal Countries' p.188 and Table 132, 
'Value of Exports consigned to each of the Principal Countries', p.188. 
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Trade Statistics of Ireland, December 1982, (Dublin, Central Statistics 
Office, 1983) Table 7B 'Percentage Trade by Area', p.11. 
The import figures conceal a shift from U.K. manufactured goods to 
, t' f 't 162 d t f 1ncreased propor 10n 0 energy requ1remen s, an en years a ter 
entering the Community, the Irish economy remained "heavily trade-
dependent essential supplies of materials and fuels" needing to be 
imported, and with exports and imports constituting "over 120 percent 
of Irish Gross Domestic Product (GDP) , a figure twice the EEC average" 
, t' , d 163 1n h1s per10 . Moreover, the Community states, including Britain, 
retaineda preponderant position in Irish trade, with indeed Irish 
external trade being conducted within the framework of the Common External 
Tariff (CET) and the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of the Community.164 
Despite the diversification, a significant dependence upon the U.K. 
remained. Nevertheless, in December 1974 FitzGerald felt able to speak 
of the "new rel ationship" wi th Britain in the new "mul til ateral context" 
and of the "considerable effect" of this and of the reduced economic 
dependence upon Britain, "not just economically but pol i tically and 
l)sychological1y" .165 
Evidence of this was demonstrated in the broad consensus in 1974-
1975 that Ireland should seek to stay in the Community, even if 
Britain withdrew, a stark contrast to the pre-entry attitudes. 166 It 
was acknowledged British withdrawal "would pose some problems lt ,167 but 
the Irish felt they should stay "as a matter of principle and economic 
advantage" as well as because of "political obligation".168 Similarly, 
in 1978-1979 the Irish, albeit somewhat hesitantly, agreed to participate 
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in the European Monetary System (EMS), although Britain did not. The 
problems involved the link with sterling, the trade relationship with 
Britain, the common currency on the island, and the genera1 levels of 
Irish economic development. However, "the Irish were offered 
substantial inducements, in the form of so-called 'resource transfers', 
to join the EMS", and those eased the decision, although it was still 
difficult. 169 Ireland joined the EMS at its commencement, and "on 
30 March 1979, .•• adherence to the EMS intervention limits forced the 
Central Bank of Ireland to fix the value of the Irish pound below that 
of sterling", breaking the link of 150 years. 170 The Irish, 
fundamentally, preferring multilateral to bilateral constraint. 
In 1978 O'Kennedy acknowledged a series of constraints faced Irish 
policy-makers, recognising that they produced a "framework" which 
created "the limits within which we must determine our policies and 
our atti tudes", al though he remained adamant that neither the "present 
situation nor ••• past choices can wholly determine what our future 
will be", and that there were still choices to be made. 171 One such 
was the question of alliance membership. 
In May 1973 FitzGerald made clear that the Irish attitude remained 
"one of not wishing to become involved in any pre-existing defence 
organisation such as NATO or WED", and that vhey desired "to make more 
explicit distinction between a possible independent European 
defence body in the more distant future" and existing-alliances. 
Ireland did not wish the Community to become "a power bloc", nor to 
"evolve as an element of NATO". Instead it should evolve 
independently. 172 When specifically asked what the difference was 
between NATO and a future European arrangement, FitzGerald resorted to a 
reference to the origins of NATO and its "balancing function" in a 
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divided Europe, and then claimed that "European defence is quite ••• 
different", since it would arise out of a European federation, which 
naturally would wish to defend itself. He clearly saw, however, that 
this was not likely in the forseeable future. 173 Irish governments 
continued to give undertakings not to consider joining NATO, and in 
February 1981 resurrected the argument "that we were not able, and are 
still not able" to join NATO, "because of its implications for the Six 
County area situation".174 
It also became routine to assert that joining "the EEC did not 
entail any military or defence obligations for Ireland. The Community 
have not got a common defence pol icy" .175 This was made somewhat 
problematical, however, by Fianna Fail governments continuing to 
accept that "in the event of political developments occurring in 
Europe and in the event of a situation arising ••• (where) the 
Community of which we were a member were under attack, then obviously 
we would face our obligations".176 However, even Fianna Fail were 
conditional in their commitment, predicating it upon "full political 
union",177 and arguing that "defence arrangements within the Community 
would have to be consequent upon and following upon the achievement 
of an acceptable political union",178 although they occasionally 
caused trouble for themselves by reiterating _ynch's statement of July 
1969 that they were interested in the defence of Community territories, 
with the doubt as to whether this implied at the moment or in the 
future. 179 Dooge, as Coalition Foreign Minister, in December 1981 
when asked specifically whether Ireland was under any current obligation 
to defend a Community partner was clear that "Ireland is under no such 
obligation", and did "not feel committed to act" in such a way.180 
All were happier talking of the future, with Haughey in 1981 suggesting 
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that the question of Ireland and Community defence could be opened, 
"when full economic and monetary union has been achieved, and when 
Ireland's per capita income is at least 80 percent of the Community 
average and rising, instead of 61 percent as it is today ,,181 
Not surprisingly the Irish were somewhat disconcerted in 
November 1981 to see the proposed British, French, Italian and Dutch 
contribution of a peace-keeping force in Sinai described "as a 
European, or EEC contingent", and represented as "The EEC's first-
'1' t d"" 182 ever m~ ~ ary ec~s~on. The Irish were insistent it was no such 
thing, but only "a decision of those four countries" and all that the 
EPC members had done was to confirm that such a force "was entirely 
compatible with the Community policy which had been declared at 
V ' ,,183 en~ce • However, the period 1980-1982 saw more substantial 
challenges to Irish attitudes. 
In May 1980 it was reported by the Sunday Times that Mr. Haughey 
was to present Mrs. Thatcher with a "package of proposals aimed at 
transforming the Northern Ireland problem" and that the package 
included "Anglo-Irish cooperation on defence to ease British qualms 
about Ireland's traditional neutrality".184 No such suggestion 
appeared in the communique,185 but Haughey subsequently refused in 
the Dail to explici .y reject the possibility of a deal over defence, 
although he flatly rejected the suggestion of a return to the 
186 Commonwealth. At the end of the year doubts re-surfaced given 
the 8 December agreement to examine "the tota1ity of relationships", 
including "security matters",187 and with Lenihan, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, saying that "everything was on the table".188 Early in 1981, 
the Daily Telegraph cl aimed that the Irish were reviewing neutrality and 
considering offering a bilateral defence agreement in return for 
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concessions over Northern Ireland, al though apparently NATO membership 
was still ruled out. It claimed "Mr. Haughey is known to have 
discussed" these questions, and was influenced by the realization 
"that sooner or 1 ater they will have to abandon the stance of 
neutrality" given European developments. 189 Even Sile de Valera 
(Eamon de Valera's grand-daughter) appeared ready to countenance such 
a deal. 190 
In March 1981, however, Mrs. Thatcher ruled out a bilateral 
defence treaty,191 and on 11 March 1981 Haughey denied "unequivocally" 
that any secret arrangement was being discussed with anyone, although 
he did say that when "a satisfactory political solution is arrived 
at, we would of course have to review what would be the most 
appropriate defence arrangements for the island as a whole".192 The 
Irish Times noted that the eventual possibility of a pact had not been 
ruled out, and that there was little doubt the matter had been raised, 
but that clearly Haughey had had second thoughts. 193 It is difficult 
to be definite about what occurred, but it is clear that at least 
some in Dublin recognised that a deal with Britain over Northern 
Ireland could not avoid defence. 194 
If the old issue of a deal with Britain could cause difficulty, 
so too periodically q' i the new relationship with the Community, 
although despite some initial fears that EPC might be "the thin end _ 
of the wedge", Ireland settled into it "fairly comfortably", finding 
it "very tolerant" and allowing "genuine diversity". Officials claim 
that Ireland's "special position" was accepted, and that there was no 
case of "8 NATO v. Ireland", the division being more likely to be 
"big v. small".195 Ireland appreciated the "non-institutionalised, 
intergovernmental" nature of EPC and that it operated "pragmatically 
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196 
and by consensus", It denied that EPC could be equated with a 
common foreign policy, on the grounds that it lacked instruments and 
an internal union, as well as being limited by the need for consensus 
and the historical divergencies,197 
Nonetheless, it was the framework within which Irish policy-
makers worked and it has occasionally been regarded as exhibiting a 
tendency towards "groupthink,,198 as the participants develop a 
"European ref1 ex" from the habit of consultation, a110wing them to see 
the "collective dimension" of issues, and making it "normal"to search 
199 
"for consensus", It may also be argued that "the various 
collective actions of the Ten '" gradually constitute a policy line 
from which it is difficult to depart",200 and that as the London Report 
of 1981 put it, political cooperation became Ila central element in the 
foreign policies of all member states",201 
The Irish, then, found a certain "in-built pressure towards 
202 ,203 
consensus" and the need for "glve and take", It was accepted 
that the question of balancing an independent role and the EPC role 
was "difficult", and that there was a "certain dilution of capacity 
to act completely independentlY",204 it being necessary to "accept 
a compromise on some issues about which we feel concern", The Irish 
accepted "a serious commitment to try and reach a common positlon" 
but also argued that the obligation, "though binding in the sense that 
we have committed ourselves to co-ordinate our policies, is not 
absolute since we are not obliged to reach agreement",205 EPC, 
however, was regarded as "not so much a constraint '" as an opportunity,,~06 
since a small country could not decisively influence events "by its own 
actions ll ,207 whereas the Community states acting together "carry much 
greater weight than anything which a small nation like ours could 
h ' "l t' II 208 ac leve ln lS0 a 10n , Some officials believed, indeed, that 
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Ireland now had a greater importance than when it was "free_f1oating".209 
Nonetheless, when "fundamental interests" were at stake, Ireland 
managed to pursue an "independent role",210 still being "free to act 
in isolation if ... wish(ed)",211 and still being able to speak and 
act "in a reasonably independent and disinterested manner".212 As 
has been seen, Ireland was prepared to take a minority view, and even 
stand alone apart from its EPC partners on a number of issues,213 
although it can be argued that "its stand on particular issues has 
altered. Rather than adopting a 'yes' or 'no' vote, Ireland may now 
opt to abstain".214 
More generally, Ireland adhered "quite closely,,215 to the 
predominant EPC view on a range of issues such as CSCE, Poland, 
Afghanistan, the southern enlargement, the Euro-Arab dialogue, and 
generally on the Middle East, despite reservations about putative 
parallels between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the 
IRA. Generally, Ireland acted as a part of the Community. 
In acting in the world, many of Ireland's policies were touched 
upon and constrained by the Community treaties. Given the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP), for example, Ireland was no longer free to 
conclude bilateral trade agreements with non-member countries, although 
like other CommllT)ity states it had retained "some independence of 
action" outside CCP by the conclusion of cooperation agreements. 216 
Lome I and II straddled treaty and non-treaty areas and also 
constrained Irish policy. Both agreements were concluded under the 
Irish Presidency, and the Irish claimed a role in their successful 
conclusion. In addition, both the Common Agricultural Policy and 
Common Fisheries Policy, amongst other policies, had external impacts, 
and contributed to Ireland's interactions with the world being heavily 
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influenced by the Community, and reinforced the notion of Ireland as 
part of the Community. 
Ireland, certainly until 1982, also showed it was one of the 
Community by taking part in sanctions with its partners. Whi1st the 
sanctions agreed were largely "minimal and informal",217 they 
were evidence of commonality and solidarity. They were imposed against 
Iran; albeit on "an almost inter-governmental pattern", although there 
C . . . 1 t 218 was some omm1SS10n 1nvo vemen • Moreover, Lenihan in introducing 
the measures was clear that they followed a decision of the Nine, and 
that Ireland was acting "in conjunction with ••. (its) Community 
partners", that as "one of the nine partners", it "could not stand 
apart".219 In addition, collective action was taken against the 
Soviet Union over Afghanistan and Poland, in the first case utilising 
CAP regulations and in the second invoking CCP. Interestingly, 
whilst the Greeks, for political reasons, made an economic case to 
opt out of the latter sanctions,220 the Irish did not argue any 
special case with respect to 'neutrality'. The question of sanctions 
and Community solidarity took a different turn in 1982. 
The Irish condemned at the outset the Argentinian invasion of the 
Falkland Islands and supported the British inspired Resolution 502 in 
the Security Council. The Irish fel~ the Argentinians had flouted 
U.N. authority by ignoring the 1 April Security Council call for non-
use of force, and they also opposed the use of force and the general 
221 
challenge to the rule of law. Subsequently, however, a certain 
tension arose between a concern for freedom of action, neutrality and 
the desire to utilise their Security Council position, and the British 
effort to secure Community support and solidarity.222 
After initial hesitations concerning the efficacy of sanctions,223 
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on 10, April the Irish announced they would support them "in the 
interests of EEC solidaritY",224 subsequently explaining that it had 
been hoped sanctions would complement other measures, rendering 
"unnecessary further mil i tary action". 225 In mid-April, the Department 
of Foreign Affairs was adamant that the acceptance of sanctions had "no 
implications whatsoever for Ireland's neutralitY",226 and on 16 April 
Ireland supported Council Regulation (EEC) No.877/82 "suspending imports 
of a11 products originating in Argentina" until 17 May 1982. 227 
The Preamble to the Regulation referred to discussions "in the 
context of European political cooperation", to consultations under 
Article 224, a proposal from the Commission, and "in particular 
Article 113" of the EEC Treaty. Interestingly, both EPC and Article 
224 involve consultations between member states and the Irish could 
not have been compelled to take action, in the form of sanctions, 
under either. However, Article 113 allows for qualified majority 
voting, and regulations are, as Regulation 877/82 specifically stated 
"binding in ••• entirety and directly applicable in all Member States".228 
On 20 April the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Collins, warned 
that neutrality was "sacred to us" and would be maintained in the 
event of a formal declaratianof war,229 this on the eve of the British 
attack on South Georgia. Indeed, as violence increased, the Irish 
Government was increasingly anxious about the compatibility of 
sanctions and neutrality. On 2 Maya statement was issued confirming 
the "wish to re-affirm Ireland's traditional role of neutrality in 
relation to armed conflicts", and given the sinking of the General 
Belgrano, on 4 Maya further statement expressed dismay at what 
amounted to "open war". It said the government would seek an 
"immediate meeting of the Security Council" at which Ireland would 
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call for an "immediate" ceasefire and a negotiated settlement, In a 
further assertion of an independent stance, the statement concluded 
that the government "regard the application of economic sanctions as 
no longer applicable and will therefore be seeking the withdrawal of 
these sanctions by the Community", although it did not give neutrality 
230 
as a reason, 
It came to be argued that "as a neutral nation" Ireland had 
al ways "refrained from mil i tary a]} iance of any kind", and thus had 
to take "a very clear view of any action, economic or otherwise, that 
would appear supportive of military action", Therefore, "sanctions 
complementing military action" were unacceptable" and Ireland had to 
assert its "neutral status",231 Nonetheless, it was also made clear 
that Ireland would, in the meantime, "act in concert with our EEC 
partners" and "would not unilaterally lift the embargo",232 In fact, 
Ireland was constrained until the 17 May by Regulation 877/82, 
especially since at a meeting on 8-9 May they failed to convince 
others thatsanctions should be discontinued,233 
The Irish do not appear to have led the anti-renewal campaign as 
17 May approached, the Italians being in the forefront, and some 
observers failed to detect signs "of a nation resolutely defending its 
'traditional F_utrality' against the depredations of a belligerent 
neighbour",234 Nonetheless, on 18 and 24 May Ireland and Italy_opted 
out of the continuance of further measures, although both Council 
Regulation (EEC) 1176/82 and 1254/82 specifically stated they were 
binding in their "entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
st t ,,235 a es , It is not clear, therefore, that Irish and Italian 
action can be reconciled with those Regulations and Community law, 
although the matter was not tested in the courts, The argument turns 
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on the relationship between Article 113 and Article 224, and the status 
of the original Preamble, but doubts exist as to the legality of the 
Irish position, and whether if hostilities had been more protracted, 
236 they could have been made to comply. 
Haughey was cl ear, whi1 st not addressing this probl em directly, 
that nothing in Irish EEC obJigations required Ireland "to back 
military action",237 and that Ireland's position had changed when it 
found itself "moving into a situation which would seriously endanger 
tradi tional pol icy of neutral i ty" • Ireland was "being seen ••• as being 
associated with a serious escalation of military activity", with 
t ' t"'t t' f 238 sanc lons opera lng ln a Sl ua lon 0 open war. Given this, 
Ireland was "not afraid to stand alone on the issue of peace", or in 
reasserting its "neutrality". It had faced pressure before, and 
would withstand it again, especially since the people were so "deeply 
attached to neutrality". The government had, claimed Haughey, made 
it clear "in principle and in practice" that Irish neutrality would 
not be eroded. If Community solidarity was threatened, it was only 
threatened by those seeking to use it for purposes for which it was 
d ' d 239 not eSlgne • 
The Community dimension became less significant and the Irish 
pursued their independent line at ~he Security Council which re-
convened on 21 May. Having made clear they would support a ceasefire, 
on 24 May the Irish circulated a draft resolution calling for a 72 
hour ceasefire and negotiations, although the agreed resolution dropped 
the reference to a ceasefire. The Irish draft made no explicit 
reference to Argentinian withdrawal. 240 
A key feature in this episode appears to have been a concern "to 
uphold Ireland's independence of action",241 although at times it 
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degenerated into anti-Britishness, as when the Minister of Defence 
referred, after the sinking of the General Bel grano, to the British 
as "very much the aggressors now",242 a view disowned by Haughey.243 
Many in Ireland, however, wondered at the sudden ressurrection of 
the traditional policy of neutrality, given the debates of 1980-1981, 
and it has been argued that the government's stance was influenced 
by concerns of domestic popularity,244 leadership battles within 
Fianna Vail, and frustration at the failure of the hoped for 
"historic breakthrough" over Northern Ireland. 245 Moreover, in May 
1982 the British had also made life difficult for the Irish by trying 
t 1 't f ' , 246 o bock Commun1 y arm pr1ce r1ses. Certainly, Ireland has 
previously accepted participation in sanctions after military action, 
and in this case that action started on 2 April, after which the Irish 
, t' 247 aga1n accepted sanc rons. More problematical is that 1982 left 
somewhat unresolved the compatability of Ireland's position and 
Community law, although in the short-term it demonstrated that Ireland 
retained sufficient freedom of action to adopt a neutral stance. 
Interestingly, in addressing the U.N. General Assembly on 30 September 
1982, Collins made no reference to neutrality.248 
The question of the relationship between defence, security, 
neutralit~ ~nd Community membership also caused the Irish some 
anguish in 1981 in the context of the Genscher/Colombo proposals for 
a "Treaty of European Union" consolidating "the bases of concerted 
action in foreign affairs" and extending "coordination in the field 
of security policy".249 For years, at least since Irish entry, EPC 
had touched on matters such as disarmament and CSCE,250 and European 
Councils had also touched on NATO issues, these also being discussed 
'en marge' at least at Foreign Ministers' meetings~51 Now the issue 
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was being raised formally, with security as a "code word" meaning "as 
little or as much as its listeners like(d) to understand by it",252 
it in any case being accepted that there was a Ilgrey area where 
defence merges into security pol icy in a general sensell. 253 Lenihan, 
nonetheless, publicly argued in November 1980 that there was a IIc1ear 
distinction" between EPC, involving foreign pol icy consul tation, Iland 
defence ll which was not discussed. He went on, lithe question of 
harmonising the national defence policies of the member states simply 
does not arise".254 
In 1981 it did arise, and the issue became whether II defence is 
indivisible from security ll255 or whether as Lenihan argued in March 
1981, there was Iia very big difference between security, as such, and 
defence ll , security being Iia much wider concept bringing in our whol e 
relations within the United Nations, international relations generally, 
political relations and all that area other than defence ll • There was 
a difference between IIsecuri ty on an international 1 evel and mil i tary 
neutrality ll.256 
In May 1981 at Venlo, whilst agreeing that there was no question 
of the Community becoming involved in II defence questions properll, some 
Community ministers did wish for regular exchanges on IIsecurity policy 
in the broad sense of stabilj~qtion and confidence-building".257 
Four options with regard to EPC were discussed: (i) to maintain the 
present system as it was; (ii) to make minor administrative procedural 
modifications to the present system, while retaining its present aims 
and basic features; (iii) to draw up a new report which would change 
the nature and expand the scope of political cooperation and; (iv) 
to draw up a formal treaty of political cooperation. 258 What the 
Irish representatives agreed to at this and subsequent meetings became 
a heavily contested issue. 
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Lenihan, the Irish Minister at Venlo, subsequently claimed that 
he had favoured options (i) and (ii) , but not the drawing up of a new 
report. 259 The official record, however, showed agreement that "the 
political directors ••• should examine options two and three" and this, 
according to FitzGerald, put Ireland "on a slippery slope of a highly 
dangerous kind". FitzGerald claimed it was only the subsequent 
activity by the new Minister, Dooge, and his officials which managed 
"for the moment" to push shut the door Lenihan had opened. 260 Dooge 
had apparently been firm that discussion of political-military issues 
by foreign ministers was out, as was the notion that defence or other 
officials should coordinate policy on these issues. 261 FitzGerald 
claimed that Lenihan had left the impression that Ireland "would be 
willing" to move, which had encouraged these ideas. 262 
For his part, Lenihan, by October 1981 in opposition, claimed the 
London Report had "profound implications" for Irish neutrality, and 
for all practical purposes made Ireland a political member of the 
Western alliance, there being, according to Lenihan, "no limit" on 
the political subjects which could be discussed. Now, in October 
1981, Lenihan spoke of "the artificial distinction between security 
and defence, which are really synonymous" and argued the distinction 
and Irish independence of action were being eroded. 263 What worried 
Lenihan was the Report's reference to the agreement "to maintain the 
flexible and pragmatic approach which had made it possible to discuss 
in political cooperation certain important foreign policy questions 
bearing on the political aspects of security". Lenihan now wondered, 
"What does 'the political aspect of security' mean?". He claimed it 
was a new phrase, and that now instead of an "excellent" ad hoc 
arrangement within a "loose framework", there was for the first time 
a "formal ising of the situation and the first step towards having a 
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treaty on this basis", invol ving Irel and "sti 11 closer in mil i tary 
matters". He now felt the "political aspects of security" covered 
"the whol e area of weaponry and mil i tary and defence aspects in 
relation to politica1 security", although the "ug1y word 'defence'" 
as such did not appear. Dooge had bargained away or put Ireland 
"on the slippery s10pe to bargaining" away, "the cornerstone of Irish 
diplomatic policy", neutrality.264 
FitzGerald c1aimed the "s1ippery s1ope" had started with the 
agreement to study option (iii) and that the Coalition had secured 
the insertion subsequently of the key clause only partially referred 
to by Lenihan. FitzGerald referred to the additional initia1 clause 
"and having regard to the different situations of the member states" 
and argued that this was "a reference to our position", whilst the 
London Report agreed to "maintaining and not expanding" the EPC 
system, and constrained it to the "political aspects of security".265 
Moreover, the Coalition believed that a paper on the scope and nature 
of EPC actually strengthened the Irish position by serving as a 
266 bench-mark for what was or was not acceptable. 
The London Report was, in fact, a compromise between options ~i) 
and (iii) since whilst it maintained the existing basic features of 
the ~ystem, it a1so contained some new features. EPC was to be 
extended, in that instead of reacting to events consideration was now 
to be given to taking "a longer-term approach to certain problems" 
and instituting "studies to that end". In addition, the presidency 
was in future to be aided by a small team from preceding and 
succeeding presidencies in order to strengthen it organisationally 
and enhance continuity, whilst it was also made clear that there cou1d 
be both formal and informa1 meetings under the aegis of EPC, the 
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latter being confidentia1. Confidentiality was regarded as a key to 
success,267 although it also had the benefit of erecting a smokescreen 
as to the nature of what was to be discussed. 268 
In general, on this issue of EPC reform the Irish avoided some 
of their worst fears since military matters per se were to be left 
to NATO, and it was not only the Irish who were worried by the 
possible expansion of EPC. On the other hand, no definitive 
definition of 'the political aspects of security' had been agreed 
and Irish equivocation did not provide a firm basis upon which to 
avoid further slipping down "the slippery slope". Indeed, by 
November 1981 Genscher was circulating the text of a draft treaty or 
solemn undertaking on European Union, a draft which called for 
regular exchanges of view on security questions, leading to 
harmonisation of viewpoints, and to the strengthening of the Atlantic 
alliance. It was suggested that to allow for such discussion the 
Council of Ministers should be able to vary its composition, which 
was regarded by some "as diplomatic code for saying that Defence 
Ministers or experts shou1d attend European Council meetings with 
the aim of strengthening NATO",269 something which Dooge made clear 
in December 1981 was beyond the pail. 270 FitzGerald had warned of 
further pressure in octc";qr 1981, and had even suggested it "could 
lead to our isolation and to a two-tier political cooperation which 
would be greatly to our political disadvantage".271 
With regard to the general development of the Community the 
Irish "produced a certain amount of integrationist rhetoric, paying 
lip-service to the idea of European 'togetherness,,,272 and European 
Union, but the latter was clearly seen as something for "the 
distant future".273 As well as expressing their continuing 
acceptance of the political objectives of the Community,274 the Irish 
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stressed the importance of redistribution,275 and of inter-governmental 
progress not out-stripping treaty-based progress, having, in fact, a 
strong preference for building "on the Treaty foundations".276 
Specific proposals to make progress in the direction of European 
Union often caused embarrassment, as with the Genscher/Colombo 
ini tiati ve and subsequent deve 1 opments • Irish caution was also 
exhibited in the reaction to the reports on European Union in 1975-76. 
Tindemans, for example, caused alarm by raising the possibility of 
two-tier development in the Community, and in his calls for 
exchanges of view on defence leading to "a common analysis of 
defence problems" and for cooperation in armaments manufacture. 277 
The Irish were wary of such proposals. They also, on occasion, 
obstructed smaller steps, such as allowing the incoming Commission 
President to pick his own team, although on the other hand, 
FitzGerald expressed general support for a more democratic, 
supranational Community, with a stronger voice for the European 
P 1 · t 278 ar l.amen • 
In terms of the development of the Community, the Irish faced 
prob1ems in the way in which action taken under the Treaty, for 
example, the achievement of a customs union, presaged other activity, 
namely in this case, pressure for an industrial po1icy in order to 
make the sing1e market a rea1ity.279 This, in turn, 1 ed to defence-
related questions being raised, since it was argued that the 
Community cou1d not "draw an artificial dividing line between the 
civi1ian and defence industry sectors",280 that "without the 
deve10pment of a sing1e organised market for the armaments sector", 
moreover, "it is hardly possible to imagine how a common industria1 
policy could be brought into play", especially in ship-building, 
-417-
electronics and aircraft industries. The Klepsch-Normanton Report 
of June 1978 which argued in this way went on to propose that there 
should be Community representation, either through the Commission or 
the President-in-Office, in the Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG), a collaborative forum for armaments cooperation. 281 The 
Irish did not object "in principle to there being a Community policy 
for the manufacture or export of arms" but clearly were wary of any 
blurring of competences or linkage between the Community and defence 
't' 282 organlsa lons. Irish difficulties on such issues as raised by 
Klepsch-Normanton were illustrated by the three-way division among 
Irish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) when Klepsch-Normanton 
/ 
was voted on in the European Parliament. Fianna Fail MEPs abstained 
on the grounds that it was irrelevant to Ireland, Fine Gael supported 
it on the grounds of employment, whilst Kavanagh of Labour voted 
against on the basis of it possibly drawing Ireland into NATO 
'l t 283 lnvo vemen • Fortunately for Ireland subsequent reports have 
tended to be more modest,284 although in October 1981 the Commission 
did send the Council of Ministers a document on industrial innovation 
which drew attention to the problems caused by nationalistic 
approaches to defence procurement and urged closer cooperation of 
military equipment purchaB~s as an important element in development 
f C ' t 1 ' , d t' l' t' 285 o a ommunl y po lCy on ln us rla lnnova lon. 
One possible aspect of the development of the Community took 
place on 18 May 1982, when at the very moment the Irish were 
asserting their own freedom of action, in regard to the Falkland's 
conflict, they consented to the over-riding of a British veto, and 
thus placed in potential future jeopardy both Irish independence of 
action and a basis of neutrality. Most interestingly, whilst Ireland 
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joined with the majority to vote through farm price rises, both 
Greece and Denmark refused to vote on the grounds of setting a 
precedent which could be used against them, although the increases 
would have been to their benefit. Ireland not only voted, but it 
also failed to have recorded at the end of the meeting its belief 
in the continuing validity of the veto principle, the course adopted 
by France and Italy. The Irish accepted there was a distinction 
between using a veto when it was a question of implementing agreed 
policy and law, as against vetoing new developments. Nonetheless, 
as an Irish diplomat admitted they had put themselves in a position 
where other people could "now tell us what our national interest 
. " 286 ~s • 
The Irish then have faced pressures upon their independence of 
action and their claim to neutrality emanating from (a) the natural 
evolution of policies within the Treaty framework, for example, the 
Common Commercial Policy, fisheries policy and industrial policy; 
(b) the evolution of EPC, as the difficulties of separating defence 
and security grew and; (c) the spill-over between (a) and (b). 
Moreover, in the tenth year of membership FitzGerald felt obliged to 
point out that had Ireland not joined the Community, the "level of 
public and social services would by DOW have been at a ••• totally 
unaccceptable" level, a point he argued that those "who urge that we 
would be better to be outside the Community ... alleging a threat to 
our neutrality ... ought to reflect " 287 on ... . 
(v) lack of isolationism, a willinghess to ameliorate 
world problems and impartiality 
In 1980 Ireland was elected to the U.N. Security Council for 
1981-1982. In December 1980 the Dail was reminded of the functions 
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of the Security Council and assured that Ireland would play its 
"part in efforts to resolve whatever international disputes are 
considered by the Council", joining in efforts to promote 
implementation of solutions and working within the general aims of 
Irish foreign policy" for a more peaceful, stable and just 
international order".288 The most conspicuous Irish activity on 
the Council was their calls for ceasefires during the Falklarids' 
confJict. Whilst, arguably, contributing to both the fulfilment 
of Irish policy and Council responsibilities, some of the Irish 
activity at this time was ill-thought out, in that, for example, their 
call for an "immediate" Security Council meeting had to be dropped, 
whilst their proposals made no explicit reference to Argentinian 
withdrawal. 289 On the other hand, the government and Foreign Affairs 
officials have argued that Irish activity reflected the seriousness 
with which they took their membership responsibilities, their view 
of the need to bolster the U.N. role, and their belief that the 
conflict was precisely the sort of conflict that the U.N. should have 
290 been able to handle. 
Of greater long-term significance, perhaps, was the continued 
Irish contribution to U.N. peace-keeping, particularly in the Middle 
East between 1973 and 1982, save for the interruption b~tween July 
1974 and May 1978 because of the domestic security situation. The 
Irish record with the U.N. was: 
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Table 9.4 Record of Unit Service with United Nations 
Non- Period or Service 
No. of Commissioned Place of 
Unit Officers Officers Privates From To Service 
23 Infantry Group i2 49 76 October 1972 April 1973 Cyprus 
24 Infantry Group 12 46 72 April 1973 October 1973 Cyrrus 
25 Infantry Group 12 37 81 October 1973 April 1974 CYrrlls & 
Middle East 
25 Inrantry Group 
Increment 10 46 76 December 1973 April 1974 Middle East 
26 Infantry Group 23 104 180 April 1974 May & July 1974 Middle East 
43 Infant n Batt h55 104 759 May 197R November 1978 Lebanon 
44 Infantn Batt 634 107 741 November 1978 April 1979 Lebanon 
45 Infant r\ Batt. 625 104 729 April 1979 October 1'979 Lebanon 
~~---,~' 
46 Infantry Batt. 625 4X 673 October 1979 April 1980 Lebanon 
47 Inlantry Ball 59X 75 673 April 1980 October 1980 Lebanon 
4~ Infantn Batt 565 91 656 October 1980 April !981 Lebanon 
49 Inlantn Batt. 571 X5 656 April 19RI October 1981 Lebanon 
------ ~. 
50 Inl.lntr\ Batt 572 X() 652 October 1981 April 1982 Lebanon 
~---------
51 Infantrv Bait. 642 80 722 Arril 1982 October 1982 Lebanon 
52 Infallln Batt. 642 XJ 725 October 1982 April 1983 Lebanon 
• The Pl'flOd of ,en'lce relate, to the Infantrv Battalion. In many case, the service of the UNIFIL HQ Group would overlap with that orthe 
Battalion, 
Source: Capt. J. Shehhan, Defence Forces Handbook, (Dublin, Department 
of Defence, n/d), Appendix E, pp.79-80. 
Even during 1974-1978 small numbers served at times with UNICYP and 
UNTSO (of whom some served with United Nations Disengagement Observer 
Force}.291 The Irish were flattered by the requests for their 
contribution, and saw it as a role they could play precisely because 
they were "not members of any military alliance".292 Their peace-
keeping contribution was regarded as "out of all proportion II to their 
size, and it was felt it "might well be compromised if we were to 
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become members of any particular military alliance".293 That non-
membership, together with Ireland's history, was regarded as 
enhancing Irish "acceptability among the Third World countries", and 
in addition, placed Ireland in a good position to playa "prominent 
rol e in the various disarmament debates", 294 perhaps even being abl e 
to lead "a movement for peace in the U.N.". This latter because 
Ireland was "one of the nonaligned nations who can speak with 
independence and confidence about ••• world peace and security".295 
It also allowed, according to Lenihan, as has been seen, 
Ireland to playa crucial role regarding the Madrid CSCE review 
296 
conference. More generally, it was felt that Ireland could help 
push the EPC process into a "progressive" direction,297 and 
FitzGerald in 1981 argued that Ireland, in conjunction with other 
countries, had influenced British policy on issues like Zimbabwe, 
and had made a "constructive" contribution on Namibia and the Middle 
East. 298 This 1981 view echoing his argument in 1975 of the 
influence of the Irish Presidency in the Euro-Arab dialogue and in 
299 the Lome process. 
Some, particularly the Labour Party, felt Ireland should be more 
active and fretted at the constraints of EPC. In Cork in the 
autumn of 19::=<0, as well as call ing for neutrality to be enshrined in 
the Constitution and for cooperation with the nonaligned, the party 
called on the government to pursue" acti ve neutral i ty", involving a 
"total commitment to peace, detente and disarmament, together with a 
programme of involvement in world affairs" as part of "the evolution 
and implementation of a positive policy of neutrality".300 Cluskey, 
the Labour leader, explained that neutrality could no longer simply 
be "an assertion that one wishes to avoid being draw into war" (sic), 
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but rather that its value was in "preventing war not escaping from 
it", and that this required "positive proposals" rather than with-
drawal into a "neutralist cacoon".301 Ryan of Fine Gael continued 
to see a version of active neutrality as appropriate for the 
E C 't 302 uropean ommun~ y. 
The official view was rather more low key, acknowledging the 
limitations imposed by the range of Irish diplomatic representation 
and the "lack of resources",303 the result of which meant that 
Ireland couldnot contribute financially and economically.304 Indeed, 
its aid record was poor,305 and whilst the Irish continued to seek 
an input into the disarmament process, and support, for example, 
nuclear free zones, their input was limitedby a lack of technological 
expertise. 306 Apart from nudging the policy of others, the 
government saw Ireland's role as that of being "imaginative and 
constructive", which it was felt was all the more valuable given the 
alleged recognition of Ireland's "disinterestedness".307 
Principally, after 1973, the Irish sought to exert influence 
within and via EPC, as has been seen. From 1973 it caMe to be 
argued that Ireland no longer acted "in isolation" but rather now 
faced "the world in partnership within the European CommunitY",308 
thus carrying "much greater weight" in the world. 309 ":;learly, 
moreover, membership of the Community and involvement in EPC were 
incompatible with isolationism. 
Notwithstanding occasional 'deviant' Irish behaviour within EPC 
and the stance during the Falklands' conflict, there was also the 
question of whether Community and EPC involvement were incompatible 
with impartiality, especially given the number of other occasions 
on which the Irish did join their Community partners in sanctions 
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against third parties. As has been seen, Haughey as Taoiseach 
acknow1edged that "Po1itical neutrality or non-a1ignment" was 
"incompatible" with Community membership. More generally, a further 
difficulty was the continuing and related be1ief that Ireland's place 
was "with the Western democracies", since it shared with them, 
"common concepts of human rights, freedom under the law, individual 
liberty and freedom of conscience". According to Haughey, Irish 
economic interests also were "tied in with the Western industria1ised 
world".310 Indeed, FitzGerald was quoted in 1980 as going further: 
"There reaDy isn't such a thing as neutrality today: we are part 
of Western Europe and our interests coincide with theirs". 311 
Ireland was not indifferent to what happened between East and 
West, nor to the issues which divided them. On "crucial issues", 
its sympathies were "clearly ... with the West", according to 
FitzGerald, and when asked whether Ire1and was neutral between 
ideo1ogies, he replied "Who is?".312 Given such dear commitment 
to the West and the Community, some doubted whether the c1assical 
formulation by Lenihan, namely "we are neutral in the military sense, 
we are neither ideologically neutral nor politica1ly indifferent" 
f . . t . th . t' 313 . 11 t k' . t was su flclen to galnsay e pOSl lon, especla y a lng ln 0 
account thE Irish performance as examined against other variab1es. 
Tne Labour Party, in particular, raised the issue of impartiality, 
c1aiming that the close association with the West meant that it had 
been lost. To them, Ireland appeared to favour U.S. policy in El 
Salvador, as it had in Vietnam, British connivance in Rhodesia and 
the West's support for apartheid. Querying Irish acquiescence in 
the Council of Ministers decision not to release humanitarian aid to 
the refugees in E1 Salvador, Quinn of Labour asserted "That is some 
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neutrality. That is some independence",314 whilst the March 1981 
debate led to the Irish Times to ask: "whose side are you neutral 
?" 315 on .• 
(vi) attitude to identity, nation-building, unity, 
stability and self-determination 
Membership of the European Communi ty, at 1 east wi thin the 
immediate regional external environment of Europe, served to enhance 
Ireland's distinctive identity, and especially its distinctiveness 
from Britain, albeit that in the world more generally, as has been 
seen, Ireland was increasingly identified as a Community state. 
Enhancing the separateness of Ireland from Britain appears to have 
been a deliberate policy of FitzGerald as Foreign Minister in the 
first years of Community membership,316 and in 1974 he argued that 
the Irish communautaire attitude had "certainly marked us out in 
317 
contrast" to the U. K. He claimed that nobody was "in any doubt 
as to whether Ireland is some kind of British satellite", given that 
on many issues Irish "views and those of Britain diverge markedly".318 
The Irish Presidency of the Council of the Community in 1975 and the 
determination to remain as members, even if Britain did not, broke 
any lingering linkage people may have perceived. Four years later, 
the divergent British and Irish paths over EMS confirmed the 
distinction and arguably, subject only to the uncompleted business of 
unity, marked the drawing to a close of the Irish independence struggle 
. ". . t' 319 VlS a VlS Brl aln. 
The unity issue and the related question of stability on the 
island remained high on the Irish agenda throughout the 1973-1982 
period. The concern for stability was reflected in the increased 
defence effort and in 1976 by the Oireachtas determining "that, arising 
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out of the armed conflict now taking place in Northern Ireland, a 
national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State". 
The Taoiseach, in introducing the measures, spoke of the challenge to 
the "public safety" and lithe preservation of the State II , by "an 
illegal organisation dedicated to the overthrow of the institutions 
of this State ll • 320 
In the period after 1969 more than 45 civilians and 9 members 
of the security forces were killed by terrorist explosions and 
activity in the Republic. In addition, the Republic suffered a 
severe economic cost, estimated at IR £1,050m in 1982 prices (£850m) 
between 1969 and 1982, whilst within the Republic there were periodic 
disturbances and riots, such as, for example, over the hunger strikes 
in 1981, when some 13-15,000 people marched on the British embassy. 
In addition, there was a significant rise in armed robberies, 
k 'd ' d t t' 321 1 napplng an ex or lon. 
At the beginning of the period, just as the forces of law and 
order in the Republic were ill-equipped to deal with the situation 
in the Republic, so too the PDF remained ill-equipped to intervene 
in the North. In the summer of 1974 two Coalition ministers publicly 
warned as to the limited ability of Dublin to help. O'Brien argued 
it would be wrong to suppose there was a "reassuring ·ontingency 
plan", since if certain things happened "neither we nor anyone else 
can divert dire consequences for many people". 322 In September 1974 
O'Brien caused an outcry when he warned that the Irish army did not 
possess the caps.ci ty to control events in the North and that it coul d 
only hope to hold one border town, such as Newry, in the event of 
"1 323 C1Vl war. FitzGerald, meanwhile, suggested people were asking 
the wrong question, when they asked whether the government had lithe 
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will to protect the minority in Northern Ireland", since "nobody 
raised ... the question of the extent to which we have the power to 
protect the minority ••• ".324 
With regard to general policy on Northern Ireland, for some of 
the period Irish governments were largely reactive to British 
initiatives, but at both the beginning and the end of the period 
they engaged in major joint initiatives with Britain. In December 
1973 British, Irish and Northern Ireland representatives met together 
for the first time and agreed to the formation of a Northern Ireland 
power-sharing Executive, involving representatives from both 
communities in Northern Ireland. An 'Irish dimension' was also to 
be catered for, by a Council of Ireland, comprised of a Council of 
Ministers and a Consultative Assembly with Belfast and Dublin 
representation. In the Sunningdale agreement of December 1973 the 
Irish recognised that unity required the consent of a majority in 
325 Northern Ireland. The power-sharing Executive and the 
Sunningdale agreement collapsed in May 1974, given opposition within 
Northern Ireland, and for nearly five years, periodic British 
initiatives elicited periodic Irish attempts to influence them and 
to become accepted as a party with a legitimate interest in Northern 
Ireland. 
One feature of this period was the 1975 Fianna Fail call for 
the British government to declare its "commitment to implement an 
ordered withdrawal from ••• involvement in the six counties", 
although it transpired they did not wish a date to be set, being 
fearful of the consequences, and that the declaration of withdrawal 
really meant a declaration of intent regarding a united Ireland. 326 
In 1979-1980 the Republic began to take the initiative rather more 
and began to seek a solution in the wider context of relationships 
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between Ireland and Britain, although the process was disrupted by 
elections and consequent changes of government in June 1981 and 
February and November 1982. 8 December 1980 saw the Haughey-
Thatcher agreement on studying the "totality of relationships in 
these islands,,327 and prompted Haughey's claim that the governments 
were "in the middle of an historic breakthrough".328 Subsequently, 
FitzGerald and Thatcher agreed in November 1981 to set up an Inter-
governmental Council, which was to give institutional expression to 
the "unique character of the relationship between the two countries". 
The November 1981 agreement again saw an Irish acknowledgement 
"that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland 
would require the consent of the majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland",329 which led to a Fine Gael/Fianna Fail row as to whether 
this involved abandonment of the legitimacy of the Irish claim to 
unity, especially since FitzGerald had made clear he favoured 
deletion of Articles Two and Three of the Irish Constitution. In 
practice, however, it was a question of tactics and strategy rather 
than objective, and in any case no substantial progress was made by 
the end of 1982, indeed in 1982 relations were temporarily strained 
over the Falklands and other issues. 330 
Conclusion 
The first ten years of Community membership did not see the 
dramatic foreclosure of Irish freedom of decision that some had 
envisaged prior to 1973. Whilst somewhat constrained by Community 
membership and EPC, the Irish clearly retained a degree of freedom, 
although they did encounter some difficulties in balancing that 
freedom with their commitment to the Community. They managed to 
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walk that tight-rope because the nature of the Community between 1973 
and 1982 meant that there was little general inclination among the 
member-States to engage in vertical integration measures which would 
really have challenged the Irish. FitzGerald, nonetheless, hinted 
at how dependent upon the Community Ireland was becoming,331 and this 
suggests there was some validity in the escalator analogy used before 
entry, even if the escalator moved rather more slowly between 1973 and 
1982 than anticipated. 332 
On the other hand, despite the increased effort, there was still 
a lack of genuine due diligence in terms of the scale, scope and 
orientation of the defence effort, and despite the assertion of 
neutrality in 1982, in general the period saw equivocation and 
confusion as to what Ireland really stood for, especially given the 
convolutions over EPC and the possibility of a defence deal with 
Britain. No clear, consistent set of principles were enunciated or 
upheld, except the continued narrow technical view of neutrality, 
as being equal to non-alliance membership. The key continued to be 
an assertion that they were not committed to co-belligerency, which 
they regarded as the essence of alliance. 333 This, however, also 
continued to be a partial and inadequate view of neutrality, 
reflecting more a concern with "non-belligerency status in time of 
war" than neutrality per se. 334 In essence, then, Irish policy 
whilst refraining from alliance, was neither one of 'for neutrality' 
nor nonalignment, but rather sui generis. 
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion: Sui Generis Ireland 
Neutrality per se involves the fulfilment of specific duties and 
the upholding of specific rights. Moreover, it only truly exists in 
times of war or armed conflict. - However, given the absence of war 
in Europe since 1945, several states have attempted to pursue a policy 
"aiming at neutrality in the event. of war" (p;7),1 and alth·ough 
properly speaking no agreed name for neutrality in peacetime exists, 
the policies of these states may be described as ones 'for neutrality' 
if not 'of neutrality'. Even such policies, however, require the 
fu1filment of certain criteria. 
Nonalignment is not a particu1ar policy as such, but rather a 
spirit within which policies are approached, and it is best understood 
as a "frame of mind" (pp. 66-7) • This frame of mind having been 
shaped by socio-economic and political experiences, which the European 
states under review, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and particularly 
Ireland, did not experience in the same form or in the same degree. 
Thus, whilst these states, may, on occasion, seek to act as do the 
nona1igned, that should not be equated with nonalignment per se. 
The Irish have claimed at times to be either neutral or nonaligned, 
or both. The analysis of neutrality, nonalignment and of the model 
provided by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, a110wed the identification 
of a number of variables against which the Irish c1aims could be 
tested (pp.136-8). However, prior to the formal app1ication of such 
tests, it was necessary to examine the basis of Irish pOlicy in the 
period prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, to establish the 
nature of their experience and to establish what traditions, if any, 
had been estab1ished. Subsequent1y, four variab1es were applied as 
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tests of Irish neutrality during the Second World War itself, namely 
the extent to which: (i) the Irish fulfilled the duties and upheld 
the rights of a neutral; (ii) their position was recognised by 
belligerents; (iii) they disavowed help and; (iv) they retained 
freedom of decision and action. 
Subsequently, to take account of the period of peace, the 
variables were adjusted so as to be appropriate to examine a policy 
'for neutrality'. The variables were also adjusted to take 
cognizance of some aspects of nonalignment, and two other variables 
were added for this purpose, although the following analysis 
concentrated more upon the 'for neutrality' dimension, since it had 
already been established that European states, including Ireland, 
were different in kind and not just degree from the nonaligned. The 
variables applied in the 1945-1982 period were: (i) due diligence; 
(ii) recognition of position by others; (iii) disavowal of help; 
(iv) freedom of decision and action; (v) lack of isolationism, a 
willingness to ameliorate world problems and impartiality and; (vi) 
attitude to identity, nation-building, unity, stability and self-
determination. 
In the pre-Second World War period, the pre-eminent Irish pre-
occupation was with the establishment of Irish sovereignty, 
particularly vis-a-vis Britain, although at times there was also 
some manifestation of an incipient aspiration 'for neutrality'. That 
aspiration, however, was undermined by the lack of defence and 
economic self-sufficiency, and was not in any case unambiguous or 
shared by all. Indeed, whilst later proponents of 'traditional 
neutrality' point to the anti-conscription campaign during 1914-1918, 
the Irish Neutrality League, the Casement call for a 'neutralised' 
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Ireland and antipathy initially to the League of Nations and the 1921 
Treaty, as well as to the 1927 defence debate and the late 1930s 
desire to avoid participation in war, there was an alternative tradition, 
which was at least as strong, if not more so. This was the tradition 
of enlistment in the British Army, of support for Redmond, of the 
willingness to forego neutrality in the 1921 negotiations with Britain, 
of commitment to collective security, and of the willingness to accept 
the British 'protective umbrella' as well as to discuss possible 
defence arrangements and agreements with them. In addition, there was 
a discrepancy between Irish rhetoric and their commitment in terms of 
resources. As war approached, the Irish simply sought to avoid 
participation in it, not conditionally by insistence on neutral rights 
and duties, but at any price. It was not a policy 'for neutrality' 
but rather 'for non-belligerency'. 
World War Two provided the only true test of Irish neutrality 
per se, and despite the conventional wisdom, the Irish failed the test. 
There was no strict adherence, for example, to neutral rights and 
duties, but rather a self-confessed "certain consideration for Britain" 
(p.191) and "friendly neutrality" towards the Allies (p.207). In 
addition, there was the inadequacy of Irish defence efforts, 
particularly with regard to equipment and air and naval defence. 
Whilst the Germans were willing to recognise Irish neutrality, they 
violated Irish neutral rights on occasion, whilst the British never 
formally recognised Irish neutrality throughout the war. The lack of 
tradition ~ neutrality in Ireland, the omission of neutrality from 
the Constitution, and the nature of domestic opinion, gave be1ligerents 
some grounds for questioning Irish commitment to neutrality, especially 
given the Irish lack of resources and due diligence. In addition, 
there was no unequivocal disavowal of help, especially given the talks 
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with the British. On the other hand, whilst they bent with the wind, 
the Irish retained enough freedom of decision and action to say 'no' 
regarding the ports and in rejecting, for example, both threats (like 
the American Note) and promises (on unity). Ireland did not become 
a belligerent, but the evidence suggests that the screw was never 
really turned on Ireland, as evidenced, for example, by the 1942 
British decision to keep Ireland going on a "minimum basis" (p.235). 
Nonetheless, freedom of decision and action was relative, and 
conditional upon others, and the lack of self-sufficiency posed 
difficulties for Ireland in fulfilling the requirements of neutrality. 
The main pre-occupations were non-belligerency and the pursuit of 
sovereignty, pre-occupations which came together in abstention from a 
British war. Despite this, the apparent success of Irish neutrality, 
led to some elevating it to a "mystery of faith" (p.252). 
After the war, the Irish failed to meet the criteria 'for 
neutral i ty' • In the initial postwar period, for example, there was 
a clear fai1ure to meet their own self-assigned standards regarding 
due diligence, and there appeared again, at least on the part of 
some, to be dependence upon the British 'protective umbrella'. The 
Irish position was certainly not initially accepted by the Soviet 
Union, whilst Britain and the United States, at times, both saw Irish 
neutrality as negotiable. Even more problematical was the Irish 
failure to advance neutrality as a reason for non-participation in 
the Atlantic Pact, with Partition being referred to as the "sole 
obstacle" to participation (p.283). During this period it again 
appears as if, whilst concerned with the Irish position, the British 
and Americans were not so concerned as to really take advantage of 
Irish economic dependence, and so, the Irish again retained a degree 
-449-
of freedom of decision and action, albeit also being subject to 
constraints. The 1946-1955 period saw opposition to a specific 
alliance, but also a willingness to accept United Nations collective 
security, and equivocation regarding possible bilateral defence 
arrangements. It was a time of relative Irish isolation from the 
mainstream of events, with the Irish making little contribution to 
the world. Despite the non-adhesion to the Atlantic Pact, the 
Irish were not impartial in the emerging Cold War, but remained 
hampered by their concern with the achievement of unity. Fundamentally 
important was the lack of a~ unequivocal assertion of "policy 'for 
neutrality' and the failure to provide the necessary wherewithal to 
underpin such a policy. Non-participation in alliance cannot be 
equated with neutrality, and Irish policy was rather sui generis. 
During the years 1956-1972 there was again a clear failure with 
regard to due diligence, with all aspects of Irish defence being 
inadequate. The Irish faced problems in having their position 
recognised by others since they were not participants in the Non-
Aligned Movement and since their application to join the European 
Community in 1961 meant that they "definitely parted company with the 
European neutrals" (p.320). Furthermore, there was a clearer 
acceptance of a British and NATO protective umbrella, and a willingness 
to forego even the aspiration 'for neutrality' in the context of 
Community membership and development. It was in connection with the 
Community that the limitations upon Irish freedom of decision and 
action really became apparent, with the Hobson's choice they faced 
given the British application. At this time the Irish left behind 
their relative isolation by contributing extensively to the United 
Nations, and in their approach to Europe. Nonetheless, the 
equivocation in their policy was evidenced by the appearance of what 
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might be termed two foreign policies, the one ref~ective of a 'for 
neutrality' and 'nonalignment' aspiration, the other pragmatic and 
reflective of an aspiration for material prosperity. Whil st for much 
of the period issues connected with unity were not high on the agenda, 
the eruption of Northern Ireland in 1968-1969 made unity a major issue 
in Irish politics and revealed the constraints faced by the Irish. 
Crucial in this period, however, was the clear abandonment, 
albeit subject to Community development, of any aspiration 'for 
neutrality', or adoption of the European model of Austria, Sweden and 
Switzerland, or to be nonaligned, at least as far as Irish governments 
were concerned. The decisive pre-occupations were welfare 
maximisation, economic growth and, through Community membership also, 
the reduction of dependence upon Britain. 
In the final period under review, 1973-1982, there continued to 
be a lack of sufficient commitment to the requirements of due diligence. 
Whilst improvements in Irish defence effort took place, they were either 
orientated towards the Northern Ireland situation or towards fishery 
protection, the latter being to some extent dependent upon Community 
funding. Ireland's own experts judged the Irish defence effort 
inadequate when measured against the requirements of a truly neutral 
stance. Sixty years after independence, Ireland still lacked its own 
munitions factory and was dependent upon others for supplies of 
weapons. Irish forces were those appropriate for a state "in a 
disarmed wod d" (p. 387) . 
The equivocations of 1980-1982 relating to neutrality caused 
confusion in third party minds as to where the Irish really stood, 
and the nature of the stand in 1982 regarding the Falklands did not 
altogether destroy the impression of equivocation. Moreover, Ireland 
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still remained separated from both the Non-Aligned Movement and the 
Neutral and Nonaligned caucus of CSCE review conferences, and was 
instead increasingly perceived as a Community state. There was, again, 
no unequivocal disavowal of help, but rather an apparent Irish 
readiness to take the initiative in raising the question of defence 
cooperation with the British. Some in government;-moreover, still 
clearly believed in the British and NATO umbrella, although as 
previously there was no formal agreement with either. 
During the 1973-1982 period a notable development was the marked 
decline in the economic and political dependence upon Britain as a 
result of both Irish trade diversification and the multilateralisation 
of the previously bilateral relationship with Britain. These 
developments enhanced Irish freedom of decision, as evidenced by the 
1975 Irish policy regarding their position in the event of British 
withdrawal from the Community, and the 1979 decision to enter the EMS. 
Whilst Community membership imposed new constraints upon Ireland, it 
appears that by 1982 these constraints had not become more severe than 
the old constraints imposed by the relationship with Britain, and the 
Irish thus enjoyed somewhat greater freedom of decision than 
anticipated prior to entry into the Community. In this period, more-
over, the Irish became gradually increasingly more ambivalent in their 
attitude to the Community and in their commitment to its defence. 
By 1982 the Irish appeared to retain sufficient sovereignty to 
say 'no' on certain questions, both, for example, regarding the 
expansion of EPC and with respect to the Falklands' conflict. Nonethe-
less, Community membership did impose constraints, and the Irish lacked 
the freedom of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. Moreoever, FitzGerald 
in 1982 spoke in terms which implied that pre-entry fears of an 
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escalator effect of membership had some foundation, and there were 
signs both in regard to Community and EPC development that the Irish 
were on a "slippery slope" (p.414), although it was not clear how 
slippery the slope was, nor what lay at the bottom of it. 
In the 1973-1982 period Ireland became even more committed to 
involvement in the world, but this increasingly took the form of 
involvement in and through the Community, rather than an identifiable 
and distinctive Irish involvement. On questions relating to 
identity, therefore, the reco~d was mixed since the Irish achieved 
greater distinctiveness from Britain, but at the cost of identification 
with the Community. Whilst unity remained high on the political 
agenda little progress was made. Perhaps the most interesting 
feature of this period is that contrary to pre-Community expectations, 
the Irish still retained a reasonable degree of choice as to their 
policies and actions, albeit that in some cases the opportunity costs 
of alternative choices were potentially severe. 
The examination of Irish security, foreign and defence policies 
demonstates conclusively that there have been "no set of common 
princi pI es" (p. 389 ) underlying them. Moreover, despite the claims 
of the Irish themselves, in whi~h they have repeatedly regarded 
themselves as neutral and/or nonaligned, it is clear that Ireland 
has never been truly neutral, and cannot be regarded as nonaligned. 
In addition, Irish policy has not met the requirements inherent in 
the Swedish formulation of "non-participation in alliances in peace-
time, aiming at neutrality in the event of war" (p.7), given its 
failure to meet the criteria of 'for neutrality', most strikingly 
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in its lack of due diligence and in its equivocation as the foundations 
of Irish policy. Irish assertions of their being "neutral in a 
military sense" (p.388) do not save neutrality, since neutrality is not 
to be equated with mere non-belligerency, nor non-alliance membership. 
Despite the periodic apparent stance of neutrality there has been a 
demonstrable failure to evolve a single, unequivocal tradition on 
neutrality, and in many cases the Irish commitment to neutrality has 
clearly been conditional, for example, upon the ending of Partition 
or the development of the European Community. 
Whilst a tradition regarding neutrality can be identified, it is 
not a consistent tradition, and an alternative tradition has been 
more powerful, reflecting the primordial concern with sovereignty, 
unity and independence, and establishing a distinctive position 
vis-a-vis Britain. The alternative tradition has also seen a high 
degree of pragmatism and expediency, awareness of geographical 
realities as well as of the constraints imposed by economic dependence, 
and the concern with prosperity and welfare maximisation. This alter-
native tradition has for the most part been adopted as Ireland's operative 
policy framework, and concerns for unity, sovereignty, independence, 
prosperity and limited resources, have predominantly been accorded 
greater weight than neutrality, nonalignment or the European model 
represented by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. The alternative 
tradition has increasingly been preferred to the austere, autarkic 
and Arcadian vision of de Valera. 
Given that there have been these two traditions, there has been 
confusion in Irish rhetoric, and in the minds of third parties, as 
to the true nature of Irish policy and aspirations, and this has 
contributed to the appearance of "a somewhat messy neutrality" (p.6) 
in the Irish case. But contrary to appearance, it is not simply a 
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question of messiness, but rather that Ireland has consistently, over 
several decades, failed to meet the criteria of either 'of' or 'for' 
neutrality. This despite Keatinge's claim that "Ireland fulfills two 
basic conditions to be categorised as neutral: it does not belong to 
any military alliance, and it continues to make declarations asserting 
its neutrality".2 In the case of the latter it has been shown that 
the declarations have not been consistent and, in addition, they have 
been more than matched by declarations yielding any real claim to 
neutrality. Similarly, non-alliance membership and the lack of a 
formal commitment to co-belligerency in the event of war on behalf of 
any other state or group of states, have been shown to be insufficient 
conditions of neutrality. It is not sufficient in these circumstances 
to argue merely "that the use of the term neutrality is best qualified 
in the Irish context", or to refer to "the limited nature of Irish 
neutrality".3 The concept is inappropriate to Ireland. 
Similarly, recent suggestions regarding the pursuit of 'active 
neutrality,4 involve a contradiction in terms, and a dismissal of the 
established meaning of the concept of neutrality. Indeed, the 
difference is so great that it is perhaps an abuse of language to apply 
the same term to neutrality per se and the policies advocated by 
McSweeney and the Irish Labour Party, namely being actively involved 
in the creation of peace. Nonalignment, as properly understood, is 
also, as demonstrated, inappropriate terminology, whilst Ireland does 
not fit the model of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. 
Given that there is no currently accepted concept which fits the 
Irish case, that Ireland differs from "the three neutral countries" (p.96) 
and that Ireland is unique within the European Community and has had its 
aspirations, such as they were, to neutrality, compromised by Community 
membership, Ireland is best regarded as a special case or sui generis. 
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Chapter Ten Footnotes 
1. Page numbers in this chapter refer to the text above. 
2. Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, 
(Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1984) p.55. 
3. Ibid p.56. 
4. See, in particular, Bill McSweeney, 'Postscript: The Case for 
Active I~ish Neutrality' in Bill McSweeney (ed.), Ireland and the 
threat of Nuclear War, (Dublin, Dominican Publications, 1985). 
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